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In The Sociological Tradition, Robert A. Nisbet (1953; 1967) persuasively argued that the ‘unit-ideas’ of sociology were constituted by three philosophical traditions (conservatism, liberalism and radicalism) in response to the two revolutions of the modern world, the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. The most thought provoking aspect of Nisbet’s thesis was that the predominant issues and concerns of sociology, organised around the concepts of community, authority, status, the sacred and alienation, were derived from conservatism. And the point goes deeper than the character of sociology. For on this analysis, sociology is not just an analysis of capitalist modernity as a contrast to the world it had replaced, it is a disguised moral critique of the new world from the perspective of the eclipsed society. To explain this, Nisbet’s ‘unit-ideas’ of sociology are also core components of civilisation. Community, authority, status (identity, role, function), the sacred (religion, God and the church, morality) and alienation are constants which need to be clear, strong and stable for any civilisation to thrive and prosper. And that’s the point. Every single one of these constants are rendered problematic within capitalist modernity, for the reasons that Nisbet in The Sociological Tradition sets out. The importance of values, shared assumptions and a range of institutions and associations which guaranteed some form of social stability all throw the problem of order, loss of meaning and loss of community in the modern world in sharp relief. This is not nostalgia so much as a concern for the future of civilisation. Money is not a civilisation. Problematic on every ‘unit-idea’, capitalist modernity has no moral, cultural and institutional resources once the money runs out. 

In social theory this sense of despair was prominent in Weber's sociology of fate (Turner, 1981) because Weber said that the future would be a polar night of icy darkness; E. Troeltsch in 1896 proclaimed to a gathering of theologians at Eisenach 'gentlemen, everything is tottering' (Hughes, 1959).

The loss of moral certainty is a key feature of the modern crisis. Where once universal morality and shared values had provided the unity of social relations and personal experience, modernity is characterised by a polytheism of subjective values. Capitalist industrialization, the collapse of traditional communities, the spread of scientific knowledge and the increasing social differentiation all combine to displace morality from the supremacy it once had. Maybe people really do think they have become gods, so in thrall to their personal success, money, power and status. So much so that they do not feel the need for a morality, or pick and choose between them according to fashion and mood. In a world exhibiting a pluralism of values, it is difficult to commit oneself to a moral scheme of life. In The Division of Labour in Society Durkheim gave a theoretical account of the transformation of social structures by differentiation. The moral coherence of mechanical solidarity had given way to a more complex and uncertain world of organic solidarity in which the collective consciousness had become generally thin and dispersed through society. Durkheim had been confident that the world of organic solidarity would issue in a new social unity. By the time of The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life in 1912 and of the First World War, Durkheim was seeking possibilities for social unity in nationalist symbolism and social ritual. 

The collapse of moral and social unity results in a world characterized by relativism in ethics and a pervasive sense of uncertainty in politics. 

Weber described this world as polytheistic since the modern world was characterised by endless conflict between moral frameworks which was without resolution.

The collapse of genuine social relationships and their replacement by instrumental relations in which people become means to ends external to them involves the loss individual autonomy. With the loss of moral unity and social unity, the individual loses the micro-social connections which give meaning and identity to life and is instead subordinated to macro-social processes and institutions which systematically enclose and suffocate the individual in a world of bureaucratic dominance. The most famous theorist of this incarceration is Max Weber, who coined the term ‘iron cage’ to describe the increasing subordination of the individual to social bureaucratic relations. Some such notion is implicit in the process of civilisation, the imposition of the civil state upon the natural state, implying institutions which raise human beings above their ‘beastly’ nature and put them in touch with their ‘divine’ selves (Plato’s culture of virtue, Kant’s ‘culture of discipline). Rousseau saw social development as the negation of individual autonomy and moral coherence. Rousseau contrasted the autonomous savage in a state of nature with urban individuals in civil society who only know how to live in the opinion of others, which to Rousseau amounted to fashion and malicious gossip. Critical theory puts forward the idea that modern society is an administered world in which the isolated individual is subordinated to the overpowering logic of instrumental rationality. Adorno's conception of the modern world as 'the administered society' (Jay, 1984) bears some similarities to Foucault’s notion of the carceral society. Capitalist modernity produces individualism whilst undermining the conditions for individuality and instead locating the individual within the vast supra-individual forces of the division of labour, the dominance of the discipline, the spread of bureaucracy and the regulation of persons by the State. From this perspective, the mythology of the individual in liberal politics and economic theory serves to mask the fact that capitalism is a world in which the individual is progressively regulated and dominated by systemic and institutional forces which undermine privacy.

In fine, capitalist modernity is a world which lacks moral and social unity, which is governed by autonomy-denying structures, administrative rules and economic systems, where close social ties permitting the direct expression of feeling have been destroyed, and where wants have been packaged as false needs to rule individuals by desire within an artificial and superficial consumer culture. The result is a merging of Weberian bureaucracy and Foucaultian discipline to create a system of personal controls (O'Neill, 1986). 
 The classic statement of the transition from feudal society to capitalist society as a social way of life is Tonnies (Freund, 1979). Tonnies' regarded all forms of social life as representations of the will and his contrast between Gemeinschaft  and Gesellschaft is a contrast between organic will in community and reflective will in society respectively. For Tonnies, community is always a response to the needs of real, organic life whilst society is a form of social relationship based upon artificial and mechanical representations of reflective will. As Tonnies presented the contrast: ‘all intimate, private, and exclusive living together, so we discover, is understood as life in Gemeinschaft (community). Gesellschaft (society) is public life - it is the world itself. In Gemeinschaft (community) with one's family, one lives from birth on bound to it in weal and woe. One goes into Gesellschaft (society) as one goes into a strange country’ (Tonnies, 1955, p. 38).

Human beings are not at home in a world that they have themselves made. The natural and organic world of Gemeimchaft was undermined by the development of exchange relations and finally replaced by a market society in which the natural and local relationships between individuals was replaced by external economic interest. Whereas once relationships were natural and interior, they now became artificial and exterior. Gesellschaft replaced Gemeimchaft and the reflective world of public opinion, exchange, cosmopolitanism and class replaced the organic world of the village.

In The Philosophy of Money, Simmel examined the process by which modern society emerged as the result of an expanding money economy. Simmel's key idea is the ‘tragedy of culture’ as pertaining to a contradiction between the vibrant content of social interaction and the reified forms of money. The creative energies that human beings put into social relations come to be expressed in congealed and reified forms to produce a tragic contradiction between content and form. This culture is tragic precisely because all humanly constructed forms of life must gain an independence from their human creators. Human creation in the process of sociation takes reified form as expressed by money. ‘Money is the reification of the pure relationship between things as expressed in their economic motion ... the activity of exchange amongst individuals is represented by money in a concrete, independent, and as it were, congealed form, in the same sense as government represents the reciprocal self regulation of the members of a community, as the palladium or the ark of the covenant represents the cohesion of the group or the military order represents its self defence .. . This feature then assumes a structure of its own and the process of abstraction is brought to a conclusion when it crystallizes in a concrete formation’. (Simmel, 1978, p. 176).

This reification of exchange in money is just one part of a general process. Modern society as a whole is reified upon the basis of the money economy, the growing dominance of monetary exchanges and the spread of monetary ties. The dominance of money has three central components: the transition from barter to a complex monetary system; the prominence of impersonal social relations as symbolically expressed in abstract money; the extension of exchange as the expansion of personal freedom but also the subjection and subordination of the individual to bureaucratic control. 

Tragedy and fate are the dominant motifs of Weber’s sociology (Lowith 1982). Weber’s rationalization renders Simmel’s ‘tragedy of culture’ endemic and irrevocable within capitalist modernity (Brubaker 1984; Schluchter 1981). The paradox of rationalization as a disenchantment is that it frees human beings from magic and superstition but renders the world meaningless through its subordination to science. Science is not a morality and does not deliver meaning in itself. As the everyday world is filled up with scientific knowledge and practice, the world becomes devoid of values. Science is one the wrong side of the fact/value divide. It can answer the question ‘how’ but has nothing to say on the question ‘why’. Science can never tell human beings what they ought to do. Human beings are caught between the how and the why, subject to knowledge, disciplines and techniques that overload the former with means, but empty the latter of ends. The result is a bifurcation as individuals become objects of a struggle between unresolved and irreconcilable paradigms. 

What is most striking about Weber’s argument concerning disenchantment is the extent to which it savours of Genesis. Human beings have eaten from the Tree of Knowledge only to discover that their nakedness cannot be covered by science and its products. The pathos of means and ends in Weber is that the more we come to know, the less we come to understand. As a result, human beings are subject to a polytheism of competing value positions with no way of deciding between them. 
As Weber said in the famous 'science as a vocation': ‘the fate of our times is characterised by rationalisation and intellectualisation and, above all, by the 'disenchantment of the world'. Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from public life either into the transcendental real of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations (FW, p. 155).
With the collapse of the world of charismatic prophets, the social realm comes to be dominated by the objective, exterior regulating force of bureaucratic power and knowledge. A society of instrumental rationality is a society of means enlarged to the status of ends. Such a society denies the possibility of an ethic of ultimate ends. All that Weber can offer is the modest ethic of responsibility and the ‘polar night of icy darkness..’
There is no need to be shy of a ‘traditional’ morality and politics, for these are tried and tested by experience. Regardless of the debates over particular forms, there are certain constants in civilisation building. The institutions of the political and social order are firmly rooted in biological realities, realities which are embodied in a variety of way in different times and places but which overall indicate certain regularities and conditions of human well being. Without stable ties, loyalties and solidarities connecting each and all, extended sociality, reciprocal relations, human beings fail to learn the habits of association and co-operation. Whether one calls is Paideia with the ancient Greeks or Bildung with the Germans, this public mindedness is the basis of trust on which the economics and politics of a free society depend. Not only does self-interest not generate this trust, self-interest in itself generates a destructive cycle of reprisal in which each responds negatively to the self-interest of others. The result is a diminution in individual and collective freedom. 
A politics which determines public policy according to aggregates of individual votes and an economics which sees the market as the true democracy, with individuals using money as votes, places the focus firmly upon individual gain in the short term. Electoral politics and market economics generate outcomes which sacrifice the long term common good for short term individual gain. It is a politics and economics which systematically preclude the long term health and well being of all. And within its own terms, voting and consuming as private individuals, there is no resolution of the problem.
The challenge facing any renewal of politics lies in the unwillingness on the part of substantial numbers of people to defer short term gratification of wants and desires for the long term health and well being of families, neighbourhoods and communities. A ‘new politics’ succeeds or fails according to whether it can reinvest associational space with meaning and power. Back in 1987 The World Commission on Environment and Development headed by Gro Harlem Brundtland published Our Common Future, a book which argued for a marriage of economy and ecology to ensure the survival of the human race in the future. This responsibility belongs to us all. No politician or businessman holds our common future in their hands. An electoral politics which addresses individuals, atomises individuals, as voters and a free market which identifies individuals as consumers does not make individuals solicitous, law-abiding, honest, public-spirited or reliable. Nothing in this atomising experience encourages individuals to associate and extend civic and social engagement. The responsibility for reinvigorating public through revaluing associational space lies with the individuals composing civil society themselves.
The new politics is born the moment that individuals locate responsibility for change within themselves in relation to others, in the awareness that we can change ourselves and our behaviour at the same time as we change society, and in knowing that we are not alone.

NOSTALGIA
The argument presented here is quite often called ‘nostalgic’. The thesis that the modern world is nihilistic or meaningless is not new. Alasdair Maclntyre's After Virtue is an indictment of the moral failures of modernity, but has attracted criticisms for being nostalgic in its presentation and reactionary in its conclusions. Maclntyre seeks to salvage morality from within the wreckage of modernity by revaluing those residues of a lost past which survive in the modern world. The problems of the modern world, however, will not be solved by modes pertaining to the past. Hegel’s ‘high road’ of modernity and beyond is more socially and historically promising in the way it locates the ideal within the real. Hope, in other words, lies not in the past but in those lines of development and elements of social potential immanent in the present which point towards an alternative society in the future.

The crisis in moral philosophy reflects the deeper crisis of morality in a modern culture. The moral crisis is at the same time a crisis of reason. Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment shows how the emancipatory potential of reason has been realised as a repressive actuality. It is commonplace to refer to the end of the Enlightenment project and the collapse of reason. The most influential thinker in this respect is Nietzsche who, in the nineteenth century, declared that God was dead. This was no simple atheistic act of deicide. Nietzsche’s serious point was that the value system of traditional Christianity had been dissolved and the idea of a universal, objective morality could not be sustained within modernity. The death of God was and is a tragedy. It calls upon human beings to fill the gap and become gods by creatively living up to their powers. Instead, human powers in alien form have come to constitute a new absolutism. Human beings cannot supply their own ends but are lost in a disenchanted world of increasing rationalization. This rationalization relates to technique and the means to achieving social goals. However, the values which supply these goals are obscure.

For Marshall Berman 'to be modern is to find ourselves in an environment that promises us adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of our souls and the world - and, at the same time, that threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are' (Berman 1982, p. 15). The title of Berman’s great work is a quote from Karl Marx, 'all that is solid melts into air.' 
Modernity is characterised by a crisis of morality, knowledge, and reason, replacing the traditional moral framework of universal values with instrumental reason and technique, and finding that not only is endless material and technical expansion humanly unsatisfying but that it comes with a bill for world war, economic crisis, social instability, anomie, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ecological disaster. Hobsbawm titled his history of the twentieth century The Age of Extremes, greater standards of living and greater disasters and tragedies for greater numbers of people. The book could have been called The Age of Excess. Overscale towns and cities, states and corporations, wars and weapons, peoples’ wants and desires, waste. And most of all, it is the scale of the crisis now facing the human race that is most beyond our comprehension and control. 

No wonder that many look back in an attempt to regain the world we have lost rather than look forward to recover certain constants - community, moral certainty and meaning, reciprocity and solidarity in social relations – on a higher level in a feasible future. Nostalgia is an attempt to seek identity and meaning in traditional modes and institutions. It is a pain for home, homesickness in English, malodie du pays for the French. In the contemporary age, nostalgia is a reaction to the loss of social stability and community in a world of endless social change and disruption (Davis, 1974). Since modern individuals are not comfortable in their social roles and lack a social identity that connects them and their interests with others, they are no longer at home in the world. This is nostalgia as a painful sense of homelessness. ‘As we build, so shall we live’. The problem is that the building never ceases and the living never starts. Civilisation was founded upon a universal morality that commanded the common adherence of states, towns and communities. The death of God has rendered us homeless.

Without the overarching moral – and political – framework and the constitutive social ties to others, individuals are left utterly alone both in culture and in consciousness. The modern world is meaningless, nihilistic, and cannot long survive such loss of moral direction. There is a need to develop a new morality which is rooted in the prominence of our physical embodiment in the world as social, natural and rational beings. The collapse of traditional morality creates the opportunity to rethink reason and knowledge and identify the everyday lifeworld as the habitus for human embodiment, offering a context for anchoring rationalism and morality in practical life. The provides the springboard for embedding rationality in the lifeworld and everyday relations of individuals. The crisis of knowledge and reason is in part the failure of public institutions and vested interests but also stems from abstraction from embodied, lived human experience. The way that systemic power of economics dominates over the lifeworld of individuals, the abstract power of the state over society, and expertise over practical experience all points to a crisis of legitimacy which undermines the power and influence of reason and knowledge in the world. This paper, in short, attempts to bring reason back to its origins, namely homo sapiens, rational, reasoning man, through an exploration of association, friendship, fellowship (socius), by showing how cooperation and extended sociality increases social and cultural intelligence whereas individual competition diminishes human potential, by revaluing solidaristic exchange and reciprocity against the revenge of institutions and rationalism, by affirming the human being as a zoon politikon, by recovering public life as a politikon bion.


HUMAN SPECIES ENVIRONMENT AND CIVILISATION
The human species is the only species that adapts the environment to itself instead of adapting itself to the environment. My point is that in changing the environment, the human species changes its own nature in some way. In creating an alienated world, human beings become alienated from their own selves. An ecological politics is one which embodies the old Pythagorean commitment to the true, the good and the beautiful, making the world what the human being potentially is. As we build, so shall we live.

I met a traveller from an antique land Who said, 'Two vast and trunkless legs of stone stand in the desert. Near them on the sand, Half sunk, a shattered visage lies, whose frown  And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command, Tell that its sculptor well those passions read Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things, The hand that mocked them and the heart that fed. And on the pedestal these words appear: "My name is Ozymandias, king of kings: Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair!" Nothing beside remains. Round the decay Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare, The lone and level sands stretch far away.'

P. B. Shelley, Ozymandias.

There is nothing inevitable in history. There is nothing inevitable about the rise and fall of civilisations. There is nothing inevitable about civilisation as such. History books are the cemeteries of cities, cultures and civilisations, books of remembrance whose pride in their worldly deeds now look as pitiful as Ozymandias’ plaque, epitaphs to the folly of earthly success. Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece, Rome etc seemed impregnable in their day, but that day, like all days, is soon done. 

But civilisation has a tendency to bounce back. If there is no inevitability about the process there does seem to be a necessity grounded in something real and recurrent, nature, what it is for a living organism to flourish, human capacities linked to human curiosity. Further, human beings are capable of learning, continually modifying their behaviour to return to the task of building and rebuilding, only at ever higher levels of achievement. Human beings also have the ability to sense when things are going wrong, understand the causal processes and then to change behaviour. The nature of learning is the change in behaviour.

The human species is unique in not merely adapting to its environment but adapting the environment to itself. Human beings are animals capable of exercising foresight and deliberation. It is for this reason that nothing is inevitable in history, neither rise nor fall, neither survival nor collapse. The most important resource that human beings have in facing any environmental crisis is the clear awareness of that crisis and an appreciation that there is a moral imperative in crisis resolution. Human behaviour in adapting and adapting to the environment is not hard wired; it is malleable and can be altered as and when required. Transforming dysfunctional behaviour may be difficult but it is not impossible. This is what people in thriving cities, societies and civilisations do to prolong their existence. Those that don’t, fail. They don’t survive not because of some historical law concerning the inevitability of collapse but because people are too tired and lazy, too complacent, too cynical and hopelessness to deal with the crisis with transformative potential facing them. The real threat to any culture and civilisation lies in the inability to recognise when it is in trouble or a reluctance to respond to the danger signs. Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote well on this point:

Nations, like men, are teachable only in their youth; with age they become incorrigible. Once customs are established and prejudices rooted, reform is a dangerous and fruitless exercise; a people cannot bear to see its evils touched, even if only to be eradicated; it is like a stupid, pusillanimous invalid who trembles at the sight of a physician.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, 88-9.

Alasdair MacIntyre made the same point in the specific context of politics and morality. Human beings are in trouble and the main part of their predicament is that they do not know it. The point is capable of general application with respect to the environmental crisis. This is the basic claim of the book Requiem for a Species. 

‘Sometimes facing up to the truth is just too hard. When the facts are distressing it is easier to reframe or ignore them. Around the world only a few have truly faced up to the facts about global warming. Apart from the climate 'sceptics', most people do not disbelieve what the climate scientists have been saying about the calamities expected to befall us. But accepting intellectually is not the same as accepting emotionally the possibility that the world as we know it is heading for a horrible end. It's the same with our own deaths; we all 'accept' that we will die, but it is only when death is imminent that we confront the true meaning of our mortality’ (Hamilton 2010).

This is a challenge of politics, of institutions, of government, of public policy, of political leadership. It is not, as Hamilton states, the fault of climate scientists. The reported failures of scientists are as nothing compared to political failures, and in part have resulted from the need to make complicated issues simple enough for the world of politics. But the world of politics is the world of opinion and therein lies the problem. How can rationality prevail within that world is the problem. In writing in praise of the great scientist Andrei Sakharov, Harrison Salisbury writes that ‘with their finely tuned minds the physicists are able to penetrate more swiftly and more deeply the murk and bias with which human beings normally shroud their affairs’ (Sakharov Speaks 1974:9). The word ‘shroud’ is particularly apt in relation to Hamilton’s book Requiem for a Species. Scientists may well be able to penetrate the ‘murk and bias’ of politics, but there is a long list of scientists and philosophers and intellectuals who have been assassinated, executed, exiled and imprisoned ever since Socrates to show the difficulty of ruling human affairs with ‘clear and distinct ideas’. And this is why this paper does not deal with the science of ecology and focuses instead on the relation of knowledge and opinion, the old question of philosophy and politics. 

It is now four centuries since The Renaissance, three since the ‘Age of Reason’ and two since The Enlightenment. This is a golden age of science. Yet, ‘despite our pretensions to rationality, scientific facts are fighting against more powerful forces’ (Hamilton 2010). Hamilton refers to institutional factors such as ‘the power of industry, the rise of money politics and bureaucratic inertia’ and also psychological factors, ‘we have never really believed the dire warnings of the scientists’. The view of this paper is that the two go together. People and politics shape each other. Politics is what the people are. People will face realities that they have been psychologically prepared for by their institutions and public life. The argument presented in this paper seeks to build long term strategic thinking capacity into public institutions by a social and institutional matrix that enables individuals to access their highest reasoning and moral powers. As tall an order as this is, it may well be the condition of the survival of civilised human life as we know it.

There have been countless thousands of books, reports and articles over the past quarter of a century explaining just how great and growing the ecological crisis is and just how little time we have left to deal with it. The warnings have been largely ignored, too many being satisfied with too little. Hamilton writes about ‘the frailties of the human species, the perversity of our institutions and the psychological dispositions that have set us on a self-destructive path’ (Hamilton 2010). 

It is not just that human beings have a penchant for avoiding the facts, there are any number of powerful interest groups who distort the facts or make them up, knowing that there will be enough people willing to believe them. We can retell the Greek myth of hubris and nemesis, except that the consequences of pride’s fall in these circumstances are too great. Hamilton states the problem concisely:





It is Plato’s problem of how philosophy should and could rule. What political and institutional framework is required so that our capacity to reason translates into public policy? It is an old question, as old as Socrates and Plato, the Stoics and the Christian fathers. “‘Morality is the royal road to happiness …. because the highest and best part of human nature is reason and morality is life guided by reason. Since happiness comes when we fulfil the best that is in us, then it is the good life alone that will achieve it for us’ (John Jacques Plato’s Republic). So how can reason as the highest part of human nature triumph over the most basic forces of human nature – desire, wants, selfishness? This is the challenge before us and it is a political challenge rather than a scientific challenge. Plenty of articles have been written about what more scientists need to do to explain their findings and clarify the issues. They have done more than enough. This is a political, institutional and psychological failure, the inability of people and politicians to penetrate the murk and bias of the world where interests and opinions reign, a failure of nous and nerve.

The gap between what the science is showing to be necessary and what the political institutions are delivering is vast. Political and psychological failure feed each other here. For a couple of centuries, capitalism has fed the illusion that humanity has conquered nature and that nature only exists for humanity’s seemingly endless material benefit. Scientific evidence and argument that not only is humanity part of nature but that nature is hitting back hard is not just a technical and institutional crisis but, for a species seduced by technical and material power, an existential crisis. Hamilton writes as though it is all over, writing contemptuously of ‘the politicians, business executives and climate sceptics who are largely responsible for delaying action against global warming until it became too late’. 

Hamilton seems to have anticipated the suggestion that this pessimistic assessment is a deliberate strategy to finally inspire effort. He writes that until recently ‘anyone predicting the end of modern civilisation was arguably guilty of exaggerating the known risks because the prevailing warming projections indicated there was a good chance that early action could prevent dangerous climate change. But in the last few years scientists' predictions about climate change have become much more certain and much more alarming, with bigger and irreversible changes now expected sooner. After a decade of little real action, even with a very optimistic assessment of the likelihood of the world taking the necessary action and in the absence of so-called unknown unknowns, catastrophic climate change is now virtually certain’.

‘In these circumstances refusing to accept that we face a very unpleasant future becomes perverse. Denial requires a wilful misreading of the science, a romantic view of the ability of political institutions to respond, or faith in divine intervention. Climate Pollyannas adopt the same tactic as doom-mongers, but in reverse: instead of taking a very small risk of disaster and exaggerating it, they take a very high risk of disaster and minimise it.’

So why continue? It is said that anyone who writes a book is an optimist, otherwise why spend so much time putting arguments and offering evidence that will have no effect?

Human society and civilisation is in crisis. There is nothing new in that. That is the nature of the beast. Crises are as much opportunities as threats. But either way, there is a need for a change in behaviour, a willingness to treat society as a learning mechanism and incorporate new information into social practice. 
From the perspective of MacIntyre’s argument, the environmental crisis is part of a general crisis in the political life and moral culture of modernity. MacIntyre puts it this way: If all the scientific knowledge, all the terms and concepts and laws of science that we know, should disappear overnight, people would struggle to function in their societies and would barely be able to recognise their own world. That, MacIntyre argues, is the situation with respect to morality. 
This is the situation facing us. Moral language has collapsed, public discourse has been impoverished, the public realm is in retreat, and notions of the common good have unravelled in the face of the egoistic assertion of liberty and rights. Liberty and rights are not in themselves emancipatory but, as Marx argued long ago, could be expressions of an atomistic, legalistic and commercial society in which social relations separate individuals from each other and hold them in antagonistic relation. For this reason, Marx opposed the solidary notion of human emancipation which treated human beings as citizens against the individualistic notion of political emancipation which conceived human beings as bourgeois.

Liberty and rights in the egoistic sense do not constitute a public life but, on the contrary, subvert it, undermining many ties and institutions and traditions which, in connecting human beings together and hence widening the scope of human experience, are essential to our humanity. 









The reaction against green ideas and politics is a product of both the success of the environmental movement and its failure. The more Green ideas and issues become a matter of public concern, and are translated into practical effect and public policy, the more the reaction against the ethics and the science of ecology will find a ‘popular’ audience. The resistance to change fits easily with the anti-interventionist, deregulationist politics of neo-liberal ‘free’ marketers. The reaction is to be expected. Having come this far, it is most important not to lose nerve. As Gandhi wrote, first they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight and then you win. It is a time for cool heads and a continued commitment to the ethical imperative and to scientific reason. The paradigm shift that ecological politics is effecting all over the world will continue and will offer an alternative to neo-liberal globalisation.

The lessons learnt from the emails fiasco at East Anglia, as well as the way that certain mistakes are reported in certain sections of the press, is that the reaction against environmentalism the world over is a measure of how far the movement has come and how close it is to effecting a real global transformation. The very successes of environmentalism marks environmentalists out as a threat to vested interests and power elites in politics and business. The more successful environmentalism becomes, the more it will be targeted as a threat, the greater the reaction will be. There is a need to anticipate this reaction and be prepared for it, organisationally and psychologically. Failure to do so means, paradoxically enough, that as the resource wars that many ecologists have long warned of break out, the more politics retreats from possible alternative futures to the old issues of control and scarcity and necessity. As more and more people fight over less and less resources, the margin for an alternative politics will be diminished. There are already conflicts over fish stocks, wood supplies, water, metals, minerals, energy, oil and cars. As these conflicts intensify, a politics of fear and necessity will replace a politics of hope and possibility. So, a green politics needs to be proactive rather than reactive.

The reaction against Green ideas and politics and against climate science has to be seen in a positive light. To the Delphic inscription ‘know thyself’ can be added ‘know thy enemy’. By learning the right lessons, the environmental movement can embark on the next stage with a much better self-awareness and a greater clarity in terms of means and ends and their interpenetration. The reaction must force the environmental movement as a whole, from the science to the politics, to reevaluate itself and understand that it will not be allowed to propagate its politics and ideas unchallenged by those who have money and power invested in the status quo.

In the long run, truth will out. But, as Keynes said, in the long run we are all dead. We need a vision of a viable ecological social order, the outlines of a polity and an economy that functions and commands support and consent. In The Economics of a Feasible Socialism, the economist Alec Nove defined ‘feasible’ in terms of being realisable within a generation or two. Ideas detached from realities and detached from possibilities function well as regulative ideals but too easily set impossibly high standards. Politics need not drift away into a fantasy world. N Scott Arnold, in Marx’s Radical Critique, employs what he calls the ‘alternative institutions requirement’ as a technical threshold which all radical critics must meet in demanding social and political change. A viable model of a social and political order must be proposed which, in the least, does not suffer the defects of the social order being criticised and replaced.

An encouraging line of argument comes from Keynes himself. The world, ultimately, is shaped more by ideas than by interests. 





The ‘gradual encroachment of ideas’ is the key line. It is important to hold, at all times, what Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza called ‘clear and distinct ideas’. Retain that commitment to knowledge, and the world of prejudice and interest and error and opinion will fall away.

Back in 1991, in the aftermath of the fall of what was once called ‘actually existing socialism’, Jurgen Habermas lamented the absence of 'constructive models' within marxism (Habermas 1991; Habermas in MacGregor 1998:143). For Habermas this meant that the philosophical foundations of marxism needed to be reworked. At this stage, the ethical and scientific and organisational foundations of the ecology ‘movement’ – is there one? – need not so much to be reworked as clarified and made coherent. The reaction against the science of climate change showed the extent to which the ideas and politics of ecology are exposed and not strongly rooted. And this shows the danger of a concentration upon the politics of parties, state institutions and elections. This treats people as individuals as voters, as taxpayers, not as active citizens participating in the constitutive, creative praxis that alone brings about the ecological society of the future.

TASKS FACING THE GREENS
Anyone involved in environmentalism, from the scientists to the public officials to members of The Green Party itself must also face up to some painful realities. It is easy to get absorbed in the politics and the ideology of ecology as a movement when becoming increasingly distanced from the ethics and the science of ecology, indeed from the people who are supposed to be running the future eco-communities and eco-cities. Change, real change, is more than institutional, it is cultural, social and psychological and moral. It is a self-change on the part of the people. At some point, people need to be addressed as more than voters and taxpayers, at a level beyond the politics of opinion, prejudice, party division. Absorbed in this ‘old’ politics, many ‘Greens’ come to be corrupted by the very system that they claimed to be changing.

 To prepare for the next stage, there is a need to address three clear areas.
1.	The Green Party has to either recover, rediscover or renew its roots in ecology as a science and as an organic principle of practice.
2.	The Green Party has to broaden out to work closely with other groups. This is more than working with other political parties. A coalition politics is the future and The Green Party should be prepared to cooperate on issues of common concern. The point is broader and deeper than this and looks to ground politics at the institutional and policy making level in the communal and associational space of civil society.
3.	The Green Party needs to connect criticism of the status quo with a vision of an alternative, feasible future society, putting forward solutions to every problem identified. As problems mount up, there is a danger of fatigue and exhaustion as people are overcome with a sense of hopelessness and despair. The Green Party needs to attract people with a positive alternative coherent vision of the future ecological society, showing how people have a role in bringing that vision about.
 
The Green Party must rediscover its roots, and continually reinvigorate itself from these roots in the wider scientific and social community, because that is where the strength and the ideas will come from and that, ultimately, is where they will be brought into effect. Many people argue that the future of the environmental movement lies not with those practising politics within the institutional level of the nation state, but in the activist movements outside the sphere of ‘official’ politics. If one defines ‘public life’ in the Hellenic sense of Aristotle’s Politics, as politikon bion, as the shared sphere of human reciprocity, solidarity and interaction, then there is a way of keeping both wings together, channelling the energies of activism into practical effect as public policy on a global scale. Certainly, all of the Green parties of the world need always to be reanalysing their agenda so as to ensure that means and ends complement rather than contradict each other. 

Failure to involve sufficient numbers of people in the politics of transformation risks a politics that is hollowed out, easily falling prey to vested interests through lack of popular support and social power and structural capacity.
The most successful Green parties achieve some leverage in public office but only at the expense of losing viable ‘Green’ political ideas that are distinctive and can restructure power by appealing to the people. The price of electoral success is to render Green politics anodyne, diluted, silent on real problems: the global power and reach of the transnational corporations wield over our production, investment, employment, quality of life, mass media, elections, legislature, law etc.
The reaction against climate change science will hopefully make ecologists and environmentalists both inside politics and outside more aware of the forces which are working to block change. Many scientists seemed genuinely surprised by the strength of the reaction and by the biased nature of the media coverage. Honest scientific mistakes were misreported to portray scientists as politically motivated. The solution is not to have scientists entering the lists and putting deniers in their place, as the likes of Prof Brian Cox and Prince Charles have urged. This is indeed to reduce the science to politics, something which has the paradoxical result of dignifying scientific illiterates and ignoramuses with a voice they do not merit. The scientific case remains solid and it has achieved this position by keeping out of the political bear pit. 
But the whole furore did show how fragile the hold of ecological ideas and practices is in wider society. Polarising the debate into the simplistic contours of black and white, it was remarkable how many people were receptive to the message of the deniers. That is the real worry for The Green Party.
This argument will not be won by science and scientists alone, and maybe not even mainly by science. Citing scientists and scientific evidence will not suffice. Those open to such persuasion will already tend towards Green politics in the first place. Green politics needs to be informed by ecological science but it cannot use the science as a substitute politics and ethics. 

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF GREEN SOCIAL THEORY
Perhaps the best place to start is with a statement of the basic principles of green social theory. It is these principles that one would expect a Green Party to express and embody in some way.

Affirming the unity of social and environmental justice as part of the process of abolishing the separation between 'society' and 'environment'. This involves extending environment from the natural world to the human, built environment, the world of human praxis.

	Conceiving human beings as a species of natural being, with particular species-specific needs and characteristics.
	Valuing of the biological embodiedness and ecological embeddedness of human beings and human society.
	Working within natural limits, internal and external, both with respect to the particular needs and dependent character of 'human nature' and to the fact that natural resources are finite.
	Goes beyond the rejection of 'economic growth' to connect this growth with the systemic process of capital accumulation underlying notions of 'development', 'modernisation' and progress.
	Considers the treatment of the environment to be a moral issue, and not merely or simply a 'technical' or 'economic' one. This embraces claims that the nonhuman world has intrinsic value and the idea of animal rights.
	That an ecological sustainable world is about living rather than development and involves prescriptive aspects in terms of restructuring social, economic and political institutions.
	Affirms an ecological interconnectedness and interdependence which transcends national boundaries, as expressed in the slogan 'Act locally, think globally'.
	Expands the time-frame to include concern for future generations. This futurity makes sense of the slogan ‘neither left nor right but in front’. Or forwards. Or in future.
	Is critical of the use and manipulation of scientific knowledge on the basis of a firm commitment to science. Green principles are based on ecology as a science, but also incorporates discoveries in other natural sciences such as biology and physics.
	Possesses a spiritual dimension connecting each and all forms of life in an interdependent whole.

GREEN PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Let us take a closer look at some of the old Green slogans:
‘neither left nor right but in front’
‘new politics’
‘the anti-party party’
‘act locally, think globally’

These slogans, dating back to the first successes of Der Grunen, have been challenged, criticised, rejected and reworked on account of their supposed political naivety. They suggest a social movement of activists innocent of politics, capable of opposing public policy but incapable of framing one.

In examining The Green Party and green politics, the assumption is that there is a commitment to properly political action, an engagement in the political terrain of the existing public domain. This may seem obvious but is not so. There is a very strong strand of radical opinion, both left and right which, in repudiating existing politics as practised, ‘big government’, ‘reformism’, actually lacks any politics beyond slogans and stances. The politics of protest, betrayal and defeat seems a permanent condition for those congenitally incapable of appreciating that revolution is a process not of destruction and rejection but of construction and affirmation. So the argument begins by spelling out what political action and organisation entails.

A naively apolitical or an anti-political stance are display a certain institutional pessimism. That is, upholding some Edenic world free of power and corruption, they reject the optimistic idea the development of governing institutions within a viable public life creates ever-widening possibilities for human self-actualisation, individually and collectively. Whether one writes of ‘counter-publics’ or a counter-culture, this radicalism disables itself in that it can propose no way of embodying its protest. In seeing institutional thinking and institution building as an obstacle in the way of the development of the human potential, such apolitical and anti-political thinking can reject a given order but cannot build an alternative. Instead, it is locked in a permanent protest, continually fighting an oppression that is assumed to be an artefact and hence by definition corrupt and corrupting. This politics of permanent protest invites irrelevance and defeat. For many years, The Green Party gained some mileage out of the slogans ‘new politics’ and the ‘anti-party party’. Politics is politics and a party is a party, however different from the parties and politics of others. The argument in this paper affirms an explicitly political position and as such expresses a strong interest in institution building. This presumes that the green politics of The Green Party is more than pressure, protest and publicity and envisages the structures and forms of a feasible Green polity, comprising government and economy. That is, there is a long term objective that orients political action. 

Despite the often extreme rhetoric of the anti-political radicals, the protest is permanent precisely because of political innocence. No viable institutional alternative is proposed and no means or agency of transition to a future state is envisaged. There is a vague belief that existing institutions survive only because those subject to them have yet to appreciate their corrupt and iniquitous nature. Expose that nature and the people withdraw their consent. There is truth in the view that all institutions rest to a large extent upon the acquiescence by the people who are subject to them. Tacit or otherwise, government proceeds with the consent of the governed. It follows from this that can emancipate themselves from the repressive tentacles of iniquitous institutions by withdrawing their consent and rejecting their assumptions. Then what?

From the start, an argument which concerns serious politics, politics as building and governing a viable social order – one that actually works – should insist on strict criteria.

The first is what may be called the ‘alternative institutions requirement’.

Since the radical critic argues that the problems of the social order are rooted in the workings of its basic institutions, it follows that solution to these problems is possible by abolishing existing institutions. Marx’s notion of abolition as Aufhebung gives a sophisticated angle on this question of problem resolution, involving as it does preserving and raising up to a higher level possibilities immanent in the existing order. In other words, the radical has material to work with in that any possible future exists already in the present as potentiality.
A radical critique should be able to give an account of the alternative institutions that will replace or should replace existing institutions. Further, a radical critique should have to explain why these institutions do not exhibit the same systemic problems as the institutions of existing society and which motivated the critique in the first place. 

As N Scott Arnold argues the point: ‘The radical critic needs to specify a set of alternative social institu​tions that he believes should and/or will replace the existing ones. This specification must meet the following conditions:

a.	These institutions meet the conditions for a good or just society insofar as the latter are specified by the theory or partial theory called for in (ii). Or, more weakly, it must be shown that these alternative institutions at least do not have the problems that face existing institutions identified in (i). 
b.	A plausible description/explanation of how the institutions will function can be given. 
c.	These institutions can persist as stable social forms. Or, more weakly, there is some reason lo believe that they are stable.
Let us call this the Alternative Institutions requirement. (Arnold 1991 ch 1). 

Existing institutions may well have all of the problems identified by critics. But a viable social order, one that functions, is no mean feat and is not to be transformed without clear thinking about a viable alternative. Wishful thinking is a menace in politics. Problems denied at the ideological level have a habit of returning in an even more repressive reality.

Which brings the argument to a second requirement, any alternative proposed must be ‘feasible’. 
Alec Nove in The Economics of Feasible Socialism sought to bring socialism out of the clouds – and divisions – of political utopia and into practical reality. His definition of ‘feasible’ is useful in concentrating minds and getting them to focus on what can be achieved in the short to medium range. It is the easiest thing in the world to evade present realities by means of thought. In the end, though, escaping into a future to come is no less a political cheat than invoking the lost Edenic paradise. The human race can never go back, but it can go forwards. But only if it builds that future.

‘The word 'socialism' is apt to produce strong feelings, of enthusiasm, cynicism, hostility. It is the road to a future just society, or to serfdom. It is the next stage of an ineluctable historical process, or a tragic aberration, a cul-de-sac, into which the deluded masses are drawn by power-hungry agitator-intellectuals… Let me make it clear that my object is not propagandist, in either direction. It is to explore what could be a workable, feasible sort of socialism, which might be achieved within the lifetime of a child already conceived (Nove 1983 Preface).

Noting that the basic assumptions of liberal capitalism are ceasing to be true, Nove made the not unreasonable point that a definition of a socialism that is feasible is required, a socialism that could work with reasonable effectiveness (since a socialism that does not function can be of little help to anyone). (Nove 1983 ch 1). 

These issues are ones of practicalities. Real society functions according to real institutions and practices - marriage, law, the economy, the state are not merely good or bad ideas to be changed by thinking differently. A counter-culture can destroy but to survive and thrive it will need to construct around certain constants present in every civilisation. 

 Although the stated objective of many radical critics is to create a 'revolutionary' counterculture capable of bringing down an existing order, in crucial respects this is a protest rather than a serious politics. Indeed, the ritual of protesting against existing power is a tacit acknowledgement of its inability to properly contest with that power. Instead of presenting itself as an alternative to existing institutions, critics present demands to power in the hope or expectation that these supposedly corrupt and iniquitous institutions of the current social order will change course. The institutional pessimism feeds into the politics of protest, with critics marching and protesting but unable to replace the power they oppose. Lacking politics, lacking institutional awareness, the critics are enclosed within a tacit acceptance of the alienation they protest, rehearsing their defeat and disillusion as they march and demand. 

And in defeat, innocence is preserved. There are too many vested interests to allow universal principles to prevail. Particular interests have captured the public realm, a damning indictment that confirms the rejection of politics and confines critics within the cul-de-sac of lost hope. The claims may well be true, but leave the question of how public life and policy is to be constituted begging. This means wrestling with power and interests for the definition and scope of the public realm and the public good. It means politics. A purist scenario which seeks to preserve universal principles and aspirations from the dangers and seductions of politics has simply departed the public arena, abandoned the struggle. To engage in politics is to accept and be aware of the ever present threat that universal principles and aspirations are always open to incorporation by the state as another special interest. There are plenty who see Green politics as the green wing of the very techno-urban industrial system driving ecological destruction. Rather than merely lament the continuing inability to transcend a given social order, abandoning the possibility, know what politics is, understand that there is something frustrating and even deeply alienating about a practice that requires participants to compromise the ideals for which they fight, avoid debilitating disillusion by not having any illusions about politics in the first place. That’s the nature of the beast and there is no going round it. 

Institutional pessimism comes with the corollary of expectation of the inevitable defeat of radicalism as an inescapable consequence of avoiding both incorporation and assimilation. Fighting the status quo on its own terrain and radicals change themselves rather than the world. 

These are the main scenarios of protest and defeat within radical discourse and they amount to a political innocence as the price of avoiding incorporation and assimilation. The trick is to engage in politics in order to make progress towards the realisation of universal principles and this is accomplished by broadening the base and tapping into the human roots below that feed politics above. Keeping politics grounded means basing action and organisation on a renewed capacity for associational solidarity. A movement that self-consciously keeps its moral integrity by keeping apart from politics abandoned all pretence of building lasting institutions, at best offering a short-term outlet for the expression of social frustrations and at worst seeking solace in utopian hopes. Neither approach offers an institutional alternative. Rejecting institutions as such as necessarily corrupting makes it impossible to envisage any scenario in which power and principle can be embodied. In such a way, radical politics collapses into an inveterate conservatism. 

It is time to abandon the mythologies of an anti-political politics and escape the nihilistic cycle of protest and defeat which is forever swinging between hope and betrayal until its powerlessness resolves itself in cynicism and despair.
Here, Hegel the conservative takes his revenge against the left-Hegelian radicals. In The Philosophy of Right, in his conception of the system of the ethical life or Sittlichkeit, in the idea of the corporation as a form of functional representation, Hegel engaged in precisely the kind of institution building which alone gives expression to the universal idea. There is a need to recognise that ‘new politics’ is a politics and that to be ‘anti-party’ is not to be an ‘anti-politics’ and is not to be against political organisation as such. Otherwise, a supposedly radical position is merely protest in anticipation of defeat, a politics of subjectivity with no place to go beyond its own subjectivism. This institutional naivety and political innocence is the pathology of leftist thought, a permanent protest rather than a serious politics, inviting defeat. 

 In focusing on the importance of institution building the intention to outline the framework for the embodiment and expression of self-realization, not to deny it. This explicitly contests the view that institutional mediation renders self-realisation impossible, conceiving institutions as a means of enhancing self-realization rather than inhibiting it. Repudiating institutions as such as necessarily corrupting, the politics of subjectivity necessarily implies a return to unmediated experience, individuals apparently independent, all pure ego outside of institutional frameworks. The argument back follows Aristotle’s recognition that the human individual is a zoon politkon, a social animal that achieves self-realisation only in relation, organised relation, to other individuals in an organised public life, a public life that involves overarching connections, reciprocal relations, morality and institutions of government, law, custom etc. Human beings achieve freedom within that context. Outside of that context there is nothing but atomistic individuals cancelling each others projects. Life is nasty, brutish and short.

Failure to engage in political alternatives means that radicalism very easily slides over into its conservatism, from a complete repudiation of existing institutions to an acquiescence in a current alienation. Rejecting the world of politics as a corruption of universal principle but unable to propose an alternative out of a rejection of institutions as an alienating mediation, the radical continues to live within it. The politics of radical rejection and the politics of ultimate reconciliation are actually flip sides of the same coin. The radical rejects politics and institutions as corrupt but the rejected world carries on regardless. 

The end of political innocence requires that universal principle be considered a Kantian regulative ideal motivating action or an Hegelian ideal that one can identify within real immanent potentialities. The progressive unfolding of this idea requires political engagement and action, a changed world. A mature approach abandons the politics of protest and defeat, hope and betrayal, rejection and reconciliation that ties thought and action to the existing order. A genuinely transformative politics is grounded in the forces and agencies through which the social world is changing itself. As Marx tried to make clear, real revolutionary change has to proceed from within the world that was being transformed. ‘Men make their own history, but not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen.’ (Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire).

 In criticising institutions as an alienating objectification, radicals fail to distinguish legitimate criticism of the way that specific institutions no longer operate as they once did or ought to do from a general criticism. The result is that specific deficiencies are turned into deficiencies of institutions as such, replacing an alienating objectification with an equally alienating subjectification. Cf. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness.  

Having established the legitimacy of politics and the necessity of institution building, the discussion can now make sense of The Green Party as the ‘anti-party party’ proposing a ‘new politics’. Those who still reject politics and institutions as a corrupt world in which self-realisation is blocked by mediation need read no further. The argument proposes the necessity of institutional mediation as a condition of human self-realisation and examines the basis of a green politics worthy of the names ‘green’ and ‘politics’.

NEITHER LEFT NOR RIGHT BUT FORWARDS
The appeal of a Green ‘new politics’ in a negative sense is not difficult to understand. Most western liberal democracies are marked by a growing popular frustration with and even rejection of party political, electoral politics. Either side of the ‘debate’ inflate the most marginal of differences to give the impression of real alternatives whereas in fact people view the parties as being all the same. The established political parties in every nation employ tricks and techniques derived from advertisement campaigns to win popular support by exploiting the innate human desire for the good life, selling ineffectual, outdated old-paradigm solutions to contemporary problems in the name of the better society. Against this ‘consumer democracy’, the marketing of snake oil, all empty rhetoric and short term fixes, the promise of the Greens to introduce new-paradigm thinking into electoral politics makes them a breath of fresh air. The question is can they deliver on this promise and deliver a genuine rejuvenation of politics that encompasses a long-term vision of sustainability and the quality of life within a viable and coherent programme.

The Greens have been accused of attempting the real cause of social and economic problems in a transnational corporate capitalism and its global dynamic of private accumulation. ‘Industrialism’ is a euphemism that neutralises the political implications of the more precise ‘capitalism’. But there is more to the ‘neither left nor right’ claim than evasion. The first law of ecology is the law of integrated systems, a law which calls for interactive cooperation from all parts within the whole. What matters here is that these parts possess an emancipatory interest and functional capacity to go forwards and constitute the future social order. The traditional left-right divide has become a stalemate that serves to trap thought and action within old and stale grooves. With history comes a lot of scores to be settled. Past battles continue to be fought, blocking the creative and innovative thought, action and organisation that serves to build the future within  a sustainable framework incorporating holistic insights and ecological imperatives. That is the ‘new’ and ‘in front’ or forwards aspect of Green politics, seeking to transcend established divisions by emphasis upon building a sound framework of sustainable living.

‘Neither left nor right’ is also open to the accusation of evasiveness in another sense, failing to distinguish between social groups and classes to discern those concerned to preserve the status quo and those concerned with social transformation. Of course, ecology is a universal interest that embraces all life forms and should have a general appeal to all humankind. But, as Marx long ago recognised, whilst all ought to have an interest in human emancipation in general, there are dominant sections of every society who are comfortable in their alienation. Not all social interests, classes, groups and forces possess emancipatory potential. motivation and capacity, however much a universal ethic applies to all.

The classic statement of rising and falling classes, revolutionary and conservative classes, is Marx in The Manifesto of the Communist Party.

‘Hitherto, every form of society has been based … on the antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes. But in order to oppress a class, certain conditions must be assured to it under which it can, at least, continue its slavish existence. The serf, in the period of serfdom, raised himself to membership in the commune, just as the petty bourgeois, under the yoke of feudal absolutism, managed to develop into a bourgeois. The modern labourer, on the contrary, instead of rising with the progress of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class. He becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops more rapidly than population and wealth. And here it becomes evident that the bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the ruling class in society, and to impose its conditions of existence upon society as an overriding law. It is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him. Society can no longer live under this bourgeoisie, in other words, its existence is no longer compatible with society. 
The essential condition for the existence, and for the sway of the bourgeois class, is the formation and augmentation of capital; the condition for capital is wage labour. Wage labour rests exclusively on competition between the labourers. The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the labourers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association. The development of modern industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable. 

Marx MCP Rev1848 1973

 Adam Schaff defines alienation as 'such a relation between a human agent and the product of his activity in which that product, having acquired a socially objective existence and being situated in a given social system, functions not only autonomously (i.e., independently of the intentions of his maker) but, under specified conditions, even against the wishes and intentions of his maker, and sometimes endangers his interests or his very existence' (Adam Schaff, 'Alienation as a Social and Philosophical Problem', Social Praxis (1975) Vol.III p. 11).

There is a need to distinguish alienation in this critical sense from Durkheim’s notion of anomie.  'Anomie concentrates on barriers to the orderly functioning of society; alienation on barriers to the productive growth of individuals' (John Horton, 'The Dehumanization of Anomie and Alienation: A Problem in the Ideology of Sociology', British journal of Sociology, Vol.XV (1964): (p.286).

As Gajo Petrovic argues (Dictionary of Marxist Thought (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983 Tom Bottomore, Ed.), alienation from oneself should be regarded not so much as alienation from a factual or normative sense of human nature but as 'alienation from historically created human possibilities, especially from the human capacity for freedom and creativity" (Petrovic in Bottomore ed 1983:13).

This begs the question of social agency, which classes and groups are instrumental in the creation of this historically engendered social alienation and which classes and groups possess the structural capacity to fully realise the human potential for freedom and creativity.
For Adam Schaff, class is the most basic unit in a class-divided society. An individual may transcend his or her class, but not class society and class division altogether. Class society must therefore be studied from a class perspective. Just as Marx argued that there is a class comfortable in the general alienation and a class with ‘radical chains’ – the proletariat – so Schaff argues that there are two major classes, the 'rising' revolutionary class and the 'falling' conservative class. A universal ethic – human emancipation in general, the ecology of sustainable living – may appeal to individuals in the ‘falling’ conservative class, but not to that class as a class. Indeed, as the objective trends in society continue to go against the latter, it has a vested interest in (consciously or unconsciously) denying their existence, misinterpreting their ideas, concealing unpleasant truths, impugning motives etc. The knowledge any emergent movement for social and political change offers is systematically corrupted by 'conservative deformations'. The misrepresentation of the science of ecology, of climate change and global warming, the impugning of the motivations of those involved, the denigration of the science as not real science but politics, has all the classic traits of ‘conservative deformation’. 

In Hard Times, the economist Bob Sutcliffe wrote of the difficulties which lead capitalist leaders to espouse militantly reactionary ideologies and policies on many questions to escape the revolutionary implications of class struggle. ‘Militarism, patriotism, racism and sexism are all in this way growing like maggots in the rotting flesh of capitalism’. That was written back in 1983. Now we can add climate change denial (in no way do these characters merit the honourable title of sceptic  - any scientist worthy of the name is a sceptic following an argument according to empirical, rational and logical control). The likes of Prince Charles and Brian Cox have called upon scientists to continually rebut every piece of nonsense and misinformation churned out by deniers. There are dangers here. Apart from dragging scientists away from serious work, it also risks being drawn into a war of attrition which exhausts energies. It also risks the loss of arguably the greatest asset, the science itself, by the appearance of having a political agenda. It also risks dignifying the deniers with a voice in the debate – for reasons of balance – which their ‘science’ does not merit. It takes the fight onto the ugly, decaying, maggot infested terrain of the declining class.

The ‘rising’ class has nothing to fear from social change, and is therefore free from these deformations and delusions. Indeed, since its material and other interests are promoted by social transformation, it has every reason to engage in an objective and rigorous investigation of society. In Marxist terms, the working class have the epistemological insight and structural capacity to see through and break through capitalist relations. As Schaff puts the point, 'If you wish to attain objective truth ... then consciously adopt class and party positions which are in accord with the interests of the proletariat' (Adam  Schaft, History and Truth (Pergamon Press, London, 1976),p. 246; see also pp. 234ff). 

More generally, the ‘rising’ class is cognitively enabled and materially equipped to constitute the new social order. The ‘ascending’ point of view offers the fullest and richest perspective on existing society and represents the cognitively optimum position.
There is an epistemological inequality between the ‘rising’ and the ‘falling’ class, the former being epistemologically privileged and 'higher' in that its standpoint is capable of yielding the truth. Lucio Colletti points to 'two realities' within capitalism, the one that appears on the surface and one that lies deeper (Lucio Colletti, 'Marxism: Science or Revolution?' in Robin Blackburn(ed.) Ideology in Social Science (Fontana, London, 1972), pp. 375ff). The capitalist perspective sees only the  surface. The capitalist buys labour just as he buys raw material, and is incapable of seeing the profound difference between the two. And the wage relation seems fair to the capitalist since the worker is not forced to sell his labour. The reality of exploitation is only perceived from the proletarian point of view. The worker knows that the sale of labour is not a matter of free choice, and knows that more value is produced than is returned in wages, that therefore labour sustains capitalism. The exploitative character of capitalism is therefore visible from the point of view of the worker but not from the point of view of the capitalist. Colletti therefore concludes that Marxism 'is the analysis of reality from the view point of the working class'.
A brief and general sketch like this cannot do justice to the complexity of this issue, whether or not Marxism privileges one class at the expense of other social groups and interests, the anti-democratic implications of notions epistemological and structural capacity. The concern is a limited one, to distil a general line of emancipatory interest and intent within a given society and identify the grounds upon which any social futurity is based.

A class understanding relates conflicts within society and between interests and groups to materially available directions of development rather than just to general ideas or to humanity in general. ‘Neither left nor right’ can be interpreted to mean everything and nothing and thus lacks a critical, cutting edge able to withstand contact with the interstices of class society. Class in Marx’s usage is employed to determine which groups possess material futurity and structural capacity to remake society in their own emancipatory interest. Where, one needs to ask, are the clusters of alternative society-making potential?

To refer to clusters in the plural rather than class in the particular is to acknowledge that there is something awry in the old Marxist nostrums. This was what Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy was all about. For some time now it has been apparent that socialism has lost the historical guarantees it once claimed and that the socialist future is not written into the historical process as an objective necessity. As EP Thompson wrote, 'The project of Socialism is guaranteed BY NOTHING -certainly not by "Science", or by "Marxism—Leninism" — but can find its own guarantees only by reason and through and upon choice of values. . . . And it is here that the silence of Marx and most Marxisms is so loud as to be deafening" (E. P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory, London, Merlin, 1978, p. 362).

'The various mechanisms on which Marxists, more or less loosely basing themselves on Marx's analysis, have relied for the replacement of capitalism by socialism are not working: neither in the developed countries, nor in most of the "third world" - itself a concept whose looseness is now obvious…Capitalist society is at present in global crisis, but few can believe that its probable, or even in the short term, its possible, outcome in any country will be socialism. On what then, other than blind will or an act of faith in historical inevitability, are we to base our hopes? But Marxists have never been blind voluntarists, nor have they ever based themselves on historical inevitability or philosophical generalisation in the abstract. They have always sought to identify specific conjunctures and situations, which would dig capitalism's grave' (E. J. Hobsbawm, 'Some Reflections on The Break-up of Britain', New Left Review, 105, Sept./Oct. 1977, pp. 15-16. S. Rowbotham, 'The Women's Movement and Organising for Socialism', in Beyond the Fragments, London, Merlin, 1980, p. 48.)

Well, the gravediggers were supposed to be the proletariat. Barrington Moore wrote something pertinent in this respect:

The chief basis of radicalism (in modernizing countries) has been the peasants and the smaller artisans in the towns. .. .the wellsprings of human freedom lie not where Marx saw them, in the aspirations of classes about to take power, but perhaps even more in the dying wail of a class over whom the wave of progress is about to roll.

Barrington Moore, Jr, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Boston, Beacon Press, 1966, p. 505.

Marxist politics spent over a century involved in chercher le proletariat. Well, western political thought in general has ever been haunted by the ghost of the citizen. Perhaps the whole approach is misguided, endlessly searching for revolutionary agents whereas such an agency will appear only in the process of social transformation itself. The key point is that the future, the ‘in front’ of the slogan, has to be made, rather than rising like the sun, and made during the revolution, not before as a condition or after as a consequence. If the slogan of ‘neither left nor right’ captures the cross class appeal of a politics in the universal interest, those old questions of the politics of transformation remain - 'Who makes the future?', 'how?' and 'when?' These are questions which are integral to what the ‘in front’ looks like.

The slogan ‘neither left nor right’ implies a general ‘all humankind’ appeal that founders against a social reality structured and divided according to material interests and classes. An emancipatory politics seeks to hegemonize certain social groups rather others according to the place each occupies within the status quo. The ‘given' place situation of the social group, whether this makes it revolutionary or conservative, is of relevance to the radical project. If the executives of the transnational corporations have no material interests independent of their politically articulation, then there is no reason at all why socialists shouldn’t seek to enlist them to the cause of revolutionary socialism and no reason why Greens shouldn’t try to recruit them in the fight against ecological destruction caused by economic growth. The fact that neither socialists nor greens do this is precisely because the connection between material interests and political allegiances is known and understood. It may be possible to win individuals over to a general emancipatory politics, but not a specific class or group as such.
The question of how one identifies material interests, how one interprets them and what weight one allots to them is of critical importance in practical politics. A bland universal appeal to all on account of a universal ethic seems to invite a shallow, eclectic, opportunistic politics, in which the message is tailored to whatever social groups seem most amenable at the time. There would be no good reason why the struggle against capitalism should not be spearheaded by capitalists. There is good reason, of course, once one identifies the class basis of exploitative relations. Labour is the value producing force that can autonomize itself from capital; capital is the value appropriating force that cannot autonomize itself from labour. What distinguishes an agency or group as emancipatory is its social location within the process of production making it feasibly capable of taking it over. The identification of such an agency in terms of its material futurity and structural capacity is another condition of the feasibility of a political ideal.

The questions of ‘who’, ‘what’ and ‘when’ have particular relevance with respect to Green politics. The Greens provide a channel for activism in a wide variety of forms. No wonder, then, that it could present itself as the ‘anti-party party’. Do ‘the Greens’ possess sufficient identity as to form a party? Are they one of the ‘new social movements’ or an umbrella for nsm’s? A loose coalition of activists? And are ‘the Greens’ social ecologists or deep ecologists, biocentrists or ecofeminists? The slogan "We are neither left nor right, we are in the front" was coined by the German Die Grunen. The German Green Party represented a synthesis of ecology, alternative and social justice movements, the peace movement, feminism and other social movements. The four pillars of The Greens' platform comprise ecology, social responsibility, grassroots democracy, and nonviolence. 
Rejecting left and right and conceiving themselves as the ‘anti-party party’, the German Greens sought a ‘new politics’ that sought to transcend the conventional party political split between liberals/socialists and conservatives. Popular discontent with the old politics and views that ‘they are all the same’ indicates the increasing sterility and nullity of the left/right division and confirms the Green concern to seek not just a new government but a new way of politics. 

This ‘new politics’ seeks to tap the human roots that feed politics, a grassroots politics that empowers citizens and envisages an extension of public spaces for citizen interaction and decision making, decentralized, autonomous regions which make wide use of referenda, rotation of office holders, and town meetings. 

The emphasis on new models of democracy make it clear that ecology is not just considered as a science but has social and political and moral dimensions. Ecology is a public issue and Green thinkers and movements have provided sophisticated analyses of the causal connections between environmental problems - toxic wastes, acid deposition, nuclear reactors, and water pollution – and social and economic processes (Porritt 1984).

The 'neither left nor right' claim is meant to convey the truth that ‘Green’ concerns are not the conventional party political ones. This is made clear by analysing what constitutes the ‘in front’. The environment is the guiding principle of Green politics:

	Respect for nature and life forms.
	Respect for non-human life forms – which may be expressed in terms of vegetarianism or veganism or animal liberation.
	A commitment to living lightly on the earth - avoiding those technologies such as planes or cars which damage the planet, seeking alternative technologies.
	Scepticism as to the claims of science and technology, particularly with respect to the links with business, government and the military.
	A commitment to living simply and a rejection of consumerism.

All of these values can be incorporated into lifestyles and thus return ethics to its original Greek meaning of ethos, a practice and a way of life. They can all be expressed as a green politics as a coherent response to looming ecological disaster. A Green politics is ‘in front’ in demanding a wholly new ethic in which aggressive, exploitative humankind abandons its destructive practices and acknowledges its dependence on Nature. From this visionary perspective the old-style political discourse between Left and Right is revealed to be a conflict between alternate approaches to the exploitation of Nature and natural resources. With the evidence of growing environmental crisis now conclusive, what matters now is for human beings, as a species, to regulate the interchange with Nature so as to live in harmony with our surroundings - the entire biosphere, that is, and not just the built environment. This harmonious relationship is a requirement if we are to ever have an ‘in front’, a ‘forwards’, a future.

A ‘new politics’ is not necessarily an evasion of old issues of class, exploitation and justice but a recognition that addressing climate change and global warming, pollution, world famine, the destruction of the rainforests, and the myriad other environmental problems confronting the world requires solutions that go further than reforming the industrial system by conventional political means. The environmental crisis is systemic rather than accidental and requires fundamental action rather than piecemeal reform.

Even if it was possible to prevent the occurrence of environmental disasters whilst at the same time ensuring the protection of all the habitats and life-support systems currently under threat, the systemic nature of economic growth, relating to the central dynamic of capital accumulation, means that even with the successful achievement of reform the problem of the progressive diminution of finite resources and the progressive destruction of the environment will be continuing without check. The destruction of the Earth’s life support system is an issue beyond left and right but it isn’t an issue beyond politics. There are classes and groups whose material interests are served by this environmental destruction. They owe no responsibility and feel no responsibility to others, whether in existing global society or future generations. To these people, there is no ‘in front’ or ‘forwards’. And left unchecked they will ensure that there is no future. The Earth's non-renewable resources (oil, minerals etc.) are being used up at an exponential rate at the same time that its renewable resources (clean water, forests and fertile soil) are being poisoned, polluted and destroyed, a trend which if not reversed will bring a predictable collapse of the system. The particular environmental issues are therefore fought as part of a broader, more systemic concern.

The roots of Green politics, as a movement before it cohered as a party, are manifold. There is a question of how precious the Greens should be. As a 'new social movement', Green politics can exhibit a certain sensitivity with respect to its distinct identity, insisting on its 'newness' and 'authenticity'. Thus Porritt argues that 'For an ecologist, the debate between the protagonists of capitalism and communism is about as uplifting as the dialogue between Tweedledum and Tweedledee' (1984: 44). To which one may add that not only is the old left-right debate pretty uninspiring for everybody else, it now seems sterile and exhausted. The lesson to learn here is not that left and right are really the same or are either side of the same industrialist-materialist coin but that capitalism proved capable of absorbing, assimilating and deradicalising its supposed socialist enemy. The left long ago gave up the ghost. Marx’s proletariat proved more than happy to become contented consumers rather than socialist revolutionaries. Reform from above staved off revolution from below, with a capitalism modified by social policies and regulatory practices curbing the edges of the ‘free’ market. And this brings us to another aspect of Green preciousness with regard to identity, the concern that existing parties and politics steals their ideas and proposals and assimilates them to the very system destroying the environment. Hypocrisy is the homage that vice pays to virtue but there comes a danger that people will mistake the business as usual of light green reformism that preserves the system intact for the real thing. 

Thus the Green Parties are right to insist and keep insisting on a completely new type of politics. But this comes with the corollary that the more successful the party is within the conventional political sphere, the more its ‘new’ politics will be exposed to criticism, ridicule and rejection. Being neither left nor right risks being well in front of political debate, comment and the electorate. At this point, Green politics must hold its nerve and risk a temporary loss of ground for greater gains in the longer run. If the evidence of growing environmental problems is right – and how many hundreds of thousands of scientific papers, articles and publications support this evidence – then the case for a ‘new’ ecological politics will keep returning to the political agenda. The greatest danger is to proceed too quickly, intoxicated by electoral successes at all levels, and become part of the very conventional political arena that is collapsing along with the economic system it supports. The trick is to engage in practical politics, fighting elections, winning seats and proposing legislation, whilst remaining committed to being the vanguard of the future post-industrial society (Milbrath, 1984) and the ‘new’ green politics of the twentieth first century (Sessions, 1995). The danger is that political success as a party draws Green politics further within the old politics in its period of dissolution, increasingly losing sight of the ‘new’ and the ‘in front’. 
This is the price paid for engaging in politics. Early green discourse was characterised by broad-brush strokes at the level of principle and wishful thinking with little attention given to how these fine words and sentiments translated into practical policy. That kind of general statement of ideals characterises any new social actor that lacks access to the policy-making process, does not seek political power and hence does not need to develop detailed policies, outline programmes, cost budgets or do any of the things that come with politics. But any movement or party that is serious about social change so that its ideals are translated into the real has at some point to address political realities. It is a precarious business, for with the possibilities come the dangers. 

No matter how electorally successful and popular they are, Green parties themselves are not enough to develop a ‘new politics’. It is easy enough to reject the bureaucracy and compromise of conventional politics at the level of principle outside of the political arena. The hard part is avoiding these pressures once the party is a participant within the conventional political arena. It is easy to win support from those who agree at the level of principle. The trick is to keep that support whilst trying to draw wider support at the level of practical policy. To repeat fidelity to one’s principles is no defence against electoral and institutional pressures which compel compromise and conservatism. Old or new, politics is politics.

Green politics can learn from Marxism here. In criticising Marx for lacking an adequate political theory of socialism and communism,  Tony Polan describes Marx’s politics as a gigantic gamble that, given a whole number of unrealistic assumptions that Marx made about the absence of class and conflict and necessity and freedom we would be well advised not to make. Marx was, at best, sketchy about institutional structures. With a general statement of principles which insisted that the new political apparatus would be open, transparent, accessible to all, and assuming that the end of class and class exploitation, serious conflict and scarcity would end, Marx reduced political institutions to one undifferentiated type comprising a complex of organisations with no separation of power. This is most certainly a ‘new’ politics in that it bears little or no relation to any functional political society. It seems to replace politics with administration, inviting bureaucratisation in the way that the path is cleared for power to congeal in hierarchical form. That this was not Marx’s intention only serves to prove Marx’s intellectual innocence by proving his political naivety. Marx presumes the conquest of natural necessity and the self-conscious mastery of the self-created social necessity. This is a society beyond alienation. But is this non-alienated society also beyond further creativity, creative differences, arguments over the use of resources, choices, disagreements? A transformed human nature, yes, a fulfilled one too, but an end to human nature also? History has long since exposed the essential innocence of a model that requires an end to conflicts, an end to necessity, an end to economics as the science of scarcity, an end to exploitation and injustice and the social contradictions that follow, an end to inadequate ideas, to egoistic impulses, to simply human emotions and motivations. It demands, as Polan argued, an end of politics (Polan, 1984:129-30).

 In the Theories of Surplus Value, Marx criticises David Ricardo’s book for its 'faulty architectonics' (TSV, vol. II, 169). For Marx, the discovery of truth is a matter of a correct method of investigation leading to a well-structured and well-presented theory. The 'faulty architectonics' of a theory is 'not accidental, rather it is the result of... and . . . expresses the scientific deficiencies of the method of investigation itself’. 

This conception of architectonics indicates that, for Marx, a true theory is compelled on account of its 'deep insight' to develop an elegant conceptual structure. It seems that Marx, then, adhered to the Platonic trinity of the true, the good and the beautiful and affirmed the rationalist belief in the harmony of truth, goodness (as human freedom) and beauty.

As an end of history, the marxist vision amounts to the realisation of the philosophical ideal within the real. It is not so much Plato’s Philosopher Ruler as the rule of philosophy, Spinoza’s free humanity governing itself with adequate ideas, or Descartes’ ‘clear and distinct ideas’. That is a philosophical vision and will be realised when humanity finally does evolve the long term strategic thinking capacity that joins all together for the common good. It is not politics and to engage in politics on these assumptions is to invite not human emancipation in general but its total enslavement as institutions, laws and bureaucracies intervene to compensate for a failing moral conversion.

One thing is certain, no politics and no possibilities at all for a legal and institutional intervention to ensure the basis for sustainable living on the earth. The deep ecologists simply lack a politics and are completely naked against the forces of global capital holding the planet and its people and its life forms to ransom. On this level, one may as well trust Gaia herself to knock the human species into a shape more appropriately fitted to its environment. The only thing is, that it is difficult to see the hundreds of millions whose lives will be affected and even destroyed being so philosophical in face of the inevitable. 

The only other option in this apolitical or anti-political stance is an eco-monasticism. Alasdair MacIntyre at the end of his great book on the collapse of morality in modern  society, After Virtue, opines that the barbarians are already ruling over us, the fact that we don’t know this amounting to our predicament and that we are waiting for a new St Benedict. Well, the desert fathers and the monastic movement saved civilisation once, rebuilding it anew on stronger foundations that lasted more than a thousand years. Capitalism has been as busy dissipating this moral capital as it has been in wasting natural resources. 

The controversy over leadership is instructive. The commitment to a ‘new’ politics made Greens sceptical of the concept of leadership. The problem was that this gave the party an uncertain identity amongst an electorate still used to an old politics. Was the acceptance of the concept of leadership a sign of the drift to compromise and conservatism or a recognition of the necessity of politics? Whether one can resist the ‘old’ politics and keep a commitment to the ‘new’ politics depends upon the extent to which Green politics can ensure the correspondence of means and ends. If Green parties are the institutional means by which to achieve a Green society, they should act and function in a specifically Green fashion, actively and directly democratic, beyond the dualism of rulers and ruled, decentralised. The means are the ends in the process of becoming. The problem is that this ‘new politics’ simply doesn’t work within the terrain of the ‘old politics’ and leaves Green parties unprepared for the pressures that election campaigns and parliamentary procedures put on any party. Worse, the victory of ‘realists’ over ‘fundamentalists’ positively invites the situation whereby Green parties, like socialist parties before them, succumb to 'the iron law of oligarchy', controlled by a small active elite of officials directing a passive membership. It works if a party wishes to be successful within the ‘old’ politics. But what price that success when the old politics as such is failing?
Rather than campaigning for social transformation, the active leaders become obsessed with winning more seats and gaining more influence within the system. Policies motivated by principle are increasingly rejected as too ‘radical’ for electoral appeal and because compromise is the best way to get things done in Parliament. Once the strength and the basis of the ‘new politics’, extra-parliamentary activity is either neglected or considered as a dangerous distraction. Those active in building the new society within the shell of the old are neglected in favour of attempts to win the passive support of individuals in the mass electorate.

Michels in his Political Parties charts the process in which party leadership fossilizes into a self-protecting and self-preserving clique, concentrating activity and initiative at the top whilst deradicalising the base. Parties as organisations need full-time staff who, in time, form themselves into a 'political class' which is able to keep control through access to the lines of communication both within a party and the political system and external media. In time, ‘the party’ develops interests independent of the principles for which the party was formed and the party leadership see their role as defending ‘the party’ rather than dissolving it into the new political society:

When faced with a threat to their authority or office from within the organization, the leaders will become extremely aggressive and will not hesitate to undermine many democratic rights. To lose command of their organization is to lose that which makes them important individuals, and hence they are strongly motivated to preserve their position even if it requires using repressive methods. They legitimize such behaviour by pointing out that a mass organization is inevitably an organization maintaining itself by its struggle with powerful and evil opponents. Therefore all efforts to introduce factionalism into the organization, to challenge the appropriateness of party or organization policy, result in aid and comfort to its enemies. Serious criticism of the leadership is thus denned as treachery to the organization itself.

Before long, the party of the ‘new’ politics is colluding with the forces it once opposed whilst ignoring the basis of its own support and identity.

The ability to ensure the interdependence of means and ends eluded socialist parties of all kinds. The question is how to participate successfully on the terrain of an existing politics whilst preparing to go forward to a different political order. How to ensure that the means are effective on one terrain whilst growing into another. The way that Green politics fractured between ‘realists’ and ‘fundamentalists’ shows the extent to which Green parties are extremely vulnerable on this point. The former are easily absorbed into the ‘old’ politics, the latter are lost in the cul-de-sac of an anti-politics. 

Accepting the necessity of politics means addressing issues of incorporation and assimilation. This is a serious problem for Green parties. Form without content is a head without a body. At some point, presuming continued political success, The Green Party will need to demonstrate the social power behind policies and principles. As a ‘new’ politics, Green politics is outside the terms of conventional political coverage and discourse. This is its strength, its point, but it is also vulnerable spot without the content to back it up. Political opponents and commentators will obvious target those areas that make The Green Party distinctive from other parties - decentralization, peace, commitment to the redistribution of wealth in the name of justice and inequality, any number of proposals for taxation, regulation, government intervention, projects for renewable energy. The weight of the conventional wisdom of conventional politics will compel any party, top heavy as a result of political ‘realism’ to remove the radical edges in order to gain influence within the system. But if The Green Party reaches the situation where it barely mentions or leaves out distinctive Green proposals as difficult to sell to the electorate, hasn’t it already abandoned any claim to newness and instead opted for a shallow environmentalism which is incapable of addressing the social and economic roots of the environmental crisis? The Green Party becomes merely the green wing of the techno-urban industrial system driving us on to ecological disaster. 

After having raised hopes of a ‘new’ politics, the necessity of parliamentary compromise and electoral appeal succeed only in bringing despair to activists and cynicism to voters. If the ‘old’ politics is failing owing to its symbiotic relation to a global economic system in crisis, any political 'success' of Green parties at the expense of Green principles and policies actually makes Greens something of a Trojan horse. By compromising with the system, the Greens actually canalize energies and efforts for the ecological society into sterile and destructive channels, allowing the system to pretend that it is taking steps towards ecological responsibility whilst giving full vent to the destruction rooted in exploitative economics and social and environmental injustice. 

Acting politically whilst resisting the ‘iron law’ is extremely difficult, but not impossible. Acknowledging the necessity of politics means also shedding any illusions about the nature of political power. Green parties need to back up their principles and policies with a sound understanding of the processes and pressures of politics. But it means more than this. ‘Realism’ ought not be used as a euphemism for compromise. Once principles are abandoned for electoral success and political appeal, then the game is lost. Learn a lesson from ‘parliamentary socialism’. Back in 1961 Ralph Miliband exposed the ‘parliamentary socialism’ of the Labour Party as the politics of futility. He bemoaned the way that the Labour Party is ‘the most dogmatic—not about socialism, but about the parliamentary system’. ‘The leaders of the Labour Party have always rejected any kind of political action (such as industrial action for political purposes) which fell, or which appeared to them to fall, outside the framework and conventions of the parliamentary system’ (Miliband 1987:13 Parliamentary Socialism 1987 Merlin Press). 

The clue is in there in the reference to the party’s detachment from and opposition to the political action which is outside of the framework and conventions of the old politics. The Green Party originated as a social movement and should always be looking to strengthen its social roots as a condition of empowering and rejuvenating itself. That social base is the content to the political form.
What’s the point of principle without power, asked Tony Blair. He won three elections and proved that power without principle is itself not only pointless but utterly dispiriting. The strength of any politics is its principles. There is no point in being elected at the expense of one’s principles. And when these principles concern a ‘new’ society, as Green principles do with alternative forms of energy, decision making, economic activity etc., they will be vulnerable on account of their very difference. People are attached to the familiar, whether they like it or not. In the main, they opt for the known over the unknown. Any radical party is vulnerable to the logic of electoral politics.

The problem with realism is that it involves a kind of pragmatism that doesn’t work. To abandon crucial principles in order to win extra votes is immoral and is utterly unrealistic as a long term politics. The old phrase ‘easy come, easy go’ applies to passive support as passing trade. What is left is a disillusioned former support. This kind of politics is a demoralisation in a literal sense.

Here, one hears the words of James Lovelock talking about rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. It gives people something to do before the ship goes down. Plato compared politics to steering a ship safely. In 1969, Lewis Mumford wrote to social critic Roderick Seidenberg: "I think, in view of all that has happened the last half century, that it is likely the ship will sink."
Well, crisis is opportunity and expressions of pessimism are often motivated by the hope that enough will heed the warning and prove the prophecies of doom wrong. 
How? The trick is to navigate a route past realism and fundamentalism as twin reefs. The problem will be found to originate in the inability to keep form and content together. Keeping principles and politics together is a question of ensuring correspondence of means and ends. The form of the Greens as a political party requires a constant replenishment from the base. The content of Green politics lies in the origins of the Green Party as a social movement. This social movement not only forms the content of the Green Party in the present but the social potential and institutional capacity for the Green polity of the future, the functioning forms of the associative civic public of the ecological society, 

HOLISTIC POLITICS
A Green party, no matter how much it confirms to actively democratic forms which challenge the model of conventional party politics, has a role to play in Green politics as one part of a greater whole. Real change cannot be brought about by purely instrumental, institutional and technical means; there are no technical fixes and there are no parliamentary fixes. This respects the basic ecological principle of interdependence and interconnectedness. Green politics is expansive and operates in a holistic way — building feasible alternatives through practical action whilst fighting election campaigns at the same time. By contesting elections, Greens are able to promote ecological ideas and extend the reach of ecological principles in the wider public, drawing not only a greater electoral support but increasing numbers into practical projects making the alternative society. With the spread of Green ideas, support for Green politics will increase at elections but even more important involvement in practical social and economic projects will increase, encouraging participants to vote Green. Those involved in projects for ecological renewal and transformation, however local and small scale, will be more likely to vote for a Green ‘new’ politics which offers an alternative to the politics of capitalism and economic growth. This is to set in motion a progressive cycle in which elections and practical action reinforce each other, spreading principles and empowering people. The electoral appeal 'Vote for us’ followed by any promise always leaves a party in an exposed position in that it invites passive support by giving the impression of power and initiative at the top. The conventional political sphere lacks this power and initiative and is caught within the constraints of political institutions and financial and economic imperatives. This particularly affects a radical politics aiming at change. The strength of such politics is its active support, its social roots and bases. Passive electoral appeal and support invites a demonstration of impotence, defeat and disillusionment. The greatest victory at elections lies in being able to address large numbers of people about the ecological crisis and encouraging them to make an active contribution to any number of practical ecological, community or social projects and campaigns. In other words, electoral politics is a way of promoting the extra-parliamentary action which forms the social and political content of the Green movement as a whole. By engaging in politics to encourage activism so that voters come to act as citizens involved in politics in civil society, Greens can escape the ‘iron law’ and avoid the all too typical fate of radical parties, emptied of their best ideas and robbed of their support.

There’s a first time for everything. A biocentric civilisation nowhere exists. This is the end in view, a wholly new way in which human beings regulate their interchange with nature, as part of nature. The scale of the looming ecological crisis – let alone political, economic and moral implosion – makes this task an imperative. If Green parties are not involved in attaining this end, the question is just what are they in politics for? And why anyone with an ecological awareness should be involved with them, let alone giving them support.

The controversy over political leadership indicates the extent of the challenge of a ‘new’ politics. There is a Taoist principle of leadership in which leaders merely guide and cajole in a passive, almost invisible sense and when human liberation is achieved the people say they did it themselves. Green leadership like the Green Party is, ultimately, self-dissolving in that the hallmark of the ecological society is that people lead themselves, govern their own affairs in common agreement. Whatever the conventions of parliamentary politics and electoral campaigns, the end of Green politics is the self-organizing, self-governing society in which individuals determine their purposes within the reciprocal relations of community, as against being controlled by external economic imperatives and hierarchical institutional structures. Self-organization is therefore both the ends and the means of Green politics, not only a characteristic of the ecological society but also a condition of its realisation. The means are the ends in the process of becoming. The ends do not justify the means; the means shape the ends. 'We had better aim not at seizing power but at eroding, undermining, democratizing, decentralizing and distributing.'(Dave Dellinger).

The hostile criticism of the press, political media and the traditional parties is predictable and should be anticipated. Greens should not compromise key principles as a response but affirm them all the more. Not only will this emphasise distinctiveness, it will serve the purpose of communicating a strong green message to the grassroots level. It is at this level, ultimately, that the success or otherwise of green politics will be determined, not TV and radio politics shows, not newspaper editorials. 
Practical action outside conventional channels is vital. Contesting elections is only one part of a green politics and getting the message across is as important in these elections as is their winning. A green politics is characterised by a social and communal activism and should be involved in building networks for organic producers, supporting city gardens and city farms, promoting local produce, creating community trusts, housing trusts, LETS schemes, ethical investment trusts and so on. All of which gives people a practical demonstration that positive change is possible and invests everyday society with social and political significance. In changing circumstances, people change themselves. In building the ecological society, people develop an ecological sensibility. Local campaigns, outings, festivals are a way of living ethics and politics and knitting activists together, creating social bonds and new solidarities. Organic producer networks, co-operative production and consumption, green fairs will all make politics more dynamic and relevant through activism. As against the passive individualistic support of electoral politics, where voters as individuals give support in expectation of some promise of future reward, a communal and ecological activism rewards activists with a tangible result and reward. Greens need to ground politics in personal and collective action transforming communities from below.

The activism and dynamism from within civil society is crucial to ensure Green politicians and parties stay Green. Top level politics requires a support network as the ultimate check against compromise on and retreat from green principles. Local councils, national parliaments and senates are exhausting as much as corrupting in what is required of its participants. There are institutional mechanisms to ensure rejuvenation (rotation in various forms, the interchange of representative and helper for instance). A diffusion of power and initiative is crucial since a top-heavy politics is easily separated from its support and contained. It is not a question of rejecting organization but finding new ways of organizing. 

ACT LOCALLY, THINK GLOBALLY
The slogan ‘act locally, think globally captures the ecological value of the interdependence of the parts within the whole. It captures the commitment to both local communalism and internationalism so that decentralisation and diffusion of power avoids parochialism and insularity. It affirms the possibility of acting small whilst thinking big. In fact, what matters is not size, small and large, but scale, appropriateness and competence. There is no such thing as ecologism in one country or national ecologism. A long lasting, sustainable economics and a better quality of life has to address the globalisation of trade, production and investment and all manner of other relations. 
An essential part of this is the commitment to scale, building societies and systems to human dimension and proportion. Only in appropriately sized, self-reliant communities foster the trust relations that build a sense of loyalty and participation, engender solidarities and reciprocities that enable the free and full development of individual potential. And with the globalisation of economic relations alongside the ICT revolution, localism and communalism can develop other regarding and outward looking orientations that avoid parochialism and insularity.
And this sense of loyalty to and participation in the local environment is an integral part of building a sense of the planet, participating in its laws and rhythms as a Gaian species. 
'Act locally, think globally' captures well the sensibility and society that Green politics is attempting to achieve. The approach savours a great deal of the old organic principle of subsidiarity, a core principle of Catholic and medieval social and political thought but which can also be seen in Hegel’s system of the ethical life, Sittlichkeit, the political philosophy of TH Green, Guild Socialism and elsewhere in the myriad attempts to build and empower intermediary associations between the centralised state and the atomised individuals of civil society. It could even be interpreted in terms of Marx’s critique of ‘alien power’ (Thomas 1995), with social power alienated to the state and capital being practically reappropriated and reorganised as a social power (Marx EW OJQ). 
The advantage of subsidiarity is that it proposes a way of taking effective action at the appropriate level of competence and avoids the dangers of a decentralisation that dissolves power downwards to levels which are incapable of acting in face of greater, more than local, problems. According to the principle of subsidiarity, power is located at its most appropriate level of competence so that nothing is done at a higher level that can be done at a lower level. It is a diffusion of power that enables individuals to become citizens and exercise personal responsibility in relation to each other in affairs of common concern. Individuals cease to be mere voters and taxpayers and instead are encouraged to assume the ultimate responsibility for things rather than blame external forces, parties and politicians, ‘the system', acting rather than voting someone or something else into office to do things on their behalf. Without this appropriate scaling and restructuring of power and resources, principles of greater self-reliance are merely pious words. The electoral system of representative democracy encourages individuals to see themselves as voters rather than citizens, acting out of self-interest and giving passive support to someone else. This undermines the element of participation in politics and undermines the sense of politics as a collective project in which each joins with others in pursuit of a common purpose or goal. The danger for Green parties is that they become so heavily involved in the electoral politics of representative democracy that they themselves also lose the participatory and solidaristic elements of a genuine citizen democracy. Traditional representative politics needs to be buttressed by a more participatory form of politics. ‘We are looking for a common power, a power to be used by all and shared by all’ (Petra Kelly, Green Line, no. 70, 1989, p. 14). And that entails a ‘new’ conception of politics as more than parties, parliaments and elections; and it means a new conception of power and its connection to human creativity and knowledge. 


Back in the 1990s Jeremy Rifkin wrote a book called Biosphere Politics and this title captures well the expansive nature of the local-global interconnection in politics. The biggest global issue of all pertains to the planet. The transition to a transnational capital system has created a supra-national economy populated by increasingly impotent national governments. For economic reasons alone a supra-national institutional and legal framework is required. The ecological crisis makes this imperative. An effective biospheric politics involves a new ecological way of conceiving space and requires a conception of governance beyond political borders.

The spatial map of the nation-state is based on outdated notions of capturing and controlling expanding markets. The global reach and private priorities of the transnational corporations have eliminated spatial boundaries and undermined the power of the state. Rather than expanding markets, the world is one single market of global commons. Old systems of governance cannot compete with the TNCs for control here, which effectively leaves business unregulated and irresponsible in exploiting the planet’s resources for private ends. Biosphere politics requires a new spatial map in which governing institutions which connect the local level of geographical lines of regional ecosystems with the global level of the biosphere.

‘Because biospheric politics is based on sustainable economic development, rather than ever-accelerating production, the ecosystem rather than the market dictates the spatial limits of political rule. Equally important, as biospheric consciousness is global and rooted in an organismic worldview, new international political institutions will need to be created to oversee and protect the entire biosphere of the planet (Rifkin 1991 BP 38).
The local-global interconnection thus extends from the ecosystem to the biosphere in a sustainable living. The destruction of the biosphere as a result of human technics is a challenge for human civilization to find arrangements which are fitted to the environment. Green politics is involved in creating a new way of life, aiming at a biocentric civilisation comprising new political institutions at both the local and global level, bioregions divided into ecoregions, georegions, and morpharegions.

Act locally, think globally therefore involves not merely a decentralisation but a fitting of governance to scale.

Green politics seeks to replace the centralisation and giantism of industrial societies with a decentralisation resting on non-hierarchical principles. The principle of decentralisation is influenced by Fritz Schumacher's Small is Beautiful'. Schumacher’s argument was that industrial society had become so large and complex that individual human beings no longer mattered. Perhaps the word ‘small’ in the title is misleading. Really, the book is an argument for humanly scaled political and economic institutions so that direct control gave individuals opportunities to participate effectively and exercise autonomy. Appropriate technologies are designed to serve the needs of properly scaled communities, thus giving human beings control over processes of production from the local level upwards. 
Green politics seek to apply the 'grass-roots' principle throughout all political and economic institutions as the basis for an active democracy. The way that decisions are made matters as much as the outcomes of decision making. All decisions should be taken at the most appropriate level, starting from the lowest. Der Grunen made directness a key principle of ‘basic democracy’, with 'replaceability at any time so as to make organisation and policy transparent to everyone and to counter the dissociation of individuals from their base' (pggp, p. 7).

Which begs the question as to what unit of self-governance corresponds to appropriate size and scale. Garden cities, eco-communities, villages, parishes which are self-contained in terms of economic, social and cultural activities, surrounded by an agricultural hinterland. 
How many people? How are numbers regulated and kept within limits. Schumacher writes of a city with a maximum population of 500,000 and governed by something like a local council. Bookchin is similar to Kropotkin in arguing for something of the size of the pre-industrial city (Bookchin, 1989; Kropotkin, 1955). 

Perhaps the whole approach is misconceived, even apart from its manipulative overtones. Plato himself fixed the number of citizens of the ideal city at just over 5,000. Aristotle criticised the approach by arguing that the problem is not one of quantity in number but quality of internal relationships.

The most promising line of argument, since the end in view is a biocentric civilisation, concerns the bio-region as a geographic region large and diverse enough to meet all the needs of the human community it contains. Here again, numbers have been proposed, with Kirkpatrick Sale arguing that a typical bio-region would contain between 5,000 and 10,000 individuals (Dobson 1990).

The consistent thread that runs through green politics is that of the self-reliant community of co-operatives or self-employed craftsmen in which all public affairs are undertaken in face-to-face community meetings. As such, it locates itself in a tradition of active democracy that goes back to the Athenian polis and also comprises the medieval communes and city-states, the township democracy of early New England, the Paris Commune of 1871 and the workers’ councils of the early twentieth century (Tokar 1987; Bookchin 1989). 

The idea of municipal confederalism is completely out of kilter with the reality of politics in modern liberal democracies, but is this really a criticism? It all depends on just how deep the commitment is to a ‘new’ politics? The speed with which Der Grunen went from the active, participatory and anti-hierarchical principles of ‘basic democracy’ to sharing political power in coalition government is enough to suggest at least a tension, if not a flagrant contradiction. The tendency is for Green parties to begin as principled grass-roots decentralisers and then, with each political success, become more like the traditional political machines in becoming more centralised and hierarchical in structure (Kemp and Wall, 1990; Parkin, 1989). There is in this tendency a tacit admission that Green principles are utopian and cannot survive in the interstices of real world politics. Jonathon Porritt condemned the Green Party for 'living in a world of fantasy', engaging in politics whilst rejecting the concept of political leadership (Guardian, 22 March 1991). In September 1991 the 'realos' won over the ‘fundis’ as the British Green Party gave itself a more centralised structure with two spokespersons. In April 1991 the German Green Party abandoned the principle of the rotation of posts, causing a breakaway, the Ecological Left/Alternative List in May 1991. 

So perhaps, all along, the problem lay with the utopian claims to a ‘new’ politics in the first place. A Green politics that claims a lineage going back to Athens and including all manner of communes and guilds and city-states and town meetings isn’t a ‘new’ politics at all, just a particular way of conducting politics. 

The diversity of forms with which Green politics expresses itself indicates not so much confusion as the extent to which environmental issues are capable of expression in a variety of social settings - from local campaigns to transnational corporations and from community initiatives to government programmes. This variety itself expresses the wide ranging scope of environmental issues, from matters of ozone depletion, global warming and pollution which affect all to questions of factory pollution, road construction or urban quality of life at a local level.

Whilst it is difficult to locate each action on the global/local link continuum, that link does highlight the underlying commonality to these issues in 'the challenge of sustainability'. The challenge of sustainability is as much social as it is technical or environmental and, being so, involves a recognition of the necessity of politics. Sustainable living requires that human beings form a new social compact, human beings coming together organize their common life in such a way that is indeed 'sustainable'. 

The concept of 'sustainability' needs to be defined with respect to power and knowledge. A major part of this concerns the relationship of human being – ontology – with the environment, the built environment made by human beings and the natural world, pertaining to ways of 'living with' and 'knowing' the environment. 

Those coming from an ecological perspective are well placed to intervene in the debates concerning the effects of economic globalisation. A crucial aspect of that intervention concerns the principles and practices by which global dynamics proceed in a way that ensures economic, social and environmental well-being. Often the phrase 'sustainable development' is used to denote these principles and practices but a better phrase is ‘sustainable living’ since technical and instrumental character of the developmental aspect is tempered by notions of health and happiness.

The question of economic globalisation involves an examination of the state and existing political institutions. It means asking questions about politics, democracy and citizenship. Much of the debate involves the location of power, upwards, downwards or both according to appropriate scale. Globalisation implies a supra-national perspective in which power is invested in structures and processes of global governance and government to ensure the effectiveness of policies for 'the greater good'. At the same time, power can be devolved to sub-national systems of decision-making to ensure the vigour and vitality of the parts. Above all, it is necessary to avoid fracturing the case for appropriate scale into a stark choice between either the supra-state level or the sub-state level (Wapner 1995). It is not an either/or question but a question of appropriate scale, power residing at the level at which it is most effective, responsible and accountable. Both supra-statists and sub-statists agree that existing state systems are implicated in the current environmental crisis but disagree as to whether power should be transferred up or down the spatial scale in the necessary reorganisation of political life.

How about power goes both up and down the spatial scale so that it is appropriately located along the local-global continuum. It is a question of how power is best deployed. The advantage of act locally, think globally encapsulates the extensive spatial scale in a world where all manner of human relations have become transnational beyond the old legal and political boundaries. In this context, ‘small is beautiful’ highlights possibilities in only one aspect. Indeed, there is a danger that decentralisation can render power ineffective, with the result that global problems continue unabated. Ecologists should appreciate this point most of all with respect to the threat to the global commons as a consequence of processes of development and economic globalisation. The attempt by national governments to agree an agenda for sustainable development, results routinely fall short of targets. What this suggests is an 'implementation deficit' (Crowley 1999) as a result of scales of governance inadequate to the problem. The failure of strategies of sustainable development to check ecological destruction, social dislocation and economic crisis indicates an institutional framework of politics which lacks effective control and is incapable of addressing issues at their level. 

A Green politics as the politics of constructive social change needs to view conventional politics as one aspect of a more expansive conception of political activity. Indeed, a politics of change is effective only when buttressed by activity and organisation outside the conventional political arena. Democracy in its fundamental form is the active rule of the people, and thus concerns how people live and control their lives in relation to each other. What this means in the sense of extensive public spaces cannot be determined given the infinite number of ways in which people can express their power from the microstructures of everyday life to formal electoral politics.

It is a mistake to disregard politics in the conventional parliamentary arena as an ‘old’ politics. For all of its many flaws, it still commands widespread allegiance and remains the public face of politics. A movement that is serious about politics needs a profile in this arena. That said, there are pressures and conventions of traditional politics which militate against any radical politics that relocates its challenge from the wider social sphere to the narrow official sphere. It is by revaluing the sense of social movement, in the more pluralistic, more expansive sense of community organising and civic activism that Green politics will thrive as a force for social change.

The global nature of economic and ecological problems ensures the continued relevance of Green politics, organised around a consistent set of principles. Green politics, organised around a universal interest and ethic of sustainable living, is a global phenomenon that will remain as an ecologically sound alternative available within the global integration of trade, production and investment. It is an alternative which keeps a sense of the local and the global as connected according to a continuum in contrast to an economic globalisation which imposes economic imperatives on localities and communities from the outside and from above.
Green politics as a movement is expansive and outer looking, proceeding from the local in accordance with principles of decentralization and grassroots democracy, making wider connection by means of alliances and coalitions, to take shape at the national and the international level. The local level is therefore integrated within a complex of global community and citizen-based networks, ICT enabled and disseminating information and resources concerning ecology around the world. Somewhere on this continuum, practical activity can connect up with the efforts of campaigning groups like Amnesty International, Friends of the Earth, and any number of animal welfare groups. All of which is a part of creating an ecological sensibility.

The slogan 'Think Globally, Act Locally' captures the best way to proceed. Green politics, as party and movement, expands from and is powered by the grassroots, proceeding within global networks which disseminate information concerning local developments and integrating local activities within a global vision. The end is to organise contact between local organizations within emerging global networks so as to ensure effective cooperation for the formulation of Green principles into Green policies and the implementation of these policies on the global arena.

By focusing on political activity at the local level, Greens politics demonstrates the power of people to change both their environment and themselves as part of the same process. This is an ecological praxis, engendering the ecological sensibility and the grass-roots basis for a fundamental social transformation. Whilst problems of ecology, economics, war etc are global in their scale, involvement in practical projects creating alternatives in food, shelter and other basic needs up to and including real community control and economic cooperation all offer forms of local activity with global implications and consequences. 
An ecological sensibility offers an ethical and psychological framework to connect the particular projects of local issue-oriented work together. Thus, the arms industry fuels war and militarization, distorts regional employment and investment patterns, and produces massive quantities of toxic wastes. Campaigns against the arms industry can be resisted as a threat to jobs and investment and need address worker security and community control, connecting these local interests to broader questions concerning the nature of economic and technological change, involving specific proposals of how such facilities can be converted to peaceful civilian uses. Large development projects are sold on the employment and investment they bring, blunting campaigns against the destruction of farmland, wildlife habitats, green spaces and communities. A Green campaign integrates these concerns whilst showing how development destroys the local economy by centralizing control in the hands of global players outside of the community.

 Electoral campaigns are a vehicle for bringing ecological ideas to a broader public. Campaigning for election can attract a media attention for Greens not normally available and give an opportunity for Greens to reach a greater cross-section of the public. An increasing number of Green candidates are being elected at various levels, but more important than this is publicising certain issues and reshaping public discourse. At a time when the parameters of political debate are being narrowed within terms acceptable to business elites, principled Green electioneering serves to maintain a public focus for issues of environmental protection, social welfare and health, democratic control and human rights and liberation, in the very least reminding and hopefully shaming erstwhile labour and social democratic parties of commitments they have shed in order to demonstrate their fitness to govern to financial and business elites. When such positions attract popular support, the major parties must take note. Win or lose, a Green politics shows the possibility of an alternative.

Electoral politics comes with dangers, however. Having an 'audience' for Green ideas is not the same thing as intellectual, moral and psychological commitment, conviction or even acceptance. This deeper cultural transformation comes with practical participation in activities that transform society from below, not passive consent for promises to be delivered from above via the conventional political arena. Electoral campaigns should complement local and community grass-roots activities, not replace them. 

 Media campaigns sustained by well-funded think tanks notwithstanding, environmental problems have not only not gone away, but are intensifying. So much so, that predictions of ecological disaster are not required. The impact of ecological crisis is felt in the here and now – adverse and extreme weather conditions, increasingly violent storms, disappearing rainforests, the hole in the ozone layer, global warming, losses of biodiversity. Every single problem backed by such a wealth of scientific evidence that the question is what psychological and institutional processes are at work to prevent governments and peoples taking the required action (Requiem for a Species). 

One of the most important aspects of a Green politics is to widen horizons whilst emphasizing the various levels at which ecological principles cease to be an abstraction and instead become a lived reality for people in their communities and workplaces. This realises ethics in the original Greek sense of ethos, a practice or way of life, bringing psychological senses of security, dignity, purpose, fulfilment, conviviality, identity, service to others, trust, belonging, solidarity. There is a need to organise public life so that each has a social role and identity in relation to people and place. 

The end of environmental security is served by action which checks and reverses the trends which are destroying the planet’s ecosystem. This means redefining development so as to practise sustainable living. And it means engaging in politics so as to transform conventional political theory and practice according to the incorporation of ecological insights. 
Take growing resource conflicts— water or pollution. The confrontational mode of conventional politics exacerbates such conflicts whilst failing to address the root cause. An ecologically informed politics would relate human linear logic to Nature's circular or cyclical logic, along the lines of Lovelock’s cybernetic Gaia hypothesis.

The phrase charity begins at home comes with the corollary that it doesn’t end there and the same applies to environmental sustainability. It extends on an unbroken chain from local concerns up to the global biosphere. The argument recognises that what matters most to human beings and what motivates their concern and efforts the most are things that are closer to home. The key is to connect this specific focus within a broader connection of time and space, life far off on the horizon. 

Gwyn Prins Global Security Institute has the stated aims of Stewardship, Sustainability and Survival.
Stewardship, sustainability and survival are not principles that can be embraced in piecemeal fashion. There can be no ecology in one country. Environmental goals can only be achieved on a supra-national basis through cooperation between national governments. And this switch from confrontational to cooperative modes in politics will help us to avoid a future of more and more conflict over fewer and fewer resources. 
Existing institutions are not adequate to the task of dealing with the long term future of life on earth. They are tailored to short term thinking that addresses individuals at the level of self-interest and are designed to engage in conflict over resources. Given that the threats to the environment develop, they are difficult to recognize and easy to ignore or deny. The reactions of existing political institutions, even under favourable circumstances, are likely to be out of date and hence inadequate to the task. The danger point will have been passed before the electorate start waking political institutions up and demanding action. Political institutions need to develop and embody a long term strategic thinking capacity that responds in timely fashion to indicators and warnings concerning the environmental problems, resource disputes, climate difficulties. Ultimately, the success of this strategic capacity depends on being located within a coordinated international framework. The precautionary principle speaks of 'late lessons from early warnings, cataloguing a series of situations like fisheries, asbestos, chemical contamination of the Great Lakes and BSE where early warnings were ignored — to our later cost.' This requires a political and institutional framework that is able to respond to scientific findings, withstanding pressure from vested interests and lobby groups to formulate appropriate policy options.

The challenge is to bridge the gap a reactive current politics which responds to crises as they occur and a proactive approach to anticipated ecological problems. The problem with long term climate change is that the most effective action is required long before its tangible effects are apparent enough to cause the electorate to demand or accept necessary actions. An effective political framework needs to connect short and long range thinking and perspectives so that long-term eventualities cease to be abstractions by being embedded in current realities — through specific programmes dealing with energy, through market instruments and incentives to promote energy efficiency, through improvements to public facilities, and so on. People seem to be motivated or satisfied when they can see that action and effort produces tangible benefits, when they can see the result of their labours. The advantage of practical projects and programmes is that they can deliver short-term benefits to the local economy and to people's immediate quality of life whilst being mindful of long term ecological eventualities. Ecological issues thus cease to be abstractions on the horizon by being incorporated into practical activities. 
A new slogan might be relevant in this context: 'Act today, think tomorrow.' There are some scientists who are proceeding on the basis that it is already too late and that existing political institutions will not change. The only thing to do is ensure good quality research to aid decision making when ecological catastrophe finally strikes.
It seems that short-term thinking is hard wired into the electorate, its representatives in the traditional parties and the political system locked into the systemic imperatives of the global economy. Either we wait for disaster and hope this brings the world to its senses – conflictual politics within a context of resource scarcity does not augur well – or we find a way of addressing long term threats by developing policies and projects which deliver short term benefits. This is part of evolving the long term strategic thinking capacity that James Lovelock says is required for the next phase of human history. Short term self-interest is the bedrock of the individualist politics and economics of modern society. There is no doubting the popularity of this individualism. The problem with egoism is that it addresses human beings at the lowest rung of human potentiality – desires, wants, impulses. For all of the talk of freedom and democracy, institutions and systems tailored to short term self-interest manacle individuals to a level that falls far short of a more expansive, richer set of human possibilities. 
The solution is to develop institutions and practices as a learning mechanism so that individuals are able to ascend the levels of cognition and potentiality, extending sociality in time and space through reciprocal relations and mutual obligations of citizenship to realise a greater range of human attributes. With respect to ecology, short-term self-interest is set within a long-term framework of stewardship that develops the wisdom, courage, and restraint to deal with the fundamental realities of sustainable living on a finite planet. 
Developing a vision of how this can be achieved requires new levels of openness and creativity in politics, absorbing all the scientific, moral and philosophical resources that are available and incorporating them into an ecological praxis focused on stewardship, sustainability and survival. 

This paper explores the relation of ecology and politic. It recognises the electoral successes of Green parties and affirms the necessity of politics; however it notes the continuing marginality of the world's various green parties within traditional political arenas and asks whether this is such a bad thing. Given that traditional parties which once commanded upwards of 50% of the vote are themselves in decline, Green parties could be guilty of overrating the importance of electoral success and underestimating the educative function of getting the Green message across. 
On various levels - critiques of conflictual models of settling political disputes, the roots of the current crisis in the mastery of nature (Latour 1993), ecology cannot be inserted into the existing institutional framework without ceasing to be ecology by losing the connection with nature. Ecology requires to be understood as an alternative to the modern techno-industrial order, a new way of regulating all the objects of human and non-human collective life.3

Since its inception, the green movement has made the distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ politics. Closer analysis exposes uncertainty and confusion. A ‘new politics’ is not an anti-politics, but a new form of politics. A ‘new’ form that addresses the ‘old’ issues of class, justice, allocation and distribution of resources, economics, poverty and draws upon a tradition that dates back to Athenian democracy. Accepting this as politics helps remove some of the uncertainty in the eco-movement with respect to ideals and their realisation. 

The biggest uncertainty of all concerns whether Greens are ecologists or environmentalists. As ecologists, they would be committed to an alternative civilisation; as environmentalists they would seek the integration of eco-concerns into people's everyday life via rules, regulations, institutional intervention and government policy. This is not an alternative civilisation but the environmental reform of the present one, akin to the health, sanitation, hygiene and town and country acts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Green parties thus disappear as other political parties, governments and citizens add another layer of behaviour and regulation to their everyday concerns. (Lascoumes 1994). But is this progressive normalisation of eco-activity success or failure? A reduction to environmentalism identifies The Green Party as the green wing of the very techno-urban industrial system which is destroying the planet’s biosphere. 


The alternative is to see ecology as implying a new civilisation, a new way of regulating the human interchange with nature on the assumption that all things are interdependent, that humankind and nature are one and the same thing and that the political imperative now is to govern a single system of nature and of society so as to prevent moral, economic and ecological disaster. 

This 'globalisation' of the ecological perspective as a new biocentric civilisation is a political and social ecology rather than a deep ecology. As such, it reforms but does not replace the traditional domain of political action, which continues as the common ground of numerous practical activities and campaigns forming the public imaginary (Latour in Braun and Castree ed 1998 ch 10).
Nature and society as one single system does not imply the submersion of politics and of society into nature. This would be the end of politics, lacking in popular appeal and plausibility. The ‘nature’ of this deep ecology is an abstraction which transcends the ordinary horizons of citizens. For, as the Gaia hypothesis makes clear (Lovelock 1979) and as deep ecologists acknowledge, this Nature is not human, and the human species is only one amongst many, of no greater importance than the others within the whole. As a science, one can admire its disinterested purity. It is, however, lacking in political sense and plausibility; human beings have a vested interest in human concerns. And they have a view, a perspective, a notion which leads to an attachment to democracy. There is a temptation to eco-dictatorship, an enlightened or benevolent despotism, in the notion of a single substance called Nature whose laws and properties are accessible only to scientists. The infinitely complex architecture of this Nature as a totality would be those with specialists, whose expertise and knowledge raises them above common humanity, the demos (Lafaye and Thevenot 1993). 

There is a real problem here. This is Plato’s old question of the relation of philosophy and politics. If one accepts the ancient Greek distinction between knowledge (nous) and opinion (doxa) – and it is difficult to see how any scientist, ecologist or otherwise, cannot respect that division – then it comes with the corollary that there is a hierarchy of enlightenment in which the views of those who know count for more than the views of those who don’t. Opinion is not of the same merit as knowledge. Those who criticise this for its anti-democratic implications, such as Popper, who finds a totalitarian impulse in Plato’s allegory of the cave, ignore that the business of everyday life operates according to this principle. A person with toothache consults a dentist rather than a bookmaker, a person with a hernia visits a doctor rather than a car mechanic. If you want to know about time and space, the views of Stephen Hawking are more relevant than those of Ant and Dec. And if anyone with a serious concern in ecology is still in doubt about the importance of the knowledge-opinion distinction, consider that the most vociferous critics of climate science include such luminaries as Peter Hitchens, Anne Widdecombe, Melanie Phillips, Alan Titchmarsh, Neil Hamilton, Carol McGiffen from Loose Women, and Richard Madeley. If democracy means that the views of each and all count for the same, then hundreds of thousands of scientific papers, articles and publications are on the same level as the opinions of those above. Either we have knowledge and can gain knowledge or we can’t. If we can, then it follows that knowledge is of a higher quality than opinion. Which means that those with the knowledge have a greater weight than those who don’t.

The only way to avoid a dictatorship of specialists and experts whilst affirming the knowledge-opinion distinction is create a societal and institutional learning mechanism which can guide individuals to higher levels in the learning continuum.
Historical experience does not favour Plato’s Philosopher Ruler. The rule of specialists and experts lacks legitimacy in being detached from the ordinary rank and file of citizens. 
Affirming Nature as an all-embracing totality which subsumes the human species along with all other life forms diminishes humanity in two ways, by affirming an entity which has priority over humankind and by privileging a technocracy of knowledge over ordinary human beings capable only of opinion (Latour in Braun and Castree ed 1998 ch 10).

The result is that (deep) ecology becomes inflated as an end beyond political controversy and debate, handing power to specialists and experts outside of the world of politics and who minister to a natural unity which no longer has the political domain as its concern (Latour in Braun and Castree ed 1998 ch 10).

Practical experience does not encourage faith in this perspective. All government proceeds with the consent of the governed. A detached scientific elite will not have this consent.

There is a paradox in ecology as politics. Ecologists want ecology to be at the heart of political action without being absorbed and assimilated in an existing political system and its priorities. How to avoid marginalisation without falling victim to integration?
There are a number of formulae which address the paradox: 'think globally, act locally', integrated management, sustainable development, etc. 

Green politics should not be judged by electoral results. Rather, electoral support is one part of a whole which integrates different facets within a general movement that ends up embracing the whole planet. The commitment to small causes derives from the certain knowledge of wider connections so that eventually the movement assumes responsibility for all the big issues. (Latour in Braun and Castree ed 1998 ch 10).

Ecology thus comes to address itself to the whole task of political life. Yet Green parties across the world seem to be able to command little more than 5 per cent of the votes, 10-15 per cent tops. To command a greater electoral presence seems to require more compromise on principle and a greater mirroring of the conventional politics that Greens were supposed to replace. The Green Party has to find a way of overcoming the marginalisation of green principles whilst avoiding the integration of green parties. What makes it likely that green politics is not a passing trend is the ubiquitous and growing nature of the environmental crisis.

In large part the confusion and the difficulty lies in the attempt to marry the world of knowledge and the world of opinion, science and politics. Green politics is an attempt to incorporate the insights of ecology into political practice and public policy. Failure to give permanent expression and organisation to practical campaigns and projects, Green politics makes little inroads into the mass electorate, making practical action politically effective and ensuring enduring and consistent political viability. (Latour in Braun and Castree ed 1998 ch 10).

The key challenge is to reorganise political society on the basis of reciprocal relations that connect the small community within an international context. The slogan 'act locally - think globally’ captures the need for cooperative endeavour and international responsibility. International cooperation is more easily stated as an ideal than achieved in the real. 

Greens in the past tried to talk past the global political economy, arguing that the problems of class exploitations are insignificant by comparison with humankind as a whole exploiting nature (Alsopp 1972 P93). The two forms of exploitation are linked, the case for social justice and environmental justice is the same.
Claims like 'The old-fashioned politics of class conflict are grinding to a halt. The politics of life start here' and ‘We’re all in it together’ (the Ecology Party 1983 p20) reveal a dangerous political naivety, suggesting an inability to get to the social and economic roots of environmental crisis and, worse, inviting repressive and reactionary policies as a result of addressing problems of resources, consumption, population etc in abstraction from social relations. 

Murray Bookchin claims that 'environmentalism is merely a technocratic attempt to contain ecological disruption within the framework of capitalism' (i.e. it is merely technocentric). The social ecology he espouses argues for the 'non-hierarchical nature of ecosystems and the importance of ecological diversity for stability'. This points to not only a ‘new’ politics but a new civilisation, a non-hierarchical and diverse society as the prerequisite to an ecologically harmonious human-nature relationship. 
These criticisms expose the limitations of a technologically-oriented form of ecology as environmentalism, assimilating ecological necessities to conditions of exploitation. In other words, whilst capitalism is destructive of the planet’s ecology, it can assimilate the potential threat to the system by defining them as environmental problems. 

The critique of environmentalism should make us sceptical of the politics of Green parties who emphasise a pluralistic approach of reform through Parliament. Far from being the new politics of life, this is the well-trodden ground of parliamentary socialism.
The truth in the ecological prognostications of the Greens needs to be complemented by a more sophisticated social analysis. 
The strength of the Green position is the recognition that there has been a quantum leap in the environmental problems generated by modern industrialisation which calls for a fundamental rethinking in the way that human beings organise their affairs. To the charges of utopianism from the Marxist camp, Greens can point to a recognition that 'any possible future belongs to the realm of necessity and not that of freedom, and that every political theory and practice, including that of socialists, is confronted not with the problem of abundance but survival' (Ensenbergef 1974).
 Rudolf Bahro locates the 'impulse to self-destruction' (Via an arms race and an ecology crisis) in industrial capitalism, an 'impulse' he finds in human nature itself. Thus 'so long as we continue to see class struggle as the key to the contemporary crisis we will only remain trapped in the very circle out of which it is imperative to break'. Bahro shifts the emphasis from capitalist forms of industrialisation to industrialisation as such. The impulse to exterminism lies in the very foundation of industrialisation. Transformation begins with the individual. 'We have to embark on a psychological revolution that starts with ourselves, and liberates our politics from the aggressive model of reactive class antagonism that only reinforces and accelerates exterminism'. Human beings must agree on means and ends 'in a common project capable of subordinating the opposing special interests of all those engaged in it to their own fundamental and long-term interests' (Bahro 1982).

It would take a number of volumes to give comprehensive coverage that does justice to the issues discussed. Instead the text concentrates on the connection between means and ends as an attempt to join theory and practice at the political level. It recognises the necessity of politics, even though the long term ideal is not just a new politics but a new civilisation. 

There is no debate on programme details and policies, but remains at a general level discussing aims and strategies. The paper is meant to be read and examined at leisure to stimulate thought and discussion and maybe inspire some new thinking. There is an urgent need for ‘Green politics’ to remember that it is ‘Green’ as well as ‘politics’, with universal principles concerning ecology as a science and a way of life to be systematically connected with grassroots activism and campaigning. Ecology as a science assumes the distinction between knowledge and opinion which, in politics, has elitist, anti-democratic, even totalitarian implications (if one follows the likes of Popper). It is possible to combine science and politics if one defines democracy not in terms of individual self-interest and opinion but in terms of functional capacity, participation and representation. This means valuing active contribution as well as passive electoral support, an ecological praxis in which every participant and activist is a citizen with a say in political life. Green parties need to focus more on practical projects and actions at grassroots level rather than just on parliamentary work and electoral campaigning.

THE ANTI-PARTY PARTY
The notion of The Green Party as the ‘anti-party party’ is ‘an acknowledgement of the paradox of working within a party political system and having to organise activities as a party, while at the same time believing that such an organisation is largely antithetical to green thinking.’ (Dictionary of Green Ideas). The Green Party is thus self-dissolving in the manner of Marx’s dictatorship of the proletariat should have been self-dissolving. Instead the party became the state.


The rationale behind the ‘anti-party’ formulation is the same which supports Green politics as a ‘new’ politics beyond the divisions of left and right. Party derives from the Latin partire, meaning to divide. The system of political parties aiming to be elected to government stands condemned as divisive and competitive, exaggerating marginal differences whilst simplifying complicated issues in order to appeal to the worst and most selfish aspirations of the electorate. Such a system violates the ecological principle of integrated systems, with pretend divisions in public masking an agreement on fundamentals in private. Working within a party political and electoral system challenges Greens to make a fist of keeping means and ends united within the contradictory identity of being a ‘Green Party’. Ecology into Economics Won’t Go was the title of a book by S McBurney. There is some debate as to whether ecology and politics as such are compatible, let alone participation within the very political system which administers the ecologically destructive economics which is the target of McBurney’s book.
The paradox is that many people’s interest in the Greens begins at the level of principle, the protection of the environment, feminism, peace, animal rights, but these principles can tend to be diluted in order to widen electoral appeal. In other words, the very things which made the Greens stand out from conventional political parties can, in time, get lost in the yearly grind of electoral politics. So it is as well to give a reminder as to what it was and is that makes the Greens different. The Greens affirm the interdependence of all things, proposing an integrated approach to social, economic and ecological issues, which are interrelated in nature and connect all from the local to the global. The Greens address the alienation from nature as the cause of the 'spiritual impoverishment' of industrialized societies. The Greens put questions on the political agenda that none of the traditional parties could answer or wanted to. 
But appeal brings political success, which in turn involves Greens in some paradoxes. Principles take political shaped in the programmes of Green parties and stand better chance of being applied as the parties win seats in city councils, county assemblies, and state legislatures. The antiparty party, the political voice of various community and citizen movements, wins political office at various levels as a political party.

And the biggest appeal of this anti-party party was its origins in a variety of new social movements. The party grounded in a diverse movement, holding together a genuine coalition of ecologists and peace activists, holistic theorists and anti-nuclear-power activists, scientists and animal rights campaigners, feminists and Third World activists, value-conservatives and left wing socialists. ‘The party’ as a successful combination of various elements serves as a model of the future public life. 
Whether the party ever does develop into that future ecological society depends upon how successful the Greens operate on the terrain of the state and parliament so as to channel voters in the direction of community and civic activism rather than canalise the activist roots into sterile political channels. To turn a social movement into a political party is to empty Green politics of the embryonic political structure which it had within it. Can the Green Party pursue electoral success without dispossessing its principled members of its  original base. 

In electoral terms, the identity ‘Green’ can be a liability, with many perceiving the party to be a ‘single issue’ party. Aside from the argument that ecology is an ‘issue’ that embraces all life forms on Earth, the identification underestimates the complexity of inputs, arguments, and activities that comprise Green parties. The diversity of Green politics is impressive, with the party having its roots a number of political traditions, the student movement of the late 1960s and the campaigns against nuclear power, "citizens' initiatives" and movements. These essentially extra-parliamentary and anti-party origins caused resistance to proposals for political leadership, formal structures, electioneering and other aspects of conventional political parties. That issue has been settled, the ‘realos’ triumphing over the ‘fundis’.

The constitution of a Green movement as a party has thus been accompanied by serious misgivings. The real question is not really one of party structure and operation – devices such as "rotation" of members of parliament, limits on the proportion of their salary that MPs may retain for personal use, the direct accountability of the elected to the electors, and a prohibition on the holding of party offices by those who sit in parliament. Whilst these devices express the actively democratic convictions of the Greens and seek to avoid the creation of hierarchies of professional politicians that is the nature of the political beast. Effective political representation, intervention, influence and drafting and implementation of legislation does require ‘professional’ politicians. That is their job. More important than this is to ensure that representation in parliament and other legislative chambers is not the sole or even the main focus of Green politics, just its organised political profile at the level of ‘high politics’. The strength remains low politics at the base, the broader social movement with its practical projects, citizen initiatives, community campaigns, demonstrations, and grassroots activities.

Involvement in parliamentary institutions, coalitions and election campaigns gives a valuable publicity to Green politics but is itself the visible end of a diverse and diffuse spectrum that runs the whole breadth from organised politics to grassroots community and civic activism.

Rudolf Bahro puts the strongest case for Green fundamentalism. He rejects ‘realism’ as a series of compromises with the very political and economic system that is destroying the planet. For Bahro, the Green Realos are the dupes of a system that simply wants them to help pretend that the environmentally destructive impacts of the system are being addressed whilst preserving the destructive system intact. This merely extends the life of the ecologically destructive system whilst feeding the illusion that environmental issues are being addressed. Bahro denounces environmental reformism as "euthanasia as Green politics", as symbolized in the anti-pollution filters of the "eco-industrialists" and their "catalytic converters for the next boom in the car industry". 
"It is the time, not of reformists, but of a reformation, which has now commenced."

Strong words, which amount to the commitment to the building of a new civilisation. Bahro writes of "a change so deep that one must speak of a break with basic European patterns of behaviour", and "the building of a new psychology". Bahro argues that the fall of the Roman Empire is "the only event which can be compared in dimension with the present-day crisis of civilization". And he takes as his inspiration the communal monastic orders which emerged to found civilisation anew. These monastic orders, the Benedictines in particular, offer a model for our way forward.

Before one dismisses this ‘eco-monasticsm’ as hopelessly reactionary, its striking resemblance to the conclusions formed by moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre at the end of After Virtue are worth emphasising. Now MacIntyre too has been criticised as a nostalgic philosopher unable to identify alternative and progressive lines of development within modernity. That is to take Hegel’s ‘high road’ out of modernity. 

Bahro and MacIntyre clearly deny that possibility. MacIntyre looks to those examples of communality which have survived since medieval times to ground attempts to preserve human civilisation. Bahro looks to the creation of "zones liberated from the industrial system", the liberation of "surplus consciousness" and the "surplus energies" that human beings have not yet surrendered to the system. From this perspective, the Green promise is not redeemed in the accumulation of a greater share of votes and seats, but in slowly but surely accumulating a greater share of the popular consciousness, regardless of formal political allegiance. 

Before condemning Bahro for unrealistic politics, one should remember the success of the monastic orders in building a civilisation that lasted a thousand and more years. And one should also remember that the point of Green politics is to engender an ecological consciousness or sensibility within the broadest sections of the world’s population, regardless of race, colour, creed, nationality, ethnicity. Across this public, party loyalty is the least important and the most ephemeral. Unless one does think that The Green Party of any nation will win sufficient electoral support for a majority government. Given the way that national parliamentary institutions have been drained of real power in a globalised economic environment and given the general drift of support and attachment away from political parties, this really does amount to utopian thinking.

It is no longer possible to rely on the methods and institutions of a conventional parliamentary politics that has been disempowered in an era of globalised economic relations. At the same time, to work exclusively through extra-parliamentary channels directs Green politics into a cul-de-sac. A genuinely ‘new’ politics combines party and movement and functions both in parliament and outside it. This combination is captured by the idea of the ‘anti-party party’. The question is can the Greens keep those two aspects in play? It is about form and content. It is often claimed that voting is the choice between lesser evils. This is a definition that severs politics from its roots in the search for the good public life. A lesser evil is still an evil. In an era of increasing cynicism it is important that those who propose an alternative to offer a platform based on principled content rather than merely give voters another lesser evil to waste a vote on. The criticisms that established parties and political commentators direct at certain aspects of Green politics should be taken as evidence of the inability of the existing political culture to address fundamental questions of survival. Confidence in content easily outweighs the nervousness that results from shaping slogans and soundbites for uncertain and transitory electoral appeal. Undertaking a radical examination all the fundamental issues facing society gives a moral and intellectual force that withstands the triviality that typifies political debate. The only thing to insist on is to give examples of successful practice to buttress a statement of principle.

The social movements express demands for a peaceful and environment-conscious future or for community control or cooperative enterprise that, since outside of the pro-business agenda, are no longer expressed through the established party system. However, social movements which operate exclusively outside parliament suffer an implantation deficit. At best, they can bring pressure to bear upon the political process, but only as one more pressure or interest group amongst many. They would stand greater chance of translating their demands into public policy if the case could also be put in parliament. Despite understandable concerns to preserve autonomy from politics, particularly organised politics, to be politically effective the social movements, citizen campaigns need to find a place within the political system, a form of political engagement, given the fact that the conventional or official political sphere remains the principle arena which decides which issues figure on the political agenda and which commands the most public attention. There is an ecological imperative but there is also a political imperative for social, citizen and community movements to carve a political identity for themselves within the established arena. Which is not to abandon the social roots. On the contrary, political expression and representation is only effective if it is backed with social content, that is, if extra-parliamentary forces and local action groups continue to flourish in the associational space of civil society. Green politics requires that the party organisation at one end is in touch with and constantly nourished by the anti-party movement at the other end. The party is the unity and the movement is the diversity contained within. The party gives form to content, the content is the life force of the form. Green politics flourishes with grass-roots activism: citizen initiatives, community organisation, rank and file groups in the trade unions, alternative media, the peace movement and its members in the Green party.

The intention of The Green Party is not to become the environmental wing of the existing political system, becoming a mirror of the established parties. Alliance and coalition is not to help other parties maintain power and privilege but to work for practical policy and reforms.

Problems of environment, peace, society and the economy are of such a scale that their resolution is a matter of structural transformation that gets to root causes, not by crisis management and institutional adjustments. Politics is all about strategic compromise, working with others in order to achieve things that otherwise would not be achieved. Compromise for strategic purposes is not only acceptable but necessary given the diversity of agents and forces in the real world. At no point does strategic compromise imply compromise on fundamental principles concerning social and environmental justice, peace, sexual equality and the economy.

Green politics will have a future so long as the world faces the challenge of living in a sustainable way on the planet. The Green Party has no future if it attempts to win office and use government in the manner of the established parties. The history of ‘parliamentary ecologism’ has already been written. It is Ralph Miliband’s Parliamentary Socialism with different names. Coalition politics, networking with others, should be second nature to ecologists, and offers a way of ensuring that parliament represents the interests of all the people. Its origins as a social movement reveal The Green Party as a coalition. Given the symbiotic connection of the state and capital, parliaments have acted as the executive body for powerful interests.

Green politics seeks to ensure a form of political representation that is capable of responding to the demands of those who act and organise outside of parliament within communities. The Greens aim to democratize the political sphere, publicising issues outside of the stranglehold of business and finance, and presenting alternatives to the people. Green principles must be given political shape in the form of programmatic objectives, so that Greens engage in debate and discussion and face criticism armed with practicable alternatives. Backing principles with feasible projects and policies and connecting politics within parliament with politics in the everyday life world, Green parties should aim to inspire individuals to making an active contribution to the public life of their communities, thus shedding the hopelessness, despair, cynicism and apathy which conventional politics has brought them to.

The Green Party is half party and half social movement, the anti-party party that has one foot within the conventional political sphere and one foot in the real organisations and groups of the people as citizens. The learning process that begins in society proceeds to the political level and must be carried into effective public policy.





Many Greens seek a an alternative social order based on the idea of a self-reliant community, with the commune as a political means as well as a social end. For Rudolf Bahro, parliamentary road to sustainability is counter-productive. The required social transformation is so fundamental as to involve a complete change of consciousness through a strategic withdrawal from conventional politics. Bahro compares the predicament in the contemporary world with that of the Dark Ages after the fall of Rome, calling for a 'new Benedictine order' organized in a 'commune-type framework'. Commune living not only realises human fulfilment but enables the 'longer run-up' required for achieving radical goals (Rudolf Bahro, Building the Green Movement (London: GMP, 1986) pp. 87-91). 
The commune perspective assumes really is concerned with building a new civilisation rather than even large scale reform through existing institutions. ‘We dare to make an experiment … for the principle of a life beyond the currently valid norms and career paths of civilization’. 

The (relatively) autonomous basic unit of social life is no longer economically expansive (self-reliance) and is presented as the only long term chance of building human community. The communes are an alternative to the destructive and exploitative imperatives of the existing techno-bureaucratic structure.


Social transformation through commune living is also a self-transformation. Bahro’s argument rests on a philosophical anthropology in which commune organization corresponds to human nature, avoiding the alienating effects of overscale organization. The commune is the social form which reabsorbs social power from state, bureaucratic and economic institutions and organises it as social power.
As the basic social form of a more economical way of life, the commune is concerned less with economic production than with the production of a commune-type way of life. Economic requirements are not denied but are subordinated to social relationships so that imperatives of ecology and human self-fulfilment prevail. The material and institutional infrastructure of this civilisation is grounded in the commune network so as to check possibilities for the realienation of social power.

MOVEMENT AND PARTY
In Germany, the Green organization has always been known as ‘the Greens’, with no reference to the word "party". ‘The Greens’ were something different to a political party. Candidates for elective office were not political ‘leaders’ but delegates drawn from various local, grass-roots, citizen movements. As the ‘anti-party party’ the Greens sought to bridge the gap between extra-parliamentary social movements and the local and national legislatures. The Greens in parliament would serve to "supplement" activities in civil society. The Greens reject politics as a profession and a career so that Green candidates elected to office continue to work in their local organizations or citizen action groups.
Petra Kelly gave a classic definition of the original Green approach: ‘We aim to democratize parliament as much as possible, putting the issues, and the costs of solving them, squarely before the public. We must set ourselves uncompromising programmatic objectives in order to stimulate debate and discussion inside and outside parliament. A place in parliament, together with the success of a non-violent opposition movement in the streets, should, we hope, put us in a position to shake people out of their apathy and quiescence’ (Kelly Fighting for Hope).

The slogan used in Green politics, ‘neither left nor right but in front’, captures a couple of things distinctive about Green politics. It avoided the traditional but exhausted split in politics between left and right whilst at the same time steering clear of the pitfalls of the middle ground. A Green politics affirms the interdependence of all the parts within the whole but does so not by occupying some vacuous middle of the road but by situating itself firmly in the future. 

COGNITIVE PRAXIS
The problems facing the notion of a ‘Green politics’ date back to Plato’s question of how philosophy can come to rule. Green politics is in large part informed by science as well as by popular praxis. How can knowledge, theoretical and practical, shape politics. What is required is a theory of politics that conceives splits between left and right as a horizontal division that is part of a vertical ascent of levels of cognition. At the lowest rungs are desire, impulse and wants, then interests, self and collective, upwards to analysis, understanding, reason and wisdom. What matters most of all is not which side of the left-right divide the politics falls on but how far up the levels one can go. That is to conceive society, politics and evolution as a learning mechanism. It is to use the ancient Greek distinction between knowledge (nous) and opinion (doxa), emphasising that the solution to problems comes as we move forwards from the politics of opinion, where vested interests as well as impulses and inclinations prevail, to knowledge or reason, where ideas rule. That is the ‘forwards’ of the old Green slogan to me. And it is a forwards which respects the first law of ecology, the law of integrated systems. Left or right, the parts hold together and reinforce each other in an integrated whole.
The reasoning can be supported by rational choice theory, games theory, the prisoner’s dilemma. Two prisoners have been arrested and are being held in separate rooms. There is no contact between them. They are both offered deals. If both remain silent, they will each receive two years in prison, making four years in total. If one splits on the other, the one who talks goes free whilst the other receives eight years in prison, a total of eight years. If both talk, then each receives eight years, a total of sixteen years. Self-interest tells each to split on the other and so go free. Of course, the reasoning is symmetrical, they both think in the same self-interested way and so both receive eight years. Self-interest generates the worst possible outcome. The best outcome would be if both put the common good before self-interest and remained silent. The moral is that cooperative, communicative and communitarian structures and institutions ensure a common good which enhances the freedom of each individual and all individuals. Self-interest actually inhibits rather than enhances individual freedom. 

Kunzig and Broecker (2008) make a telling argument concerning the plight of the polar bears, the most dramatic and most highlighted example of the impact of global warming. With sea-ice coverage declining by 30 percent in the past twenty five years, the Arctic could be entirely ice-free in summer by the mid-twenty first century. The last time that this occurred was at least a million years ago. Polar bears are the public face of this dramatic event, with reports that some of them are drowning as they try to cross the increasing stretches of open water between ice floes in search of food. Even the Bush administration was moved, in 2006, to add polar bears to the U.S. government's list of threatened species, a step below "endangered." The Washington Post optimistically reported that the decision "could have an enormous political and practical impact" on U.S. policy on global warming.

That is the kind of wishful thinking that plagues environmental politics. ‘Televised pictures of clubbed and bloody seal pups, and highly publicized protests of the Canadian seal hunt, have never managed to end the hunt, even though it is an insignificant part of the global economy; in 2006, Canadian hunters killed more than three hundred thousand seals, about as many as when the protests started in the 1960s. So it seems unlikely that pictures of emaciated polar bears and even the threat of their extinction will convince the world to revolutionize the very foundation of the global economy—and it will take a revolutionary change to the energy supply system just to slow down global warming. (Even if we were to stop all emissions of carbon dioxide today, the planet would still warm by another 0.6 degree Celsius or so, as the ocean radiated to the atmosphere some of the excess heat it absorbs.) Human beings are not going to make that kind of effort, in our opinion, to save polar bears or any other wild organism. More powerful appeals to self-interest will be needed’ (Kunzig and Broecker 2008).

But just how is this ‘powerful appeal’ to be framed? At its most powerful, with the accent on the ‘self’, self-interest actually fosters the kind of short term self-maximisation of resources that is driving ecological crisis. The challenge is to avoid a dualism of extremes of altruism and egoism and this requires social relationships and institutions that connect each with all and all with longer range time scales.

The evidence that global warming actually kills people in large numbers is a powerful appeal to self-interest at its most basic level of survival. There is no need to make predictions of the doom to come. The World Health Organization has estimated that global warming is already responsible for 150,000 excess deaths a year. Considered alarmist when first published in 2002, it was made more plausible by the European heat wave of 2003. In the summer of that year, France and Italy recorded temperatures which were by far the warmest since records began in 1851, and probably the warmest since 1500. The heat wave caused between twenty-two thousand and forty-five thousand excess deaths. One can't give exact proof that global warming caused the heat wave and so many excess deaths, no more than a doctor can state precisely that smoking a pack of cigarettes a day caused a particular lung cancer. Such a level of proof is beyond the remit of any science. Ultimately, it is a matter of reasoned judgement. Certain things can be said. After modelling the summer of 2003, Peter Stott of the U.K. Met Office and his colleagues argued that global warming had made a heat wave of this magnitude at least twice as likely as before. Further, if CO2 emissions continue to grow at their current level, such heat waves will become more common than not by the mid twenty first century. 

The problem is that these warnings have been made many times before. The science is running far ahead of the governments and, indeed, the governed. As it always has done. It took a couple of centuries before Galileo’s findings finally found general acceptance. The difference now is that we don’t have a couple of centuries to evolve the necessary long term strategic thinking capacity. 

Substitute the ecological crisis for atomic energy below, and Mumford’s words in 1945 are apposite.

“Up to now, because of man's slow development, the human race has operated with a wide margin of error. Man has undoubtedly made many false starts, has handi​capped himself with radical maladaptations, and has gone down many blind alleys; but none of these errors proved fatal to the human race as a whole, even though this or that culture may have suffered for its perversities. Today the margin of error has narrowed to a hair-line. If we make a succession of serious mistakes in the exploitation of atomic energy, or even if we make a single critical mistake, we may actually sentence the better part of mankind to extinction. Since all of man's custom's and attitudes have been formed under a regime that allowed him far more latitude for error, he is insufficiently prepared for this emergency; and must therefore take extra steps to correct for the current aberration that "everything will come out right in time." With the cosmic power man now commands, he can no longer afford to make mistakes, at least in this realm; for the first mistake may be the last one’ (quoted in Mumford PROGRAMME FOR SURVIVAL 4)

The urgent nature of the scientific evidence and the tardy nature of political action needs explanation. ‘One reason is obvious as soon as you look at the color-coded world map in the WHO study, showing the number of deaths attributed to global warming in the year 2000. Almost none of them occurred in the developed CO2-spewing countries of the North; almost all occurred in poor tropical countries, above all in sub-Saharan Africa, because that's where the diseases promoted by warming occur (Kunzig and Broecker 2008).

That is the case for conceiving politics in terms of levels of cognition, knowledge and clear and distinct ideas rather than interests and opinion. But here is the problem. In the real world of necessity and interests and employment, individuals are governed more by the tangible than the intangible, by what they see, feel and touch than by what they think or are told to think. The ‘forwards’ in the ‘neither right nor left’ slogan refers to a future rather than a present, that long run in which we are all dead. At some point, Green politics needs to devise a practice which draws increasing numbers into a sphere which connects the tangible and intangible, allowing people to navigate their own way down the path to that ‘forwards’ of the ecological society of the future.

ECOLOGICAL PRAXIS
The Green Party used to characterise itself as the anti-party party. This captures something of the sense of the party as a broader social movement. Quite so. But party or movement, it cannot be anti-political. Politics matter and, at some point, ecological issues become matters of public controversy subject to intervention, alteration and change. The challenge is to keep pushing a Green ethic and agenda whilst avoiding both the twin reefs of fundamentalism and realism, the one too anti-political, the other absorbed in the very institutions of the world which is to be changed. Many Green parties have been drawn into the world of politics and instead of changing the world, have changed themselves.
To keep the above and the below in an interactive, organic fusion means going back to the grassroots and tapping into the social and human and natural roots that feed a genuinely Green politics. This requires that Greens start organising, campaigning and talking face to face, door to door, street to street, building a Green social identity neighbourhood by neighbourhood, community by community. And the purpose is more than building up electoral support for the Green Party. Seats in the council as well as in the national parliament are important but not all-important. The political philosopher Edmund Burke wrote of the ‘little platoons’ which are the strength of any society. A genuinely ecological politics is not hollow or top heavy but is grounded in this associational space of everyday life and activity, the very identities and purposes of the people.
Within this associational space, a definite agenda and a positive message can be generated and articulated. Grassroots organising is certainly an area where the institutional form of Green politics can be filled with content, the ecological message coming to be embedded in the social practices of the people. Any attempt to engineer change institutionally via the law and politics always runs the risk of neglecting or even overriding popular and social concerns, failing to evaluate the human consequences of such policy decisions. The Green Party has made great strides in recent years here, advocating social and economic policies which indicate the extent to which ecology is a social ecology. 
That said, there is a need to respect the distinction between ecologism and environmentalism and, at the same time, be aware of that environmentalism which is merely the green wing of the very techno-industrial system which is destructive of ecology. The principal beneficiaries of such actions arc the transnational corporations whose primary interest is the accumulation of capital and profit maximisation. The Green Party needs a practise which draws attention to the way that business interests backing the reaction against environmentalism have a history of working against the public interest and not for it, against communities rather than for them. This message has been delivered for many decades. Socialists and Marxists delivered many decades before. The lesson is not learned in abstraction. The TNCs have global reach and exploit this to determine what is produced, who produces it and how it is produced. Detached from any social and political movement and organisation, individuals feel powerless to resist such power and in the main are inclined to accept it as the ‘real world’. The message cannot be understood or accepted in abstraction from the real lives and practices of individuals. There is a danger of an institutional-social engineering Green politics merely being a head without a body. The Green Party needs to be part of a broad social movement in which environmentalists work with other campaign groups, with workers, with women, trade unions and other progressive organisations to address social, cultural and development issues, holding social and ecological justice together. And acting not just as campaigns bringing pressure to bear on those in power, but in some way getting into the practices of society drawing people together within the associational space of civil society, in some way prefiguring the future social order. Burke’s ‘little platoons’ in this way become ‘little republics’, reinvigorating public life from within and below, filling out the centre with active, solidaristic and organic content. 
Without this content forming the main body of Green politics and society, the environmental movement will not even exist as a movement. It will be all institutional form, any distinctive ideas or politics being absorbed by the other parties, becoming irrelevant and being forgotten.

Connecting ecology with social justice and equity issues is the right approach, as is a positive approach to politics. In many ways, a Green politics promises to restore politics to its ancient Greek origins in the broad public life of people as citizens and communities as poleis. The word politics derives from the Greek polites, meaning those interested in public affairs. The antonym of polites is idiotes, meaning those interested only in private affairs. Modern politics lacks public life in this sense, with individuals conceived as – and conceiving themselves as – voters and taxpayers rather than as citizens. Any politics which addresses individuals as only or as mainly voters and taxpayers will necessarily have to make an appeal to self-interest – private idiocy in the Greek sense – or fall victim to it.





A Green politics still holds the promise of an ecopolis, an active civic public practising citizen democracy in a functional and organic sense, grounding in social practices and identities of the people in the everyday lifeworld of solidary exchange, reciprocity and interaction.
If The Green Party and the environmental movement as a whole act independently of each other – and of others who are outside of any organised politics, then they can be easily isolated and contained by any anti-environmental reaction. And there is the old problem upon which socialism foundered, the fact that capitalism is not a public domain subject to politico-institutional alteration but a regime of private accumulation. As Ralph Miliband noted back in the sixties, the state does not determine but is determined. Socialism’s thrust to create a social democratic state was from the first radically compromised by the institutional and systemic reality of the structure and imperatives of the process of private capital accumulation. This  is the central dynamic of the global economy, upon which all states rest, upon which all communities and people depend. In these circumstances, politics is very easily fragmented into primary and secondary interests. Vested interests easily triumph by polarisation, making employment and self-interest the primary interest, the issues of most concern to most people, claiming that ‘the system’ is the best way of satisfying these interests. The environmental interest is all too easily defined as a secondary interest, put further down the agenda, to be tackled only when the primary concerns have been finally addressed. The system keeps everyone prisoners to an undeliverable promise, exploiting its necessity as a hope.
The Green Party has been quite right to emphasise that the environmental interest is also a livelihood interest, and that environmental issues are connected closely to social issues, and that ecological sustainability is also economic survival. What is now required is an expansive approach that broadens the base of environmentalism within social practises, in the lives of communities, addressing quality of life concerns, issues of local governance, municipal and public services etc. There is a need to renew the public domain by building and uniting large citizens' alliances, forming a positive counter-point to the anti-public life, self-interested appeal of taxpayers’ alliances. Building public life from below is the only way ultimately of checking deregulated finance and the uncontrolled power of capital.

Coalition politics is the future in a networked and networking society. Digital technologies are speeding interconnections and increasing information flows. And information is power, which is why states and corporations fight for exclusive access and control. Coalition is more that party alliances at the level of political government but a way of working within the public life of community. Common cause can be made and common ground can be found between environmental groups, human rights activists, development groups and so on. By making common cause and uniting on common ground, the fact of political isolation and the feeling of political alienation can be overcome, becoming the base of further action. Grassroots community-based action not only influence the political process but form the content of the reinvigorated public life. The Green Party needs to highlight and publicise – and in some way connect and connect to - the many examples around the world where the empowerment of activism is succeeding in overcoming political disillusionment. Social and environmental groups need to work together and broaden out to build coalitions within nations and across continents. 
Again, it is time to look again at the old Green slogan of ‘think globally, act locally’. The slogan captures the interdependence of the local and the global. Terry Eagleton bemoans the fact that as capitalism has gone bigger with globalisation, large sections of the Left started to think small. The Green Party has always thought big. Ecology is an issue wholly in the tradition of the universal aspirations of the radical tradition. With the globalisation of economic relations, it is the world that is getting smaller, making it easier to think big. The technical and institutional and digital integration of the world is principally being organised around interests of finance, commerce and industry. The global social and environmental problems that also follow are of interest to all. The Green Party needs to be part of a global environmental movement that is capable of responding to these challenges, working with and drawing together other groups where common interest can be found. All over the world, movements are growing contesting the power of the TNCs and capital, demanding managed trade as against ‘free’ trade, and fighting the plundering of biodiversity and natural resources by transnationals. Isolated and independent, these groups can be resisted and contained, even suppressed.

Finally, The Green Party is often criticised for being negative, focusing upon the problems of economic growth and development. In many respects the criticism is unfair and is a plain example of scaremongering and scapegoating amongst political and economic groups with an interest in denigrated the Green message. A principle to adhere to is to always present coherent solutions – or commitments to finding solutions where none are clear - when pointing out problems. Again, working in alliance with other groups, environmentalists have to become problem solvers, committing themselves to finding viable solutions which command popular support. Again, this means working with people as citizens rather than as taxpayers and voters. To just protest at the inequality of world trade and the global environmental, social and health problems associated with globalisation is a necessary but in no way a sufficient condition of a successful Green politics. There is an analogy with chess here. Any move made can only be justified in terms of some overall strategy and desirable conclusion. At some point, there has to be an end game. Green thought, action and organisation must have as its end the ecological society. The Green Party must offer positive solutions to the problem identified and outline the contours of a Green polity and a Green economy as a feasible, coherent, potentially popular alternative to the current economic system. A movement which simply exploits ills which are obvious to most people will quickly exhaust itself through want of an alternative, popular protest fading into apathy and hopelessness. An alternative gives an end point and gives the hope which motivates effort.

THE PUBLIC REALM AND THE CAPITAL SYSTEM
A weakness of the broad approach can be a blurring of distinctions. Much that passes for sustainable development is merely economic development with a greenwash and plainly contradicts the goals of environmental as well as social justice. One hears the words of James Lovelock here, who refers the Green wing of the environmentally destructive techno-urban system. How about a concept of sustainable living? For all of the, often worthy, attempts to make incremental progress in greening production and consumption, there is still no shying away from difficult questions, making business face up to its responsibilities and making the public aware of some awkward realities. There is plenty about the investment, production and employment of the economic system that may never be sustainable. Do The Greens have a strategy that shows how a system organised around economic growth, that slippery euphemism for capital accumulation, can be replaced by a viable and functioning economic order? In making this case, The Greens will have to work with others to somehow bring private capital subject to public control, regulating their ecological, social and cultural impact in the public interest.

Whilst business remains unaccountable and unsustainable, its symbiotic relation with the political system continues. This is the corruption of public life, a public realm that has been captured by private priorities, vested interests and lobbyists. The relationship has to be challenged and changed. Once more, this is a question that is bigger than the divisions of Left and Right and once more points to the question of how we live and how we want to live. It is a question of civilisation, involving questions must bigger than the distribution of power and resources to address the question of the ultimate purpose of life and living. If we are to have ecologically sound sustainable living based on social justice and equity, then we need a politics that projects this as an ideal rooted in real possibilities in the present, identifying in current developments those elements and forces possessing social futurity and which point towards an alternative future. 

The current economic system, organised around the central dynamic of accumulation, cannot deliver sustainable living based on environmental justice and equity. But this criticism, under the alternative institutions requirements, begs the question of a vision of a coherent and realisable economic model that can deliver sustainable living. If the goal is social and environmental justice and equity, then there needs to be a system where people and planet are prioritised rather than profit. Which, ultimately, is to ask whether The Green Party specifically and Green politics generally is reformist or revolutionary. But here is another way of approaching the difficult politics: conceive revolution as a process rather than an event, a slow, organic accumulation of change and self-change in which the means are the ends in the process of becoming. ‘The revolution’, as such, is merely the end product of prior evolution based on creative praxis constitutive of social order. 

Which is to underline again the slogan, neither Left nor Right but forwards. That forwards is the new social order of harmony, proportion and balance. By applying the first law of ecology, the law of integrated systems, a genuinely Green politics affirms an interactive cooperation between the parts within the whole to tip the scales towards harmony, proportion and balance. The new millennium is an opportunity to rebuild civilisation beyond the age of excess. With the dominant economic  systems  in disarray, the global environmental movement seems uniquely placed to serve as a vehicle for creating a new civilisation beyond instrumental power and monetary wealth.

Curiously, capitalism is failing for much the same reason that communism failed, an excessive, inflated material power abstracted from human nature within and nature without. Monetary ties are the most ephemeral of ties. Long before the full effects of ecological crisis become apparent, even before the long predicted collapse of the economic system comes to pass, capitalism seems ready to fall as a result of a moral implosion. Capitalism and communism seem to be the two sides of the same materialist coin, not a materialism rooted in a sensuous human nature based on human capacities, potentialities and loyalties, but an empty, denatured materialism possessed by covetousness and greed. Environmentally, both capitalism and communism have been disastrous. But if capitalism isn’t working, the question is still begged as to what socio-economic order can be put into place to provide long-term secure employment, on which individuals and communities can base a sustainable future.


This presentation of a viable constructive model of a sustainable social order could be the ultimate challenge facing the various Green parties of the world. Do they have an alternative, do they have an end game, do they have a process that shows progression from here to there? To find a global political and economic system that provides sustainable living without destroying the planet. To achieve a balance between the need for employment and security and the need for environmental protection. To formulate the practical politics that support an ecologically sustainable world, in which individuals order their existence within a civic public grounded in community democracy, equality and justice. Local empowerment via eco-cities and eco-communities is the way to connect people to the global agenda, offering an alternative to the top down global repression of the local that is the result of a globalisation in which the TNCs are the main agencies of power and control. This is to offer a locally grounded associative civil public against the unregulated anarchic global sweatshop ‘governed’ by all-powerful transnational corporations who use their structural power and global reach to cow nation states. The reaction has given the environmental movement the opportunity to expose to public controversy some of the private economic forces which are working to block social and environmental justice in the present and sustainable living in the future.

NEITHER LEFT NOR RIGHT
So is The Green Party left wing or right wing? There are plenty, particularly those schooled in Marxist political economy, who urge Greens to be more clear that the problem is not some general ‘industrialism’ as such but the way that industrialisation is organised within capitalist relations. The problem is that the record of Socialist socialisation – as collectivisation and nationalisation, reformist and revolutionary – does seem to indicate an environmentally destructive logic in an instrumental and institutional conception of industry and technology. There are others who point to the more right wing lineage of Green politics, the Nazi worship of Nature for instance (actually, the Nazis exploited the general German love of Nature). And the phrase ‘eco-fascist’ can be heard every now and then. Certainly, right wing figures and leaders have been ecologists. Take Theodore Roosevelt, who played a leading role in the modern conservation movement, leading the revulsion against the unregulated and unreflecting mining of the land and destruction of biological capital, to replace exploitation by deliberate, scientific policies of conservation. One thinks also of Jan Smuts and his ‘Holism and Evolution’. There is plenty in that book which forms an essential part of an ecological politics. Smuts writes of the ‘subtle interdependence of functionings in an organic field’, an organism in which ‘everything functions as influenced and modified internally by everything else; and the result is not so much due to this or that element, this or that factor or gene by itself, as to the inter-relations between the factors in the general structure and field.’ Smuts refers to the ‘internal organic field constituted by the reciprocal inter-relations of the parts in the cell or the organism’. Here we have a principal of the ‘structural and functional evolution of organisms’ which takes place in response to environmental influence. External and internal fields together form the ‘total milieu for all happening and change in connection with organisms. And whatever takes place in this total field does so holistically, that is to say, not in isolation but in reciprocal and mutual association with all other functioning within that field. The past, the future, the internal elements in the organic structure as well as its external environment, all form integral features in the total field of an organism, influencing its functioning and its evolution.’

That principle is neither left nor right, it forms the centre as one of harmony and balance. That is the forwards towards which ecological politics must progress. That defines the centre of sustainable living as one of interactive cooperation in which the parts grow and flourish together in a functioning order.

Without shying away from the awkward questions that need to be directed to constituted power and business interests, there is a need to radicalise whilst keeping touch with the centre. There is a clear risk that Green politics can be dragged back down and into the sharp political polarities of Left and Right, becoming identified in the public's mind with political radicalism, unreasonable measures to protect nature, Government spending and unpopular ‘Green taxes’, and the endangerment of job security as a result of eco-friendly measures. There are more than enough ‘boo words’ in there for ideologues to play with to incite and feed popular fears. To repeat, there is only so much ground a genuinely ecological politics can make in the world of opinion. That world builds upon the tangibles of an already constituted social and economic order. Green politics will not triumph at that level but can be easily targeted, labelled, marginalised and contained. The future lies in the intangible centre of the future, that forwards of integrated systems and interactive cooperation of the parts, the process in which the sustainable future emerges as a result of a present praxis. This can only be brought about by citizens, not by voters and taxpayers.
The way that Greens are portrayed as ‘Red’ or communist subversives in ecological guise, threatening employment and consumption and lifestyles for their own ‘political’ ends may well be a travesty. But current politics is a world of opinion, not of knowledge and truth. The more of a threat Greens become, the more this hostile invective will be spewed against them. The solution is to avoid a politics abstracted from people and place and instead occupy that ‘neither left nor right’ centre by affirming the first principle of ecology, the law of "integrated systems." This is a genuinely ecological politics in that it models sustainable living on the way that nature actually functions, according to a principle pf interactive cooperation. This is clearly the antithesis of self-interested behaviour, of reductionism, isolationism and individualism but emphasises real reciprocal relations between the parts within an interdependent whole. Bring the whole community within an expanded centre ground and it becomes impossible for vested interests, political operators and media ideologues to find the target to isolate and hit. 

GLOBAL ECOLOGY MOVEMENT
A way needs to be found to live the ‘think global, act local’ slogan. Green politics starts locally, but it doesn’t end there. Connecting the local and the global is the way of constituting the universal. At present, the transnationals are the principal agents of globalisation. The TNCs are in command of vast processes of trade, investment, employment and production. They decide what is produced, where it is produced and how it is produced. With global priorities and exploiting a global reach, the TNCs tower over national governments, let alone labour organisations, community activists and ecological groups. There is a global repression vis fragmented, diverse social and ecological organisations.

A cohesive global ecology movement and a unified course of action have yet to be established. All over the world, grass-roots movements, community organisations, activist organizations, and green parties are mobilising to bring pressure to bear on national governments and business interests. Can these form the basis of a global counter-public, formed of associative civic publics within nations? Individuals as citizens of a public life as against taxpayers and voters. Constituting the world as known as against delivering opinion. Politics, even opinion, remain important. All across Europe, green parties continue to win ground and gain seats at every level within the political process. And political action remains important. Ultimately, environmental action means change and means policy. But form needs content. The number of environmental pressure groups and advocacy societies is flourishing, with such groups as Greenpeace, Environmental Action, The Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, and The Nature Conservancy all demonstrating growing memberships. 

GREEN POLITICS AND VISION
The fact that many Green demands and ideas are being acted upon and absorbed into the political mainstream is a sign of success but also a challenge to move to the next stage. In the very least, we are witnessing the partial realisation of many of the Greens' most far-reaching demands. This success is a mere beginning and an encouragement to continue along these lines. There is a danger that gains may become conservative positions to defend rather than centres for further progress in the direction of the dissolution of military blocs; the withdrawal of nuclear weapons; the end of nuclear power; the inclusion of ecological considerations into urban planning and economic development; the diffusion of economic power; community empowerment; the protection of the integrity of local cultures. The Green Party needs to live up to its claim to think globally by absorbing issues like global warming, the greenhouse effect, deforestation, the poisoning of water tables etc into policy and practice. New thinking about the relationship of human civilisation to nature is given practical, institutional shape in the form of new political and economic structures.

The Green Party needs to retain its vision of a pacified existence beyond industrialism. Greens need to be in the forefront of evolving a vision of an ecological society. And they need to retain that commitment to an ideal. Even as they take their place within coalition governments managing a present, Green parties need to retain that vision of an alternative future. The danger is that politics gains a hold and a momentum of its own and the need to court electoral popularity and protect temporary political successes comes to outweigh the vision of a different future. Any number of books detail this tendency to inertia and conservatism in Green political organisation (Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe Michael O Neill 1997 Ashgate). The reason that such a political approach fails ultimately is that it is rooted in little more than opinion, resting upon the vagaries and interests of individual opinion as electors and taxpayers. The bottom up approach of building the associative civil public as against a top heavy concentration on the party is the only secure, long term basis for Green politics.

Despite tremendous internal struggles, particularly the inherent split between realists and fundamentalists, and despite the obvious ethical dilemmas and intellectual pains of political compromises, the various Green parties of the world remain the most articulate political expression of an alternative politics. The challenge is to canalise the deep-lying discontent with the current state of affairs with an ecological sensibility. The danger lies in being drawn, by electoral success, into the conventional political spectrum which is falling further and further into disrepute. In all four continents, individuals are acting and joining together to envision and create the foundations for a Green world, free of the constraints and imperatives of state, corporate, commercial, financial and military domination.

How to confront this domination without losing a base in place and people is the task confronting Green politics, forging centres of popular community resistance to alien power in all its forms. In every part of the world Green parties and environmental groups have been at the forefront of efforts to protect rainforests and soils, combat pollution and develop alternative technologies and economic policies, connecting ecological issues with a burgeoning community and cooperative movement, developing a powerful consciousness of the connections between political and personal changes. The world over, the Greens are committed to racial and sexual equality, political independence and nonviolence.

How does this impact on Britain? Can a new ecological politics take hold in Britain, where a temporary coalition has replaced the old two party interchange, but with no discernible departure from the same old politics? The problem with an electoral politics is that it is too bound up with the world of opinion – with all of the limitations of political discourse and exchange and media reporting – to really succeed in breaking through to a genuine appreciation of ecological issues. The opinion-shapers in politics, the press and the televisual media will narrow the parameters of ‘reasonable’ debate within an acceptance of egoistic, competitive values as the norm. Private greed continue to trump public good. To repeat, this discourse addresses people as taxpayers and voters and encourages them to identify themselves as such. That narrows the sphere of the political whereas a Green politics can flourish only with its expansion. That can come only by broadening the base and absorbing increasing numbers and groups into an active centre. As voters and taxpayers, individuals do not seek to change the world, only protect the comfortable life they have achieved for themselves within it. Such an approach is sceptical and even hostile towards grand public programmes for change. Green politics needs content within society to strengthen the political form.

The potential for forming this content exists. Accepting the vagaries of polling, there is ample evidence of increasing numbers in most countries coming to place a high priority upon the protection of the natural environment. All of the supposed primary interests of economic wealth, military security and other such national obsessions count for nothing if people lack air to breathe, water to drink and food to eat. Individuals from all backgrounds, class, race, creed, are changing their lifestyles, demanding changes in institutions, practices and policies and participate in Earth Day celebrations, with a view to bringing the built social and urban environment in line with a more respectful attitude towards the planet and all other species upon it.

The Green Party is right to practise a social ecology. Environmental justice and social justice are one and the same commitment within an interdependent whole. An increasing unity around environmental issues needs to be associated with a commitment to social justice and equity. For all of the repeated mantras concerning the failure, the collapse and the end of socialism, society remains sharply divided between rich and poor, haves and have-nots, between classes. It is now apparent – or ought to be apparent – that the prosperity and economic vitality of recent years has been a debt fuelled illusion, speculation, finance, consumption and has been accompanied by the entrenchment of new metropolarities within the global urban environment. As the walls came down in Eastern Europe, they were going up all over the western world as the rich – averse to spending their money for the public purpose – spend fortunes to form gated communities and gentrified neighbourhoods, purchasing holiday homes in the country or abroad. The divisions between left and right appear as a mere echo of a long departed politics as individuals use their money as votes and consumerism ravages what remains of the public life of the community (The City of Quartz Mike Davis 1990).

Many years ago the American sociologist C. Wright Mills proposed a ‘big split' between work and leisure. Mills’ point was that the work ethic has been replaced by the leisure ethic. When work and leisure compete, 'leisure wins hands down'. Mills is scathing of the deleterious effects of the leisure ethic: 'Each day men sell little pieces of themselves in order to try to buy them back each night and weekend with the coin of "fun"'. 
The point is that leisure does not provide the fulfilment which is denied in the work undertaken to earn the coin of fun. Consumption is no substitute for production and no compensation for alienated labour. The techniques of mass persuasion and manipulation have been employed to stupefy ‘the masses’ via the leisure industry with organized spectator sport, gambling, ‘movies’, radio and television. These leisure ‘activities’ offer stupefaction rather than fulfilment. Mass leisure activities 'astonish, excite and distract but they do not enlarge reason or feeling, or allow spontaneous dispositions to unfold creatively'. They create a fantasy world into which the masses escape in non-work hours, a world in which 'the amusement of hollow people rests on their own hollowness and does not fill it up'.

In the final analysis, individuals will only do what they enjoy doing. The best way to fight the allures of consumption is to recover that Aristotelian sense of public life. For Aristotle, the human being is a zoon politikon, a social-political animal who is capable of individuating himself/herself within a politikon bion, a public life. This entails an ethic of virtue and a notion of flourishing based on the realisation of human potentialities and exercise of human capacities. For Aristotle, you are what you repeatedly do. Again, it is a notion that points towards the notion of a citizen democracy composed of an active, informed citizenry. There is a principle of Vico’s New Science which holds that the condition of knowing something is to have made it – verum ipsum factum. To make the world, to know the world, to realise one’s potentialities and exercise one’s capacities in the process is precisely Plato’s point that virtue is its own reward. This is a far richer sense of human being than anything contained in the hollow world of consumerism, a citizen democracy of functional representation against a consumer democracy. An active civic public takes the place of a manipulated mass society. When production – what people actively do - and consumption – what people passively do – compete, consumption wins out. And it wins out over politics, private interest taking priority over public good. 

Whilst many people are seeking a pacified existence which heals the human relationship with the earth, connecting nature within with nature without, many others are using environmentalism as a rationalization for remaining part of the culture of exploitation and selfishness, giving self-interest the veneer of an ‘enlightened’ or even ‘green’ form of consumerism. Greenwash. The ecological way of life is captured and re-presented as yet another commodity to be bought and sold. How to break the hold of consumerism and the atomism and passivity and isolationism of a consumer culture is a major challenge. This is a privatism quite beyond politics, that depoliticises. Individuals confronted with their own isolation in an increasingly insecure and atomized society have abandoned notions of community, collective action and public life to pursue their own private fortunes. With this cult of selfishness comes a rejection of public purpose, known by the boo word of ‘big government’, and a rejection of redistributive, egalitarian policies in the name of social justice. The symbiosis of state and corporate capital has succeeded in suppressing citizen space and public life so that all that remains is a depoliticised space of atomised, ‘apolitical’ voters and taxpayers. All such people want to know about politics is that it costs them as little of their tax as possible. No appeal to reason and morality and science is possible at this level. Green politics needs a gamebreaker and a game changer. Green politics needs to form a coalition of the willing within society itself, addressing the best, the active, the informed and the intelligent and forming these into a coherent movement, in time drawing those who finally understand the hollowness of consumption and privatism into an expanding centre. Utopian? Read how increasing numbers of the best and the most intelligent within the Roman Empire abandoned posts and careers and rejected hollow materialism and power to form the new Christian civilisation. We are looking at a cultural, moral and psychological transformation as the only secure basis for long term sustainable living.

It is a time of seeking and a time of seeing. A new spiritual yearning is making its presence felt in large segments of our society. Many people are seeking a new ethical underpinning for their lives. The Oxford moral philosopher Toby Ord has made a commitment to practise his ethics and has committed a third of his lifetime’s earnings to charity. And there are signs that the world’s religions are becoming proactive on the implications of climate change and are relating ecology to a rebirth in spirituality.


The Green Party needs to tread carefully. As a political party, it has no choice but to participate in the political arena. It needs policies and it needs to contribute and be a player, or else risk being dismissed as a political lightweight, fit only for protest around single issues. But it needs to perform the delicate task of being in and against the political sphere as currently constituted. It would be ironic that as conventional politics becomes increasingly discredited, The Green Party, having proclaimed themselves the ‘anti-party party’, the party of a ‘new politics’, should become identified with the failures and hypocrisies of the ‘old politics’. The Green Party needs to have more social content and community content than individuals as taxpayers and voters afford.

There are lessons here from the fate of party political socialism. The more socialism came to abstracted from the social space which formed its premise and its promise, the more it abandoned its principles for a managerial politics that offered shallow, bureaucratic solutions to fundamental social problems. Individuals continually express a frustration with and even a contempt for the methods and institutions of conventional politics. A moral and political vacuum is opening up, one which the ideologists and opinion formers of press, radio and television fill up with their own highly loaded and manipulative populism. Listen to any radio/TV discussion, read any newspaper article on the science of climate change and despair. 

Despite the denigration of the science, the ecological crisis shows no signs of going away. The nature of the crisis is unprecedented. James Lovelock is reported to have said that the human race is too stupid to save itself. What he actually argued is that the human race has reached this far by maximising resources for itself in the short run, whereas what the human race needs now is to develop a long range strategic thinking capacity that secures the global commons for each and all. The human race has yet to evolve the long range strategic thought capacity required to secure the long term common good.

That is an issue of psychology, culture and evolution. This is a far reaching transformation which is well beyond the arena of conventional politics. It is far too late to expect a solution to emerge from within the conventional political spectrum. And it is probably futile to expect such a thing to emerge from within conventional politics in the first place. In his book Parliamentary Socialism, Ralph Miliband argues that the vision of realising socialism via parliament died in 1931. It took an awful long time for socialists to get the message. And that is the danger of the route of electoral politics. The party becomes so intoxicated with the successes and gains along the way that eventually the means displace the end and the party becomes hooked on the path rather than proceeding to journey’s end.

The danger is that The Green Party comes to abandon the possible recruits it may make to its ‘new politics’ to focus on maximisation its vote. The Green Party needs to keep its connection with the ecologically-minded individuals who are starting to express not just a new politics, but a new ethics based on a new ecological sensibility that can reawaken the life-affirming impulses captured by the Aristotelian notion of flourishing. 

A new planet centred moral sensibility which combines social and environmental justice and equity is being articulated in a variety of ways, from a broad range of sectors within society. Scientists, bioregionalists, ecofeminists, community organisers, cooperators, spiritual healers, earth-centred poets and any number of other people from all walks of life are articulating a vision which points to the evolution of new modes of thought, action and organisation relating people to place and planet.
For all their talk about democracy, community, and freedom, the global agenda of political and business elites seeks to limit individual rights and subject people’s lives to surveillance. The only ecology these elites are acting on is an ecology of fear. Police replaces polis as public life diminishes and individuals are marginalised into an atomised private sphere. At the same time of this global repression, the political and institutional constraints on corporations are relaxed. Freedom and repression go together. Economic activity can only be free to proceed without restriction if the rights of people in communities to live their own lives and protect themselves from the system's abuses are restricted from above and policed from below.

The Green movement is charged with renegotiating the local-global relation in a way that enhances freedom of individuals in communities and restructures power. These are the values that The Green Party exists to give an active political expression to. 
There are many diverse grassroots movements and groups in existence. Since the survival of the species is a universal issue, it follows that a Green politics must be committed to a universal ethic and seek to fit the various parts together in an integrated whole, discovering how ecological principles of interactive cooperation can inform a practise leading to the necessary social transformation. 

Of course, this is question begging and suggests a number of points.
1) The way to beat mass management and manipulation of private individuals from above is to create a dynamic content from below by forging the various ecological currents together to create an integrated whole that is greater than the sum of its interrelating individual parts. 
2) The Green Party embodies an ecological sensibility that transforms individuals’ lives and offers a means for people to associate together and work for social change.
3) In acting locally and thinking globally, the Greens’ need to demonstrate how local autonomy is both preserved and strengthened as Green values are embodied and articulated within expanded spaces of public expression on a regional, national and global scale.
4) The Green Party needs to be clear about not just the possibilities of participating within the conventional political arena but also the limitations. There is history here. Participation at this level is not new and illusory claims and expectations are soon followed by cynicism, despair and apathy. Achieve what can be achieved but keep affirming possibility beyond institutional constraints.
5) The Green Party must affirm an expansive notion of ‘the political’ which recognises the mutual relationship between personal, social and political changes.

Greens are to be found in many walks of like, working in many different arenas and using many different approaches. Unity in diversity is a key principle, how to achieve universality canalising and enhancing difference without suppressing it. Many individuals focus their activities on specific issues, many are active on local and regional issues. Yet in one way or another, no matter how particular and local, a great deal of these issues and concerns originate in the predations and excesses of the global corporate economy. Thinking globally means thinking big, and it means looking at new ways of constituting the universal. Acting locally in the community interest is shown to counter the social and ecological destruction concomitant with the materialistic order. 

There is plenty of material here to give content to the associative civic public, with social movements forming a counter-public to the conventional political arena and developing new modes of political expression and organisation such as community organizing, referendum campaigns, legal interventions, and direct nonviolent actions to contest ecologically and socially disruptive policies and projects.

This oppositional approach becomes constitutive of a new public life in its more reconstructive aspects. There is currently a plethora of experiments in cooperation and local democracy in areas of community living and politics and workplace organisation and all of which suggest potential for living alternatives to present modes of operation. These variety of efforts and activities include developing alternative technologies, founding cooperatives of all kinds, and raising ecological sensibility. 

For the Green Party to develop and grow it needs to strike roots in a genuine public life constituted by social and civic activism and see itself clearly as a part of a wider Green movement. This suggests the notion of integrated systems and interactive cooperation again, combining oppositional and reconstructive strategies, going beyond right and left to form a new expanded centre beyond division and polarity, connecting local and global, allowing all currents in their diversity and autonomy to feed, support and strengthen the centre.

Issue-based politics without the universal vision can be politically inhibiting and personally frustrating. Nothing succeeds like success. Broad alliance, common cause and most of all movement can draw people in. Many people may be discontented with the status quo, but lack the motivation to act because they see no alternative. Atomised and isolated, apathy and hopelessness follows and the world of manipulated opinion drowns the little shoots of truth and knowledge. Even where many involved in particular issues achieve success, they can be worn down by the emergence of new complications. Action needs to be taken at appropriate level. You are what you repeatedly do. People will do something that they enjoy. People will be soon exhausted by sermonising appeals and tough science. Get people acting – verum ipsum factum. They will go beyond the manipulated vagaries of opinion to know the world as their own creation. And that knowledge will be embodied in the associational civic public. 
The globalisation of economic relations is creating the technical and institutional conditions that makes it possible to live up to the old Green slogan ‘think globally, act locally’.

A more integrated world economy furnishes the foundation for a global ecology, with the erosion of nationalism, state power, reduced military conflict, and an increasing uniformity of conditions for people everywhere. The idea gives new life to the original idea of a socialist international based on an international proletariat which is in command of forces of production which have been universally developed.
Local impacts of the military-industrial complex, local urban-rural and ecological problems, local attempts to create alternatives satisfying basic needs of food distribution, shelter, water access upwards all offer a focus for local activities that carry a global message. Local action is a practical demonstration of the power of real people to really change things for the better. By highlighting action which proceeds primarily on the local level, Greens identify the grass roots basis for real change, giving new life to the old notion of praxis, change in circumstances as a change in consciousness, a self-change. Again, individuals joining and working together become change-agents, seeing themselves as makers of their own worlds, active, informed citizens converting their place and space from exchange value to use value.

The nature of locally oriented work is small scale and isolated; it can fail to ensure action proceeds to a more effective level. Local problems often have their origin outside of the locality, hence the need to connect local action with a global orientation. A Green sensibility should make the necessary connections and generate the capacity to link together specific issues. For instance, areas dependent upon arms industries can organise and campaign in defence of arms production in the interest of local employment and investment. Yet these local arms industries fuel the arms race, distort employment and investment patterns in a region, and often produce the largest quantities of toxic wastes. A clear example of where a global ecology perspective can infuse local action. Ultimately, capital is a global power, and in more than geography. An overall strategy integrating groups, organisation and groups is required to foster the ‘global’ consciousness required for genuine, long term solutions. In this specific instance, local action can be reoriented toward converting arms production to socially and ecologically sound uses, affirming community and worker control and transforming the nature of economic and technological change. Will the workers campaigning to protect employment in communities dependent on arms production be convinced? Any more than workers in the car industry, workers involved in any production perceived to be ecologically unsound? Alternative ecological industry and technology in the green collar economy has to be the key. Failure to persuade important sections of the working class leaves Green politics without a social and structural power.
There is a clear fracture here in that large sections of marxism’s exploited proletariat are quite comfortable in their exploitation, so long as employment and investment come their way. Far from being the gravediggers of capitalism, these sections of the working class seem to be the strongest defenders of the system and perceive The Greens’ as working against their material interests. The local action of these groups is a sectional and selfish action, not at all global and paying no regard to the universal ethic. It is a form of collective self-interest. A global ecology has to provide the universal mentality that encourages people to locate their particular interest in a wider ethic. And the key may be the presentation of a clear institutional and infrastructural alternative.

Large development projects often destroy green spaces and prime farmland, wildlife habitats and communities, while centralizing the control of a local economy and its technology and energy in fewer hands. Paradoxically, workers will happily forfeit community, control and democracy in return for employment. In practical terms, this is much more of a problem than media bias against climate science and ecological politics. 
The Green Party needs to take the fight to these areas, promoting local democracy, control and community by integrating development issues in the public interest. Again, the emphasis is on promoting use value over exchange value. By articulating the interconnections among campaigns and issues, highlighting the ecological aspects of local efforts and activities, and affirming a ‘global’ social and ecological vision which relates the parts to the whole, a Green politics is oriented towards transcending the limitations of local issue-oriented politics. Obviously very difficult, but we are talking about moving forwards to a new biocentric civilisation and such an ideal involves a change in values and practices, not a passive evolution.

Traditionally, coalitions of local organisations and interest groups are very narrowly defined. A number of organizations join together around a specific set of common concerns. The coalition's remit is limited to a lowest common denominator of what the different groups can agree upon. And with limited objectives satisfied, groups drop out of the coalition, lacking interest or motivation to pursue larger goals, maybe even disagreeing with further objectives.

Green politics involves a qualitatively different kind of coalition, more broad and long range, uniting individuals by a larger vision of an ecologically-transformed society. This implies a new mode of coalition-building, developing organisational, intellectual and community capacities and pooling these cultural and social resources to promote popular empowerment of people in a community setting. How many groups can be coordinated within a broad coalition? It depends on the extent to which particular interests involve a universal claim and commitment — anti-pollution groups, peace and anti-nuclear organizations, students, gays and lesbians, ecologists, trade unionists. 

MOVEMENTISM AND COALITION POLITICS
There is a danger of a naïve ‘movementism’. Groups, campaigns, organisations have particular interests and often very narrow, sectional or single issue aims. There may not be a common cause, although they may have a common enemy – the impact of global economics in specific areas. Somewhere, the objective must be to create a Green polity and this, in the view presented here, is an associative civic public based on a welter of intermediary associations. The words of Jurgen Habermas outlining the contours of a ‘new politics’ are appropriate here. The ‘new politics’ centres on 'the peace movement, the anti-nuclear and environmental movement, minority liberation movements, the movement for alternative lifestyles, the tax protest movement, religious fundamentalist protest groups and, finally, the women's movement' (Roderick, 1986, p. 136). However, these groups are mainly oppositional whereas the creation of a civic public requires a reconstructive approach also. And not all protest is emancipatory or in the public interest. The various groups, campaigns, organisations etc need to be evaluated for their emancipatory potential, distinguishing between those that seek 'particularistic' change and 'those that seek fundamental change from a universalistic viewpoint'. 

For all of the claims that identity politics forms a new politics, the result seems to be a transformation of culture and lifestyle within rather than against existing power structures and relations. Back in the 1980s Eric Hobsbawm warned that the great principles, struggles and slogans of the Left are universalistic and apply to all human beings equally. Without this universal ethic and there is no Left left. One returns to the point that as capital went big, went global, the Left started thinking small. The key is to identify the universal implications of particular struggles and unite the particular together in a general emancipation. At present, the ecology movement is the movement which seeks fundamental transformation from a universalistic viewpoint. An ecological society requires a fundamental transformation in power relations and the social structure to ensure public good in a concrete life situation.

The source of social transformation is located in a sphere which is not opposed to particular consequences but is totally opposed to the claims and imperatives of the dominant techno-urban industrial system. Yes, that is an awkward euphemism for the capital system. Yes, a Green politics achieving the ecological society is revolutionary. But isn’t it better to let people find this out for themselves, through their own efforts and actions, rather than being told this as an abstract lesson in political economy, delivered outside of constitutive ecological praxis? 
To offer a Green coalition politics as a new politics capable of constituting the new civic public is not to blandly argue that all social movements or even social movements as such are agents of political and social transformation. Lacking a common interest, they cannot act coherently, unless that common identity is manufactured from the outside, the Green polity as the old state as abstraction. Various social movements do not have a ready-formed identity and cannot be given one by external political action. This is true, as the history of party state socialism proved. 
The failures of socialism to constitute a genuine public life are salutary, engineering a collective interest from above, institutionally suppressing particular interests. But this is the very antithesis of a civic public. The critical project would precisely reject engineering a common identity between heterogeneous groups by identifying those groups, organisations, movements etc whose aims and objectives most profoundly challenge the presuppositions on which existing social relations and structures depend. By integrating oppositional and reconstructive approaches within a universal ethic, it will be possible to resist absorption by the system it seeks to overcome.

All groups with emancipatory content and potential can unite around a Green vision of a cooperative, ecological way of life.

In the environmental movement, a Green politics offers new grass-roots focus and more democratic dialogic modes of thought, organisation and action. There is a need to keep the local and the global integrated, connecting particular and universal at all levels. A Green Party that becomes too focused upon the level of institutional politics risks leaving a vacuum behind them, a space occupied by environmental groups and activists who can, in turn, repudiate the Green position as overly political, as part of the system to be transformed. An effective political approach could devote energies and resources to aid people form local groups and address local issues. The political framework offers advice and information, technical and legal help, teaches organisation skills and engages in lobbying at the political level. These efforts, however, are given content by the sustained activities of the diverse citizens' and community groups, large and small, organized and ready to take action to protect their communities. Again, these form the content of the civic public.

Through this work, the people most directly affected by the impact and disruption of an economy based on ecological harm start to raise fundamental questions about the nature of the economy and its institutions. 
A Green politics transforms the way that individuals work to create alternatives to our present way of life. The universal ecological vision and ethic fosters strong ties between particular efforts in different spheres, forging links between consumer and producer co-ops, and promotes the adoption of actively democratic forms of organization. A Green politics must be involved with local, community, cooperative efforts to create working alternatives, giving people viable options to withdraw themselves from the system that oppresses us all. At a time when the dominant economic system is proving increasingly unable to meet people's basic needs, a Green politics must be committed to a vision of new ways of living and working together and must have the goal of putting that vision —a vision grounded in a variety of local and particular struggles and campaigns the world over — on the political agenda. As the system careers to moral, economic and ecological implosion, it is more important to outline the contours of a viable alternative than to win seats and win votes and bring pressure for change on already constituted power within the system.


POLITICAL AND ELECTORAL OBJECTIVES
What are the political objectives of The Green Party? Is the objective the creation of a Green political sphere? Or merely to green the existing political sphere? Any radical movement committed to fundamental social transformation has to be aware of the pitfalls of ‘electoralism’, the progressive dilution of principle for a realistic appraisal of a success redefined as an increased vote and an increased number of seats at council and national level.
As the environmental message becomes understood and accepted across broad sectors of society and as environmental awareness develops and Green ideas enter the mainstream, it becomes increasingly likely that Green politics becomes part of the political mainstream of electoral politics. The electoral successes of Green parties raise hopes that Greens can come to directly influence local and national policies from within the political mainstream. Green parties have been partners in coalition governments. There is nothing, in principle, wrong with this. A political party must, by definition, have a politics, a policy for change, a legislative impact and hence be more than a pressure group demanding action from others. But an honest appraisal of limitations and possibilities is called for to avoid the inevitable disillusion that follows misplaced hopes. All political careers end in failure goes the adage. Recognise this, acknowledge realistically possibilities and keep encouraging action outside the parliamentary sphere, in the real public life grounded in social practices and activities.

In many place, Green electoral efforts can demonstrate real practical achievement at the level of policy – addressing Issues of housing, urban regeneration, commercial development, pollution and waste disposal, developing strong positions on social, feminist and multicultural issues. There is no reason to see these efforts not continuing and these gains being reversed as Greens continue to bring these ideas to the electoral arena. 

At least as important as the direct practical influence within the mainstream political arena is the way that Green electoral campaigns can help foster an ecological sensibility within the general electorate, bringing ecological ideas to a wider audience. The danger of The Green Party being perceived as a single issue organisation is real and The Green Party has been right to emphasise ideas and policies on a range of social and economic issues. There is a potential danger here of losing distinctiveness and sounding like all the other parties, repeating ‘economy, health, education’ etc like a mantra. If The Green Party succumbs to the limited thinking of priorities – economics comes before ecology according to the conventional political wisdom – then they are failing to create the far reaching ecological awareness that rearranges priorities. The Green Party has to give a Green message. The best way may well be to focus on the conventional priorities of politics – health, education, ‘the economy’ – and infuse each area with ecological ideas and imperatives. Familiar ground, unfamiliar policies and ideas gets the message across. Either way, a Green politics rests on an ecological consciousness and sensibility. Learn lessons from ‘parliamentary socialism’. To keep diluting the message for further electoral success and at some point there is no message left. 

A Green electoral politics can attract substantial media attention and provide a national and international profile that gives meaning and point to ecological ideas. It enables Greens to address a greater cross-section of the public than would be possible with grass roots activism. And these efforts can reshape public debate and can have a tangible effect on public policies. This is no mean feat at a time when the terms of political debate have been narrowed to within parameters set by huge financial interests and corporate lobbies. The Green Party offers people who still believe in democracy a public focus for their concerns on issues of environmental protection, community life, popular control and human emancipation. When Green parties exist to demonstrate broad popular support for such causes, the effect on shifting the political agenda can be significant.

Green electoral politics is not without its limitations and its dangers. One returns here to Ralph Miliband’s cautionary lesson to parliamentary socialists, ‘the state does not determine, it is determined’. Ultimately, the political arena is subject to the imperatives and process of private capital accumulation. The Green Party can build an "electorate" for Green ideas. But to really transform political institutions it requires a social body, content and power. Green electoral politics can complement and even enhance more grass-roots efforts, but it can also undermine them by creating the illusion that real social change is the result of political choice at election time. The fate of the urban social movements in Spain points to the dangers of this political illusion. Within the totalitarian political shell of the Franco regime, urban activists built a new social state within the national state. These urban social movements formed the core of a self-governing civil society, As soon as Spain became a parliamentary democracy, many of the leading activists joined the national parties and local grass roots efforts withered. In the end, the Socialist Party became yet another neo-liberal party whose hands were tied by the imperatives of the global capital system. 

And there are opportunities to explore an alternative electoral politics, scaling political units down to human proportion, expanding public spaces, creating, face-to-face institutions and experiment with citizen legislatures to draw people into an expanding political mainstream. This is to explore possibilities of an alternative participatory dimension to the electoral approach to social change.

The notion of ‘greening’ the political sphere and electoral politics has a political rationale. The mainstream political arena offers little space for the active relationship between elected representatives and the grass-roots movements that form the main content of any participatory citizen democracy. The dominance of interests of money and power in the mass media serves to skew the terms of political discourse and reporting and narrows the character of political life. Any political party committed to fundamental change has to work many times harder to gain a voice at this level and over time the effort can start to tell and exhaustion set in. Becoming part of this world, elected Green representatives will find it difficult to relate to grass roots community work and activism.

The spread of Green ideas makes it more and more possible to give voice to principles which in the past may have been dismissed as utopian – a politics of scale and of decentralisation. The important thing is to keep the channels open to encourage the continual emergence of ideas from within both local environmental movements and from conventional political circles. Imitation is a form of flattery. Hypocrisy is the homage that vice pays to virtue. Other parties will steal policies and principles. Good, if they make them work. Others will use Green ideas as a veneer covering an unecological policy. The fact that they feel the need to imitate and respect Green ideas is a kind of victory. Green ideas are becoming so strong that they cannot be ignored.
How to spot electoralists and careerists? Judge a person’s willingness to subordinate their personal ambitions to grassroots organisations and local alliances that are fully democratic, participatory and infused with an ecological awareness. With these conditions respected, The Green Party is a legitimate political expression of a broader and deeper ecological and social movement.
The uncertainties of Green electoral politics are compounded by the vagaries of the electoral system. Any party lacking strong social identity and class roots has to base its appeal on ethics and ideas. The problem here is that success or failure is decided by that amorphous, vacuous category ‘the floating voter’. These are supposedly ‘nonpolitical’ or ‘apolitical’. Actually, they are highly antipolitical, avowedly private individuals focused mainly upon self-interest and who reject all grand schemes of political transformation as more than likely bureaucratic and expensive. Green politics is often described as a ‘post-materialism’. The private idiocy of the floating voter is likely to perceive Greens as interventionist and regulatory, a high tax and spend party that interferes with the freedom of the private individual. No appeal to morality or reason – not even a species wide collective self-interest in survival – will win a single vote from these people. In electoral terms, numbers will always be against Green parties. Greens should compete on quality rather than quantity. The best, the most active, the most informed are the ones who can reshape politics from neighbourhood and community level upwards. Greens should form a coalition of the willing from below. Coalitions representing a fairly wide spectrum of people and ideas can participate in building the civic public life, in time expanding the numbers in the potential Green electorate.
It is claimed that parties win elections from the centre. Only centrist voices perceived to be ‘electable’. As a party dedicated to fundamental transformation to achieve an ecological way of life, The Green Party is bound to be placed at the extreme of the political spectrum. The Green Party needs to fight to reshape the centre and redefine the whole notion and nature of the centre. The centre ground in current politics is hollow, value free and anti-political. In electoral terms the effects are appalling, with political principles being sunk as parties and politicians seek a bland, depoliticised appeal via slogans, soundbites and images manufactured by and for television. That may be the centre ground but it is a centre denuded of politics and principle. As a result, the electoral system compels all politicians and parties to become alike, different brands of the same product. They do so because it wins or retains votes from the hollow centre.

To repeat, an ecological politics really is neither left nor right and really is a centre ground politics organised around principles of balance, harmony, proportion, scale, equity. But that centre has still to be created. This is the forwards of the Green slogan. Green politics raises new hopes for finding a way to engage the system from within whilst at the same time generating alternatives to it.
Greens need to pioneer new ways of addressing ‘mainstream’ voters without a) putting them off with a message perceived to be utopian and extreme; b) without compromising basic ecological principles. 
There are many reasons to doubt that this can be achieved by a purely electoral appeal from with the existing political system. The solution seems to be in creating that expanded centre.
The trick is to be both in and against the conventional political mainstream, becoming a Green politician without becoming like the other politicians. In The Prison Notebooks Antonio Gramsci defined the fundamental question of politics in these terms: ‘is it the intention that there should always be rulers and ruled, or is the objective to create the conditions in which this division is no longer necessary? In other words, is the initial premiss the perpetual division of the human race, or the belief that this division is only an historical fact, corresponding to certain conditions ?’

Green politics is committed to dissolving the dualism of state and civil society by creating an expanded civic public as the new centre ground. And this development will invest the civil sphere with political governing significance overcoming the division between leaders and led. The populist clamour against ‘big government’ will be called upon to live up to its name and make social self-government work. Grassroots activism and organisation will serve to raise people's capacities to change things and ultimately to run things. 
Green politicians as well as their supporters will need to serve as organizers and catalysts for grass roots activity rather than being just another set of representatives, packaged personalities selling principles as political brand and product.
The abstracted political level needs to be continually reinvigorated by a dynamic base and this requires a decentralized approach in which a variety of grassroots organisations carry out a wide variety of ecological campaigns, educational projects and local community activism. Globally orientated parties need locally-focused organizations to furnish public life with a grass-roots base. The Green Party needs to work hard to prevent an electoralism that isolates its politics from its grass roots. With increased abstraction from the local and community and campaigning roots comes the familiar problems of an overly political approach – arguments and splits over strategy, ideology and conflicting political styles. Political isolation from active roots turns a party and its leadership in against itself as marginal differences are inflated into divisive struggle. When this stage is reached, the party really is over and it is best to build again from the still fresh roots that are more in tune with ecological issues.
In the very least, Green electoral campaigns can mobilize an ecological constituency that politicians of all parties need to pay attention to in the competition for votes. We are now well beyond this stage. Green parties are capable of keeping these votes for themselves and taking their place in the political mainstream. The question now is what role Green parties can play in forcing the political system to reform itself, opening up the mainstream to popular movements. But Greens are well placed to form a proactive, well defined constituency out of all types of ecologists who, with a political identity, can contest power and public purpose with the corporate and other elites who work surreptitiously to manipulate popular consent and manage society.
Those who think talk of the dissolution of the dualism of state and civil society and the creation of a Green political as an associative civil public is utopian need to consider the sobering theory of the ‘overloaded’ state. The theory has never gone away and seems now to have been given cuddly form in the shape of ‘the Big Society’. The basic theme of the ‘overloaded’ state is that the western world suffers from an ‘excess of democracy’. Too many sections of the population have come to have a voice in public decision-making and the state responds by making too many commitments and performing too many services. All the commitments of the state are financed from resources obtained in the private economy. To business, this is economically unsustainable. Further, people come to have rising expectations of the state, expectations which the state lacks the resources to meet, resulting in a decline in its authority. The theorists of the overloaded state perceive clearly the prospect of the revolution of rising expectations and propose a straightjacketed democracy, insulated public policy once more from popular claims and thus preventing the dictation of economic and foreign policy by powerful business interests from reaching public controversy. 
The Green Party positively values the threat that an active and informed citizenry poses to the dominance of elite interests and institutions over political life. It goes further. It channels citizen efforts and organisation into the creation of a public life worthy of the name. Democracy is more, much more, than counting votes. Individuals are more than voters, they are also citizens. Here, Green politics taps into the essential roots of politics, the desire for people to control their own lives. Democracy in this sense is a threat to those whose political purpose is to manage and manipulate consent so as to serve economic and political ends external to the democratic political sphere. The radical decentralist outlook of Green politics is oriented towards the creation of confederations of self-governing communities which ultimately withdraw from the system. Is The Green Party committed to this Green politics or is it simply the green wing of the system? No Green politics and no real democracy will ever be practised within this system. The associative civil public is the ecopolis, the Green polity.

A major hope for the creation of the ecopolis lies in the development of new community-based institutions and experiments in local democracy. Is it possible to incorporate town meeting models into a community politics, building from neighbourhood units upwards. Along with these political steps, there are the efforts to create local and cooperative economic alternatives. Such efforts do more than create a genuine counter-power to check the influence of established institutions; they go further to constitute a public life of their own. The successes of a few ‘eco-communities’ in various places can start to map the terrain of an ecological public life, encouraging others to experiment with ways to break the web of dependencies that keep people attached to a political and economic system which they are increasingly frustrated with. People will take their rising expectations from a system that is failing and will be more inclined to seek satisfaction in richer terms. By maintaining its ideals, The Green Party can play a role in ensuring that the search for alternatives evolve to an entirely new qualitative level.

In the short term, Green politics can serve as an important vehicle for renewing public activity at the local level. This is to associate the ecological critique of the current system with a vision of the future ecological society, inspiring efforts to develop an ecological sensibility and an ethic of local self-government. Greens in neighbouring communities can associate together to transform economic and social policies and practices on a wider scale. Direct action, face-to-face institutions and participatory democracy bring individuals out of private idiocy into citizen life, organised around real life community issues rather than ideological splits. Democracy will be achieved only when the individuals composing the demos are capable of exercising control. These political innovations can help individuals to gain control over basic economic and political decisions. Acting locally and thinking globally means beginning at the grass-roots level to establish open relationships with people in other places. Connecting the local and the global – the world in one city is at the same time the city in one world. A ‘new politics’ of neighborhood and community control and organisation, grounded in an ecological sensibility, offer a fundamental challenge to the forces of global elite control and systemic destruction all around us. This challenge is spread to all the far corners of the world by force of example. An ecological praxis in which ecological principles are incorporated into transformative activity and are in turn generated by it.
A Green politics which succeeds at both the level of community organizing and the electoral sphere makes the ecological transformation of society a genuine prospect. In combining social and ecological justice and equity with a commitment to active citizenship and participatory democracy, nonviolence and a thorough decentralization of political and economic power into expanded public spaces, provides a moral, political and institutional framework for addressing immediate concerns in such a way as to progress toward the ecological society of the future. 
A Green politics connects each with all within society and this society with nature. In the same way that society's relationship to nature is formed by its social, economic and political institutions, the structure of these institutions is formed by the character of people's relationships to each other within these institutions.
An ecological praxis does more than create the basis for an ecological constituency and for an ecopolis. Social and political change is also a self-change, people transforming themselves in the process of transforming their world. A Green polity and economy involves processes and activities within the built techno-urban environment which enable people to heal their own personal ties to the natural environment. If personal changes are incomplete without broader social change, so changes in the political structure and in social relations are also insufficient in themselves. An ecological praxis affirms the interdependence of social change and self change, being sensitive to complex interplay between the political, social and cultural spheres. As a Green politics – electoral, parliamentary or otherwise – strives to alter political institutions and social structures, a grassroots and community activism operates to establish the foundations of an earth-centred ethic, a personal practice of cooperation and new ways of articulating human intimacy with the natural world.

An ecological praxis affirming harmony between human nature within and nature without establishes a model for harmony within human communities at political, social and personal levels. The institutional transformation is therefore also a psychological, moral and cultural transformation. A Green politics establishes human diversity and human freedom as conditions of a healed relationship to nature.
A Green politics promises the transformation of ‘the political’. In a world where ‘politics’ and politicians are held in contempt, the Green approach offers a promise to invest the word with new meaning. Green politics articulates a new understanding of public life as a living space for individual self-actualisation in reciprocal relation to each other, a forum for enhancing the living interrelationships between individuals within self-governing eco-communities, something very notion from a ‘Green’ way of administering the institutions of the state and the economy.

ECOLOGY AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
An ecological sensibility entails the free and full expression of people's individuality within a community setting. This is Aristotle’s politikon bion, a public life which enables each individual to develop his/her individuality in relation to all other individuals. In other words, this politikon bion is an ecopolis; an ecological politics is firmly in the tradition of political philosophy. 

“Observation tells us that every state is an association, and that every association is formed with a view to some good purpose. I say 'good', because in all their actions all men do in fact aim at what they think good. Clearly then, as all associations aim at some good, that association which is the most sovereign among them all and embraces all others will aim highest, i.e. at the most sovereign of all goods. This is the association which we call the state, the association which is 'political'. (koinonia politike: 'the association that takes the form of a polis (state)'.

(Aristotle Politics Book I)

‘The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before’.
(Rousseau The Social Contract)

The ideal civic constitution allows 'the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all others'.
(Kant Critique of Pure Reason)

‘an association in which the free development of each is the condition of the free development of all’.
(Marx The Manifesto of the Communist Party)

Aristotle’s political community (koinonia politike) is 'the association that takes the form of a polis'. Rousseau’s association, Kant’s ideal civil constitution, Marx’s communism all affirm the interdependence of the freedom of each and the freedom of all. No one person is free unless all are free. Without these reciprocal relations between individuals, community ceases to be an association of each with all and instead becomes an atomistic society in which each pursues freedom independently of all other individuals. Individual freedom results in a collective unfreedom that actually inhibits both individual and community freedom. A society of self-cancelling wills and wants becomes a collective constraint which limit individual expression, a realm of coercive social union and enforced social roles. That traditional communities could be repressive is not denied. But Aristotle was correct to argue that man is a zoon politikon, a social-political animal capable of individuation only in relation to others in community. Many people are now experiencing the innate need for community that atomistic urban society leaves unsatisfied. Even the escape into the digital communities of electronic hyperreality expresses this innate social need which modern society denies. 

An ecological praxis leading to an associative civic public offers a renewed ethic of cooperative and communicative interaction between individuals, creating solidaristic ties of exchange and interchange between individuals. A public life informed by the ecological wisdom of unity-in-diversity, achieving self-reliance as interdependence rather than autonomy, freeing community life from the acquisitive pressures of contemporary neurotic culture can become a true vehicle for a universal emancipation.

An ecological consciousness affirms a deepened personal relationship with the natural world. The reawakened awareness of one’s place within the wholeness of nature serves to enhance one’s sense of personhood and enrich one's deepest personal relationships. In an acquisitive, materialistic culture, the concept of individuality entails a hostile, competitive relation to one’s fellow human beings. In John Ruskin’s famous quote, ‘There is no wealth but life’. This is a life-denying culture shaped by autonomy denying structures. An ecological sensibility affirms the possibility of making every aspect of personal life express a sense of connectedness with humanity in the social world and with the natural world also.

A Green politics offers the tools and techniques for recreating the ties between the political, social and personal spheres. A consensual approach to working together in groups values the unique contribution each can make to the creation of a genuine public. A Green politics is a genuine coalition politics based on trusting, cooperative relationships between individuals, creating the structures enabling individuals to work together. The goal of consensus entails a commitment to cooperative, peaceful methods for mediating conflicts and resolving problems and reaching solutions. Habermas’ communicative public community in which coercion is replaced by the force of reason and the better argument is actualised in this vision of a consensual coalition politics in the ecopolis. 


A confederal approach to social transformation which envisages broad changes as proceeding outwards from the local level values the constitutive creative praxis of individual community efforts. Beyond opinion forming, information flows, electoral appeals, ecology is fundamentally a praxis affirming the unity of social change and self-change. Every activity undertaken by each individual in one area is the germ of further transformation in another area, subverting the dominant culture of passivity and subservience and replacing it with activity and independence, generating new channels for cooperation and communication between individuals in community and between communities to the global level.

ARISTOTLE AND FLOURISHING
The picture of the sane and healthy ‘flourishing’ personality comes from Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia. Indeed, the idea that there is a goal of life and that a human being can have a function is at the heart of most ancient ethical theories. The idea is that the best kind of life for human beings involves functioning properly. The task is to identify what that function was in the sense of the activity that people are suited to. The most famous exponent of this theory is Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle argues that happiness is like health in that it is a matter of correct functioning. The person who lives the kind of life for which human beings are most suited will be the happiest in fully realizing his or her potential. Aristotle's ethical philosophy is called 'eudaimonistic', from the Greek word for 'happiness' - eudaimonia  ‘good’ (eu) and god or spirit or demon (daimon). The term is broader and more dynamic than this, best captured by the idea of 'flourishing' or 'enjoying a good (successful, fortunate) life'. 

SPINOZA
Aristotle’s notion of ‘flourishing’ savours a little of Spinoza’s conatus. A conatus is a mode's essence (or degree of power) once the mode has begun to exist. Spinoza's account of the conative aspect of human beings rests on two important propositions of Part Three. 'Each thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours (conatus) to persevere in its being’. Our most fundamental desire, and indeed our essence, is the endeavour (conatus) or power to persist in existence. Spinoza's theory of conatus is of universal application; all things, and not just human beings, manifest this endeavour.' 
Thus conatus is the affirmation of essence in a mode's existence. The notion implies that freedom, flourishing, the assertion of power or energy involves activity in relation to circumstances as against passivity. 

The vision of a healthy, sane sense of self and personhood is rooted in a philosophical anthropology which originates in the ancient Greeks, particularly Aristotle, but which reappears as the autonomous, active, creative and productive human being in the works of Vico, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel and Marx. 

For Spinoza, freedom depends upon adhering to clear and distinct ideas. Human beings are free in so far as they have a clear and distinct idea of the causes of their own physical and mental states. 
The origins of human unfreedom are emotions of desire, hate and love with respect to particular things, being attached to and affected by particular things and persons. These desires, loves and hates arise by the association of ideas through inadequate ideas of the true causes of our pleasures and pains. Spinoza therefore affirms knowledge over ignorance as the key to human freedom. Adequate ideas giving adequate knowledge of causes necessarily involves a more complete knowledge of Nature as a whole. In acquiring more adequate knowledge of Nature, human beings conceive themselves as parts of Nature, in the process coming to cease to desire, love and hate particular things, hence ceasing to be attached to and affected by the particular things and persons around us. 

The free and wise human being therefore feels morally and emotionally neutral towards the particular things and persons around him. The free and the wise understanding that they are what they are and understands why they cannot be otherwise, and hence does not ignorantly see them as the causes of personal pleasures and pains. The free and wise person is the true origin of his or her own pleasures; these are generated spontaneously, as the consciousness of his or her own free activity and are not the effects of external causes. Mind and body are interconnected. The greater the real activity and vitality of the body, the greater the real activity and vitality of the mind and vice versa. Since pleasure is the reflection of the activity and vitality of the whole person, a person who is functioning freely and is uninhibited by external causes is necessarily in a state of pleasure (laetitia). Hence, for Spinoza, the aim of the free and wise person will be 'bene agere ac laetari — 'to act well and to rejoice.' Repudiating ascetic virtues of self-sacrifice and self-denial as unnatural, Spinoza focuses upon activity and vitality of mind and body to argue that 'there cannot be too much joy: it is always good: but melancholy is always bad" (Ethics Pt. IV. Prop. XLII). 

 Pain and the emotions associated with pain (hatred, envy, fear etc.) indicate weakness and lack of freedom; they are evidence of some inhibition of activity and vitality by external causes. For Spinoza, particular pleasures in the narrow sense (titillatio) may be excessive in that they upset the balance and well-being of the whole organism. Spinoza defines the true pleasure of the free and intelligent person in terms of conscious well-being and enjoyed activity. To act well is fully to enjoy oneself, and fully to enjoy oneself is to act well.

Spinoza reworks the old notions of vice and virtue in physiological and psychological sense. Virtue is health and sanity whereas the old religious standbys of suffering, guilt, and remorse are revealed to be morbid symptoms of inadequate ideas and ignorance. It follows that anything which furthers knowledge and intelligence expands power and freedom is necessarily good for the individual and is to be pursued in the interests of self-preservation. The converse is also true. Anything which inhibits obstructs the development of knowledge and intelligence is self-destructive and is bad in inhibiting the freedom and vitality of the individual. 
The free individual is the active, productive being conscious of being the creator of circumstances. The world of necessity is a self-made social world and hence for that reason can be consciously governed as a human product. Spinoza distinguished between active and passive emotions. The active emotions (fortitude and generosity) originate in the individual, and they are accompanied by adequate ideas. Passive emotions rule over human beings; the passive human being is the slave of passions, and these are connected with inadequate ideas.
The argument employs the opposition between activity and passivity as the central concepts for the understanding of freedom. And the activity vs passivity opposition also pertains to the Platonic distinction between knowledge (nous) and opinion (doxa). Passivity is associated with inadequate ideas, ideas which fall short of reason and knowledge. In a passive state, human beings are slaves of circumstances and are capable only of opinion. Politics currently practised is a world of opinion. Activity is associated with adequate ideas, the world of knowledge, human beings understanding themselves as the self-conscious creators of the social world. 
This connection between  knowledge and freedom and flourishing is something that presupposes an active relation to the world, but an open rather than an aggressive relation, one which bases true knowledge on the relatedness of all things. Goethe wrote well here: 'Man knows himself only inasmuch as he knows the world. He knows the world only within himself, and he is aware of himself only within the world. Each new object, truly recognized, opens up a new organ within ourselves.' 
Spinoza’s conatus means ‘striving’. It is a striving proportionate to a being’s essence. Only that striving, that active relation, satisfies the essential human need to make sense of existence. The active human being is free and productive, united to others and at peace with the world.
This philosophy has political implications. The personal rivalries and polarities concerning belief and opinion foster social and political instability and impinge upon the independence and detachment which the free and wise person requires for the development of knowledge and intelligence. The free and wise person therefore has an interest in the creation and maintenance of a peaceful social order. By overcoming desires, loves and hates attached to particular things and persons, human beings are able to avoid the conflicts which obstruct the pursuit of knowledge and intelligence. The happiness of the free and wise person is achieved by the free exercise understanding and is essentially cooperative rather than competitive; it requires only mutual peacefulness and respect for law and order on the part of each and all. Far from being competitive, the free individual has a positive interest in promoting the happiness and intellectual emancipation of all other individuals. To the extent that the individuals composing society are governed by passive emotions, conflicts of interest between individuals arise and these must obstruct the free person in his or her pursuit of self-preservation in life and self-advancement in knowledge. It follows that ‘Whatever helps to maintain the common society of men, whatever brings it about that men live together in peace and agreement, is useful, and, on the other hand, what produces discord in the state, is bad' (Ethics Pt. IV. Prop. XL). The free and wise person will also be the ‘happy’ person, in Spinoza’s sense of ‘joy’ and Aristotle’s sense of ‘flourishing’. The free and wise person comes to appreciate the meaning of Plato’s argument that 'virtue is its own reward'.

THE GOOD LIFE
Such an ethics is inevitably involved in politics. In a definite sense, all political action involves a vision of the good society. When aiming at preservation, political action maintains the present order to be the best and aims to prevent a change to the worse. When aiming at change, political action is intended to bring about a future order better than the present. Notions of better or worse imply some standard by which to evaluate courses of action and results and that standard is ‘the good’. 

The awareness of the good which guides all our actions has the character of opinion: it is no longer questioned but, on reflection, it proves to be questionable. The very fact that we can question it directs us towards such a thought of the good as is no longer questionable—towards a thought which is no longer opinion but knowledge. All political action has then in itself a directedness towards knowledge of the good: of the good. life, or of the good society. For the good society is the complete political good.

Leo Strauss What is Political Philosophy 1988

Ethics as outlined above with respect to Aristotle and Spinoza is the royal road to happiness through truth and knowledge. Reason is the highest and the best part of human nature and ethics entails a good life guided by reason. In the strict sense that the best life is necessarily the happiest life, the intrinsic satisfactions of the free mind are the most lasting and secure. Happiness is achieved when human beings realise their highest and best part, and it is the good life alone that which provides the context (John Jacques Plato’s Republic). 
Green politics fosters personal development by publicising the real impact that local and community action can make, showing the extent to which individual efforts can have transformative social and political consequences. People like to see tangible results and are motivated to make further efforts and commit more time and resources when a real result is visible. Nothing succeeds like success and here activity feeds itself. Green political praxis can embody a real sense of conatus in Spinoza’s sense, expressing ‘joy’, unfolding people's creative essence and giving it permanent form in the work of transforming society. Respecting unity-in-diversity and interactive cooperation within an integrated whole, the ecological movement fully values and validates the contributions of all individuals in all fields of endeavour and in all forms of expression.

All over the world, the basis for a new earth-centred culture is being created by the practical efforts of a variety of groups. Artists and poets are turning back to the earth as a source of inspiration. Scientists like Rupert Sheldrake and philosophers like Arne Naess have brought a renewed reverence for the natural world into their work. Through a variety of practical efforts, human beings are engendering new forms of personal and community rituals to express their bond to the earth, viewed once again as Gaia, the nurturing goddess of all life. The term Gaia has entered the public consciousness through the work of scientist James Lovelock, indicating the extent to which even the natural sciences are regaining a renewed sense of the ancient view of the earth as a living organism, generating new insights into the origins of life, the regulation of the atmosphere, and the role of cooperation and consciousness in biological evolution.

The most remarkable thing is the stark contrast between this broadening and opening of outlook and vision in the scientific world and the narrowing of horizons in politics. The globalisation of economic relations has been used to buttress a political agenda of liberalisation which has involved the rolling back of any number of governmental and institutional regulations and controls upon business and finance. In terms of the levels of cognition outlined earlier, the politics of the neo-liberal reaction has focused firmly upon the selfish and the stupid, using the command over public policy to deliberately cultivate changes in people's attitudes towards the private, the individualistic and the materialistic. Although coated in words like ‘aspirational’, this represents a stifling narrowing of aspirations down to the most obvious and the most immediate satisfaction of desires and impulses in relation to material objects. Neo-liberal politics has served to raise to the surface, indeed elevate to the level of highest principle and purpose, the lowest and basest aspects of the human psyche – desire, impulse, fear, hatred, acquisitiveness, aggression. In other words, all those passive emotions attached to particulars that Spinoza identified with inadequate ideas which inhibit knowledge and freedom. Within a deliberately engineered ecology of fear and insecurity, many people withdrew from public life and society to protect whatever resources they could claim for themselves as individuals.

KANT AND THE ‘HOW’ AND ‘WHY’ QUESTIONS
In The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that ‘It is precisely in knowing its limits that philosophy exists ‘ This notion of limits is important. ‘I had to deny knowledge in order to make way for faith’. For Kant, human beings do not see the world as it is, but as it appears to be. This is a critical point. Certain aspects of reality are internal rather than external, that is, they are present in the conceptual apparatus of the human mind rather than in the world outside. A table appears to be a particular colour on account of the particular constitution of  human being’s visual apparatus. A species with a different visual apparatus, that could, for instance, process a wider range of light waves (infrared, ultraviolet) would the colour of that particular table differently.
And what applies to colour applies also to other aspects of reality which Kant called ‘categories’ of experience, such as space, time, cause and effect. These categories are innate, part of the conceptual apparatus of human beings, and determine how human beings experience the world. Without these innate categories, human experience would be an inchoate jumble. The world human beings experience is a human world constituted by innate categories.
But whilst this philosophy emphasises the creative constitutive human power full of reality making possibilities, Kant is careful to emphasise limits. The innate categories impose order on chaos but also impose limits on experience, determining what human beings can know. Human beings can seek causal explanations regarding everyday experience - Who put that table there? What made that noise? But there are questions to which causal explanations cannot be applied, human free will, the origin of the universe, and so on. The answers to such questions can often result in antinomy, possibilities which, though equally rational and plausible are nevertheless mutually exclusive. For instance, it seems equally plausible that human beings possess free choice and that every human act has a determined cause. Similarly, the views that the universe at one time didn't exist or that it has always existed and always will exist (Aristotle’s eternalism) seem equally implausible.
For Kant, such antinomies suggest there are limits to reason which prevent us from ever fully understanding certain things. This is the basis of Kant's transcendental idealism. Whilst human beings can only ever experience their own innate perceptions through categories of experience (idealism), there is a reality that exists beyond (transcends) these categories.
Although his philosophy is difficult, Kant repays serious study. Kant shows how human beings are creators of their own reality, and therefore possess a creative, constitutive power, a demiurge, that is independent of some external source. At the same time, Kant firmly establishes the power and possibilities of reason upon the limits of reason. Kant is clear that it is only in knowing the limits of reason that one can appreciate its possibilities. Those intoxicated with power are prone to ignore those limits, realising not the freedom pursued but its opposite. 

The point is important so as to keep ‘why’ questions in mind alongside the ‘how’. Detached from moral purpose, known ‘how’ becomes a technics which turns the emancipatory possibilities of reason into a repressive reality.
This is the instruction of Goethe, that the discrepancy between human substance and human virtuosity, increasingly separates what human beings can do from human beings so that human beings create an inhuman world. The symptoms are visible in all aspects of life. The human world is frightened out of its highly enlightened wits as ancient nightmares return. Nietzsche argued that human beings should not have such powers as they cannot creatively live up. With the death of God, human beings must become gods themselves. As Bronowski argued, science means that human beings become as gods. Whether human beings are capable of living up to that responsibility determines whether or not the death of God is a tragedy.

As Marx wrote: ‘Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells. For many a decade past, the history of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of production, against the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeoisie and of its rule. It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodical return put on trial, each time more threateningly, the existence of the entire bourgeois society.’ (Manifesto of the Communist Party).

Marx writes of ‘enforced destruction’ through the ‘epidemic of overproduction’. ‘Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of devastation had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed; and why? Because there is too much civilization, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce.’

We are back to the Delphic watchwords of ‘know thyself’ and ‘nothing to excess’. We are living in an age of excess and do not yet appreciate that we ourselves are responsible, that we are not creatively living up to our powers. We are living in a Faustian world as the sorcerer’s apprentice, not gods but dwarfs with magic powers. The poor in spirit were promised Heaven but this is understood to mean that, here on earth, they are trained and educated into becoming clever people capable of manipulating and unleashing the technical installations of Hell.

Goethe the scientist also possessed the religious sensibility to understand that technical knowledge and achievement is also the active realization of certain values in the lives of human beings. The ‘how’ and the ‘why’ are the two sides of the same question of the nature of human being. In the words of Nietzsche, the moral question, the question of ‘why’, 'is more fundamental than the question of the certainty [of knowledge]: the latter becomes serious only   if the question of values is answered'. 
 Kant would have accepted this. Indeed, throughout German critical thought – Marx, Simmel, Weber - there is an awareness of the pathos of means and ends. It is the basic theme of The Dialectic of Enlightenment by Adorno and Horkheimer and concerns the processes by which creative human agency is transformed into human bondage. 

 The critique of science and scientific reason is neither the repudiation of science nor an advocacy of a superior science but a commitment to values in human life, a commitment which is undermined and destroyed by coming to adopt an exclusively analytical-mechanical method in the interchange with nature. In the guise of Wilhelm Meister, Goethe, as a disciple of values in human life, addresses these words to the astronomer: ‘I can well understand that it must please you, sages of the sky, to bring the immense universe gradually as close to your eyes as I saw that planet just now. But allow me to say ... that these instruments, with which we aid our senses, have a morally detrimental effect on man. ... For what he thus perceives with his senses is out of keeping with his inner faculty of discernment; it would need a culture, as high as only exceptional people can possess, in order to harmonize, to a certain extent, the inner truth with the inappropriate vision from without. ...'

We are now as gods, claims Bronowski. Not yet. But we ought to be, as a moral imperative, to prevent emancipatory forces turning to repression, forces of creation becoming forces of destruction. We need a culture as high as exceptional people in order to harmonize the inner faculty of discernment with the extended vision without. In his posthumous notes Nietzsche opines that ‘there must have been a time when the religious, aesthetic and moral perceptions were at one.' There has to be a time when these perception merge with the technical and scientific.

Kant has the way to resolve the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ into the one question.

‘Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily they are reflected on: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.’ (Critique of Practical Reason (1788). In L. W. Beck (ed. and trans.), Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy (1949), 258.

‘In scientific matters . . . the greatest discoverer differs from the most arduous imitator and apprentice only in degree, whereas he differs in kind from someone whom nature has endowed for fine art. But saying this does not disparage those great men to whom the human race owes so much in contrast to those whom nature has endowed for fine art. For the scientists' talent lies in continuing to increase the perfection of our cognitions and on all the dependent benefits, as well as in imparting that same knowledge to others; and in these respects they are far superior to those who merit the honour of being called geniuses. For the latter's art stops at some point, because a boundary is set for it beyond which it cannot go and which has probably long since been reached and cannot be extended further.’ (The Critique of Judgement (l 790), trans. J. C. Meredith (1991), 72.)

Which begs the question of what the moral law is. 'The moral law commands me to make the highest possible good in a world the ultimate object of all my conduct. But I cannot hope to effect this otherwise than by the harmony of my will with that of a holy and good Author of the world' (Critique of Practical Reason).
Kant rejected the traditional arguments for the existence of God. Against the ontological argument he argued that existence isn't a necessary part of the idea of God, since ideas do not 'possess' the quality of existence. He also rejected the teleological argument, the view that the world shows evidence of design and hence was designed, agreeing with Hume that we cannot argue from effect to cause. Kant also rejects the cosmological argument, that the world must have a definite origin, since this is to argue beyond the limits of reason. For Kant, the existence of God rests on the moral law implanted within each and all. God makes sense of morality.
For Kant, moral acts aim at the summum bonum (the highest possible good). This highest possible good has two aspects: moral justice and happiness. Thus, although good acts do not always provide happiness, moral acts and happiness would coincide in an ideal world: helping a neighbour get her cat out of the tree is both good and gives a warm feeling of well being. However, regardless of whether moral acts yield happiness or not, morality for Kant necessarily implies a duty to strive for this perfect state of affairs. And for Kant duty implies possibility, ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. That is, if you ought to help your neighbour, then that's because you can do it. Therefore, if it is possible that moral acts can result in happiness then this is because God must have linked morality and possibility in this way.
A moral act for Kant is performed out of duty and not out of interest, self or otherwise. For Kant, human beings could not have created a disinterested morality -good for goodness' sake which this assumes 'moral' actions are disinterested. For utilitarianism, in contrast, morality is just about individuals seeking happiness and requires no divine explanation and cannot act as divine proof. But for Kant, this is not a true happiness but merely ‘pleasure’. For Kant the summum bonum holds moral justice together by connecting each individual with all other individuals, something which the self-interested acts of utilitarianism cannot do. Where individuals seek happiness as a merely individual pleasure, they do not enrich their relationships with others but reify them, treat people as mere means to selfish ends and thereby instrumentalise social relations. This is why, for Kant, human individuals must seek the summum bonum as a collective endeavour. In this way, happiness accompanies virtue.

A divine morality of this kind serves to reminds human beings that creativeness is accompanied by creatureliness, that alongside power there is also impotence. It is all about finding proportion between the cosmic preciousness and the cosmic minuteness of human beings so that cosmic power does not breed an arrogance that engulfs the world in a cosmic violence.

Back in 1905, Henry Adams wrote these words to Henry Osborn Taylor (developing the ideas further in Phase Rule in History).

‘At the present rate of progression since 1600, it will not need another century or half century to tip thought upside down. Law, in that case, would disappear as theory or a priori principle and give place to force. Morality would become police. Explosives would reach cosmic violence. Disintegration would overcome integration.’

Although this prediction has been fulfilled with the invention of nuclear weapons, the notion of ‘cosmic violence’ is capable of wider application. The technical assault upon nature means that human society, at the height of its technical achievement, cannot rest easy with its with its conquest, given the ever present sense of looming environmental crisis. An all encompassing ecology of fear is in turn replacing morality within self-governing communities with force. Police is indeed replacing polis. 
 Every human being must now consider the implications of this cosmic power. The task before us is to engender, under pressure of the greatest crisis humankind has yet faced, the political, cultural and moral protective devices to prevent knowledge, not only from destroying civilisation, but from causing life forms in many of its aspects to disappear from the planet.
Separating the how from the why, modern humanity has shown tendencies to cosmic arrogance; intoxicated by technics, human beings have turned means into ends and have abandoned one of the most important ingredients of human advance - the practice of restraint. Schumpeter once wrote that it is because the car has brakes that it can go so fast. Schumpeter was writing of the economy, arguing for the benefits of regulation over the free market. The point is capable of general application. 

The great achievement of Kant is to have found a way of resolving the supposed clash between science and religion in such a way as to recognise the legitimate claims of both. Einstein saw the need to integrate the how and why questions when he argued that science without conscience will doom us all. 
The cosmic time sense of religious intuition was achieved long before astronomy furnished the exact calculations, and it is this that acts as a braking device that prevents humanity from sacrificing the own long future for some temporary gratification or some transitory gain. The moral law within is a latent power for humanity’s self-preservation, possessing the potential and the capacity for the unified effort that will make wider renewal possible.

RATIONAL RESTRAINT
The midbrain is the seat of instinctual energies and explosive emotions, the forebrain is the seat of higher behaviour and inhibitions. The development of these inhibitions tempers the development of human inventiveness and curiosity to prevent self-destruction.

It is an old story. In the Jekyll and Hyde tale, Robert Louis Stevenson explores the possibility of separating the two sides of the human psyche, the good and the evil. If human beings can be gods, they can also be monsters. And the point seems to be that in aiming at becoming gods, human beings lose their inhibitions and instead become monsters.

In everyday life, individuals still, by and large, acknowledge inhibition of impulses (although the behaviour on Friday and Saturday nights is showing breakdown even here). Under pressure of a false identification of liberty with licence, an identification imposed my modern politics and economics and encouraged by advertisement and electoral campaigns, individuals have increasingly abandoned habits of restraint which eased living in common in favour of habits of relaxation. 
For the best part of a century, a long succession of thinkers, politicians and advertisers have urged individuals to throw off moral, psychic and communal restraint to act on impulse, yield to desire, and abandon measure in self-gratification. The promise if freedom and happiness. It is a false religion, Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ in the role of God. If human beings were wholly rational and wholly good, then this crude, naïve psychology, innocent of moral and institutional purpose, would have some sense. For Kant, out of nothing so crooked can something entirely straight be made. This moral and institutional nihilism actually unleashes not natural goodness but the demonic in human nature. 
Morality is itself part of the system of rational restraint and inhibition, guiding human beings in acceptable behaviour and, as such, is an integral part of the conscious control of the creative powers that humanity commands. Morality ingrained in habit and custom makes it possible to practise the highest forms of human inventiveness and creativity. The moral law within is in this sense an inner check, the rational restraint on short term impulse and desire to ensure long term health and well being. 

This rational restraint comes hard to individuals brought up to mistake licence for liberty, conflate needs with wants and seek pleasure rather than happiness. The economic system, and the political system which serves it, has operated as a regime of endless gratifications in which individuals get what they want with neither deprivation nor penalty. The whole notions of limits is overthrown. Hence its endless, purposeless, nihilistic nature. Only something with limit can be filled and fulfilled. The individual is caught within a cycle of endless insatiable satisfaction. The quantification and commodification of life through the extension of the market economy has been accompanied by the systemic elimination of the natural limits and moral inhibitions that once set human action within boundaries of the right and the good. Civilisations fall from within rather than without, and part of this fall is a decadence and self-indulgence born of success. The margin of freedom won by technique and organisation, rather than being used for a greater expansion of human creativity, is dissipated in easy living. The reluctance with which any kind of regulation is confronted alongside the rush towards deregulation, the identification of the latter with freedom, indicates a popular unwillingness and inability to exercise self-control at a time when large parts of the world require substantial governmental and legal intervention and action to confront the challenges of climate change and global warming. This is a western public fashioned in the image of business and political elites, passive consumers rather than citizen-producers with an active and conscious orientation to the world they have created.

Politically and morally, such people, both leaders and followers, are unfitted for the conscious control of the sum total of human technics and power. It is akin to putting alcoholics in charge of a brewery and a chain of public houses. Individuals who have not only lost any sense of restraint and inhibition but equate them with lack of freedom are incapable of restoring the necessary self-preservative principle within society.

 Experience requires recognition of the legitimate place of rational restraint and inhibition in human development. Deferred gratification, abstention, renunciation, self-denial are as much an essential part of human development as satisfaction, innovation, inventiveness.


 The environmental crisis refers to the social, cultural and moral sphere of human relations as much as it does to ecological disintegration. Indeed the latter is in large part the product of an unbalanced, nihilistic expansion of human technics. The challenge of social and ecological crisis requires that individuals recover the very habit of restraint and inhibition as part of a collective response, subjecting every action to proportion and measure, imposing by rational choice limits on wants so as to curtail the consumption of goods and resources, even those that may be available in limitless quantities. 

 The process of democracy, in both the political and the economic life of individuals, is crucial to human development, but requires a high degree of conscious moderation if it is to be true democracy. The word democracy comes from the ancient Greek meaning the rule of the people. It means that the individuals composing the demos must be capable of ruling. An insight into what this involves is given by Aristotle’s definition of the ‘essential function of a citizen’ is ‘to rule and to be ruled in turn’ (Politics Bk 3.iv). ‘But surely men praise the ability to rule and to be ruled, and the virtue of a citizen of repute seems to be just this - to be able to rule and be ruled well’ (Politics Bk 3). Good citizenship depends upon the contribution a person’s 'virtue' makes to the stability and well-being of the constitution. Aristotle distinguishes the virtue of the good citizen from the invariable 'perfect' virtue of the good man. The point to grasp, however, is the notion of self-restraining and other regarding behaviour in the idea of the good citizen lying in the alternation of ruling and being ruled in turn, locating one’s best interests within the interests of the community of others. This is the virtue that every citizen must master, as a condition of true democracy but also as the condition of society's survival. The good of the whole requires the voluntary acceptance of inhibition. This is rational restraint. Democracy will be achieved when the individuals composing the demos are capable of exercising rational restraint and conscious control for the common good, seeing the realisation of individual in the health and well being of the whole.

The individualistic orientation of contemporary business and politics creates mentalities and inculcates habits which deliberately and systematically undermine these assumptions and conclusions. The modern market economy, consumer and casino capitalism, electoral politics employ the devices of publicity to subvert public life, overthrowing the restraints and inhibitions that keep wants and desires in check so as to morally and institutionally disarm individuals and render them susceptible to the allurements of the advertiser. In both economics and politics, the notion of free individual choice is used to hoodwink and hook the masses, taking them further and further away from democracy as conscious self-rule, selling narcotics, stimulants, aphrodisiacs in the form of symbols and slogans which have the appearance of freedom and democracy but which render the individuals composing the demos stupefied and passive. C Wright Mills argued that all advertisement is political in that, beyond the material goods, the advertiser is selling a system. The goal of the advertiser is to create consumers out of citizens, encourage them to seek the satisfaction of their ends, freedom and happiness, on the market, endlessly want and habitually say Yes to every suggestion. 
 Under the pressure of advertisement as a system of mass manipulation, the breakdown of restraint and inhibition has proceeded to weaken and undermine public life in the name of (individual) freedom. Good government, public spiritedness and common purpose are crucial to civilised society but these are all being forced into retreat by the rejection of ‘big government’ and notions that morality is a private issue. The result exposes the lie of many radicals yearning for a lost paradise, a lost human nature corrupted by civilisation. By abandoning restraint and inhibition, we have moved even further away from the lost Eden. Paradise will be regained only if human beings can learn to exercise rational self-control, regulate impulse and desire, and ascend the levels of sympathy, empathy, understanding and wisdom within the trust relations of an extended sociality. And this requires the building of institutions, not their destruction.


The renewal of rational restraint and inhibition within a common purpose on a global basis is now a condition for human survival. The environmental crisis is universal in nature and imposes the old ideal of universalism as a moral imperative upon all national governments. More than ever before, human beings need to think globally. In the book Civilisation, Kenneth Clark argued that progress has nearly always occurred when internationalism prevailed. For Einstein, nationalism was the measles of mankind. Nationalism is a limited communalism. Human beings need to think bigger. And act on these large assumptions. Individuals must institute these practices in their social practices to ensure that national governments follow their example on the world stage. 

The human capacity for restraint and inhibition must be proportional to the power humankind now commands.  Without this proportion between technical and moral power, it will be impossible to control the growing malignity in the world. Nuclear arms, weapons of mass destruction, etc are merely the physical material manifestations of an inner disorder. It was this that Picasso expressed in Guernica. The names of the wars and the weapons get forgotten as they accumulate. It is the lack of proportion in the human soul that really matters. The aspect of human nature which tends to destruction has lost its mooring and is no longer emotionally anchored, with the result that technical and material accomplishment has been accompanied by the eruption of malign forces out of the unleashed unconscious. It is no surprise, then, that the height of human achievement in technics, the conquest of natural necessity and the creation of a margin of freedom, should have been accompanied by the heights of barbarism. Clarke was right. In two world wars in just half a century, human beings came close to wiping out civilisation. In a physical sense, large parts of European civilisation was destroyed, reduced to rubble. The idea lived. But so too did the forces for destruction. This technically accomplished, highly disciplined and highly co-ordinated civilisation brought about a technically accomplished, highly disciplined and highly coordinated destruction, destroying cities and killing and maiming millions. 

Freud exposed the death instinct – thanatos -  that is stalking civilisation. With trillion dollar arms budgets, the forces of production have indeed become forces of destruction, that very margin of freedom from necessity which Marx thought would be used for socialism being used to perpetuate a system of scarcity. Capitalism is a system of scarcity, not just material but emotional and psychological. It is not just, as Veblen argued, the institutional reproduction of scarcity to keep prices and profits up, keeping production below technologically feasible levels, but the mentalities of meanness and grasping which causes individuals time and again to fail to identify possibilities for freedom.

These mentalities need to change. The environmental crisis demands a change in political behaviour from parties, politicians and governments. And this will come if people see themselves as citizens rather than consumers. It all depends on whether individuals can ascend the levels of cognition and see the long term common good. The short term individual good is served on the market, freedom and happiness bought with the coin and sold by advertiser who promise to satisfy every want and desire. This is to exchange a limited freedom for a much richer freedom. 

If morality is not adequate, if everyday social practices are not informed by rational purposes, if human beings do not learn that restraint and inhibition serve long term health and well being for all, then the necessary political and institutional controls will always be lacking. Every political and institutional change will fall short of what is required if a fully awakened sensibility and personality is lacking.

‘Each of us must remember his humanness: it takes precedence over our race, our economic class, our politics, our religion, or our nationality. Only to the extent that the nations cultivate this humanness, becom​ing members one of another, can our civilisation achieve peace and security, to say nothing of the well-being and creativeness that will eventually issue forth from them. If we do not put humanity, in every sense of this word, before all petty and limited ends, nothing can be saved’ (Mumford Programme for Survival ch 9). 

If human life is to thrive on a high level, as distinct from merely existing as a diminished primitive horde, the response to the challenge of global ecological crisis must be decisive, intelligent and universal. It really does require that each and every person makes an effort to rise above short term, egoistic impulse, desire and want to apprehend a greater and richer range of human potentialities in relation to others. ‘No habits must be uncriticised; no values must remain unexamined; no institutional procedures must be regarded as sacred; no life-denying goals must remain unchallenged. It is not this or that group, elected or self-elected, that must carry the burden of mankind's salvation. Every individual person must first mobilise himself to meet the danger, with a more unconditional acceptance of responsibilities and sacrifices than even the British did when they stood alone, facing imminent destruction, in the summer of 1940. Our best will hardly be enough to guarantee survival. Less than our best will be treason to humanity’ (Mumford Programme for Survival ch 9).

An early appeal to neither left nor right came from Bertrand Russell. 

“There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge, and wisdom. Shall we, instead, choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? We appeal as human beings to human beings: Remember your humanity, and forget the rest.” (bertrand russell 1872-1970 The Russell-Einstein Manifesto).

The prospect of universal nuclear destruction lay behind this appeal to common humanity. In the same manner, the environmental crisis is the occasion for emphasising what human beings have in common rather than what divides them. It affirms a realm above the institutionalised divisions of politics, a politics of ontology, of human being. It is to locate the common good on common ground. The appeal to the humanity of human beings is an appeal to reason, reason with its ethical component.

ECOLOGICAL SENSIBILITY
In the emerging Green movement, we can see the beginning of a different consciousness and way of life, an ecological sensibility and ethos as a practice. Human beings are openly embracing a need for community organised around an ethic of cooperation and communication. There is in these developments evidence of the reactivated citizenry capable of counteracting ecological destruction, war and social injustice in the process of rebuilding a public life (ecopolis) from within the associational space of civil society. This points to practices of social transformation that are integrated into the everyday life of communities across every continent, spreading the ecological message by force of example, a new culture of empowerment that feeds on itself and replenishes its power at source.
The world evinces an incredible diversity of geological formations and living forms integrated within a single community of existence. This community extends beyond the Earth to include the sun that shines above us in the day and the moon and stars at night. Human beings have come into being as one of the components of this community, a view captured in Kant’s phrase: ‘Two things fill the mind with ever-increasing wonder and awe .. the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me” (Immanuel Kant 1724-1804). The recent reports of light pollution clouding out the stars in the night sky are of more than scientific import. The techno-industrial system obscuring the starry heavens above are also culpable in separating human beings from their inner moral law. As Kant understood, to be integral members of this vast and beautiful community above and below, outer and inner, is to experience an exaltation and joy that gives meaning to life.

Each mode of being has its own unique essence and function. A functional order is one in which each and everything is in its place within nature as living organism. Whether as species or as individual, with proper functioning, each is able to make a unique contribution to the integral functioning of the whole. The parts are so related within the whole that the well-being of each member of the community depends on the wellbeing of all other members of the community. The ecological law of integrated systems implies the interactive cooperation of the parts and the integral functioning of the whole. This law effectively constitutes an ontological covenant which bonds all living modes together within the universe conceived as a single manifestation of the wonders of existence. This unity finds its greatest expression in the endlessly renewing cycle of the biosystems of the Earth.
The disturbances to which ‘civilization’ is increasingly afflicted by is the consequence of a long-term violation of this naturally renewing process. Whilst the roots of this assault on nature lie in the very notion of homo faber, a notion which risked an overvaluation of and enslavement to technics, the most severe form of this bias came when the development of technique became over-development, when separation from a land-based organic self-renewing economy to an extractive techno-industrial non-renewing economy became the suppression of the former and its replacement by the latter.

Oil, electric, pharmacy, motor vehicles – key industries in the non-renewing economy. Such an economy literally depends not on creation but on dead matter, non-renewables, resources extracted from the Earth and which one day will be exhausted. Sooner rather than later when one considers the amount of extraction in its massive volume and the fact that industry’s demand is relentless and exponential. The basic resources of this economy cannot be renewed, using dead matter to leave a legacy of ecological devastation, extensive toxicity, and a vast amount of non-disposable waste.

Because of this exploitation of the planet, a large proportion of the biosystem has been destroyed. Scientists such as E. O. Wilson, Peter Raven, and Norman Myers argue that current extinction is a pandemic so extensive that one has to go back some 65 million years ago at the end of the Mesozoic and the beginning of the Cenozoic period for a parallel. One returns to the notion of inhibition and restraint as the most rational path to sustainable human growth and development. Intoxicated with a sense of power born of technics, a view promoted by advertisement, human beings seem oblivious to the threat to human life that this behaviour and the mass extinction it causes represents. The fabric of life depends upon the way that the pattern of living and being is woven together. The threads are so intricately meshed that the fabric of life is weakened and prone to unravel with the removal of even a few threads.

As the quote from Kant indicates, the outer world of nature and the inner psychic world of human beings are really two aspects of the single reality. One may conceive this Nature in the manner of Spinoza as single divine substance, Deus sive Natura, God and Nature as interchangeable, one and the same.

The outer world of this Nature and the inner world of human beings are therefore two dimensions of the one substance. When this Nature as the outer world is disturbed so profoundly, Nature as the inner psychic world of human experiences is correspondingly disturbed. The non-renewable economy which exploits and destroys the natural world therefore prevents the true functional flourishing of the psychic and the physical structure of the human component of the natural planetary world.
The connection between inner and outer worlds can be readily understood if we considered the possibility of human colonisation of the moon. Human beings could, physically, as a technical accomplishment, inhabit the moon. But the human imagination would be as barren as the lunar landscape, and human emotions would be as desolate. The human sense of the divine would be as bleak as the lunar landscape.

The techno-urban industrial world is reducing Earth to a bleak, barren lunar condition and, as a result, human beings are losing a sense of the divine within and without. Losing a sense of the sacredness of Nature as living organism, human beings are losing sublimity in their inner lives. Human beings could feasibly exist on the moon as a technical achievement, but they could not live there, and certainly they could not live well. The reason is not the technical inability to establish the physical conditions for human existence there; it is the inability to create the psychic conditions for a flourishing human life lived well. Human beings would exist in their physical outer world but die their inner psychic world.

It follows that a sustainable economy cannot be constructed merely by mitigating the consequences of the techno-urban industrial world within the same exploitative relation to nature (and labour, the human productive power). It makes sense from this perspective to replace the notion of ‘sustainable development’ with ‘sustainable living’. New modes of thought, organisation and action are required to articulate the new way of being present within the world. Even the identification of the materials of the natural world as ‘resources’ signifies a reductive, commodified relation between human beings and the natural world.
A new relationship is required, uniting human nature within with nature without. The world needs to be conceived as a communion of living subjects, not as a collection of dead objects. The whole universe is bonded by the interconnection of all things with each other. A sustainable, renewable economy rests on an intimate relation with a world that human beings commune with, as against a world of "natural resources" that human beings quantify, commodify and exploit and ultimately dissipate. Both the natural world without and the natural world within would flourish by this true knowledge of human beings as part of Nature as the one single reality. 
The critique of alienation in the sphere of technics is far from being a repudiation of scientific or technological ability, merely an attempt to integrate it within sane and harmonious relations with nature. Human technics will live up to their emancipatory potentialities when they correspond to rather than contradict nature's own technologies. Nature is itself the most impressive and intricate of technological achievements. Take Nature’s own hydrological cycle. Nature continuously drawing up a vast quantity of water from the oceans, raining water back down over the continents to nourish the forests, soils and grasslands, drawing it back into the great rivers where it flows once more into the seas. This cycle by which Nature arranges the flow of the waters of life is a remarkable technological feat in the service of the organic world of flowering plants and all the life forms and creatures that thrive in land, sea and sky.

Rather than fight this process – often in the mistaken belief of improving it or creating an alternative to it – human beings need to integrate human technologies into Nature’s technologies, living in an appropriate manner upon nature whilst remembering the legitimate claims of all other modes of being in the fulfilment of their own essential needs. Any economic programme for ‘sustainable living’ must be set within the contours of a planetary economy which respects the place that each and every mode of being has within the Earth community. For every being has the place to be, the appropriate habitat which enables it to fulfill its function in the ever-renewing processes of nature.

Human beings need to draw on all of the biological insight and technological skills at their command to yield the requisite energy for not only existence but for human well-being. True knowledge and intelligence will establish a sustainable scientific understanding and practice of an organic modus vivendi. If such a way of life often involves inhibition and restraint, it remains a creative and productive interchange with nature – including one’s own - rather than a destructive one. It develops the long range strategic capacity which alone ensures human well being. However demanding this ‘rational nature’ is, it offers a true fulfilment in the sense of flourishing and joy, the virtue of the realisation of potentials and exercise of capacities, a vision far beyond anything human beings can achieve in the exploitative industrial economy.

The view draws upon a strong tradition of ancient wisdom.

Nature will feed, clothe, shelter and heal all with eyes to see and ears to hear with, fulfilling the deepest aspirations on condition of abandoning current predatory attitude. The natural world and human beings are not adversaries but emerge from a common origin and proceed towards a common destiny. Nature within and without should find completion in each other within the greater universe that enfolds all.

But does this nature exist anymore, either inside or out? Not in an unmodified form, certainly. The human species is the only one that changes its environment to fit itself rather than fits itself to the environment. But the point goes further than this biological truism. In changing their environment, human beings change themselves. In creating a world that contradicts rather than corresponds to the human ontology, in creating an alien world that responds more to institutional and systemic imperatives rather than human needs, human beings create themselves as beings alien to their essential selves.


Zoologists devised an experiment in which various animals were given the choice of a series of refuges, each a box where the temperature and humidity are maintained at a different level. Each animal soon learns where it is most comfortable. The box it chooses to settle is called Eden. (Kingdon 1993 ch 2). Can anyone be so certain that human beings, intoxicated by their technics and institutions and products of all kinds, could find their way to their own Eden? Any zoologist observing the human species would be baffled by the lack of response to global warming, adverse weather conditions and increasing temperatures. Of course, the reason is the slow, insidious, creeping nature of the problem which people get used to as the normal reality.

When asked what the purpose of philosophy was, Wittgenstein replied that it was to show the fly the way out of the bottle. The fly cannot access the world that its senses show to exist all around it. There are levels of cognition, from instincts and desires at the level of immediacy, to reason and intellect higher up. You ascend the levels to achieve freedom. Intelligence, knowledge, wisdom will lead human beings beyond the senses to the real world outside of the institutional and systemic constraints.

This is the Hegel-Marx alienation thesis. For it is human ingenuity and creativity and technics that confine us inside the bottle in the first place. And it is our intellect – economics as the science of scarcity, politics as the art of the possible – that creates and reinforces ‘false fixities’, historically and socially created practices that are taken to be unalterable. Our intellect not only puts us in the bottle but also keeps us there. Wittgenstein’s bottle, in this sense, becomes like Plato’s cave in being misperceived to be the one and true reality. Human beings may think that they are freely choosing beings but their modes of thought, action and organisation are pre-determined.


This is to ask the question whether civilisation, as the separation of the human from the elemental forces of the world, is a humanisation – an assertion of human power to shape the world - or a dehumanisation - the denaturing of the human ontology within through the conquest of nature without.

The worship of technics has created a new sense of Eden, of heaven on earth, a new form of eternal life. The human body is fragile and unpredictable; it withers and dies. In contrast, a new security and a new eternal life could be found in the creation of a mechanical order which rests on the tools of analytical reasoning, the principles of mathematics and mechanics. These are immune from earthly mortality. Like Plato’s world of the ideal forms but with this difference. Plato’s ultimate reality was one behind the temporal reality of everyday life, a norm or a standard for human beings to live up to and incorporate into their lives. This mechanical order lacks that living, organic content. No life form, human or otherwise, can live outside of time and space. In overcoming the limitations of time and space, the mechanical order expands material production and consumption and speeds the flow of material resources, and hooks human beings on the path of unlimited material progress. 

But a mechanical order is not a living order. It is a machine. And the difference between a machine and an organicism is clear. If a machine falters and breaks down, the parts have to be replaced from the outside. When an organicism falters, it repairs and renews itself. 

Taking a cue here from Darwin’s view that all life is a descent with modification from a common source, the argument here affirms the unity of life on earth as part of one self-subsistent organism. This comes with the sense of divine power as an immanent power within the nature of each and all living things. 


The German expressionist painter Franz Marc asked the question ‘How does a horse see the world?’ ‘It is a poverty-stricken convention to place animals in landscapes as seen [and created] by men. Instead we should contemplate  the soul of the animal to divine its way of sight’. I mean also the human animal. There are potentially limitless ways of perceiving existence. I want to explore alternative possibilities.

The origins of this mechanical order go back to the conquest of the Old World. According to the researches of Marija Gimbutas (1921-1994), the Old World of 7000 to 3500BC was populated by pastoralist and egalitarian communities governed by feminine values and living in peaceful coexistence across a large area. The people of these communities were united in the worship of the Great Goddess, the giver and taker of life in the form of Mother Earth and experienced themselves as an intricate part of Nature’s web in connection with along with all other living beings. They were immersed in a sea of energies like fish in water. 
This Great Mother Goddess figure survived beyond the Old World as an all embracing and all-pervasive deity. Cybele, Kubaba, Myrene or Hepat (Turkey); Danae; Inanna (Sumer); Belet-Ili (in the Babylonian Gilgamesh Epic), Anath and Ishtar (Mesopotamia; Isis, Hathor (Egypt). To the Canaanitic and Syrian peoples she was Astarte and Asherah. To the Greeks she could be Hera, or Rhea, also, in aspects, Demeter, Artemis, or Athene. She was responsible for birth, sex and death - and for rebirth as well. Ultimately, all of these goddess images are reducible to the archetype of the original mind conceived in the light of Gaia, the Earth herself.
This Old World was extinguished in the succeeding Bronze Age as Indo-European warrior nomads invaded from the east and came to establish a patriarchal, stratified and war orientated culture. The female deities, or more accurately the Goddess Creatrix in her many aspects, came to be replaced by the predominantly male divinities. The polytheism of gods and goddesses was replaced by the monotheism of God, the single white male. 
The point is that the suppression of the feminine, the animal and the natural were all part of the one and the same process. 

Monotheism established itself as the struggle of human beings to separate themselves from animals and nature but also from their own animal nature. Thus we have Moses admonishing his people over the animal idolatry involved in prostrating themselves before the Golden Calf. 
It is during this period that it became commonplace to use animal epithets to denigrate others. People projected their own worst fears about their own natural impulses onto animals and condemned any and all human behaviour that reminded them of their animal origins —ferocity, gluttony, lust— as animal, even though it is human beings, not animals, who make war on their own species, eat more than is good for them, and are sexually active all the year round. Christian doctrine and lore reinforced the idea that animals and animal-like behaviour were sinful and evil. The devil and evil spirits were said to take up residence in the bodies of cats, dogs, rats, and other animals.

 Animal urges are an embarrassing reflection of the instinctual drives and uncontrollable impulses in nature that need to be subdued in civilisation. Carl Jung refers to the shadow when describing those features of the human personality that lie repressed in the unconscious. The suppression of the human body transforms the animal side of human existence into a shadow self, an animal shadow which continues to haunt the collective psyche of modern civilisation. The flight from the animal shadow is the fear of freedom which prevents human beings from creating a home for itself here on Earth. You can call it Eden if you want.

One is reminded here of Heidegger’s conception of dwelling in the fourfold - the fourfold of earth, sky, gods, and mortals. Heidegger argues that "dwelling" is the human "essence" (QCT 28, P 257, PLT 213 ff.). However, to dwell is to "belong within the fourfold of sky and earth, mortals and divinities" (QCT 49; compare PLT 149). For human beings to create a genuine home here on earth means ascending from mortal to divine state by integrating nature and culture. The fourfold is what "we call the world" (PLT 179). To dwell is to be "at home" (QCT 49). It is to be in the world as in a Heimat, a homeland as opposed to a foreign or alien place. The word ‘fourfold’ in the German is Geviert, meaning "square" or "courtyard" and is as such a spatial notion. By the fourfold, therefore, Heidegger defines what makes a place or space a dwelling-space. To be at home is to be in one's place as a dwelling-place in so far as it shows up as a Geviert. To understand how this happens and is constituted there is a need to understand the elements that compose it. 

"Earth is the building bearer, nourishing with its fruits, tending water and rock, plant and animal" (PLT 178). Dwellers dwell "on" the earth (PLT 149). "Sky is the sun's path, the course of the moon, the glitter of the stars, the year's seasons, the light and dusk of day, the gloom and glow of night, the clemency and inclemency of the weather, the drifting clouds and the blue depth of the aether" (PLT 178). Dwellers dwell "under" the sky (PLT 149).

“Earth" embraces the totality of things, animal, vegetable and mineral, with which human beings share the world. “Sky" embraces not just the literal sky but that which belongs to or comes from it - the predictable rhythms of the planetary motions, the annual seasons, night and day, the motions of the weather.

So far so good. The most difficult element of the fourfold to understand from an ecological perspective is "the gods," die Gottlichen, literally "the godly ones." Heidegger writes that Greek tragedy "brought the presence of the gods, [i.e.,] brought the dialogue of divine and human destinings to radiance" (QCT 34). The gods are therefore "divine destinings," the "laws" (HE 312) or "edicts" (I 116) that are the fundamental ethos of a community. It is the divine laws which permit the possibility of a critique of "the voice of the people," contemporary public opinion (HE 312). 

The fourfold of earth, sky, gods, and mortals is actually the twofold of nature and culture. "Sky" and "Earth" together refer to nature. Individuals, mortals, gathered together by a common "heritage," by a shared pantheon of gods, refer to culture or community: only by dwelling "in the sight of the gods" does "man become a people (Volk)" (GA 39 216). 

A dwelling-space is therefore a bounded space. It is a space "cleared and free... within a boundary," a boundary being "not that at which something stops but... that from which it begins its presenting" (PLT 154). It follows from this that there are therefore many fourfolds. The ethics of dwelling involves a combination of localism and universalism. The fourfold in which one dwells is a local fourfold. The ethics of dwelling will therefore vary according to place and person. The primary object of guardianship in the local fourfold is not the universe or the planet, but the particular fourfold to which one belongs. But to stand in the right relationship to Being, based on "insight into that which is" (QCT 47) rather than the illusion of "metaphysics," is to care-for, to become a "guardian" of, the dwelling-place in a universal sense. The contemporary environmental crisis is, of course, global in character and presents a substantial threat to both nature and culture. The individual can only care-for local place by caring-for the globe.

The fourfold is, Heidegger argues, is no mere collection of disconnected entities but evinces a "unity" or "simple oneness." "Each of the four mirrors in its own way, the presence of the others." They "belong... to one another," have "essential being toward one another" (PLT pp. 178-80). The mutual "mirroring" between earth, sky, gods, and mortals "does not portray a likeness" (PLT 179). It is not a matter of picturing but a functional relationship. It is possible to “read off” the three elements of the fourfold from its other element. "When we say earth [or sky, or gods, or mortals] we are already thinking of the other three along with it" (PLT 178, see also 149-50). 

Sky and earth are nature, gods and mortals - mortals living in community "before" their gods - are culture. Heidegger argues not only for an intra-natural and of an intra-cultural "mirroring" but also for a mirroring between nature and culture. There is therefore a mutual mirroring between the gods of a people on the one hand, and their sky and earth, on the other. To understand what Heidegger is getting at one can refer to Nietzsche’s argument that "once you have recognised the need and land and sky... of a people you may also guess the law of their overcomings." Where Nietzsche would say guess the virtues of a people, Heidegger would say their "gods." The point is that there is a natural affinity which connects particular virtues with particular environments. The Heideggerian "gods" mirror nature, since nature determines virtues. 

A point to emphasise here is that there is a clear difference between inhabiting a geographical region and dwelling in a fourfold. Bodenstandigkeit is a fundamental Heideggerian concept, meaning rootedness of life in the soil. In a radio broadcast entitled "Why do we stay in the Provinces?" Heidegger explained why he had rejected, in 1934, a second invitation to accept a chair in Berlin. He argued that his philosophical work is not aloof but belongs in the midst of the peasants' work. It is intimately mated in and related to the life of the peasants. The inner relationship of my own work to the Black Forest and its people comes from a centuries-long and irreplaceable rootedness in the Alemanic-Swabian soil.

The life of the philosopher is "rooted" in the life of the Black Forest peasant, and the life of the peasant is rooted in the thin and impoverished character of the Black Forest "soil." And so, too, are the virtues, the "clarity of heart" developed by the "clear light" with which "the autumn sun of the Black Forest" bathes the mountain ranges." It is, of course, possible to inhabit a region without one's "gods" being the ones native to that place. But, if so, one merely inhabits the place, one does not dwell there. 

The changes of the last couple of hundred years represent a tremendous upheaval. Peter Laslett calls it ‘the world we have lost’. But this lost world refers to much more. The gnosis of the animal shadow, the missing feminine, the Gaian collectivity of organic life all point to a cooperative, peaceful, egalitarian mode of social organisation that resides somewhere in the human psyche.

The natural world has in one part been ripped up and in another part overlaid with a new world of concrete, steel and glass. Human beings have always built worlds upon worlds, but what distinguishes the new world is the scale and the speed of construction. And its emptiness. Max Weber refers to the rationalisation of the world as a disenchantment. Fichte calls this a ‘disgodding’. For Spinoza, God and Nature are one and the same substance. Whichever figure one puts the accent on, modern construction is utterly narcissistic, divorced from all natural or divine purpose and worshipping nothing other than its own physical, technical power. 
Urbanization and industrialisation confirmed the severing of the remaining bonds between people and animals and the detachment of human beings from their own animal nature. No more could divinity be located in nature. Fichte refers to disgodding. Architects refer to the new brutalism, Derek Sayer coins the phrase the violence of abstraction. Well, it's godless, brutal, and violent. And its vacuous, a materialism that has only external form but lacks content, power for the sake of power. This world of empty materialism is a human product, evincing great technical power without moral purpose. Here is the difference with the great cathedral building of the Middle Ages. The cathedrals were built by common effort united by a common moral purpose, to the glory of a God who commanded wide respect and reverence. Modern construction is in the service of mammon. There is a common purpose of sorts here, but of the most instrumental, ephemeral and transitory kind, the selfish pursuit of money, acquisition, gain. The notion of common effort and purpose here has the character of bargain and contract, lasting no longer than the prospect of a monetary return. Karl Marx referred to alienation to describe the way that the products of human creation had gained an existential significance independently of their human creators. An older tradition refers to the sin of idolatory. Marx’s alien powers are false gods. And these gods demand not merely worship but sacrifice. But this is to see the human conquest of natural necessity as slavery to the new necessity, a new institutional-systemic necessity. The alienation thesis of Hegel and of Marx.
In the words of Marx: ‘All our invention and progress seem to result in endowing material forces with intellectual life, and in stultifying human life into a material force… To work well, the new-fangled forces of society .. only want to be mastered by new-fangled men’. 

Weber describes rationalisation as the disenchantment of the world, Friedrich Schiller characterises this as a ‘disgodding’, a dedivinization in which Nature becomes simply matter available for technological appropriation, to be exploited according to human desires and projects. 
But the old gods and goddesses have not gone away. They have take new forms. 
Weber referred to the old gods rising from their graves and warring with each other as the modern gods of impersonal forces, controlling human lives and demanding human sacrifices. The ultimate measure of the power of these new gods is to be found in the millions of bodies which the twentieth century left as its memorial. War might not be new but modernity has waged it with ruthless efficiency, under the sign of new mythologies, totalizing abstractions which name and claim the lives of all. 
Human beings think themselves to be free but still remain within mythological forms of ontological validation. Competing forces in institutionalized form, in the shape of bureaucratic political or social movements. 

Weber referred to modern society as the iron cage, a cage that was not so much a physical as a psychic prison embracing not just the bodies but the subjectivities of its members. You can’t see the bars on the cage, they are internal rather than external – what William Blake called ‘mind forged manacles’. Weber says something interesting, he refers to modern bureaucratic organisation as ‘mechanised petrification’. Petrification means the conversion of organic material into a fossilized form.

Freud defined civilisation as a social coercion which requires a sacrifice of instinctual satisfaction and increases madness.
Foucault shows that madness rather than being considered an illness was originally seen as a manifestation of animality requiring the regulation of the body by the interplay of technologies of discipline and technologies of the self through which the individual is formed to fit the system. Society needs and trains individuals to want to do what they have to do. The individuals learn to do it for themselves.

The result is the detailed surveillance of the individual by the state and other centralized agencies (such as schools, factories, hospitals and the police), the growing documentation of the individual by bureaucratic means and the decline of real ethical autonomy on the part of citizens. 
The autonomous individual is increasingly regulated by the rationalizing process of the iron cage as the system of public domination.

Stripped of its divinities, nature is made profane, and of only instrumental value. The problem is that human beings get caught up in this instrumentality, policed from cradle to the grave in a network of disciplines.

Nature has been progressively mechanized and instrumentalized, stripped of mysterious forces and meanings. Nature is no longer understood as being filled with gods, demons or spirits. Instead, nature is mathematical - something to be counted, measured and mapped, quantified and commodified. 
And it is only when we approach nature in a technological way - in a way that is concerned above all with prediction and control - that the kinds of knowledge offered by science and economics become intelligible and useful.

This upsets the ratio between biology and culture, which makes it difficult for other species to keep up. EO Wilson refers to the death of life. The sixth great extinction spasm of geological time is now underway, grace of humankind. The new Earth has acquired a force that can break the crucible of biodiversity.

I want to argue that the global capital economy represents homogenisation and the destruction of natural and cultural diversity – the ending of real nature and the ersatz diversity of museums and zoos. 

The first impression one gets of globalisation is of an explosion of diversity. But it is the same impression one would get if all the animals in a zoo were put in a single cage—an impression that lasts until only the lion, the brown bear, and the python were left to divide the cage between them. In real-world ecology, however, it is the great, noble beasts that die out first, while resourceful vermin flourish.
In the case of domesticated plants and animals, the diversity we are losing is both biological and cultural. When the world is a single market, agricultural diversity in each region is reduced. We are squeezing the whole world into a single ecosystem, a single market, and a single culture. A single cage, a single zoo.

Desmond Morris compares the modern city dweller with a captive animal. We live in a human zoo not an urban jungle.
 In their natural habitats, animals do not mutilate themselves, develop stomach ulcers, become fetishists, suffer from obesity, or commit murder. Among human city-dwellers all of these things occur. The zoo animal in a cage exhibits all these abnormalities. 
The modern human animal is no longer living in conditions natural for his species. Trapped, not by a zoo collector, but by his own brainy brilliance. 
We take the stress because there are benefits. The zoo world protects its inmates: food, drink, shelter, hygiene and medical care are provided; the basic problems of survival are reduced to a minimum. But it’s not a real Eden. With our essentially inventive brain, we organize and create more elaborate activities and plunge ourselves deeper into an even more captive zoo world. 

So what I’m getting at is what Desmond Morris urged: ‘Understand your animal nature and accept it.’ Create a social order that corresponds to rather than contradicts the human ontology. 

We could give this an ancient political basis. In Aristotle’s words, man – and woman – is a zoon politikon – a social-political animal, requiring a politikon bion, a public or social life. Zoon and bion = life = zoology and biology. Aristotle makes happiness, the happy habitat, crucial to this end.

The Greek is eudaimonia, eu meaning good and daimona meaning demon, spirit, god – good god. Deus sive Natura – God and Nature are the one and the same substance. When asked if he believed in God, Einstein declared: 'I believe in Spinoza's God who reveals himself in the orderly harmony of what exists, not in a God who concerns himself with fates and actions of human beings'?

Are we far from Lovelock’s Gaia?
For James Lovelock, human beings are inevitably part of the Gaian process of self-regulation, and 'as the transfer of power to our species proceeds, our responsibility for maintaining planetary homeostasis grows with it, whether we are conscious of the fact or not'. 

And that’s the point. Distanced further and further from the sense of nature as sacred, are we conscious or not, are we free, can we choose to do the right thing? Can we escape the zoo, the cage, the tank? Plato’s cave.

The idea of Gaia as a self-regulating, self-sustaining living organism may well be a manifestation of the Great Goddess in scientific form.
Gaia is 'no doting mother tolerant of misdemeanours... She is stern and tough, always keeping the world warm and comfortable for those who obey her rules, but ruthless in her destruction of those who transgress.' If we are talking goddesses, this recalls the old Kali image of nature as a devouress. (Marshall NW 28)
Lovelock warns that Gaia can eventually get rid of our species if we threaten the rest of life on earth: 

'Gaia is not purposefully antihuman but so long as we continue to change the global environment against her preferences, we encourage our replacement with a more environmentally seemly species.'

Drawn further and further out of our biological matrix we have become more and more dependent on an all-pervasive but ethically indifferent technology. Technology has warded off starvation, disease and the rigours of climate. Technology is an extension of what we are. If we are greedy and selfish technology will be a faithful mirror. Left to its own dynamics technological and industrial innovation destroys places and people. 

We can thus think of overcoming technology in terms of learning to hear a different language than that spoken by the technological world. We learn to hear and respond differently, Heidegger thought, by practicing dwelling with the fourfold of earth, sky, mortals, and divinities.

It is for the children of technology to humanise their parent or, like Saturn, it will consume them. Self-made Man in his self-made society needs to build a new sense of the unity of nature and of our own position within that dynamic, evolving balance. This cannot be a mere technical fix but will involve a social and spiritual revolution. Deconstruction of dominator-warrior cultural values means promotion of a Gaian Holism that was commonplace of the Edenic world of the Goddess. 

When Picasso saw the Palaeolithic art in the caves at Lascaux he remarked ‘We have invented nothing. We have made no progress in culture, although we have invented organized war on a massive scale’.

The alien world is indeed a human product and, as such, one can identify human handiwork in aspects of its form and shape. At a distance from God/Nature, in abstraction from one’s essential species powers to use Marx’s idiom, it has the appearance of the City of God. It isn’t. And it isn’t the City of Man either. It is the City of Alienated Man, human beings in thrall to their own powers. The reality within contradicts the appearance without. Alongside the wealth there is the poverty, a hedonistic luxury alongside the soul destroying squalor. The glittering promise of the hard sell shows the extent to which even the architects of the alien world are troubled by an uneasy conscience. 
This has been present all along. The capital system as such is nihilistic in the sense of being endless, with end or purpose.

MARKETS AND MORALITY
This has been present all along. The capital system as such is nihilistic in the sense of being endless, with end or purpose.
Adam Smith felt that markets and morality could be combined in an economy in which private vices resulted in public virtues. There are good reasons to doubt this. Within the market, freedom is conceived as right, the right to own private property, to exchange, to enter contracts, and the right not to be interfered with in the individual pursuit of these rights. But within the capital system, freedom is conceived as power, the power to act on and to change the world. Freedom as power challenges freedom as right. Capitalism continually promises power but can never ultimately deliver it. Whilst instrumental reason promises the efficient realisation of an individual's goals, in its capitalist form, these goals essentially unrealisable. This reveals capitalism as essentially endless, nihilistic. To take one instance, the end of consumption is not the satisfaction of one's pre-existing needs and wants, but the act of consumption itself. Satisfaction implies limits but the consumer ethic of capitalism is limitless. The satisfaction gained through the consumption of one particular object immediately gives way to the pursuit of further objects. The basic characteristic of consumption is not satisfaction, but repetition, and that is what marks it as endless. 
The goal of power within the capital system is equally endless, beyond achievement. This is partly a consequence of the power pursued being essentially comparative, possessing power meaning possessing more power than others. Any achievement one person has is susceptible to being undermined by the achievements of others, with the result that no-one can ever be certain about any achievement and therefore must endlessly strive for further success (Poole ch 2 ). 

The capital system is therefore a nihilism. The power which each individual strives to gain is not power as capacity enabling one to undertake and accomplish a particular task or series of tasks; rather, power is merely the means to acquire further means to further means in an endless cycle. Such goals as there are valued merely as means towards further ends which are themselves means. Economists employ the concept of deferred gratification to account for the attainment of ends that are of a greater quality than those immediately satisfied. What we have with capitalism, however, is an endless deferral of ends that far from realising human goals subjects human beings to a compulsive repetition that is ultimately unsatisfying. 

This nihilism is part of the dynamic of the capital system. Capitalism is a regime of private accumulation in which the system imperative, rather than purpose, is to accumulate resources for the sake of further accumulation. ‘Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and all the prophets’ wrote Marx (Capital I).

The contradictory dynamics, cycles and crisis tendencies of the capital system reveal this endless nature. Schumpeter coins the phrase ‘creative destruction’ to make sense of the crises which clear away inefficient capitals to make further growth possible. But this process of creation and destruction which is the dynamic of capitalist development serves nothing other than a systemic purpose, accumulation for further accumulation. Accumulation for the sake of accumulation.

In a historical perspective, this endless dynamic can seem progressive. For human beings subjected to this profoundly unsatisfying experience within the system, this optimistic assessment of abstractions like history and capitalist development is misplaced. To the extent that one can characterise capitalist development in a historical framework, it is of power without responsibility, power out of control, an anarchy and a nihilism of power outside of political, moral and institutional restraint. Of course, this is implicit in Smith’s notion of ‘the invisible hand’. If there is a purpose to the history of capitalism, then it is not one visible to the people who live it. We are the ghosts in the machine. Max Weber coined the phrase ‘without regard to persons’ to characterise the bureaucratised, rationalised, routinised world of modernity. Capitalism generates values - consumption, power – which promise but do not deliver satisfaction and in its cycle of endless competitive repetition cannot supply criteria in terms of which its dynamic can be conceived as the progressive realisation of some ultimate end. Capitalism is locked in the cycle of ends produced to make further ends and so on. Perhaps this is the corollary of ‘living; within a mechanical order. Teleology has been thrown out of the universe. The problem is that human beings are teleological beings who need a purpose in their lives. Without a sense of purpose or direction, there is only the anarchy of change and chaos. In conquering natural necessity, human praxis has resulted in the creation of a new social necessity. The inexorable power that was once ascribed to nature has long been overcome by technics. However, in the process, these technics, the means of technical conquest, have come to reassert this power at the level of society.

This is the Hegel-Marx alienation thesis. Capitalism generates power as a value but denies it as a practice. All pervasive yet absent, power is the most ‘invisible’ aspect of capitalism. The powers of capitalist modernity - the forces of production and destruction, of capital, of bureaucracy, of the market - are social powers in alien form. The product of the concerted action of many individuals, they are collective powers lacking a mechanism for their collective control. Since the dominant mode of existence is individual right – possession, property, contract – these collective powers are experienced as a supra-individual necessity, an anonymous and alien imperative that directs the lives of supposedly free and powerful individuals from the outside. In conditions where real power is denied, it can only be asserted as simulacrum, as fantasy or representation.
The capital system has replaced ties of personal dependency with an objective dependency of all, caging the individual within a network of social inter-dependency that is external to them, reified social relationships far more extensive and anonymous than anything in human history. 
In the name of personal freedom, capitalism has separated the individual from strong and constitutive relations with those others on whom he or she depends. By various means, the individual is encouraged to conceive identity as something distinct from other individuals. The individual will engage with others as a competitor for scarce resources, making contracts or transactions with others only for the prospective gain that issues from acting in concert. The result is the isolated individual who conceives any relations with others instrumentally, with the result that all are subject to an objective dependency. 
Isolated from others, the individual has no reason to be concerned with the specific interests of others, not even those involved in contracts and transactions. The social identity connecting the good of each with the good of all is simply lacking. The conception of individual identity which market relations makes available makes it impossible to conceive of any motivation other than an egocentric one. One ought to act in altruistic fashion but no good reason can be offered for the sacrifice of egoistic interests within market relations. The social identity which connects egoism and altruism is simply not available. It is always egoistic desires which motivate the individual, personal gratification which is aimed at. Not the least contradiction of capitalism in becoming the universal mode of production is the extent to which it has globalised the extent to which individuals are brought into mutual dependence with a conception of identity and motivation which is overwhelmingly focused on the individual self apart from constitutive ties to others. 

This thin, attenuated notion of the self lends a certain hollowness to the conception of social life. To the extent that the individual is conceived as separate from other individuals, social relationships are reified as abstractions inhibitive of individual freedom; and even personal capacities take on an alien character as means to external ends. As individual identity becomes abstract, so the individual in society assumes an elusive character. According to market notions of right, the individual is at the centre of social life, aiming at the satisfaction personal desires. At the same time, the individual disappears from view as no more than the place of origin and return of these desires. To call the activity of the market ‘endless’ captures the vacuous circularity of the route connecting desire and its satisfaction. 
The endless circularity of the market conceals the emptiness of the ends pursued from the individual agents and turns the rational pursuit of ends into an instrumental rationality which elevates means to the status of ends 

The overriding end is to pursue means in order to pursue ends as further means to further ends. In individual is locked into this endless circularity and must pursue means for the sake of means as relentlessly as Hobbes' natural man had to pursue power for the sake of power. 
A complementary goal is consumption. In a series of books, JK Galbraith showed how the enormously productive economy required a corresponding increase in consumption. The result is that freedom ceases to refer to the realisation and exercise of productive capacities, an active notion, but becomes the endless satisfaction of wants as an infinite consumer, a passive notion. 
The individual thus subjected to two desires which are not only incompatible but are also incapable of satisfaction on their own terms. Galbraith is right about the ‘enormously productive’ capitalist economy, but he is also right that this productivity has been dissociated from human happiness as a passive, purposeless consumption. This generates frustration rather than satisfaction; competitive repetition rather than creativity; ceaseless striving rather than fulfilment. Not the least of capitalism’s achievements is to have identified this nihilistic mode of experience with reason, freedom and happiness.
The social identity made available under the capitalist form is fragile. The individual is separated from the resources and constitutive ties necessary to provide substance and coherence to human life. The larger networks of meaning do not exist for the individual whose self-contained identity is conceived to possess the locus of all that is meaningful. However, the identity of this individual is not given but is a tenuous and unstable achievement which is constantly under threat as a result of the instrumental activities of other such individuals, and by the impersonality of the social relations to which all are subject. Each individual treats all others as means to personal ends with the result that all end in subjection to the reified laws of social activity. 

At present there is a perfection of means and an imperfection of ends. Science without conscience will doom us all (Einstein). Technics and the use of technics without a moral purpose grounded in the biosystem and lifeworld will indeed doom us all. It already is, with an extinction not seen for 65 million years. 

POWER AND CIVILISATION
 Any ‘civilisation’ worthy of its name is defined in terms of the constitutive creative praxis of human beings, the organisation and use of powers to the enlargement and enrichment of human faculties. Nietzsche argues that human beings should not have such power as they cannot creatively live up to. It is from this perspective that Marx’s condemnation of alienation and the enslavement to alien powers needs to be understood. 

The perfected political state is by its nature the species-life of man in opposition to his material life. All the presuppositions of this egoistic life continue to exist outside the sphere of the state in civil society, but as qualities of civil society. Where the political state has attained its full degree of development man leads a double life, a life in heaven and a life on earth, not only in his mind, in his consciousness, but in reality. He lives in the political community, where he regards himself as a communal being, and in civil society, where he is active as a private individual, regards other men as means, debases himself to a means and becomes a plaything of alien powers.

The ‘perfected political state’ is indeed heaven, the celestial city. 

The great technical achievement is to have rolled back poverty, hunger, and disease and if the Four Horsemen still ride this is because a failure of politics and not technics. War, plague, famine and death are not natural and inevitable, like the weather, but are remediable. The problem is that technics are in the service of accumulation, of power and resources.

Ultimately, the choice is not one between the City of God and the City of Man. Augustine gives us a loaded question, a straw man, by setting up the City of Man as such as irretrievably doomed to failure on account of being the product of a fallen humankind. On these premises all civilisation building is doomed to failure. For Augustine, it is folly to seek purpose and meaning in the earthly city. Only the City of God offers these in permanent form. Augustine attacks not merely the decadence, hedonism, egoism and shallow materialism of the citizens present at the fall of Rome but the very ideals of city building, investing the earthly city with a moral significance that, ultimately, it lacks. The good citizen merely passes through the City of Man and sees in the great technical, institutional, political and cultural accomplishments as having no more significance than routes to the greater glory attained in the City of God.

Augustine’s words still ring true. It is Shelley’s tale of Ozymandias. All that remains of this ‘king of kings’ is a statue reduced to a couple of stumped legs and rubble and a plinth inscribed with the words, 'My name is Ozymandias, king of kings: Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair!'. The point is that the truly wise do not seek worldly fame and fortune, for these are but superficial and transitory things which are destined to crumble into dust in time. On this, the atheist Shelley and the devout Augustine were in agreement. Yet both Augustine and Shelley and many more philosophers who have taught the folly of worldly success have themselves used their talents to make names of themselves. The criticism, of course, is not of striving to achieve in any given time and place but of seeing any fame and fortune as having any significance beyond this temporal striving. Ozymandias clearly achieved a great deal in his time, but the permanence of his name should depend on his achievement not his power. That power is now like the crumbled ruin of his statue. His claim that the mighty would look upon him and despair made him a figure of ridicule. Ozymandias is here guilty of believing that his power and wealth sufficed to give him an immortality that elevated him above the common herd of humankind. Shelley’s poem about the statue not only shredded the delusions of grandeur of the mighty but taught a lesson to all those who count success in terms of money and power. Earthly success in these limited terms is as short as a lifespan. For what does a life count? Human accomplishment is measured in far more expansive, richer terms. This doesn’t mean merely accepting that one does one’s best rather than obsess about being the best. The best themselves also do their best, by definition. Undermining delusions of grandeur isn’t an invitation to pragmatic realism and mediocrity. It was not a route that Shelley followed after all. It begs the question of what success is. ‘It profits a man nothing to gain the world in exchange for his soul’. ‘Man does not live by bread alone’. These teachings point to a spiritual reality behind and beyond the physical plane, a truer reality than that available by pandering to physical selves and serving the senses. What does it profit a man to win the world of politics and high finance but lose his friends and family, his connection with the lifeworld of human reciprocity, solidarity and exchange? Jimmy Reid used the above quote from Jesus Christ when repudiating the rat race as fit only for rats. Jimmy Reid addressed a working class audience in industrial Britain but the message has a cross class, ethical and spiritual significance. Hence the current rage for downsizing amongst the middle class, in which people who have achieved a certain standard of living say ‘enough’ and give up on the rat race, rejecting the extra money in order to reclaim their lives. These are people who have actually won the rat race but, having seen the rewards, consider the price of victory is not worth paying. We are back to Aristotle. The purpose of human life is not just to live but to live well. Human life is not well lived if the costs of lost life and time outweigh the benefits of material reward. The Aristotelian conception of flourishing recognises this. Human well being requires that human beings realise their essential potentialities so as to be able to exercise their natural capacities to the full. 
 Since reason is the best part of human nature, this meant a life of thought and contemplation. Both Plato and Aristotle agreed that to be a philosopher is the greatest thing a human being can be. Before one claims a little self-interest on their part in forming this conclusion, one should consider the claim in more depth. In this tradition, the reason is the highest and best part of human nature. Fulfilling the highest and best achieves ‘happiness’. The Greek word eudaimonia means good (eu) god or spirit (daimon). It is best conceived as ‘flourishing’. With morality as the high road to this happiness, the good life is the life guided by reason. The good life here could easily be related to Spinoza. Where Aristotle wrote of eudaimonia or flourishing, Spinoza wrote of conatus or striving or endeavour. Spinoza wrote of freedom and wisdom resulting from adequate ideas, the intellectual appreciation of God/Nature giving knowledge and truth. The possession of a rational capacity on the part of all individuals as members of the species homo sapiens implies that all human beings have the potential to become philosophers and hence live the best life. Plato’s Philosopher Ruler is therefore turned into the claim that philosophy should rule, Spinoza’s knowledge and truth through adequate ideas.

More generally, the ancient Greeks argued that human beings possess different 'excellences'. Plato has been criticised for upholding an elitist and hierarchical organic functionalism. His point is that each human being has a special talent which is fitted to a specific function within the whole. Those who reject this claim that it violates the principle of equality of opportunity, the right of people to strive to attain the position that their talent and effort merits. Yet equality of opportunity does not mean that everyone can become anything they want to be, far from it. All the ambition and effort and striving results in a social order that is as hierarchical and as elitist as anything proposed by Plato. And the places within this hierarchy correlate fairly closely not with talent as such but with class and money. There already is a hierarchical functionalism, its just that people’s talents are not best fitted and not properly valued and rewarded.

The point is not only to avoid the delusions of Ozymandias but also the wasted time and the wasted talent of those whose ambitions outweigh their abilities. This is how equality of opportunity is a cheat, a rationalisation which preserves a society in which wealth, resources and life opportunities are unequally divided by the illusion that all are equally able to compete for position. The result is not only a perpetuation of inequality but a hierarchy not of talent but of monied mediocrity. Ambition, effort and talent are wasted. Plato’s principle of minding one’s own business is violated, meaning that the social order does not function as it ought and people are misplaced in their life’s work.
It follows Plato’s principle that there is something intrinsically rewarding about each human being finding something that they are good at and performing it as well as possible. Here, individuals find their place within the larger whole and find meaning and purpose in their lives by dedicating themselves to developing this skill or talent. The advantage of this position is that one does not need to believe in the heaven of the City of God in the manner of Augustine to organise one’s life around a worthwhile goal. Indeed, in the absence of belief, this is a way of finding meaning in life. Like Spinoza’s God/Nature, this meaning is immanent and is located in natural organic laws and processes of being within and being without. 

 Despite Augustine’s admonitions, human beings have continued to think and act as though the earthly city matters. And it as well that they have done so. Civilisation in Europe survived only by the skin of its teeth, in John Ruskin’s words. Without the efforts of the likes of Alcuin and Charlemagne there wouldn’t have been a Christian civilisation on earth motivating the faithful on earth with the promise of an afterlife in the heavenly city. In the millennia and a half since Augustine denigrated the City of Man, the earthly city has continued to matter to human beings. Augustine himself acted as though it mattered, using his power and connections to influence the course of imperial legislation in the favour of the nascent Christian church. Significantly, in imagining heaven, Augustine gave it the shape and form of the city. A perfect, ideal city, no doubt, but a city no less. 

The city has had no shortage of critics, both religious and secular. All civilisations in particular and, with the life span of the earth, civilisation as such, are transitory. So, too, is an individual human life. But that life is no less important for that. The failings that Augustine identified – the selfishness, hedonism and materialism - are failings of one part of human nature. It is not the whole part. The City of Man has endured and so long as it continues to do so there remains scope for the enlargement of the human faculties in terms of knowledge, reason, communication and community. 


To attempt to draw lessons or conclusions from a snapshot or a sketch of ‘civilisation’ is a minefield that is best avoided. As Russell argued, the man who generalises generally lies. But even within the broadest of terms, some points stand out. All substantial change is the result of a process to which many factors contribute. Social transformation from one social order to another is the result of long evolution punctuated by short revolution. But the latter is nothing without the former. The biggest ingredient in the building of civilisation is time. There is no way of artificially accelerating this delicate process; short cuts will short circuit the whole process and arrest its development or, worse, turn it into another direction. What seems also to be clear is that civilisation rests on the active contribution made by its citizens. ‘History’, as Engels wrote, does nothing, it is all the work of individuals. Purpose and meaning are not written into the historical process; without active individual effort, there is no historical process. Many writers in the ancient Greek and Roman world argued that history had an essentially cyclical nature. Even in outline, the history of civilization confirms this conclusion. The notion of a continuous, unilinear line of progress towards a clearly defined end according to an inbuilt purpose or goal is contradicted by the facts. If we, in our technological push button electronic world think otherwise, it may be because we have yet to suffer the collapse that previous civilisations – themselves not backward in science and technics and institutions – have suffered. That collapse is possible. The urban revolution dates back millennia. Yet the essential features of urban civilisation, which had existed for hundreds of years, even millennia, were totally expunged from the face of the earth at the end of the Bronze Age. Take also ancient Greece. The birthplace of democracy it may have been. The birthplace of politics as such in theory and practice, the origin of the vocabulary of politics. Yet the Greek city states gave way to a form of charismatic kingship which savoured more than a little of the 'Big Men' of the Bronze Age Near East and eastern Mediterranean.

But urban civilisation came back and politics came back. And they came back because human beings brought them back. The gains, in other words, exist as human potentials, as part of essential human nature. They are permanent not in time and place but in human potential. When civilisation and the culture and technics it relies upon becomes a passive existence which individuals assume, then it is in danger. What matters is the active contribution of the human faculties, the best part of human nature.
Behind the vicissitudes of time and place, there are a number of constants in civilisation. The same questions crop up, even if human beings develop different solutions. Certain general conclusions can be made which point to the enduring value not of particular civilisations, inevitably transitory in their physical aspects, but of civilisation as such. The rise and fall of civilisations shows time and again that cooperation, contact, communication and community consistently engender and reinforce human well being and enlarge the human mind. Competition and conflict spell ruination. In one passage, Aristotle sums the point up: man is a zoon politikon, requiring a politikon bion in order to live well in relation to each and all. 
Another constant is the unresolved tension between cooperation and competition, general and particular, common good and individual good: the need to establish good order across the body politic as a whole as against the pursuit of individual and group freedoms; elite solidarity versus individual ambition; the defence of cultural and political exclusivity versus the inclusive enfranchisement of all; the inequitable distribution of precious resources and the sharing of the fruits of collective labour and conquest. Finding the right balance between these two apparently irreconcilable aspects of human nature and society is the key to the founding of a sustainable civilisation.
As all civilizations rise, so they fall, somehow at some time. Since the fall of Rome, empires, kingdoms, republics, democracies, theocracies and all kinds of other regimes have risen and fallen. The grandest schemes for political reform, social justice or national aggrandisement have been tested to destruction. In the worst of times, the very idea of civilization has been called into question. John Ruskin claims that European civilisation itself survived by the skin of its teeth. It has survived so far. They called 1945 ‘Germany Year Zero’.

And yet, for all of the disasters, crises and dead-ends, human beings return time and again to the possibilities offered by the City of Man. Naturally. Since man is a social animal, human nature itself compels human beings to try again and again to realise essential human powers and purposes in a meaningful civilisation. Cynics may see this as the triumph of hope over experience, but they are wrong. The experience of the past is something that human beings built in expectation of a future good. It is that expectation, born of the impulse to create a social and public life that corresponds to the human ontology, that causes human beings to continue building the City of Man, trying to build it better each time. And there is this point to be made about Aristotle’s zoon politikon. Aristotle wrote at a time when the identity of the human social animal was bound up with the polis. We have long since gone beyond this limitation to embrace the cosmopolis. The society of the human being is now well beyond the primary solidarities of family, kin or tribe. The social nature of human beings has long since expanded and enriched the notion of civilization. There is no ‘other’ any more. No one person is any one thing any more. Human beings will have to learn to get on with each other, finding the common ground and common identity in the many identities each and all possess. Human beings have developed their social side to such an extent that they are now a species that lives alongside strangers as a matter of choice. We have become used to the notion of the ‘world in one city’ but it would be truer to refer to the ‘city in one world’. The world and the people in it are interconnected and for this reason, human beings as social animals are compelled to discover new ways for living together in harmony. For all of the transitory, ephemeral character of city building, human beings are compelled to make civilisation work. They have no choice if they want not just to live but to live well. As we build, so shall we live. 

History in itself gives us little idea of where we are going and no guarantees that we will get there. History is really process rather than event. Human beings are always in the process of creating their experience. What that experience is, is their own creation and responsibility. To rely, passively, on past experience and to assume a current order as a given is to abrogate one’s responsibility in civilisation building. Rather than an enlargement of human faculties, there will be a progressive hollowing out so that civilisation will be more and more form and less and less content.

Human beings attain an end point that they have set themselves when they creatively live up to their powers. Technics alone will take them nowhere other than to a future which is no more than the present enlarged. This is the death of history but also of civilisation.
These sketches of modern technics does not mean that human beings are ephemeral in themselves, nor that society is ephemeral. But the inversion of means and ends involves a pathos in which the whole notion of being human is in the process of becoming ephemeral. Although the origins lie in the notion of civilisation as such – the imposition of certain cultural and ethical and philosophical norms upon biological nature – this ephemerality is a new experience and requires further investigation.
The first thing to note is that there can be no culture or philosophy of technique and hence no technical way of life or social order. Technique has nothing whatever to do with wisdom or morality and can say nothing about ends. To believe otherwise is an expression of pride, hubris inviting nemesis. Technique makes excess, the hubristic dream, finally achievable. One glimpses this in early critics of capitalism like Saint Simon and his call for the rule of the technicians and engineers. Or Veblen, who criticises capitalism for keeping production below technically feasible levels in order to keep prices and profit margins up. Since then, capitalism has learned to develop a managed excess in which expanding productive capacity meets with a corresponding increase in consumption. Excess is inevitable, with or without our wanting it or participating in it. Mass advertisement sells not merely products but a whole system and seduces mass involvement by techniques of mass persuasion.


Kenneth Clark writes that we are now receiving direction from machines. It goes deeper than this. As Nils Bohr could say: "Matter, the real, is what my machines permit me to record." Human beings cannot even record the products of machines, let alone given them direction. Machines are needed to record what other machines are doing, to record sounds and photographs from the planets, to record the phenomena that calculations tell us exist. 

‘In handicrafts and manufacture, the worker makes use of a tool; in the factory, the machine makes use of him. There the movements of the instrument of labour proceed from him, here it is the movements of the machine that he must follow. In manufacture the workers are the parts of a living mechanism. In the factory we have a lifeless mechanism which is independent of the workers, who are incorporated into it as its living appendages. 'The wearisome routine of endless drudgery in which the same mechanical process is ever repeated, is like the torture of Sisyphus; the burden of toil, like the rock, is ever falling back upon the worn-out drudge.’





within the capitalist system all methods for raising the social productivity of labour are put into effect at the cost of the individual worker; that all means for the development of production undergo a dialectical inversion so that they become means of domination and exploitation of the producers; they distort the worker into a fragment of a man, they degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine, they destroy the actual content of his labour by turning it into a torment; they alienate [entfremden] from him the intellectual potentialities of the labour process in the same proportion as science is incorporated in it as an independent power; they deform the conditions under which he works, subject him during the labour process to a despotism the more hateful for its meanness; they transform his life-time into working-time, and drag his wife and child beneath the wheels of the juggernaut of capital. But all methods for the production of surplus-value are at the same time methods of accumulation, and every extension of accumulation becomes, conversely, a means for the development of those methods. It follows therefore that in proportion as capital accumulates, the situation of the worker, be his payment high or low, must grow worse. Finally, the law which always holds the relative surplus population or industrial reserve army in equilibrium with the extent and energy of accumulation rivets the worker to capital more firmly than the wedges of Hephaestus held Prometheus to the rock. It makes an accumulation of misery a necessary condition, corresponding to the accumulation of wealth. Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, the torment of labour, slavery, ignorance, brutalization and moral degradation at the opposite pole, i.e. on the side of the class that produces its own product as capital. (Marx CI 1976 ch 25). 

The crucial phrase is ‘be his payment high or low’. When referring to the ‘accumulation of misery, the torment of labour, slavery …’ Marx is not referring to monetary payment. He is referring to dehumanisation, something which no amount of money can compensate. In this, Marx is in line with Plato (virtue is its own reward) and Jesus Christ (it profits a man nothing to give his soul for the whole world).

Marx is showing the potential for means to displace ends within capitalism so that machines of our own making come to replace us. This is alienation, human products are invested with existential significance whilst the human creators are reduced to their appendages. 
‘We cannot make a philosophy of them, for a philosophy implies limits and definitions and defined areas that technique will not allow.’ Faced with technical imperatives, human beings lack free choice but must obey the new necessity, ‘namely, technical growth (for in our society progress obviously means growth)’.  ‘In other words, there is no other possibility for us. We have no freedom face-to-face with technique, for freedom here means the freedom to say yes or no. But who can say no to space probes or genetic engineering? It is here that we come up against an absolute determinism (not in our genes or culture!). This is the source of the basic despair of modern humanity. This is the key to it. We despair because we can do nothing, and we are vaguely aware of this even though we do not know it (Ellul ch 11).
The final stage is reached when individuals are induced to justify the situation rather than express the anguish and despair of the human condition in subjection to technique. Thus ‘we have those who theorize about the absolute freedom that technique gives us. These people deny (or refuse to see) the other side of the matter. They also overwhelm us with a totally inhuman responsibility. For if technique gives me sovereign freedom and I can truly do all things, then I am responsible for all things—for massacres in Argentina or Afghanistan, for Third World famines, etc. Suicide is the only option. But the same is true for those who want to look at the other aspect, the absolute determinism of history and a strictly mechanistic interpretation of politics and economics, with no possibility or intervention of an act of freedom. The weighty, imperative necessity of technique is here transformed into a "has to be." For this determinism has enough imagination to despair of possibility and enough possibility to discover impossibility. Conscience, then, disappears. There is only bondage in luxury or in misery, in conformism or in the concentration camp.’
The final stage is when human beings come to see that the things which promised emancipation have instead become a fate, or even that what has become human destiny may actually be accepted as human emancipation. Freedom is the appreciation of necessity not determined by human consciousness, needs and capacities but by the imperatives of a technics beyond human control. Instead of rehumanisation we have the final human surrender to dehumanisation. David Martin’s The Last Man, the final defeat of nature within and nature without.

‘This is real absurdity. But it is an absurdity from which we cannot escape. We are not dealing now with a philosophical thesis or an accidental example (for which examples to the contrary might be adduced) but with the very nub of the situation… We have here a kind of ontology of the world fashioned by technique’ (Ellul ch 11).

At the level of technical accomplishment, there is little reason to dispute the grand claims made by futurologists of all stripes. The digital revolution no doubt does contain the potential for a dialogic order of continuous interconnection and flow of information, destroying hierarchies and rendering present modes obsolete. There is a sense in which present problems are the result of attempting to restrain technologies of the future world of communication and exchange within the institutions and modes of thought, action and organisation appropriate to an industrial capitalism of a bygone age. 

Human beings have ever believed that the crises of their own time are epoch making, either the end of the world or the beginning of one. There are reasons for thinking that some such age is upon us. The digital revolution is making it abundantly clear that symbols rather than tools are the key to civilisation. Tools satisfy human needs at more basic physical levels. Ascend the levels to the higher needs and accomplishments and symbols and symbolic thinking is more valuable. For a long time human beings have accepted the sense of themselves as homo faber, man the tool making animal. The problem with this definition is that it identifies human beings with one, instrumental, aspect of their nature and invites the alienation or idolatory in which human beings are enslaved to their powers and products in alien form. Conceive human beings as homo symbolicus, symbol making animals, offers a way of ensuring that genuine Spinozist freedom and wisdom through the triumph of knowledge and intelligence. From mathematics to music, philosophy to art, symbols reveal to human beings the true reality behind appearances and beyond the senses. These symbols are shared and foster communication and cooperation. The problem with the contemporary mechanical civilisation is that it has replaced ethos with technique. This mechanical order cannot be grasped symbolically. And this impacts upon reality more directly than anyone seems to realise. In every branch of the arts and sciences, thinkers have responded instinctively to latent assumptions about the nature of the universe The incomprehensibility of our artificial, built order would seem to explain the tendency to nonsense in contemporary social science. Postmodernism’s celebration of chaos, disorder, nihilism and otherness revels in its denial of the Platonic trinity of truth, goodness and beauty. Well, this trinity means something. It meant something to Bronowski in his Ascent of Man. And it meant something to Pythagoras:

“Pythagoras' metaphysics enables the Intellect to approach and know the ultimate truth. His moral precepts ensure conformity with the perfect goodness. To complete the trinity, he also adored the supreme beauty which inspires the Muses as they do our Arts. In the first place he seems to have used Music, both for the intellectual benefits of its speculative side and for the effects of practical music on psycho-physical health. Music is the art in which the Numbers penetrate directly to the heart; in Mathematics they occupy the brain. But it is not music alone that incarnates the transcendent virtues of Number. As it does so in time, so the visual arts do in space, depending no less for their beauty on harmony and correct proportion. It was this knowledge that enabled Classical Greek architecture and sculpture to attain such heights in the century after Pythagoras. Ever since then the high-points of Western and Islamic architecture have followed on the reapplication of harmonic principles, as one can prove by measurement of Gothic cathedrals, early Renaissance churches, and the masterpieces of Islamic architecture. Disobedience to harmonic laws leads to ugliness, which is a sin against the Muses and a denial of the divinely beautiful order of the cosmos. Obedience to them, on the other hand, presupposes a state of soul open also to Intelligible Beauty; music and architecture open our souls in the same way.”

This passage from the Pythagorean Sourcebook is quoted at length because it emphasises the transcendent virtues and harmonic principles which lead to the true, the good and the beautiful. The age of capitalist modernity is a violation of these harmonic laws and a denial of the divinely beautiful order of the cosmos. ‘All that is holy is profaned’ wrote Marx. Weber called it disenchantment. 

When writing of alienation, Marx stated that the human creators have become appendages of their machines. One can write here of the inversion of subject and object, the products of human creation being invested with an existential significance of their own, human beings reduced to the status of things. This dependence on machines has increased. So much so that the machines have become means enlarged to the status of ends, tools which now give directions. Directions to where? Machines cannot say. Technique is not a philosophy. Machines are said to be the means by which an elite controls a mass. Not so. Knowledge, information, the symbols of soft culture. The biggest weapon that the oppressor holds is the mind of the oppressed. Machines enslave all when invested with a living force in themselves.

VIOLENCE AND DESTRUCTION
Which brings the discussion to the other characteristic of modern civilisation, the tendency to destruction. 
Gil Elliot argues that ‘The scale of man-made death is the central moral as well as material fact of our time.' (Gil Elliot, The Twentieth Century Book of the Dead, New York 1972:6). This is Marx’s alienation thesis with a vengeance, human creations coming to dominate the human creators as external powers with a logic of their own. Failure to reappropriate these powers and reorganise them as social powers has consequences. All Faustian bargains come with a price. Human beings should only have such power as they can creatively live up to, argued Nietzsche. Failure to creatively live up to this human power has resulted in means of production becoming means of destruction. The mechanic order promised freedom and happiness but has issued in a veritable world of the dead that dominates the world of the living in size and meaning. World wars brought civilisation close to being ended and yet war memorials – and war films as entertainment – have made a religion of this reversion to barbarism.


Can human beings creatively live up to their powers? This is a pertinent question after the experience of the twentieth century. The historian Eric Hobsbawm presented a selection of quotes to introduce his book The Age of Extremes in an attempt to sum up the twentieth century.

Isaiah Berlin (philosopher, Britain): 'I have lived through most of the twentieth century without, I must add, suffering personal hardship. I remember it only as the most terrible century in Western history.'
Julio Caro Baroja (anthropologist, Spain): 'There's a patent contradiction between one's own life experience - childhood, youth and old age passed quietly and without major adventures - and the facts of the twentieth century . . . the terrible events which humanity has lived through.'
Rene Dumont (agronomist, ecologist, France): 'I see it only as a century of massacres and wars.'
William Golding (Nobel Laureate, writer, Britain): 'I can't help thinking that this has been the most violent century in human history.'
Severe Ochoa (Nobel Laureate, science, Spain): 'The most fundamental thing is the progress of science, which has been truly extraordinary . .. This is what characterizes our century.'
Raymond Firth (anthropologist, Britain): 'Technologically, I single out the development of electronics among the most significant developments of the twentieth century; in terms of ideas, the change from a relatively rational and scientific view of things to a non-rational and less scientific one.'

‘Terrible century’ of ‘terrible events’, a century of ‘massacres and wars’, ‘the most violent century in human history’, an ‘extraordinary’ ‘progress of science’ accompanied by a change to a ‘non-rational and less scientific view of things’.

One final quote: 
Leo Valiani (historian, Italy): 'Our century demonstrates that the victory of the ideals of justice and equality is always ephemeral, but also that, if we manage to preserve liberty, we can always start all over again . . . There is no need to despair, even in the most desperate situations.'

‘No need to despair’ comes with the corollary that there is reason to hope. 

Primo Levi (writer, Italy): 'We who survived the Camps are not true witnesses… We, the survivors, are not only a tiny but also an anomalous minority. We are those who, through prevarication, skill or luck, never touched bottom. Those who have, and who have seen the face of the Gorgon, did not return, or returned wordless.' 

Levi’s words show the shadow of death hanging over the twentieth century, burned into the very psyche of modern humanity. This is all the more despairing for the reasons given by Yehudi Menuhin (musician, Britain): 'If I had to sum up the twentieth century, I would say that it raised the greatest hopes ever conceived by humanity, and destroyed all illusions and ideals.' Because the highest hopes and expectations have been so thwarted in such a violent manner. The sense of the everyday wretchedness of war is nowhere better expressed than in Picasso’s ‘The Charnel House’ of 1945. The painting was inspired by a Spanish film about a family killed in their kitchen. The composition of the painting was already fixed in formal terms when the first photographs of liberated German concentration camps were published, adding further weight to painting's statement. The picture depicts a heap of corpses after an execution. One figure, still tied to a post, is collapsing onto the others. The still life of kitchen utensils at top left serves to emphasise the everyday banality and ubiquity of terror. Doomsday can hit anyone, anywhere, at any time in this most violent of centuries. The way that Picasso heaps his stylized figures so that the lines are interwoven to create a tangled network that obliterates distinction of separate forms. The heap of bodies symbolises the destruction of individual identity in a world of totalitarian war and terror. Human beings are extinguished in mind, body and soul. Human beings can neither preserve their individual psychic entities nor their physical identities. Minds lost to a variety of totalising abstractions that name and claim all, ultimately even their bodies are taken from them.
The twentieth century has been a ‘charnel house’ of everyday death, destruction and terror. The chief characteristics of the century are technological advance and moral decline leading to death on an unprecedented scale. Well over 100 million human beings were killed in the twentieth century as a result of war. For all of the remembrances and the endless films and documentaries, there is a deafening silence over the fact that mass killing of this scale is a question of systematic, institutional purpose and psychological preparation. 

In addition to our reliance on machines, opines Kenneth Clark, ‘our other speciality is our urge to destruction. With the help of machines we did our best to destroy ourselves in two wars, and in doing so we released a flood of evil, which intelligent people have tried to justify with praise of violence, 'theatres of cruelty' and so forth. Add to this the memory of that shadowy companion who is always with us, like an inverted guardian angel, silent, invisible, almost incredible - and yet unquestionably there and ready to assert itself at the touch of a button; and one must concede that the future of civilisation does not look very bright.’ (Clark Civilisation).

The world of the dead thrives on the destruction of hope and expectation. Those committed to a vision of the peaceable kingdom have had illusions not only concerning political ideals shattered but about human beings themselves. This calls not for cynicism but for a reappraisal of Augustine’s case against Pelagian perfectibility. A sober sense of expectations in the first place would guard against defeat turning to cynicism. The apparent self-corruption of revolutionary hopes and aspirations suggests a need for self-searching and self-examination amongst those seeking change. Socialism or barbarism were the choices posed by Rosa Luxemburg. The Soviet experience turned socialism into barbarism. Why do good intentions keep misfiring to produce great evil? 

Avoiding cynicism does not mean ignoring a realistic assessment of the human condition, what human beings are and what they are capable of – creation and destruction, good and evil. To think otherwise raises expectations and hopes too high and invites disillusion and despair. (Robert Heilbroner, author of The Human Prospect, and Christopher Lasch, author of The Culture of Narcissism,)
Basic transformations within modernity’s essential operations, its scientific analysis and promise of human betterment through technical expansion and economic growth, are generating a dark prospect for the long term.

'Disbelief, doubt, disillusionment and despair have taken over', writes Robert Nisbet '—or so it would seem from our literature, art, philosophy, theology, even our scholarship and science.' For Nisbet, the contemporary world 'almost barren of faith in progress'. (Nisbet 1980:318).

‘The incomprehensibility of our new cosmos seems to me, ultimately to be the reason for the chaos of modern art. I know next to nothing about science but I've spent my life in trying to learn about art, and I am completely baffled by what is taking place today.’ (Clarke 346)

Dominant social and behavioural structures, political institutions and values are around an assumption of progress that is nowhere visible. The result is a pervasive personal doubt that eats away at the prevailing illusion without ever quite destroying it. Our contemporary institutions remain overwhelmingly wedded to progressive assumptions, regardless of the extent to which they are contradicted by experience. For all of the accumulating personal doubts, these failing assumptions cannot be shifted but are asserted all the more strongly — a renewed commitment to the advance of science and technology, modernization as enlightenment, the spread of democracy will, this time, bring peace, freedom and happiness. All evidence to the contrary. These assumptions shape perceptions in the contemporary world. As yet, there is no equally compelling alternative vision powerful enough to shift this illusion of progress.

A. O. Lovejoy describes the idea of progress as 'a tendency inherent in nature or man to pass through a regular sequence of stages of development in the past, the present and the future, the latter stages being—with perhaps occasional retardations or regressions—superior to the earlier.'

For Nisbet, 'superior' means improvement in knowledge and in 'man's moral or spiritual condition on earth, his happiness, his freedom from torments of nature and society, and above all his serenity or tranquility.' In industrial societies, the path to human betterment is industrialization and modernization. The Marxist version associates the growth of the industrial system with the development of human powers. 
Predictions of ecological disaster and calculations of loss of life fail to move people sufficiently for a good reason. For well over 100 million people in the twentieth century, the end of the world came prematurely, yet life went on as normal. Death and destruction on a never before possible scale have been normalised.

The First World War killed some 10 million, with at least another 10 million in the Influenza epidemic as its aftermath. The Armenian massacres saw nearly a million people killed. Soviet collectivisation in the early 1930s saw the death of some 10 million peasants. Another 10 million died during the Purges. The Second World War in Europe was responsible for more than 40 million deaths. In Asia, some 20 million people were killed in the period from the Japanese invasion of China through to the victory of the Chinese Revolution.(Aronson).

The history books show that the ‘Great War’ lasted from 1914 to 1918. Wrong. The world has been fighting that war ever since, as the Russian Revolution, the Russian Civil War, Fascism, Nazism, Communism, Spanish Civil War, mass depression, unemployment, World War Two, Cold War, War on Terror and myriad offshoots in every part of the world. 
J. L. Garvin, editor of the Observer, thought he was writing the epitaph for war when, on the day that the war was declared in 1914, coined these words: ‘We have to do our part in killing a creed of war. Then at last, after a rain of blood, there may be set the greater rainbow in the Heavens before the vision of the souls of men. And after Armageddon war, indeed, may be no more’. (Quoted by D. Thomson, England in the Nineteenth Century, 1950, p.
219.)  He may well yet be proven right, if one accepts that the wars and the politics and the ideologies spawned by the Great War are one and the same. H G. Wells wrote of 'The War That Will End War', noting how 'in the hour of victory' Britain would 'save the liberated Germans from vindictive treatment'. (Daily News, 14 August 1914. Daily Chronicle, 8 August 1914.) All remember the phrase, few paid attention to arguments for fair treatment. The war continued.
The ‘Great War’ is a turning point in human history. The two hundred years of progress came to an end in 1914, Bertrand Russell baldly states. Launched with patriotic fervour on every side and presented and accepted as a noble and heroic cause by millions who didn’t need to be forced by conscription to sign up, the war quickly became a purposeless machine of mass death beyond the comprehension and control of those caught up in it. Of course, Tolstoy’s generals in War and Peace pretended to know and pretended to be in charge. But the difference now was one of numbers and scale. A further ideological dimension was added with the Russian Revolution and Civil War and, following that, Fascism and Nazism as a reaction against the Bolshevik menace. The world moved from wars between nations to a war between creeds and ideologies in which whole social systems were at stake. No longer was war fought between soldiers but now civilians became partisans and victims in unprecedented numbers. The Great War thus laid  'the foundations of massive military attrition' and spawned the massive civilian attrition of the Russian Revolution and Civil War 'and on precisely the same scale' (Elliot Aronson  ).
The Soviets Union with forced collectivisation and the Nazis with forced-labour camps added another instrument of total, all-pervasive war, the Nazis going even further with the concentration camps. The sign introducing this world of death as an end in itself was ‘work makes you free’. A crude, cynical illusion but also the reductio ad absurdum of modern notions of progress through industrialisation. The mass area bombing of the British and the atomic bombs of the Americans escalated the techniques of mass killing and further normalised death and destruction. The United States used defoliants and anticivilian weapons such as napalm and CBUs in Vietnam and on it continues to Iraq and Afghanistan, depleted uranium, starvation and illness through sanctions, extraordinary rendition, torture, genocide.
The figure of 100 million deaths is only the tip of the iceberg. For every person killed there must be many times the number affected by living through the maelstrom: walking wounded of one kind or another, the disabled and diseased, the friends and relations of the combatants, the inhabitants of the destroyed villages, towns and cities. This is doomsday as a mode of experience which destroys everyday normality and which scars the psyche as a permanent affliction.
To achieve death and destruction on this scale required institutional purpose, technical planning and psychological preparation. The ‘Great War’ started the process of brutalization that would make mass murder not only humanly thinkable but normal. Far from being the war to end all wars, the Great War began the process in which the technical and organizational capability at the command of the human race was devoted in large part to the purpose of death and destruction on a massive scale. This scale presuppose total warfare, a brutalized population which accepts murder as necessary for security, effective weaponry and organizational procedures to kill on a mass scale. Commentators and statesmen who prove their ‘realism’ by denouncing the perfectibility of the good society as ‘utopian’ and idealistic can be found devoting their energies to the perfection of the means and mechanisms of total warfare. The many Doomsdays of the twentieth century are really the one, originating in 1914-1918 and ending wherever the refinement, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and the plans of the strategists take us. That is one way of achieving the end of all wars. 

The features are well known. The expansion of great bureaucratic organizations characterised by instrumental rationality in the twentieth century was not accompanied by any increase in the substantive reason of individuals in their everyday life. Instead, caught up in the rationality of the institutional-systemic world, identifying any purpose with the great structures, individuals lost any sense of serving any overall end in their lives. Accordingly, individuals routinely undertake a series of apparently rational actions without any sense of the ends they serve, and there is the increasing suspicion that the action is quite literally endless, serves no rational purpose. The individual is not integrated according to substantive rationality which gives life as a whole a purpose or a meaning but is parcelled up within a division of labour in which reasoning is not merely impossible but simply not required. In whichever sphere of life, work and leisure, the individual undertakes a series of instrumentally rational actions without having any idea as to the ultimate end of this action and without needing any idea. In the words of Max Weber, modern institutions function 'without regard to persons’
This has implications with respect to the idea of progress through scientific and technical advance. The idea that the individual performs specific actions with no idea of the end of the action – assuming there is one - or the function of each act within the whole applies to scientists, technicians, engineers as much as anyone (Mannheim, Man and Society, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1940, p. 54) .1 Which explains in large part why science and technology has not been the road to peace, freedom and happiness. If I’d have known I would have stayed as a chicken farmer’ Einstein reputedly said about how his work came to be used. And if even scientists of the highest intelligence can perform their assigned work to such high standards without knowing that it is to issue in the atom bomb, what chance the rest of us finding rationality in a substantively irrational system? 
Technique is neither philosophy nor culture nor ethic and to the extent that it is put in place as such in a mechanical order, the more it exacerbates all too human failings. Technology is not responsible for the death and destruction of the twentieth century, these are human failings magnified by technology. There is no technological Second Coming and it was pure folly in the first place to ever expect one. Science stands on the wrong side of the fact/value, subject/object, means/ends, how/why divide.

The fact that techniques and instrumental rationality occupy a central place in society does not mean that human beings live a substantively rational life, still less that an instrumentally rational society has ended myth, fantasy, and superstition. 






ECOLOGICAL PRAXIS AND CIVILISATION
Throughout this paper reference is made to ecological praxis, meaning action which builds an ecological society. Throughout the twentieth century, death and destruction has been a praxis — the deliberate, planned project of organised human collectivities. Understanding it means identifying the social relations and political institutions which normalised mass murder.
At the root of the assumption of progress is the sense of history as the steady realization of Reason and Freedom. The problem is that ‘reason’ as a unitary phenomenon does not exist but is bifurcated between means and ends and, further, that reason does not necessarily equate with freedom — knowledge, democracy, education, science and technology – however one wishes to express the secular hope of Enlightenment.
According to Enlightenment hopes, the rational world is always seemingly at hand. It ought to be. Scientific and technological advance has been more than sufficient. The problem lies, as Einstein argued, not with the perfection of means but with the confusion of ends. And that is a question that science cannot answer. Bronowski emphatically denied the charge that science was responsible for the evils of the twentieth century. Not science, he argued, but dogma, arrogance and ignorance. That is a world of ethics and politics. For Orwell, the purpose of politics is to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable. Trapped within narratives of their own making, societies organize themselves against phantoms, kill systematically enemies who are a product of their own paranoia and neurosis, and plunge people into anarchy and disaster for no purpose that is apparent or comprehensible to sane and sober people. By drawing lessons from how societies organised around death and disaster as a conscious purpose, it will be possible to make more sense of the institutional lethargy and psychological inertia when faced with the growing spectre of ecological catastrophe. With a view to avoiding greater disasters in the future, there is a need to identify and examine the origins of organised death and destruction, and expose their links with particular social relations.
The challenge is to live the moral, political and intellectual meaning of unity with diversity and integrated systems as a practice; confronting the origins of social and ecological problems and identifying reactionary forces without getting locked into a destructive cycle of antagonistic politics. That kind of politics feeds on itself. Instead of being drawn into the politics of antagonism, the task is to draw progressive potential for change out of this destructive cycle. This affirms the potential of fluid, social movements with a unity of purpose but no single directing centre; such movements build on local self-organization, pluralism and found politics upon a genuine coalition-building. 
This restores politics to its original meaning of politikon bion and finds expression in human flourishing. Such an achievement is a rehumanisation that affirms that human beings as conscious, creative agents are more than machines and are indeed more powerful than their machines, institutional and technical. The war to end all wars will either be annihilation within the mechanical order or human flourishing through the triumph of a human order. 
This renews a commitment to civilisation by conceiving organised society and its institutional and moral framework as a learning mechanism. Learning is a change in behaviour. To be radical is to get at root causes. To learn the right lessons and draw these into a praxis that ultimately is given institutional expression exhibits the capacity to create an alternative future as a matter of conscious choice. This cultural and institution-building process draws on the efforts of each and all, whether they are conscious of the contribution they make to the overall purpose or not, so that, in time, each partakes of the cumulative intelligence and conscience of humanity as a whole, the stock of human learning becoming part of an acquired social structure and moral sense which each generation bequeaths to the next.
The term ecological praxis is well-chosen. The end as such is an abstraction, a historical potentiality immanent in existing forms. The end inspires but guarantees nothing. It is by living the overarching ethic that one gets a sense of the empowerment, enjoyment and flourishing to come. Practical activity in the projects building the new society is a form of self-empowerment in relation to others, developing constitutive ties to others and learning through experience the pleasures of collective action. The Platonic trinity of truth, goodness and beauty has motivated the greatest achievements of civilisation. The ecological crisis engulfing the planet requires that the human race lives up to that trinity as a condition of its own civilised survival. The commitment to reason, freedom, to human flourishing requires a practical orientation with the world to build a public life that meets Aristotle’s original requirements.
With all of the technical power at their command, human beings have come perilously close to destroying civilisation. The same forces and the same mentalities that generated those catastrophes have not gone away but have instead been magnified. Regardless of which side won, the world wars have unleashed a maelstrom of death and destruction which we are still dealing with – area bombing, gas, concentration camps, propaganda, techniques, mass manipulation, fascism, Nazism, Communism. Rosa Luxemburg gave humanity the choice of socialism or barbarism. The Russian Revolution leading to Stalin had the result of turning socialism into barbarism. Most remarkable of all is the extent to which supposedly intelligent human beings have been found to clothe barbarous acts with principle. 
Means of production have been converted into means of destruction. Hanging over all like the sword of Damacles is the threat of nuclear annihilation. Thanatos walks amongst us like the figure of time, silent, invisible, too incredible to comprehend, yet ever present and ready to step forward at the push of a button. The continued shadowy presence of thanatos indicates the extent to which civilisation has already ended in the psychic world of individuals. All that remains is the outer shell, the physical form of civilisation. It cannot last long unless human beings transform their way of life and tip the balance back in the direction of eros. 
There are grounds for optimism. The globalisation of economic and political relations combined with the digital revolution points to a greater unity and interconnection, a greater learning mechanism that incorporates the variety of the world’s knowledge and experience. The replacement of civilisation by barbarism is characterised by a process of separation, fissure and splitting. This results in isolation, a narrowing of intellectual horizons, apathy and hopelessness, a lack of intellectual curiosity. Current trends point precisely in the opposite direction. In terms of health, wealth, welfare and education, human history has never seen so much well being for so many of the world’s population. And this population is being brought closer together by technical, digital and institutional links. The old ideal of the universal is actually within mental and physical reach. Ecologists have spoken of the ecological society as a biocentric civilisation. It is a civilisation, a modus vivendi, a way of life, a social and civil order. And as a civilisation it will have all the hallmarks of a viable, functioning society. It will have a polity and it will have an economy. The anti-institutionalism of a certain radicalism is a naïve, anarchistic indulgence based upon a false identification of freedom with the licence for the individual to do as she or he wants. At some point, those in opposition to a present condition of society need to meet the terms of the alternative institutions requirement and propose constructive working models of the future social order. Naturally, the radical is critical of existing institutions, but radicalism means more than abolition. It is certainly much more than destruction. In Marx, abolition took the form of Aufhebung, a process which raises up and preserves as much as it destroys. To be radical is to go to the root cause. But identifying a problem begs the question of its solution. Revolution is not the exciting work of 1789 and 1917; it succeeds only as civilisation building. It is working, viable institutions that sustain a social order and, if civilisation is to be possible, institutions need to be proposed that command respect and consent and which sufficient numbers can be persuaded to make work. The only places that work in abstraction from institutions and people are utopias.
The achievements of science and technology are real and have been integral in raising billions of people out of the clutches of poverty and disease and ignorance and squalor. But, for all of that, human nature remains pretty much what it was at the beginning of this ‘ascent of man’. This is quite a sobering observation. It should cause people to reflect on the fact that, for all that has been achieved, human beings still only know a fraction of what can be known. Human beings should recognise that cognitive resources are limited. Each person has limited intelligence and limited time to absorb the available information. Only in a species wide sense can the expansion of knowledge make itself felt. Human beings need to accept that reason is only one part of the human makeup. This is a cautionary lesson to recognise the arational and the irrational, respecting the need for limits, inhibition, taboo to control impulses and urges which can turn to destruction when out of control. One can examine human nature and identify a goal or purpose for the historical process that ends in the ideal civilisation. Civilisation is conceived as a learning mechanism and curve which, over time, achievements of permanent value are never lost at the level of know how and culture. Civilisation is the embodiment of human capacities and realisation of human potentials, an enlargement of human faculties that feeds upon and reinforces itself in permanent institutional and symbolic form. Regardless of the transitory nature of time and place, the great achievements of architecture, art and sculpture, philosophy, law, literature and poetry, music, in science and engineering remain of permanent value, adding to the common stock of culture. There are no guarantees in history. Any civilisation may collapse. But renaissance is always possible.
Civilisations, it is claimed, fall from within. As Augustine pointed out, Rome fell because it deserved to fall. Augustine put the blame for fall squarely on the shoulders of the Roman people. They were no longer citizens worthy of the name; they lacked the necessary public spiritedness and civic activism and republican virtue. Instead, they had settled into comfort and decadence and apathy, a decadence and selfish materialism that put their own private interests before the public good. Augustine’s critique is a salutary warning to all. It puts the question whether individuals see themselves as polites, those interested in public affairs, or idiotes, those interested in private affairs. In the final analysis, the question is one that people must keep putting to themselves, are they citizens or private beings, are they makers or tools, are they prepared to make an active contribution or are they just the passive recipients of the efforts of others?
More than anything, civilisation destroys itself by apathy, laziness, complacency, cynicism, despair and pessimism. With lack of hope for anything better in the future and lack of meaning in the presence comes a lack of confidence which gradually drains energy and power. 

Lines of poetry penned by W. B. Yeats sound the warning.
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

It is claimed that political parties win elections from the centre. The problem is that the modern world has all the characteristics of a vast institutional-systemic shell, vast instrumental power on the outside but lacking anything on the inside. The centre doesn’t exist; it has been hollowed out. The techno-urban industrial world lacks purpose and meaning outside of instrumental power and resources, its institutions are citadels of (monetary) wealth and (institutional) power detached from the life world of human beings. Vast processes of investment, employment, production and exchange are accompanied by ties and dependencies that enclose all. And people suffer being appendages because it pays; it is a gilded cage. There is no public domain any more, to the extent that all states depend upon the process of private accumulation for their resources. Governments must facilitate this process of accumulation as a condition of their own power and support. The electorate will withdraw support from any government that contradicts the systemic economic imperative. Likewise, the electorate are also workers and consumers and their views reflect their dependence upon the investment and employment decisions of private business. 
So where, in all of this, is the centre? The deciding figure of general elections is said to be ‘the floating voter’. The floating voter lacks decided political commitments and votes according to merit, that is, according to an assessment of which political party will do most for them as private individuals. They are not citizens. Their apolitical stance is really an anti-politics in that they rule out any grand notions of politics as a collective intervention and action for the public good. They are not engaged in public life, and want nothing from politics other than it costs them as little as possible in terms of their time and money. They are taxpayers and voters rather than citizens. They are Augustine’s hedonistic materialistic Romans. They are the ones occupying the centre. The centre no longer exists but stands in need of creation. One returns to the Green slogan, ‘neither left nor right but forwards’. The creation of that centre which is the bulwark of all civilisation is the task for Green politics. This is a renewal of politics, a ‘new politics’ that has confidence and hope for the future and which beats apathy, cynicism and despair by holding to the true, the good and the beautiful. The primary commitments and loyalties of the true, the good and the beautiful take precedence over the secondary and transitory concerns of the politics of ideology/belief/opinion. Politics is restored to its origins in the Aristotelian notion of politikon bion.
The transformation of the political – the notion of an active, informed citizenry concerned with public life as opposed to individuals considered as voters and taxpayers, individuals within the private sphere motivated by self-interest. With this optimism, Green politics sustains an ecological praxis that draws increasing numbers into a reinvigorated centre. The conviction of the good is restored. Failure to reconstitute the centre in a future oriented praxis leaves us with no alternative but the hollow, hedonistic materialism that has brought one civilisation down after another. There is a need for the best amongst us to hold their nerve and find the necessary conviction in a renewed quest for truth, goodness and beauty. 

SCIENCE, LEARNING AND CIVILISATION
One returns to the notion of a learning mechanism embedded in a social order enabling human beings to ascend the levels of cognition, from impulse, instinct, desire and want to interest (both self and collective, individual and sectional) and further up to empathy, sympathy, understanding, knowledge and reason and wisdom. On the horizontal level, the split between left and right are simply alternative versions of the same thing. It is the vertical level that matters, exchanging opinion (doxa) for knowledge (nous). 

The question of civilisation as a learning mechanism is also a question of political and social organisation – what institutional framework is necessary to turn knowledge into public  policy, theory into practice. Appropriate structures, systems and institutions embed learning and culture and technics within public life to ensure that knowledge is translated into public policy. That mechanism guides individuals to knowledge.

There is plenty of ‘passionate intensity’ in the world of opinion. The worst always do seem to be full of passionate intensity. Bertrand Russell’s words are apt here: ‘the more I know, the less I assert’. The real paradox is that it is always the world of opinion that seems to generate passionate intensity sufficient to drown out knowledge. The world of knowledge, by definition, lacks certainty. 
For all that it analyses, the scientific worldview cannot form the basis of a civilisation. For all that it is, science is not a philosophy, an ethos, a culture. Which is why an Enlightenment focused on reason in the scientific and technical aspect keeps falling short of its promise, even turning against the peace, freedom, democracy it promises. For all it contributes to knowledge and understanding, science does not and cannot deliver meaning of itself. The domain of science is on the other side of the subject/object, fact/value, material/spiritual divide. The Enlightenment continues to struggle to redeem its promises precisely because it focuses on the one side of this divide, failing to realise that knowledge and its accumulation does not deliver meaning nor increase wisdom. The Faustian pact upon which the modern world rests places its faith in science, its method and its results on the assumption that the expansion of reason it delivers will be meaning enough. This faith is misplaced. The result is a culture of uncertainty and even anxiety since, ultimately, science is not so much about ‘truth’ as its endless questioning. The achievements are real but are not integrated into a wider culture. Human beings live more copiously but not more happily; more proficiently but not more meaningfully; we live with more knowledge but not more wisdom. To know how does not answer the question of why.

As Bertrand Russell argued:

‘Science, by itself, cannot supply us with an ethic. It can show us how to achieve a given end, and it may show us that some ends cannot be achieved. But among ends that can be achieved our choice must be decided by other than purely scientific considerations. If a man were to say, 'I hate the human race, and I think it would be a good thing if it were exterminated,' we could say, 'Well, my dear sir, let us begin the process with you.' But this is hardly argument, and no amount of science could prove such a man mistaken.’ ('The Science to Save us from Science', New York Times Magazine, 19 March 1950. Reprinted in M. Gardner (ed.), The Sacred Beetle: Great Essays in Science (1984), 406-7.

Many will take their cue from Darwin and will insist that there is ‘splendour’ in the scientific worldview. But this is not meaning, as Darwin himself understood. Perhaps meaning will always be elusive: '[The] ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry,' was the way that Hume put it, implying that meaning will remain as mysterious as the ultimate questions on which it depends.
However, meaning is not a mystery but a quest. Meaning is not found only in that domain where object, fact, matter are the limits of possible knowledge, building a world around so as to assert that that is all there is, all that can be known. Shakespeare’s comment, that ‘there are more things under heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy’, captures the sense that the yearning for meaning is satisfied by not by knowledge, or knowledge alone, but by living on the thresholds of ignorance.

And it is a way of living in its Socratic origins, ethos as a practice and a way of life. For Socrates, philosophy was not an ivory tower profession conducted by experts but something that was lived with others as rational beings. For Socrates, philosophy was something that was practical as well as contemplative. ‘Only this I know, that I know nothing’ said Socrates. Claiming to know nothing, he set out to find out. Not knowledge but the profession of ignorance is the beginning of wisdom.

There is an old Taoist saying that ‘he who knows does not say; he who says does not know’. The way out of this paradox is to place the accent what is done rather than what is said. Well done is better than well said. A politics of knowledge can never win at this level against a politics of opinion. The kind of passionate intensity that comes with certainty is associated with arrogance, ignorance and dogma and against these reasoned argument cannot win. Much more promising is the notion of an ecological praxis, valuing the active contribution that people make to the building of the ecopolis or biocentric civilisation rather than soliciting their passive support for the chance to build that order via traditional political institutions. 

GREEN POLITICAL THEORY
In The Politics of Nature, Andrew Dobson and Peter Lucardie (1995 Routledge) identifies a number of anti-democratic tendencies in the ecological position. Dobson and Lucardie identify a strong potential contradiction between green policy values and green (direct) democracy.
The green claim is that society, civilisation as we know, cannot survive on the current basis and that a sustainable society can only be built on ecological principles (Dobson and Lucardie).  For O’Riordan, greens offer a ‘simple binary choice’ between two opposing 'world-views' (O'Riordan 1981: 300). Except that there is no real choice between survival or self-administered destruction. Kvaloy contrasts the 'Life Necessities Society (LNS) to 'the 'Industrial Growth Society (IGS)' (Kvaloy 1990). Sale contrasts 'Bioregional’ and 'Industrial-Scientific' paradigms (Sale 1985: 50). These are not choices but alternatives, with green values or principles as imperatives. For Ophuls, 'liberal democracy as we know it ... is doomed by ecological scarcity; we need a completely new political philosophy and set of institutions' (Ophuls 1977a: 3). This means that incremental reform and a piecemeal gradualism within existing political institutions is part of the problem and can never be the (Ophuls 1977b: 160).
Many green thinkers have recognised the potential conflict between green values and green politics and have sought to modify their position. Stillman acknowledges the implications for the notions of consent:





Boris Frankel claims that Rudolf Bahro’s vision of an ecological society is 'anti-democratic' since politics as conflict disappears in a sea of 'givens' (Frankel 1987: 230). The problem is the old one addressed by Plato of whether and how philosophy can rule. Is ecology a science or a politics? How to reconcile the world of knowledge and the world of opinion? If the science clearly points to certain policies and practices as ecologically sound or ecologically unsound, how does this not become an imperative or a ‘given’ regardless of popular opinion?
Science and ethics will point to certain things as being desirable in an ultimate sense –  the very principles that makes one a green, or a socialist etc. - but attachment to democracy implies equal weight be given to alternative platforms, a plurality of values, divergent opinion (Frankel 1987: 158). The dilemma can be posed from the other direction. If popular opinion to a large extent contradicts or rejects green principles based on science and ethics, to what extent does green politics abandon the principles for reasons of electoral appeal and government by consent of the governed?
The solution will lie in the final realisation of Plato’s Philosopher Ruler. Ophuls is right to call for a ‘completely new political philosophy and set of institutions' (Ophuls 1977a: 3). This ‘new’ politics will resolve the conflict between knowledge and opinion by making political society a learning process in which the individuals composing the demos can ascend the levels of cognition to reach higher, richer, more expansive possibilities. This is to change the conception of democracy to mean something not merely more direct but more active and more functional with respect to people’s contribution to public life.
Ophuls defines the predicament: 'Is the way we organize our communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological imperatives and other natural laws? . . . how we run our lives will be increasingly determined by ecological imperatives' (Ophuls 1977a: 7-8).

To recognise ‘ecological imperatives’ as the basis of a green politics is to oppose knowledge (nous) to opinion (doxa) and is to this extent anti-democratic in the way that democracy is conceived to function today. But is it democracy? Or is it mass manipulation and manipulation of passive individuals at the level of individual desires, wants, impulses (often manufactured from the outside).
Failure to develop a new political philosophy and a new institutional framework keeps resting on an internal fracture between an authoritarian vision based on fundamental green values and a democratic vision which, within an unchanged parliamentary and electoral politics, which is based on people’s own opinions. Without a transformation of political institutions, green politics is extremely vulnerable, either to diluting its principles to widen electoral appeal, to accommodation and absorption within the existing system, or even supplying the rationale to justify authoritarian government when the impact of ecological crisis starts to be felt.
The solution is ecological praxis, the idea that the practical transformation leading to the ecological society is also at the same time a political transformation in which the individuals composing the demos come to be capable of participating within communitarian direct democracy. As a goal abstracted from the constitutive praxis that brings it about, communitarian direct democracy is utopian, cannot be achieved and will lack electoral appeal. The same applies to all other ecological values. To accept the horizons of the existing political system is to limit aims to incremental tinkering within the system, green politics as administering ecological crisis and disaster.
Ophuls is accused of ‘authoritarian tendencies’ by Dobson and Lucardie for suggesting that with a return to scarcity we must 'question whether democracy as we know it can survive' (Ophuls 1974). Note that Ophuls is questioning rather than repudiating, and note also that he refers to ‘democracy as we know it’ and not democracy as such. Given the extent to which western ‘liberal democracy’ has effectively removed substantive political questions from serious debate, has systematically favoured money and influence, not just through lobbying but simply through the dependence of politics on the process of private accumulation (a point which the pluralists like Dahl and Lindblom came to recognise) and serious argument has been replaced by brand names and soundbites, what perhaps is most in need of explanation is why ‘democracy’ as currently practised has been fetishised to such an extent as to be identified with the particular institutions of a particular time and place – institutions which on many other definitions count as extremely anti-democratic in themselves.

Ophuls is to be credited for addressing the knowledge-opinion divide, reaching back to Plato as the basis of western political philosophy:





What Ophuls calls a return to 'competence', Dahl presents as 'guardianship' (Dahl 1989). A reprise of Popper’s The Open Society on the totalitarian implications of dividing society between the wise few and the ignorant mass is not required. That may be one possible outcome but it is not the serious point. The idea that the more human beings are guided by reason, the more they are free originates with Plato but pervades the western tradition – Stoics, Aquinas, Spinoza, Descartes, Leibniz, Russell et al. The serious question concerns how reason is to rule so that human beings are actually free. Plato, it is often overlooked, was not writing a blueprint in The Republic but establishing the central principles of the best polity. The question of who guards the guardians is one that Plato would accept. The ultimate guardian is an active, informed citizenship capable of participating in public life. Nothing in Plato denied the rational faculty on the part of each and all as a condition of their humanity and that is the key to turning the Philosopher Ruler into the notion that philosophy should rule through homo sapiens as rational man.

One can simply rule the question out, dismiss Ophuls as the ‘clearest credible example of the authoritarian tendency in green political theory’ (Dobson and Lucardie). But only at the price of reducing values and principles to just one more brand in the political marketplace, with the electorate subject to the institutional-systemic constraints of market relations having no good reason to choose one brand over another. Socialism wasted away in parliament waiting for the proletarian transformation of politics that never came. Greens may do the same, ecological disaster as a self-administered doom.
 The alternative is to take seriously the ‘new’ in the ‘new politics’ promised by the Greens’. 
Where green thinkers have outlined the contours of green democracy, they have invoked visions of direct democracy in small communities based on face-to-face relations and characterized by labour-intensive production, self-reliance if not self-sufficiency, and a minimum of trade and travel. Decision-making is by face-to-face assemblies along the lines of the Athenian assembly or New England township democracy. The emphasis is upon extensive public spaces for citizen interaction and discourse, decentralized units breaking down the distinction between government and governed and affirming the need for passive voters to become citizens through participation and involvement, exercising power rather than delegating it, ceasing to be individual agents by engaging in collective action.

 The German Greens began by making direct democracy the foundation of their political structure. They discovered the difficulty of conducting politics according to the principles of a future polity within the context of an existing political framework that denies them (Spretnak and Capra 1985: 38-9). To be politically successful within this representative framework of electoral politics requires policies and practices which actually negate the end of the green polity. Greens win more votes and seats at the expense of green principles. ‘On account of life, to lose the reasons for living’ (Terence).

Much of what greens and ecologists write about politics are variants of direct democracy in decentralized communities.  Sale writes of the 'bioregional' organization of communities, Bookchin of confederal municipalism. The specific forms matter little without the popular support, activity and consent to make them work.

The biggest question is not whether the green vision of direct democracy is possible – it is, if the individuals composing the demos want to live as active citizens in conscious control of their practical existence in relation to others – but is it desirable. If it isn’t desirable, it will never be desired in sufficient numbers to make it possible.

As an ideal, green direct democracy can be presented in a desirable form: small scale decentralized communities, face-to-face assemblies and proximate forms of participation and accountability, rotation of representatives and an equal valuing of contributions from all members of the community. All within strong constitutive ties that connect each with all others.

Is it desirable? Not everyone, probably not most people, would like face-to-face participation and deliberation. How about the danger of the political becoming personal and divisions coming to poison everyday relations in a close knit community? Power, charisma, influence may even be more iniquitously used when relations between individuals are direct rather than subject to some form of institutional check and restraint. Breaking down divisions between government and governed turns politics into administration and leads to problems of encroachment and incompetence. In fine, this isn’t politics; it is the end of politics. It assumes away the basic nature and challenge of politics and courts disaster on a gamble (Frankel gives a number of other deficiencies 1987: 175-6). 
Lacking an institutional structure that is formalised and public, the vision of direct democracy invites the emergence of informal leaders who are able to impose their will on others. And these are problems within communities. The problems of relations between communities are even more serious, with all manners of inequalities and conflicts opening up. With trade and travel minimised this may seem not to be a problem, but that withdrawal from the world, opting for an inner regarding parochialism, is itself an undesirable feature that runs against the grain of globalisation, with all its potentialities for broadening and deepening connections between people and realising the ultimate in extended sociality. It all depends on where the balance between inner and outer regarding relations lies: ‘the more self-sufficient and numerically limited a community is, the smaller the range of activities and choices it can offer to its members. If it has no opening to an area of exogenous activity, knowledge and production, the community becomes a prison’ (Dobson 1990: 124)

In sum, green visions of communitarian direct democracy are to be evaluated according to whether they enhance existing potentials for an extended human sociality, locating the local within the global and vice versa. It is difficult to see how informal, small scale, face-to-face, self-reliant communities fit this expansive conception and even more difficult to see how it would appeal to any but those seeking to opt out of civilisation building. John Lennon’s Imagine is frequently quoted: ‘you may say I’m a dreamer, but I’m not the only one; I hope some day you will join me, and the world will live as one’. Well, the world is well on the way to living as one. With the globalisation of economic relations and digital connections, the world is technically more integrated than it has ever been. The challenge is to catch up at the level of morals and politics so that the world and the people in it really do live as one. 

The principles of a green political theory that sets political institutions and practices along a continuum from the local to the global is possible. This sets direct and participatory notions of democracy within functioning political institutions so as to (a) enhance citizen interaction and discourse within extensive public spaces, (b) be feasible in the sense of proposing an institutional framework capable of translating principles into policies that are practicable and programmatic in the here and now, and (c) works for and achieves the consent of the governed through nurturing green values in the praxis of the citizen body. 

There are five key areas to this ‘politically feasible ecologism’: 
the possibility of digital community and participation; the vision of eco-cities as an urban public realm based on sustainable living; the pragmatic combination of direct and representative forms of democracy; the acceptance of confederal institutions which are based upon power being invested at its most appropriate level, stretching from local to supranational institutions; finally, philosophy as praxis.

The idea that the revolution in information and communication technology contains the potential for new forms of direct political participation is not new. ICT has possibilities for interactive forms of voting, consultation, conferencing, and so on, removing the mediation between power and the people. ‘Public opinion will become the law of the land’ (Arterton 1987: 18). There are problems of access, agenda-setting and citizen apathy (Arterton 1987). 
New interactive technologies contain the potential to improve communications in politics, strengthening both vertical communications between rulers and ruled from the 'bottom-up’ and 'horizontal' communications between citizens, overcoming individual isolation to bring people closer together (von Alemann and Tonnesmann 1990). Technology can be used to encourage and enhance the impact and quality of citizen participation (Arterton 1987). Barber’s ‘strong democracy’ seeks to revitalize local participation and local political power through new technologies. Proposing the creation of 'neighbourhood assemblies' as an integral part of an ambitious programme of reform, Barber advocates 'a national civic communications cooperative to regulate and oversee the civic use of new communications technology and to supervise debate and discussion of referendum issues' (Barber 1984: 307).
Many Greens’ have been, at least, sceptical of technology. As Bramwell writes: 'Technophiles and technophobes have always warred within ecologism' (Bramwell 1989: 7). One can accept Bookchin’s point that: 'we could expect that . . . members of the communities would be disposed to deal with one another in face-to-face relationships rather than by electronic means' (Bookchin 1982: 345). But this applies only where face-to-face relations are possible for spatial reasons. Wider connections using technologies are possible and are being utilised by millions of people. A modest claim is that some new communications technologies could help to stimulate and enhance the direct forms of democracy which are part of the green vision. Face-to-face proximity can be supplemented by 'virtual proximity", teleconferencing, for instance.

The second component of green democracy is the urban public realm, eco-cities as a form of urban governance and sustainable living. The rural vision of local villages and communes is increasingly outdated in an increasingly urbanised world. The connection between cities, citizenship and civilisation have long been known. We can have garden cities, green cities but there will never be a world without cities. Green writing demonstrates a pronounced antipathy, even hostility, to cities. For Sale: 'The contemporary high rise city ... is an ecological parasite as it extracts its lifeblood from elsewhere and an ecological pathogen as it sends back its wastes' (Sale 1985: 65). But the contemporary city of this character is what Lewis Mumford called the ‘anti-city’. The way forward is to stress the cultural, political and ecological advantages of urbanism as a way of living. These are many, particularly high-density urban living: city homes which are in close proximity use less energy; a greater use of energy-efficient public transport; reduced travel distances; pedestrian pockets and cycling routes can replace cars; recycling, re-use and repair cost less; problems of acid rain and greenhouse gases are not caused by cities and will not be solved by a return to the country; hazardous waste treatment facilities with greater coverage can be used; greater diversity of activities and increased contact between more people. Further, the opportunities of ICT mechanisms boosting direct democracy increase with urban concentration. 

The third component of a new green political theory refuses to oppose direct and representative forms as mutually exclusive but instead seeks to combine both on a continuum in which each complements the other in a greater range of possibilities (Weale 1983; Bobbio 1987). Poulantzas's approach is valuable, seeking to transform the state so that 'the extension and deepening of political freedoms and the institutions of representative democracy' comes to be 'combined with the unfurling of forms of direct democracy and the mushrooming of self-management bodies' (Poulantzas 1978:256). The 'democratic road to socialism' is a 'long process' involving the creation of 'diffuse centres of resistance which  the  masses  always  possess  within  the  state networks', establishing 'real centres of power on the strategic terrain of the state'  (Poulantzas 1978:258). This idea suggests an urban public sphere grounded in the associational space of 'pluralist  civil  society'  (Jean  Cohen 1983:184; Laclau and Mouffe 1985:140; Mouffe 1988:32/4). Granted, there is a need to distinguish clearly between the less than pluralist contemporary civil society, structured around asymmetrical relations of power, and the ideal of democratic civil society (Marx CHDS 1975:191; Schecter 1994:20 184; Parekh 1982:32;  Lane 1995:144).


It follows that direct democracy is not an alternative to but a complement to representative institutions. The format of public enquiry and consultation along with interactive technologies can enhance participation of groups and individuals and make decision-making procedures more accessible (Arterton 1987: 97ff). 
This links to a fourth plank of green political theory, confederal political structures connecting the local and the global. The slogan ‘act locally, think globally’ also applies in reverse. Sometimes global actors need to think of the local impact of global imperatives. Sometimes, the issues are of such scale that local campaigners need to support global action. In a world in which employment, investment and production along with ICTs, networks etc are vast international processes, coordinated global action is inevitable and desirable. This inevitability of a supranational institutional framework implies the inevitability of supracommunal structures. Here is where Schumacher’s ‘small is beautiful’ can mislead. The issue is not one of size but of scale. Small isn’t beautiful when it renders power incompetent and ineffective. The ecological problems facing the planet require effective political institutions and the appropriate distribution of power, knowledge and competence. It is best to appreciate the confederal principle for what it has to offer an effective politics that is both ecological and democratic.

As Frankel argues:




These four principles pertain to technical and institutional questions. The final principle is the most important in that it deals with philosophy, people, politics and change. The idea of philosophy as a practice, ethos as a way of life not only takes philosophy back to its Socratic origins as a popular, lived, quest for wisdom, it offers a way of mediating the split between knowledge and opinion. Green political theory and practice is extremely vulnerable on this point. Ecology as a science clearly comes with certain implications regarding policy, policy formation and political appeal. Scientifically compelling evidence and research clearly translates into ecological imperatives and overriding principles that prejudge popular debate and deliberation and assert green values as political and moral or imperatives over and above popular choice. Not only is such a position electorally unappealing and political enervating, it does nothing to extend and deepen green values and principles where they are most needed, in the body politic. Taking a cue from Vico’s ‘New Science’, the principle of verum ipsum factum holds that the truth of something is a condition of having made it. The possibility of knowing the world lies in having made it. We come to Hegel: ‘I am at home in the world when I know it, still more when I have understood it’. And finally Marx’s conception of praxis.

 “The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it is essential to educate the educator himself. This doctrine must, therefore, divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society.
The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.”

Marx Thesis III on Feuerbach

This is the predicament of ecology caught between science and politics. As a science, opposing the knowledge of the educators to mere opinion, ecology divides society into two parts, one of which is superior to the other. But no-one learns truth in this way. Marx thus affirms the unity of theory and practice – knowledge both informing and being informed by human activity – by affirming the changing of circumstances as a self-change on the part of the people. “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.” (Marx Thesis XI on Feuerbach)

Philosophy as praxis implies that the science of ecology becomes an ecological praxis in which the ecological sensibility emerges in the process of creating the ecological society. The split between knowledge and opinion, affirming nous over doxa, is certainly open to the charge of being anti-democratic. It implies the rule of the few who know over the many who don’t. It seems to be a modern version of Plato’s Philosopher-Ruler.
There are a number of ways of qualifying this criticism, although it involves a redefinition of democracy. Plato did not deny the possession of a rational faculty on the part of all human beings as an essential part of their human nature. All are members of the species homo sapiens, rational and thinking man. All are therefore capable of exercising reason, attaining knowledge, becoming philosophers. Plato’s Philosopher Ruler becomes the view that Philosophy should Rule. Plato also is the origin of organic functionalism in politics, all parts in their respective place. Hence the meaning of the phrase ‘mind your own business’. Each part is fitted to the function it performs within the whole. The whole flourishes when each minds its own business. This is to oppose a democracy of function to a democracy of opinion. A modern variation of this democracy exists in Marx and the notion of functional representation. 
How to embed this capacity within a political and institutional framework. 
Rational choice – games theory – the need to operate according to cooperative, communicative mechanisms.
The switch from top down, hierarchical, bureaucratic monological modes of thought, organisation and action to dialogical modes which emphasise cooperation, communication, networking. 

Reconstitute public life as good government via an active sovereignty and citizen democracy that canalises individuals towards the long term common good.

MARX ON COMMUNITY
Marx’s argument for the superiority of human emancipation over political emancipation centres upon community. Whereas human emancipation in general produces ‘true community’, political emancipation conceives democracy, individuality and community only within the alien control of economics:





This replaces true social ties that join individuals together with an 'estranged form of social commerce' in which the only bond between individuals is one based on egoism (Marx JM 1975:266). This estrangement of each individual from all others destroys the social conditions for human fulfilment: 'Since, in the process of exchange men do not relate to each other as men, things lose the meaning of personal, human property' (JM 1975:261). The emancipation of the individual from relations of personal dependence creates the egoistic individual of the modern world but this freedom is accompanied by mutual relations or intercourse which are external constraints upon all individuals. This freedom from ties of personal dependence entails the impersonal dependence of all upon alien powers. The individual 





In presenting his conception of a true human freedom, Marx affirms Rousseau's 'description of the political man' as a truly socialised individual who substitutes solitary powers for powers that can be used only 'with the assistance of others' (OJQ 1975:234). The problem is that this 'rational' association is cannot be achieved in the political sphere so long as civil society is 'the sphere of egoism and of the bellum omnium contra omnes' (OJQ 1975:221). Since civil society 'is no longer the essence of community but the essence of difference', (OJQ 1975:221), the state can offer only an imaginary, 'unreal universality', not a genuine universality or common good (OJQ 1975:220). For Marx ‘a state which is not the realisation of rational freedom is a bad state’ (Marx and Engels Historische Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Frankfurt, Berlin and Moscow 1927, vol. I, i (i), p. 248).

But the state can only offer an ‘unreal’ rational freedom as a necessary consequence of a civil society having become a sphere of universal egoism and antagonism. The state can offer no more than an imaginary communality on account of the 'asocial nature of civil life' (Marx CN 1975:412). As Marx puts it, the 'slavery of civil society is the natural foundation of the modern state' (CN 1975:412). Universality and communality, needs which are essential for human fulfilment, cannot be attained in the real lives of individuals (Thomas 1994:61 62; Bonefeld 1992:116/7). The political, moral and communal existence which the philosophical tradition of ‘rational freedom’, dating back to Plato and Aristotle, identified as being conditions of human well being becomes external to individuals, in their social relations and in the political community of the state. What Marx is arguing is that a solidaristic order based upon close personal ties between individuals is capable of generating community and the common good from within but with the atomisation of society any community has become a contractarian or legal order. 
The rise of capitalism and bourgeois civil society is therefore a process of rationalistic desolidarisation in which social relations become independent of individuals and are experienced as external forces inimical to freedom. In these circumstances it is futile to expect the state to be capable of representing the universality and communality of individuals, since its roots are in the asocial nature of civil society. 'The constitution of the political state and the dissolution of civil society into independent individuals - who are related by law ... are achieved in one and the same act' (OJQ 1975:233). This process dissolved civil society into its component parts - self-interested, isolated, autonomous individuals freed from communal and universal considerations and obligations (OJQ 1975:233 234). The state is not a genuine community but is the institutional expression of this separation from community. It follows that the state can formulate and implement public policy for the good of all individuals only when this good can emerge from within social relationships which connect each individual with all individuals. Only such relationships overcome the split between egoism and altruism and make available a social identity which gives the individual good reason to choose the common good. 
Marx depicts political  democracy as  'Christian'  in  treating every individual as 'a sovereign and supreme being' whereas, in reality, this being is precisely the individual 'in his uncultivated, unsocial aspect', 'as he has been corrupted .. sold and exposed to the rule of inhuman conditions and elements of  the  entire  organisation  of  our society': 'in a word, man  who  is not yet a true species-being' (OJQ 1975:225/6). The political as a 'heavenly' sphere means that communality and universality possess a purely abstract character in relation  to  'actual  individuality',  'true  life'  (OJQ 1975:225).

The relationship of the political state to civil society is just as spiritual as the relationship of heaven to earth. The state stands in the same opposition to civil society and overcomes it in the same way as religion overcomes the restrictions of the profane world, i.e. it has to acknowledge it again, reinstate it and allow itself to be dominated by it. Man in his immediate reality, in civil society, is a profane being. Here, where he regards himself and is regarded by others as a real individual, he is an illusory phenomenon. In the state, on the other hand, where he is considered to be a species-being, he is the imaginary member of a fictitious sovereignty, he is divested of his real individual life and filled with an unreal universality.

Marx EW OJQ 1975

Marx distinguishes the ‘egoistic’ character of political rights within bourgeois society (Merquior 1986:54/5; Femia 1993:65; Pierson 1986:168/9) from their communalist-universalist character to foster a demand for community and solidarity, something akin to a conception of a social citizenship. The view is contentious. For many, Marx’s positive conception of freedom, well-being and community is beyond legal and moral rules, beyond rights as such (Lukes  in Parkinson ed  1982:198/203;  Lukes 1985:chs 345; Tucker 1970:50; Miller 1984:chs 1 2). But Buchanan’s view that Marx never made reference to rights in defining human emancipation (Buchanan 1982:67) is not strictly true. Marx’s distinction between 'the member of civil society' and 'the citizen' entails a distinction between the rights of man, which Marx criticises as egoistic, and the rights of the citizen (OJQ 1975:228/9). Rights have universal human implications beyond the separation of individuals from each other in bourgeois civil society and possess an emancipatory potential with respect to associative public life. Political rights are 'rights which are only exercised in community with others. What constitutes their content is participation in the community, in the political community or state. They come under the category of political freedom, of civic rights' (OJQ 1975:227). The distinction between the rights of man and the rights of the citizen affirms the universal-communal significance of political rights against the particularism and privatism associated with property rights. 

Having  affirmed  this  participatory  definition  of citizenship, Marx proceeds to criticise the 'so called rights of man' as the liberty of man as 'an isolated monad' (OJQ 1975:229) and whose practical application lies in private property. 'Bourgeois freedom' applies to  the nonpolitical rights associated with private property, equality as equal right to a monadic liberty, security as the guarantee of egoistic rights. Marx seeks to transcend the rights associated with property, egoism and atomism through the realisation of rights associated with citizenship, implying a true public life within real community (OJQ 1975:228/1; Hunt 1984:164 165).

Marx’s conception of 'political community' highlights the universalism implicit in rights  and liberty and affirms the connection of reason and freedom through the connection of each individual with all individuals in a genuine public life.





Civic unity in this sense would resolve the dualism of ideal and real, rationality and actuality, Kantian duty and inclination. It would overcome the dualism of altruism and egoism and would create the institutional and relational framework which would enable knowledge to triumph over opinion. Irreducible to either private interest or abstract norms, this civic unity embodies moral association in a public life. Philosophy would rule.


Marx is careful to avoid this call for ‘political community’ coming to be projected upwards to the 'abstract and restricted’ community of the state; this abstract state is 'the intermediary between man and man's freedom' (OJQ 1975:218/9). Marx’s 'political community' is the 'true' public life rooted in moral and civic association. This 'social' conception of citizenship is distinguished from the way that citizenship has been employed in the legitimation of the modern state, as 'an alternative "civil religion"' to replace the real forms of community destroyed by bourgeois society (Hobsbawm 1983:267/9). Dandeker  shows  the  extent  to  which, historically, citizenship, rights and democracy have been associated with the modern centralised state, exposing the coexistence of coercive or authoritarian rule within this discourse (Dandeker 1990; Polity Reader 1995:263). The arguments of Hobsbawm and Dandeker apply to the civic and republican turn in contemporary political philosophy, which largely leaves questions of political economy and social relations unaddressed. Marx emphasises the social aspect of ‘true community’, showing how the estrangement of individuals from each other in their social relations separates the individual from the essential bond to others. The social being is the essence of every individual; it is the egoistic individual that is the fiction, the abstraction.

The process of exchange both of human activities in the course of production and of human products is equal to the species-activity and the species-spirit whose real, conscious and authentic existence consists in social activity and social enjoyment. Since the essence of man is the true community of man, men, by activating their own essence, produce, create this human community, this social being which is no abstract, universal power standing over against the solitary individual, but is the essence of every individual, his own activity, his own life, his own spirit, his own wealth. Therefore, this true community does not come into being as the product of reflection but it arises out of the need and the egoism of individuals, i.e. it arises directly from their own activity. The existence or non-existence of this community does not depend on man; but as long as man does not recognize himself as man, and hence give the world a human organization, this community appears in the guise of estrangement. For its subject, man, is a being estranged from himself. Men, not as abstractions, but as real, living, particular individuals are this community. As they are, so it is too. To say therefore that man is estranged from himself is identical with the statement that the society of this estranged man is the caricature of a true community, of his true species-existence, that therefore his activity is a torment to him, his own creation confronts him as an alien power, his wealth appears as poverty, the essential bond joining him to other men appears inessential, in fact separation from other men appears to be his true existence, his life appears as the sacrifice of his life, the realization of his essence appears as the de-realization of his life, his production is the production of nothing, his power over objects appears as the power of objects over him; in short, he, the lord of his creation, appears as the servant of that creation.

Marx EW JM 1975

 Society, according to Adam Smith, is a commercial society. Which means that ‘each of its members is a merchant’ (Marx JM 1975:266). Marx defines community as ‘the self-activating essence of man’, ‘man's attainment of a species-life’, and ‘truly human existence through the mutuality of men’. Modern economics reduces this community to ‘exchange and trade’, a ‘series of reciprocal exchanges’. ‘We see then how economics establishes the estranged form of social commerce as the essential and fundamental form appropriate to the vocation of man’ (Marx EW JM 1975).
In contrast, Marx defines communism is the 'true community', the 'essence of man' (JM 1975:265), containing the 'real, conscious and authentic existence' of man's 'species-activity' and 'species spirit' through 'social activity and social enjoyment' (JM 1975:265). Only with communism can 'human needs' be properly satisfied. Since private property does not allow individuals to recognise themselves as human or 'give the world a human organisation, this community appears in the form of estrangement' (JM 1975:265). 'True community' as genuine public life implied by 'rational freedom' requires that this estrangement be replaced by a mode of existence realising human need. 

This is human emancipation in general: 'All emancipation is reduction of the human world and of relationships to man himself’ (OJQ 1975:234). Complete human emancipation involves the establishment of communal human nature in those areas of life excluded from political society, transcending the opposition between civil society and the state itself to create a genuine public life grounded in the real relations between individuals in society:





The practical restitution of social power from the institutional-systemic sphere abstracted from human life is the realisation of 'rational freedom' as an ethicality, communality and universality forged within social bonds. Communism is a society in which association 'puts the conditions of the free development and movement of individuals under their control' as against the way that association under capitalism has become an 'alien' bond (GI 1999:85) subjecting all to an objective dependency (Marx 1973:164).

PRIVATE VICES PUBLIC VIRTUES
This argument focuses upon constants to establish a non-relativism in politics and morality grounded in essential human nature and to point out the dangers of libertarianism and relativism.
The traditionalist case for public life and morality as essential for the common good would appear to have been contradicted in the modern world by the notion of the free market. As Mandeville satirised the point, private vices generate public virtues. As Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations made the point: 'It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, brewer or baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love.'
Smith uses the phrase 'invisible hand' in a slightly different connection in
The Wealth of Nations, vol. I, book IV, ch. ii, p. 456.

By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and in directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.

The theorem about private interests and public benefits is stated particularly clearly in the passage quoted at the beginning of this section, without however the phrase 'invisible hand' being used. The invisible hand is a particular instance of the 'law of unintended consequences' which played a key role in eighteenth century social thought. See Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977; and Ronald L. Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976.
This argument resolves the split between egoism and altruism and shows how self-interest brings about the common good. There is no contradiction between individual and community. On the contrary the pursuit of individual gain leads to the collective good. For Smith, the free market and the division of labour harness private efforts and canalise them to the common good. One can understand the religious fervour of this form of faith. In the place of God, Smith extolled the beneficial virtues of the 'invisible hand'. This really is the theological concept of divine providence, identifying as it does a pattern in human affairs that is greater than the intentions of individual agents. The common good emerges out of the disconnected decisions of individuals, each pursuing their own advantage. Through ‘the invisible hand’ the uncoordinated pursuit of individual gain produces the wealth of nations as something vast, benign and unplanned. To promote the common good of all, each simply needs to concentrate of themselves. The 'invisible hand' does the rest.
It is a view which is still the central dogma of what is called, with a religious fervour that ignores all contrary evidence, ‘free market economics’. A world of giant corporations which manage trade and regulate markets in their own interests is still referred to as ‘free trade’ in a ‘free market’. That is the power of religious belief.

MARX COMPETITION AND THE COMMON GOOD

The perfected political state is by its nature the species-life of man in opposition to his material life. All the presuppositions of this egoistic life continue to exist outside the sphere of the state in civil society, but as qualities of civil society. Where the political state has attained its full degree of development man leads a double life, a life in heaven and a life on earth, not only in his mind, in his consciousness, but in reality. He lives in the political community, where he regards himself as a communal being, and in civil society, where he is active as a private individual, regards other men as means, debases himself to a means and becomes a plaything of alien powers. 

Marx EW OJQ 1975). 

The bourgeois age replaces the undifferentiated unity of the feudal age with a differentiation without unity. Marx challenges this identification of emancipation from ties of personal dependence with freedom as such. Liberal 'independence' 'is at bottom merely an illusion': individuals are 'free to collide with one another and to engage in exchange within this freedom'. This appears as independence only by abstracting from 'the conditions of existence within which these individuals enter into contact, and these conditions, in turn, are independent of the individuals and, although created by society, appear as if they were natural conditions, not controllable by individuals' (Gr 1973:163/4).

The definedness of individuals, which in feudal society appears as a personal restriction of the individual by another, appears in bourgeois society as ‘an objective restriction of the individual by relations independent of him and sufficient unto themselves’ (Gr 1973:163/4).





Marx thus criticises the 'absurdity’ of liberal thinkers who regard competition 'as the absolute mode of existence of free individuality’. It is not individuals who are set free by competition but capital. This is 'dogmatically propounded’ as freedom 'through constant reflection back on the barriers torn down by free competition’ rather than reflecting upon the 'real development of capital' in the present as an 'external necessity' constraining all individuals (Gr 1973:649/51). Competition ‘posits as an external necessity, that which lies within the nature of capital; competition is nothing more than the way in which the many capitals force the inherent determinants of capital upon one another and upon themselves’ (Marx Gr 1973). 'Under free competition, the immanent laws of capitalist production confront the individual capitalist as a coercive force external to him’ (Marx Cl 1976:381). Hence 'the insipidity of the view that free competition is the ultimate development of human freedom; and that the negation of free competition = the negation of individual freedom’ (Gr 1973:652). This is ‘free development’ on the 'limited basis' of the 'rule of capital’ (1973:652).

Marx analyses what ‘free competition’ really is. 









A 'society in which the process of production has the mastery over man instead of being controlled by him’ has replaced the ancient worship of Nature as a natural necessity by the worship of Capital as a new social necessity. This appears to the 'bourgeois consciousness’ as a 'self-evident and nature-imposed necessity' (Marx Cl 1976:174/5). But capital's relations of objective and impersonal dependency suppress individuality in the name of individual freedom. Liberal freedom is the 'most complete' 'suspension’ and 'subjugation' of individuality under 'overpowering objects': 'things independent of the relations among individuals themselves’ (Gr 1973:652). The equation of free competition with ‘the ultimate form of the development of the forces of production and hence of human freedom means nothing other than that middle-class rule is the culmination of world history - certainly an agreeable thought for the parvenus of the day before yesterday’ (1973:652).

Marx dissects the liberal assertion of competition over cooperation as generating the common good. The liberal claim that the pursuit of private interest unwittingly produces the general interest could just as easily mean that 'each individual reciprocally blocks the assertion of the others' interests' so that the pursuit of private interests produces not a 'general affirmation' but a 'general negation' (Gr 1973:156/7). The 'collisions' between 'mutually indifferent individuals' results in their 'subordination to relations which subsist independently of them' (1973:157). The 'mutual interconnection' between individuals, a 'vital condition' for individuality, comes to be 'alien' to and 'autonomous’ of individuals: 'In exchange value, the social connection between persons is transformed into a social relation between things; personal capacity into objective wealth’ (1973:157). The  exchange  relation establishes itself as 'a power external to and independent of the producers', a means to production thus becoming 'a relation alien to the producers' (1973:146).

The product becomes a commodity; the commodity becomes exchange value; the exchange value of the commodity is its immanent money-property; this, its money-property, separates itself from it in the form of money, and achieves a general social existence separated from all particular commodities and their natural mode of existence; the relation of the product to itself as exchange value becomes its relation to money, existing alongside it; or, becomes the relation of all products to money, external to them all. Just as the real exchange of products creates their exchange value, so does their exchange value create money. (Marx Gr N1 1973). 

 Marx's critique is organised around the idea that freedom is a common project in which each individual is united with all individuals in mutually supportive, life affirming, relations. This project is obstructed by the way that the necessary interconnection between individuals becomes alien and abstract under capital's exchange relations. Exchange and trade establish an enforced common life in which the self-activating human essence and mutual reintegration toward generic and truly human life is expressed as 'an estranged form of social commerce' or intercourse (JM 1975:266). The social bond, 'the reciprocal and all sided dependence of individuals who are indifferent to one another',  is  'expressed in exchange value as an alien 'generality' 'in which all individuality and peculiarity are negated and extinguished' (Gr 1973:156/7; Meszaros 1989:430 426). Equality and freedom within the capitalist mode of production are thus revealed as formal endowments confined to the abstract realm of law or vested in money, which establishes its equivalence value by levelling all distinctions between things and individuals (1973:156/7 161/2 296 409/10 651/2).
The 'rational' community which is essential to the realisation of the human ontology, human beings as social and rational beings, takes form as the 'objective bond' of money becomes the 'real community' dissolving ancient communities based upon ties of personal dependence (Gr 1973:146/7 161 162 222/3 225 226; Rosdolsky 1989:128/9). The medium of exchange is important because it indicates the extent to which the abstractness characterising social relationships renders real community unavailable: 'The less social power the medium of exchange processes .. the greater must be the power of the community which binds the individuals together' (1973:157).

The question is how to convert the basis of social life so that it is organised around use value rather than exchange value.

GAMES THEORY
Although the conventional wisdom is that Marx’s day has come and gone, and with it socialism, the case for conscious control has come from disciplines outside of politics. Developments in mathematics, evolutionary psychology and biology and computer science have been creating a paradigm-shift in our understanding of the requisites of long term health and well being (Robert Wright, The Moral Animal; Matt Ridley, The Origins of Virtue, and Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption).
Homo sapiens, human beings as rational thinking beings, point to a rational human nature and imply that structures and institutions of cooperation, coordination and communication enhance human freedom and well being.

Games theory emerged in 1944 as a new branch of mathematics, devised by John von Neumann (1903-1957). One of the greatest intellects of the twentieth century, von Neumann was involved in the development of thermonuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and the theory of nuclear deterrence. The son of a banker, von Neumann recalled conversations he had with his father concerning the problems in running a bank. For von Neumann, economic analysis did not take adequate account of the complexities of human decision-making. Choosing the best of several alternatives is simple when consequences can be calculated. Life, however, is not that simple. The outcome of choice depends on the reactions of others, and these reactions can neither be calculated nor predicted. 
Games theory purports to show a mathematical representation of action under conditions of uncertainty. Its most famous application is the Prisoner's Dilemma. The dilemma involves the following scenario: 
The police have arrested two men under suspicion of having committed a serious crime. There is, however, evidence only to secure a conviction for a lesser offence. The only chance of getting a conviction for the serious offence lies in getting at least one prisoner to inform on the other. The prisoners are held in separate rooms with no communication between them possible. The suspects are then offered a deal. If one informs and the other stays silent, the informant will go free and the other will receive a jail sentence of ten years. If they both inform on each other, they will both receive ten years, making a total of twenty years. If both prisoners remain silent, they will be convicted only of the lesser offence, and will each spend only a year in prison.
The dilemma concerns the nature of reasoning. Reasoning alone, without communication, each prisoner pursues a self-interested strategy. The optimal decision for the individual is to inform on the other and hence go free. But since the reasoning is symmetrical, i.e. each thinks the same way as the other, each informs on the other in expectation of going free with the result that both are sentenced to serve ten years each. If both had remained silent, they would have been imprisoned for one year each. Had they cooperated and communicated and hence reasoned together, they would have opted for this strategy. The most optimal outcome is one achieved by mutual reasoning. Without cooperation and communication and mutual agreement, neither one can be certain that the other will do the right thing. Each follows the self-interested course and produce an outcome that is least optimal for all individuals.
The Prisoner's Dilemma offers mathematical proof that self-interest does not necessarily generate optimal outcomes, neither for the community nor the individual. On the contrary, self-interested reasoning inhibits rather than enhances individual freedom. The argument subverts the fundamental premise of Smithian economics. The idea that a number of individuals pursuing self-interest generate an outcome which is beneficial to all is turned on its head. What Marx had understood politically and philosophically was proved mathematically. To the contrary, individuals, acting rationally according to self-interest, produce an outcome which is the least optimal for all concerned.
Further light on the egoism-altruism relation was shed by evolutionary biology. A long running tension in Darwinian biology concerned the compatibility between the high value that all human societies placed on altruism and the notion of the survival of the fittest. In the struggle for survival, altruism should not thrive yet alone be held out for emulation. Clearly, the sacrifice of personal interest for the good of the group possessed some evolutionary advantage. This could go to extremes in the instance where the individual sacrifices his or her own life for the benefit of the group, losing the chance for his or her genes flourishing into future generations. Darwin was aware of the problem, arguing that the bravest individuals 'would on an average perish in larger number than other men'. The hero 'would often leave no offspring to inherit his noble nature'.5 Altruistic behaviour should not, in evolutionary terms, survive. Yet all thriving human societies value altruism. 

The Prisoner’s Dilemma proposed the resolution of this supposed paradox, showing how self-interested choice and action did not always yield optimal outcomes and could generate the least optimal. The paradox derives from the artificial nature of the context in which the reasoning takes place. The reasoning parties involved lack contact and communication, a notion which lacks any social and historical basis. In real society, individuals meet repeatedly, communicate and negotiate and deliberate. Individuals reason in a social context in relation to other individuals. As social and rational animals, they eventually work out compacts, agreements and strategies which are mutually beneficial to each and all. In other words, they decide to co-operate within community: 'I will stay silent if you stay silent'. It is in each individual’s interest to reach a common agreement. Each individual acts in the interest of the other individual because it is in her or his interest to do so. To political philosophers this could sound like reinventing the wheel. This argument is familiar to social contract theorists and historians of the origins of political society. The argument transcends self-interest rationality by first of all suggesting context and agreement and then going further to propose repeated contact in the same context, the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma goes beyond the single contact to propose that since individuals find themselves repeatedly in the same situation, they have a chance to learn. Political society as a learning mechanism which enables individuals to ascend the levels of cognition to the long range common good. This is the long terms strategic capacity which human beings need to evolve for survival in the opinion of James Lovelock.

If mathematics, economics and evolutionary biology were drawing conclusions which savoured a great deal of traditional political philosophy, so computer science used elaborate programmes to restate a traditional morality.
The political scientist Robert Axelrod announced an international competition to find the programme that won at playing the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma against itself and other opponents. The winning programme was called Tit-for-Tat and was devised by Anatole Rapoport. The programme began by co-operating and proceeded by repeating the last move of its opponent. The principle followed was 'What you did to me, I will do to you'. Although the more aggressive programmes did well in the short run, they would always lose out on account of the retaliation that aggressive action provoked. Tit-for-Tat thus demonstrated the survival value of reciprocal altruism. 
In the late 1980s, Martin Nowak developed a programme called ‘Generous’ which was capable of beating Tit-for-Tat. The weakness of Tit-for-Tat lay in the way it could be drawn into a destructive cycle of reprisal in face of a particularly nasty opponent. Again, the phrase of Gandhi springs to mind, ‘an eye for an eye leaves us all blind’. The fact is that the Biblical quote is an argument for proportionality, ‘measure for measure’ as in the Tit-for-Tat programme. A destructive cycle goes from bad to worse, which is what Gandhi meant. The history books are full of examples of this destructive cycle of reprisal at work. Franco-German rivalry came close to destroying European civilisation. Tit-for-Tat is vulnerable to this weakness. ‘Generous’ avoids this cycle by randomly but periodically forgetting the last move of its opponent, effectively allowing the relationship to begin again. Should France in 1919 have forgotten the war indemnities Bismarck imposed in 1871? France and Germany began a new relationship in 1945 and European civilisation recovered. Martin Nowak had produced a computer simulation of the human virtues of forgiveness and reconciliation which are central to all the world’s religions. How to embody these in political society is the key question, a question which motivated the works of thinkers like Grotius, Leibniz, Kant and many others.

The implications of these computer programmes specifically and games theory generally are profound. It sheds a penetrating light upon the ages old clash between individualism and communitarianism, liberty and authority, negative and positive liberty, Anglo-American and Continental thought. It suggests that the whole debate is based on a misplaced antithesis between individual and society, suggesting that society is composed of individuals in reciprocal relation and that it is the reasoning in that relation that counts. A whole political and moral tradition which asserts the rights and the liberties of the individual as such is not only misguided but literally misleading. Far from being protective of individual liberty, the liberal tradition systematically generates outcomes which diminish and inhibit individual freedom. Individual freedom generates a collective unfreedom, individual rationality brings about a collective irrationality. The argument offers proof that not only can a rational basis for politics and ethics be established, it can be established in a specific sense. 
Karl Popper famously wrote a defence of individualist liberal thought and politics in terms of the ‘open society’. He identified Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Marx as the ‘totalitarian’ enemies of this free and open society. His identification of liberty with the individual as such meant that he was unable to understand the way that these thinkers reconciled the legitimate claims of individual and community so as to produce a general good that benefits each as well as all. Against the whole tendency of individualist modern thought and practice, the insights generated by games theory suggest a rational basis for a communitarian ethic and politics. In a specific sense, both Tit-for-Tat and Generous demonstrate that individuals and communities as a whole thrive when organised around two fundamental principles, reciprocity and forgiveness, which may also be called justice and mercy. 
Reciprocity and justice are principles which are central to the Continental tradition in political philosophy, deriving from Plato and Aristotle and finding expression in the works of the likes of Grotius, Pufendorf, Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Marx and many others. For Plato, justice is the social virtue par excellence.

PLATO ON JUSTICE AND VIRTUE
Plato sought the remedy for political ills in philosophy: ‘I was forced .. to the belief that the only hope of finding justice for society or for the individual lay in true philosophy and that mankind will have no respite from trouble until either real philosophers gain political power or politicians become by some miracle true philosophers’ (Plato The Seventh Letter 1987:xvi). Plato’s Republic is an attempt to establish the conditions of good government through the integration of politics and philosophy. The subtitle, ‘Concerning Justice’, reveals Plato’s central concern to conceive the form that justice takes in the ideal state. Arguing that justice is the founding principle of the political community or state, Plato reveals the extent to which the unchecked pursuit of self-interest takes over and finally ruins public life in contemporary city-states. Those who quickly dismiss Plato as ‘authoritarian’ do not do justice to Plato’s critique of individualism and atomistic democracy.

By ‘Republic’ Plato means ‘constitution’, ‘state’ or ‘society’, an expansive ideal which encompasses the political and the social, the formal and the substantive. Within the ancient Greek ‘polis’, the problem of good government in the state and good government in the city were one and the same. 

Plato’s distinctive ‘rational’ conception of freedom emerges as he establishes the basic principle of inquiry early on in The Republic. Plato begins by asking what justice is. The question is both a moral and a political one, pertaining both to the individual and the community. To discover the true nature of political and social justice it is necessary to ‘first look for its quality in states, and then only examine it also in the individual, looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less’ (9-45). Such an approach seeks an objective foundation for freedom. If god is not the measure of all things, as the Sophists claimed, then neither is man. Plato’s principle of inquiry holds that abstractions or forms are the measure of things human and that these determine an intellectual progression from the forms to their collective approximations and then to real individual. This approach establishes freedom as a collective project and explicitly repudiates individualism as capable of only a limited, narrow freedom. Aristotle criticised Plato’s holistic approach for elevating pure forms and abstractions over empirical individuals, but this misunderstands Plato’s approach. Whilst the argument concentrates upon justice in the individual, Plato argues that the question is best studied on the large scale. As Aristotle himself argued, man is a social animal. To understand what any individual is or could be, it is necessary to study environing social relations, associations and allegiances. Plato thus analyses justice in the community as a whole before proceeding to apply his conclusions to the individual.

Plato is enquiring into the basis of socio-political and moral obligation. Rejecting the conventional view of giving each individual his due as inadequate, Plato argues that the problem cannot be solved in the individual but must be studied ‘in larger letters’ in society as a whole. Plato proceeds to analyse the key elements of the human mind so as to argue that its well being, full development and happiness are secured by doing right and by not doing wrong.

 In the individual, justice consists in maintaining the proper balance between the three elements of the mind so as to ensure that each is ‘doing its own job’ (1987:145). Intellect, desire and ambition must all receive their due and proper fulfilment, being given their proper place in the good life. True morality depends upon each of the different elements being given due satisfaction, with no one coming to dominate at the expense of the others. 
 In society, justice consists in everyone fulfilling his or her proper function in the social order. This principle checks social disintegration, the evil that most concerned Plato. Social justice is achieved by each class in society coming to fulfil its proper function, not encroaching on the functions of the others. 

The most important aspect of Plato’s argument is the extent to which he affirms social justice as the most desirable goal to be pursued in the city, over and against material affluence and economic growth. Plato presents a long and closely reasoned argument to prove that the just are happier than the unjust. Plato proceeds from the idea of function to argue that the individual needs justice so that he is able to perform a particular function and hence achieve happiness. The just man is happy and the unjust is miserable: ‘injustice never pays better than justice’ (Bk I 1987:41/2). Human beings achieve happiness by conforming to their nature as active beings. Plato confronts the argument that, since it is natural for individuals to pursue self-interest without regard to others, justice is simply a question of convenience. In this view, the purpose of morality is simply to regulate an amoral society of self-seeking individuals. If the sanctions of morality were removed, individual behaviour would be as self-interested as ever, suggesting that injustice pays more than justice (Bk ii 1987:49/55).

To counter this argument, Plato identifies two underlying principles at the heart of society. In the first place, there is mutual need. Since individuals are not self-sufficient beings, they need to combine in society. In the second place, there is difference of aptitude. Each individual specialises in those things for which they have a particular aptitude. There is a need for the individual to specialise ‘on a single job for which he is naturally fitted’ (Bk ii 1987:59 60). Society regulated on these principles is a natural growth and individuals achieve happiness through exercising their capacities and fulfilling their nature.

 Since individual and society go together, justice possesses a fundamentally social dimension (Bk ii 1987:58). The origin of society stems from the fact that the individual is not self-sufficient but has many needs that require many relations to others for their satisfaction. The individualism that characterises the liberal conception of liberty is untenable from this perspective. Specialisation implies necessary interrelation. Since each is fitted to one type of work, individuals need to associate together so as to supply all with what each lacks. ‘The formation of a city is due .. to this fact, that we are not individually dependent, but have many wants .. and because each seeks the aid of others to supply his various requirements; we gather many associates and helpers into one dwelling-place, and give to this joint dwelling the name of city’. This results in a settlement which goes by the name of a ‘community’ or ‘state’ (Bk ii 1987:58).

Plato’s definition of justice is the origin of the ‘rational’ conception of freedom. Plato’s objective is to integrate short and long-range interests, the immediate and the long term, the individual good and the collective good in the service of the common good. Self-discipline is ‘a kind of order’ in which the better, rational element controls the weaker element, stretched beyond the individual ‘across the whole scale’ of the city-state (Plato Bk iv 1987:142 143). ‘It produces harmony between the strongest and the weakest and middle elements, whether you measure by the standard of intelligence, or of strength, or of numbers or money or the like’ (Bk iv 1987:143).

Since justice is the result of society being properly ordered, Plato’s Republic devotes substantial space to this ordering. Plato conceives society as a structured form of organic functionalism, ordering society according to a hierarchical division of functions – leadership, protection and labour – each belonging to their corresponding collectivities: rulers/guardians, auxiliaries, and metics. The members of each group are selected according to their natural capacities with respect to the three basic functions. Placing each individual according to their natural capacity realises the thoroughly harmonious and fully integrated state, a state which exhibits the four cardinal virtues or ‘qualities’ of wisdom, courage, discipline and justice (Bk iv 1987:138). Wisdom is the product of the knowledge of the Rulers whilst courage comes from the Auxiliaries. Discipline is the self-discipline that issues from the harmonious relationship between the three classes and their common agreement over ‘who ought to rule’. Justice is the realisation of the principle of functional specialisation through individuals doing the jobs for which they are fitted according to their natural aptitude, not interfering in areas for which they are not fitted.

Plato’s three classes are arranged according to an ascending hierarchy of functional purposes. The first class is the class of rulers, the Guardians, a governing elite whose function is to govern (Bk iii 412d). The Guardians ‘must always do what is best for the community’ and a close watch is kept upon them to ensure that this principle is adhered to (Bk iii 1987:119). The function of ruling is restricted to the wise. The second class is the class of auxiliaries, whose function it is ‘to assist the Rulers in the execution of their decisions’ (1987:121). The auxiliaries combine the functions of the civil service, the police and the army. The third class comprise all those engaging in economic activities, the farmers, manufacturers and traders. The function of this class is to secure the material needs of the community. The third class is kept under strict control and has no involvement in matters of government.


Plato’s argument, it will be noted, concerns good government. The public good comes before all else. The Guardian class serves the interest of the other classes and governs with the willing consent of the governed (1987:123 143). The knowledge of the Guardians ‘is exercised not on behalf of any particular interest but on behalf of the city as a whole’. This benefits the state ‘both in its internal and external relations’ (Bk iv 1987:139).

Plato makes no attempt to rest his argument upon the value of freedom. The implication is that the best regime for human beings will, by definition, be the one that realises true freedom. Freedom follows as a consequence of right principles and reasoning. Plato is establishing the foundations for his ideal state, his functional naturalism emerging as the organically free state of truly free human beings.

The Rulers and Auxiliaries are to live an austere life without private property and the family. The purpose of these requirements was to check the tendency for the public good to be sacrificed to the pursuit of personal interests. The end to be served is the happiness of the ‘whole community’ rather than ‘the particular happiness of a single class’ (Bk iv 1987:126).

The Guardians are concerned to secure the conditions for social unity, ensuring that extremes of wealth and poverty in the Third Class are avoided and that the state does not grow to become too large. The argument is pertinent in a contemporary world characterised by overscale cities that are riven by increasing polarities. For Plato, the Guardians ‘must at all costs’ prevent ‘wealth and poverty’ from ‘slipping unobserved into the state’. ‘One produces luxury and idleness and a desire for novelty, the other meanness and bad workmanship and a desire for revolution as well’ (Bk iv 1987:129).

The state should .. be allowed to grow so long as growth is compatible with unity, but no further. So we can add to the instructions we shall give our Guardians one to the effect that they are to avoid at all costs either making the state too small or relying on apparent size, but keep it adequate in scale and a unity.

Plato Bk iv 1987:131

Further, the Guardians must ensure that individuals may pass between classes according to merit and aptitude so that ‘the integrity and unity both of the individual and of the state will be preserved’ (Plato Bk iv 1987:131).
 Plato is now in a position to define justice. Plato’s ideal city is founded upon justice defined in terms of ‘giving to each his due’. From this perspective, justice ‘consists in minding your own business and not interfering with other people’, each individual doing ‘the job he was naturally most suited for’ (Plato Bk iv 1987:145).

I think that the quality left over, now that we have discussed discipline, courage and wisdom, must be what makes it possible for them to come into being in our state and preserves them by its continued presence when they have done so. And we agreed that it would be justice that was left over if we found the other three.

Plato Bk iv 1987:145

Since the qualities expressed by the community are those of the individuals composing it, Plato establishes a parallel between the state (society) and the individual. The argument proceeds from the three elements of each soul:

1.	reason – the faculty that calculates and decides;
2.	desire or appetite – instinctive craving;
3.	ambition, indignation, pugnacity.

Human beings realise themselves fully as human beings when the rational element of human nature controls the instinctive element (Bk iv 1987:149/55). Individuals are easily manipulated and managed at the level of desire and appetite and are too prone to identify their liberty at this level of immediacy. The result is that human beings limit their liberty well within its full potential. Plato’s argument points to the need for an ethico-institutional framework that enables human beings to access their rational faculty, demonstrating a greater capacity for reflective action, conscious determination and moral choice. This enables individuals to attain a richer freedom by realising the full range of human capacities, well beyond desire and appetite.

 Justice in the individual is the counterpart of justice in the state. The individual is wise on account of reason, courageous on account of spirit and disciplined in subordinating ‘spirit’ and appetite to reason. The individual is just on account of the harmony that results when all the three elements of the mind are fulfilled in performing their proper function. Since ‘the state was just when the three elements within it each minded their own business’, ‘each of us will be just and perform his proper function only if each part of him is performing its proper function’ (Bk iv 1987:159). 

The principles of the good city identified by Plato are scale, balance, form and proportion. Self-control or discipline in a city or in an individual results ‘when all these three elements are in friendly and harmonious agreement, when reason and its subordinates are all agreed that reason should rule and there is no civil war among them’ (Plato Bk iv 1987:160).

‘So the reason ought to rule, having the wisdom and foresight to act for the whole, and the spirit ought to obey and support it’.

When these two elements have been so brought up, and trained and educated to their proper function, they must be put in charge of appetite, which forms the greater part of each man’s make up and is naturally insatiable. They must prevent its taking its fill of the so-called physical pleasures, for otherwise it will get too large and strong to mind its own business and will try to subject and control the other elements, which it has no right to do, and so wreck the life of all of them.

Plato Bk iv 1987:159

This results in justice in the city and in the individual. Justice prevents the three elements from trespassing upon each other, keeping all three in tune, binding these elements ‘into a disciplined and harmonious whole, and so become fully one instead of many’ (Plato Bk iv 1987:161). Once reason is in control and just rule ‘looks after the common interests of all by reconciling them with each other’, human beings can realise their potentiality for the good.
Plato therefore defines justice in reciprocal terms, uniting the freedom, good and happiness of each with all and the freedom, good and happiness of all with each. Justice possesses an ineliminable social component that acknowledges that individuals live in relation with each other. Some pursuing private interest at the expense of others harms the common good of all, including that of those pursuing their private interests. The private self-seekers harm their own good when they harm the good of all. Each individual is part of the society of all. The moral is clear: reason must control desire.

Then on this reckoning .. can it possibly pay anyone to make money by doing wrong, if the result of his so doing is to enslave the best part of himself to the worst? .. if one ruthlessly enslaves the divinest part of oneself to the most godless and abominable, is it not a miserable piece of bribery?

Plato Bk ix 1987:355

Each individual should be under the control of wisdom. ‘That wisdom and control should, if possible, come from within; failing that it must be imposed from without, in order that, being under the same guidance, we may all be friends and equals’ (Bk ix 1987:356). The argument is important and concerns whether the ‘rational freedom’ that secures the good of each and all is imposed externally by legal-institutional compulsion or whether human beings, as rational natural beings, can internalise reason and supply the internal moral coordination of common affairs. The latter is the ideal; the former a self-educative process that leads human beings to reason. The ‘intention of the law’ is to have educated the best element within citizens so that they may be given their freedom (Bk ix 1987:356). This view envisages legal-institutional coercion giving way to rational self-regulation practised by each in reciprocal relation to all. The rational, ‘humaner’ part is to be set free so that individuals make the best of their natural gifts (Bk ix 1987:356/7). It cannot pay to be unjust if by acquiring more money and power the individual becomes a worse human being (Bk ix 1987:356/7).

Plato’s innovations in educational theory mark his proposed ideal city-state as unique. For Plato, the citizen was produced by proper education and activity. Plato took education out of the hands of the family and made it a public activity. The function of this education is ‘that training in virtue from childhood which makes a man eager to become the perfect citizen, knowing both how to rule justly and how to obey’. No cultural form evaded this training in virtue: music, dance, athletics were all scrutinized with a view to providing moral benefit. Plato was concerned to eliminate overexcitement of the passions and the exacerbation of individualism. The accent was upon group effort and harmony, all pulling together for the common good, involved a training of the will and the inculcation of self-discipline. In the long run, public life would benefit through the citizen learning to restrain his ego and regulate his life to harmonize with the needs and desire of all other citizens.

Plato identifies the inherent tendency of personal liberty to degenerate into personal license and selfishness. He also condemns democracy for its inherent tendency to mob rule, demagoguery, and anarchy. ‘A very good description of one who believes in liberty and equality’ is the comment on the definition of ‘democratic man’ as one who has ‘no order and restraint in his life’ and who ‘reckons his way of living  .. pleasant, free and happy’ (9-49).

The absence of compulsion to exercise or submit to authority in democracy undermines the ‘good environment’ that trains individuals in ‘good habits’. Democracy ‘doesn’t mind what the habits and background of its politicians are; provided they profess themselves the people’s friends, they are duly honoured’ (Bk viii 1987:314/5).

In Book viii, Plato identifies the chief characteristic of democracy as liberty, the idea that ‘every individual is free to do as he likes’ (Plato 1987:314). Though this gives society a variety and diversity, its effects can be diremptive. There is a weakening of the bonds of political and moral authority so that ‘the minds of the citizens become so sensitive that the least vestige of restraint is resented as intolerable’ (Plato 1987:322). Without this restraint, freedom ceases to be a common purpose and instead fractures into dissension. Society is no longer capable of generating the principle of cohesion from within itself. The struggle between the rich and the poor in a democracy issues in tyranny: ‘an excessive desire for liberty at the expense of everything else is what undermines democracy and leads to the demand for tyranny’ (Bk viii 1987:321). As liberty becomes licence ‘all discipline is swept away and madness usurps its place’ (Bk viii 1987:332).
Plato’s criticisms of democracy are heavily focused upon the lack of critical reflection upon the general and long term good that the democracy of an atomized mass of individuals implies, and which an extension of greater mediation by representative bodies could check. Popular control involved ‘committing the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude’ (Plato B ii). Against this, Plato affirms that politics is the ‘art of navigation’ requiring a captain (B vi 1987:222/3).

Plato’s criticisms of democracy refer to the need for sound judgement and leadership in navigating the ship of state. For Plato, the people are bad judges on many important political matters, lacking the necessary experience or expert knowledge concerning such vital issues as finance and foreign policy. Describing the demos as ‘a large and powerful animal’, Plato states that philosophy is ‘quite impossible’ among ‘the common people’ (Bk vi 1987:228). The people will make judgements based on impulse, sentiment and prejudice rather than reason. The popular leader is dependent upon the ability to please the crowd, selling the people a package that conforms to their prejudices but which does not necessarily imply good policy (Plato 1987:222 228). This results in popular leaders who are as bereft of true knowledge as the people whom they lead.

For Plato, the only hope for realising the rule of reason is for philosophers to become rulers exercising political power.





It is easy, and wrong, to accuse Plato of an authoritarian-elitist purpose here. The educative process that Plato proposes has the end of extending reason to all so that the educative apparatus would no longer be required. The key word in the above passage is ‘humanity’, more correctly translated as the human race or the human species. Which means that the point Plato makes with regard to the rule of reason applies to all human beings, regardless of whatever or whoever they are. To argue that all human beings are capable of realising the best of their human nature is a lofty ideal and stands as a much more democratic notion than those who reduce democracy to monadic wants, desires and opinions. Plato sought to assert reason over instinct and desire, ranking physical pleasures low and seeking to restrain potentially unruly appetites and instincts. In this respect, Plato’s philosopher-ruler may be interpreted not as an institution or person presiding over the ruled than the fusion of politics and philosophy through the self-rule of all as rational beings. Politics is to become philosophical and express ideals of truth and good. Philosophy is to become political, worldly, and lose its abstract nature. Reason is to rule the world for the common good of each and all. 

Plato introduces his theory of forms, ideals or patterns that have a real existence independent of human minds. These yield knowledge by referring to a realm of reality beyond the sensible world of which full knowledge was not possible (Bk v 1987:206/220). ‘The good therefore may be said to be the source not only of the intelligibility of the objects of knowledge, but also of their being and reality; yet it is not itself that reality, but is beyond it, and superior to it in dignity and power’ (Bk vi 1987:248). Plato makes use of the simile of the cave to portray a society of individuals who mistake appearance for reality. The prisoners of the cave, their necks fastened so that they cannot move their heads, see only the shadows that the fire throws onto the wall. They naturally believe these shadows to be real (Bk vii 1987:256/61). The moral is that truth is the result of reflection, insight and experience that is beyond the immediacy of most people living in ordinary life. Much of what most people accept as truth as given by their everyday experience is in fact false, mere illusion (Bk vii 1987:263).

It would be easy to convict Plato of elitism in this argument, since the claim is that there is a deeper reality which, at first, is accessible only by a few (Popper Open Society). It should be emphasised, however, that the end that Plato has in view is that truth is to be made available to all so that all can see reality as it is. Popper convicts Plato of the very thing that Plato is concerned to challenge, the idea that truth is the preserve of the few who cast shadows on the world to keep the many chained to illusion, their ability to project images via control of the fire giving them the power to rule over the many. And above all, Plato’s explicit purpose is to challenge the exploitative and manipulative approaches to politics. Truth rather than power and wealth is the end that Plato pursues.





The philosopher-ruler is the culmination of Plato’s central theme, the integration of politics and philosophy. The aim of education is to produce the philosopher-ruler. They are identified as possessing the highest talent, receive the highest training and are put in the service of the state. They are fitted to rule by their education. They have been trained to be a dedicated elite committed to governing in the interests of all.

GAMES THEORY AND ETHICS
Forgiveness and mercy are central principles of the Judaeo-Christian faith, a faith which has sustained western civilisation for two thousand years. One can even relate this faith to the tradition of political philosophy outlined above: Plato’s ideal forms as the one true, heavenly, reality behind that apparent to the senses, Marxism as a disguised religion, as a Judaeo-Christian heresy, even.
The longevity of these principles is readily understood. They are not written into the historical process, although their embodiment can be described as a rational history; they are deeply rooted in biological reality. The philosophers and theologians, from Plato and Aristotle to the Stoics to Avicenna and Averroes up to Aquinas, Spinoza, and so on, were not, after all, wrong to build their arguments on the assumption of a rational human nature. Whether one looks at ‘nature’s plan’ in Kant or the progressive unfolding of reason in Hegel, where once we could be suspicious of a ‘windy metaphysics’, it turns out that we can locate the ideal within the real as immanent potentiality and can confront the ‘is’ with an ‘ought to be’ since these are moral imperatives grounded in biological realities. There is a direct correlation between morality and politics, between social justice and social order. A society which embodies justice and practises forgiveness will endure whereas an unequal and vengeful one will not.
The building and the endurance of civilisation depends less on individual power and more on the habits of co-operation. Individuals working together stand a better chance of achieving their goals if they can co-ordinate their efforts than they do if they work apart. Aristotle argued that reason was the feature which distinguished human beings from other animals. He has been accused of overrating the rational faculty of humans and underestimating the capacity of non-human animals to solve problems. But the name homo sapiens means rational man. The latest work in biology confirms that Aristotle was on the right lines. The distinctive feature of human beings is the 300 per cent increase in brain size since the species split from the other primates. The development of the use of language, culture, religion, art, technics etc. all followed. This distinctive feature derived from the advantages of extended sociality. Biologists even propose a close correlation amongst mammals between brain size and social group: the bigger brain is associated with the larger social group. One finds here a biological basis for the political principles of reciprocity and justice. And there is also a biological basis for scale in that this measure suggests that the human group has an optimum size of the human group. On average, the maximum number of people that any individual can know well and count as friends is 150. Community has its roots in a biological reality. The philosophical convention that one cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ breaks down against these constants.
Although self-interest has been sanctified as individual liberty and made the basis of modern electoral politics and free market economics, the figure of the self-interested, self-maximising individual is subverted by the Prisoner's Dilemma. This dilemma demonstrated the extent to which self-interested action and reasoning produced less than optimal outcomes. The dilemma was resolved only when the game was played repeatedly by the same participants who, over the course of time, learned the value of co-operation. This co-operation is predicated on trust, each individual believing that the others will reciprocate at some point the actions which that individual takes will benefit the other individual. 
This trust is the product of cooperative behaviour and is built up over time so as to create added value, a resource that is bigger than the individual parts. The simplistic slogan ‘there is no such as society’ is exposed in all its crudity’; it merely refers to the beginning of the game, before individuals have cooperated and learned. This trust as added value may be called social capital.
Social capital is generated through repeated interactions between the same individuals, the so-called Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Long term relationships build trust between participants and foster habits of co-operation. Scale and close connection are important. For Aristotle, the true city is one that can be taken in one view. At this scale, each member should know all others. Beyond this scale, human relations become impersonal and anonymous. They cease to be cities in Aristotle’s sense. Acts of robbery and violence increase in frequency with size. An individual is more likely to take advantage of others whom he or she is not likely to see again.
At this point the argument revisits certain fundamental notions of political philosophy, Plato’s notion of justice as a social virtue, Aristotle’s zoon politikon requiring a politikon bion to achieve happiness. Plato set the size of population of the ideal city at 5,000. Aristotle argued that it was the quality of relationships within that matter more than quantity of persons, although the city should be taken in one view with each member knowing all others. 
It is scale that is all important. Hegel valued the thick welter of intermediary associations that connected the individual to the state. Hegel’s state as the universal interest, the ‘march of God on earth’, is not the abstract and mystical conception critics allege. 
Families, neighbourhoods, communities and so on are the intermediary associations which form the content of the association civic public. The universal interest of the state or political system is firmly grounded in a social ecology in which the smaller associations have a vital role to play within the whole. As Aristotle argued, the state or political community is the community of all communities, each accorded their appropriate place. There is nothing mystical or mysterious about this notion. Philosophers in the Anglo-American individualist liberal tradition see a problem that is entirely of their own making. In holding individual and community apart as antagonistic poles, any notion of common good or general interest is bound to appear oppressive of individual liberty, certainly when given institutional form in the state. 

ARISTOTLE AND LIBERTY
The way that the word ‘authoritarian’ is banded around points to loose thinking with a very political motivation. The neo-liberalism of the past three decades is obsessed with unravelling all manner of social ties and unions and allegiances as evidence of a ‘collectivism’ which equates with socialism and hence with the big, centralised state. Popper’s condemnation of Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Marx as 'totalitarian' thinkers is instructive in that it points to the distinction between the 'rational’ position - with its positive conception of government - and the individualist liberal position - with its negative conception of politics. One side claims to represent true freedom as against the limited freedom or unfreedom of the other side, and vice versa.
Barnes criticises Aristotle's 'state' for being 'highly authoritarian' in its concern to 'regulate' and 'determine’ individual lives in the most intricate detail (Barnes in Miller ed 1991:23). Barnes objects to Aristotle's argument that 'in matters that belong to the public, training must be the public concern’, all citizens being regarded 'as belonging to the state, for each is a part of the state'  (Aristotle P VIII.i 1981:452). For Barnes, Aristotle's view that individuals are political animals comes with the corollary that private interests may be subordinated to the public good (Barnes in Miller ed 1991:23/4). Barnes identifies Aristotle's error as lying in assigning 'a positive function to the State, supposing that its goal is the promotion of the good life' whereas 'lovers of liberty will prefer to assign a negative function to the State and to regard it rather as a defence and a protection against Evil' (Barnes 1982:82/3).
Against Barnes' individualist and neutralist liberalism, Aristotle affirmed a positive conception of politics as creative self-realisation. Certainly, the 'rational’ argument does imply public life as an educative process which, as Aristotle puts it, 'trains' individuals to a good they do not naturally or spontaneously see. This can have repressive implications as an educational dictatorship. But this is not inherent in the Greek idea of Paideia or the German notion of Bildung at all, which are concerned with public education to bring individuals out of private interest to experience a greater freedom in public association.
Relating the individual to supra-individual organisms may seem dangerous but, properly understood, Aristotle's theory is neither as 'abhorrent' nor as 'bizarre' as Barnes suggests (Barnes in Miller ed 1991:24). Indeed, Barnes is accusing Aristotle of the very criticism that Aristotle, wrongly, made of Plato. In defending 'the democratic ideal' of 'doing whatever you want', Barnes asserts the individualist liberal position against Aristotle's identification of this individualism with the universal constraint  of  licence  (P  1981:59/60  332  373/5). Aristotle's view recognises the contextual and communal basis of individual freedom, the very things that one does not find in individualist liberalism (Clark 1975:103/4). Barnes’s criticisms of Aristotle’s ‘highly authoritarian’ politics presupposes a separation of the state from civil society which simply does not apply in Aristotle. Liberal critics fail to properly distinguish the 'polis' from the 'state'. Unlike the modern concept of the state, Aristotle's concept of the polis is not identical to political organisation but denotes the organised community in all its aspects, comprising the smaller associations as necessary to human well-being. Aristotle's 'state’ is no abstract entity like the modern liberal state but the supreme natural association rooted in the smaller natural associations, each formed 'with a view to some good purpose’. Aristotle’s 'state', therefore, is the supreme association of all associations and 'will aim the highest, i.e. at the most sovereign of all goods' (P I.i 1981:54; Edel 1982:319). [8]
Ironically, the liberal criticisms of Aristotle savour a great deal of the criticisms that Aristotle himself made of Plato. Aristotle and Plato both reject an individualism which fails to acknowledge the primary role played by the polis in securing the good life. But in explicitly repudiating any idea of society as a super-individual organic unit, Aristotle accuses Plato of ignoring the necessary role played by the various particular social groupings in human well-being. Criticising what he saw as Plato's 'extreme unity', Aristotle argues that there must be diversity in membership and functions (P 1981:103/126).
 Aristotle's account of how individuals group together in different kinds of association within the polis, from household to village to city or state, is concerned to demonstrate how smaller groupings promote the natural aims of the participating individuals and generate an appreciation of wider relations within the polis as a whole (P 1981 I.ii; Evans 1987:157/8; Edel 1982:319/20). The privileging of the individual against social units, the autonomous liberal self distinct from the larger social units, is incomprehensible in Aristotle's account of freedom. The criticisms of individualist liberalism can be turned back on the critics. Deprived of social context and connection, individual freedom is necessarily of a limited kind. 
Of course, the either individual or society antithesis is a product of an individualist liberalism which reflects the taxonomy of the modern state-civil society dualism. But to the ‘rational’ thinkers, individual and society go together as two sides of the same coin. Aristotle's society is not a super-individual organism. Rather, the free individual is at once self-determining and social. 'Man is by nature a political animal' who can be free and self-realising as a substance only within the greater substance of the polis (P I.ii 1981:59). 'Common interest' brings individuals together in a political association 'in so far as it contributes to the good life of each. The good life is indeed their chief end, both communally and individually' (P Ill.vi 1981:187). In the best society, freedom and sociality are reconciled. Community is natural for individuals (Clark 1975:110 101/2).

MARKETS, MORALITY AND MODERNITY
Whether one looks at Aristotle’s community of communities or Hegel’s Sittlichkeit these communities and associations are the homes of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, places in which individuals are brought into reciprocal relation with all other individuals, interacting with them repeatedly, developing and sustaining long-term relationships with each other and generating trust as social capital. These intermediary associations have the capacity to foster and inculcate the habits of co-operation on which the public life of society depends. Beyond the polarities and divisions of interest and opinion, this is a genuine political ecology in which individuals learn the practice and acquire the habit of reciprocity and forgiveness. It is the individual of Anglo-American liberalism that is the abstraction, a fictional person who exists only in the figure of homo economicus. Real individuals exist and flourish within a social matrix of reciprocal relations and trust.
 Adam Smith proposed a principle of self-interested behaviour that is appropriate only in times and places governed by the particular institution of ‘the market’. The notion is neither necessary nor of universal application. It is an abstraction from social, biological and psychological realities and survives as a quasi-theological concept, an article of faith which is defended and asserted with genuine religious fervour. It suits certain dominant interests as an ideology which conceals the way that certain power relations and institutions really operate in the real world.
 With the passage of time, it is increasingly apparent that dearly held Anglo-American nostrums concerning the institutions of the ‘free society’ are specific and transitory products of time and place. Some of the defenders of liberal democracy seem to have been aware of the transitory nature of the free society. Isaiah Berlin raises the possibility that the liberal society 'is only the late fruit of our declining capitalist civilization: an ideal which remote ages and primitive societies have not recognized, and one which posterity will regard with curiosity, even sympathy, but little comprehension' (Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, 172). 
And it also seems that the success of this historical aberration has depended in large part upon the moral, cultural and institutional resources of a previous civilisation. If this is so, then capitalism is parasitic not only on nature and labour as the two sole sources of wealth, but also upon the civilisation building of past generations. Capitalism depletes that moral, cultural and institutional capital of the past but, motivated solely by the endless, literally nihilistic pursuit of private accumulation, establishes no capital of its own.
For all of Smith’s arguments about the compatibility of morals and markets, capitalism is, as Keynes argued, ‘irreligious’. It’s not that capitalism doesn’t generate certain conceptions of morality, it does. But without an overarching moral framework, all that this creates is a polytheism of values, an irreducible subjectivism of competing positions, with no means of deciding between them. Capitalism destroys traditional morality but also destroys the grounds for taking any new morality seriously. Capitalism needs morality but renders it impossible. This argues that not only is capitalism destructive of traditional morality, it is also morally self-destructive. Whilst every society constructs its own form of morality, capitalism is unique in being unable to supply good reason for believing in its own principles and values. Capitalism presents a very clear conception of what it is to have reason to act, a conception of knowledge which denies the possibility of moral knowledge. Morality in this conception is a matter of subjective opinion rather than rational belief, with the result that moral imperatives have little purchase on the motivations of those to whom they are addressed. In an ‘irreligious’ capitalist world, morality lingers on as a matter of personal faith at best or dogmatic conviction at worst. Morality thus cannot command the authority it needs to play a central function in giving meaning to social and individual life. Modernity requires morality but cannot offer good enough reasons for rational behaviour.
Capitalist modernity is characterised by a plethora of competing conceptions of morality existing in unresolved tension with each other. The moral predicament of modernity is that there is no principled way in which the contentions between these various moralities can be settled. This was Weber’s position.
In many respects, Max Weber is the disillusioned heir of the philosophical tradition which sought to connect human reason with human freedom. This is apparent in his combination of reason and will and his normative concern with the appropriate regimen for the realisation of the human ontology. Weber is acutely aware that the triumph of reason in its technical and instrumental aspect has produced not freedom but an 'iron cage' of impersonal economic forces and of bureaucratically organised administration (Weber P 1994:314; Turner 1993:207; Schroeder 1992:114/6). The rational organisation of society has irrevocably removed the conditions of a universally valid ethical code. For Weber, the modern world has made it impossible to conceive the 'good' in anything other than subjective terms. Weber sees the fate of the modern age in the rise of a new polytheism taking the depersonified, objectified form of an irreconcilable antagonism among irreducible orders of value and life: 'Many old gods ascend from their graves; they are disenchanted and hence take the form of impersonal forces' (SV 1991:149). This rationalised world of modernity is meaningless, an endless struggle between a multiple set of values, lacking the conditions for an objective, integral framework for the common good (TL 1994:78/9; Habermas 1991:246). The fact that individualist liberalism argues for the ‘neutral’ conception of the state, leaving individuals to pursue the good as they see fit, is significant. This is a literally demoralised political theory to fit a modern world incapable of generating overarching morality. Weber argues that the modern world lacks intrinsic meaning: 'The fate of our times is characterised by rationalisation and intellectualisation and, above all, by the "disenchantment of the world"1 (SV 1991:155). The world is stripped of its normative dimension. 

But the loss of an overarching moral framework, the universality of a traditional objective morality, is merely symptomatic of an even deeper problem. Weber relates this loss of moral meaning to the spread and domination of an instrumental reason embodied in capitalist institutions. Instrumental rationality is not concerned with ends but with the efficient organisation of means and is so entrenched in the modern world that many identify this form of reason with rationality as such (see the editorial introduction to Elster ed. 1986). And the point is that not only does modernity not offer any good reason to decide between the disputing moral positions, it fails to supply good enough reason to accept its own instrumental rationality. Morality tells individuals what they ought to do as a moral imperative, but cannot supply a good reason for individuals to take this imperative seriously. Given the conceptions of human agency and reason which characterise capitalist modernity, a rational individual will reject the claims of morality. This was spotted as early as the start of the eighteenth century by Bernard Mandeville, for whom morality is merely a system of illusion, whose principal justification is its usefulness in serving certain social purposes. At a certain point, however, rational agents see through the illusion and so morality loses even its function as social glue or cement. At that point, modernity collapses into its own hollow centre.

Moral philosophy needs to recover its nerve and reacquaint itself with the big questions. To do this, it needs to engage with social and political life. This would reveal not morality to be the ‘illusion’ but the idea that the ‘invisible hand’ leads private vices to anything but public vices, a society of private vices writ large. As much as economics, morality is an aspect of social and political life, and ancient philosophers from Plato and Aristotle treated ethics and politics as complementary disciplines relating to the social nature of human beings. By recovering this perspective it will be possible to bring morality to bear on existing social practices. What is most in need of answer in this sense is not the social irrelevance of morality but the demoralisation of modern society.

The argument which claims inevitability and universality in the connection between market capitalism, self-interest and individual liberty suffers from a shocking social, psychological and, indeed, historical illiteracy. Even within its own particular Anglo-American terrain, the evidence contradicts the ideology. At no point ever was ‘the market’ free. The state has always been in symbiotic relation with capital. The conditions for the ‘free market’ were created and sustained and enforced by state and law – enclosures, the separation of workers from land, the anti-combination acts, the rights of property and so on and so on, each and every one an example of a socio-institutional matrix supporting the figure of the self-interested individual.
And that’s within the Anglo-American home of ‘individual liberty’. Not all societies generated and sustained a ‘free market’ economy along these lines and, even more importantly, few of these were concerned to even make use of the ‘free market’ at the level of political ideology. Germany has consistently adopted a regulatory, institutional approach to economic development and restructuring, retaining the structures and the mentalities that date back to the medieval guilds, masters, apprentices and journeymen, an emphasis on training and skill and application. Today, there is a legal obligation on companies in Germany to train, there is an emphasis on the retention of skilled labour. Germany has an economy that competes at the high added value end of the global economy. It did not attain this position by letting outcomes be determined by uncoordinated decisions by isolated agents pursuing individual self-interest on the market. German economist Wolfgang Streeck comments here that ‘the apparently growing needs of Western capitalist firms for collective, non-appropriable production factors, like a rich supply of high and broad functional and extra-functional skills, opens up political arenas where corporate self-government of social groups may be a superior mode of regulation compared to both state intervention and the free market’ (Streeck 1989:103). This could entail workplace-based industrial training but also trade union involvement in the governance of training systems. Associative democracy between the state and the market, third sector economics. Democratic corporatism based upon patterns of functional representation may have a future after all.
Successful and sustainable economic growth requires a delicate balance between cooperation and competition, enabling creativity to flourish in a competitive market without undermining the co-operative habits and trust relations learned through long term, sustained interaction. A viable social order requires a particular social and institutional matrix which canalises individual action towards a beneficial long term outcome in the interests of all. 
In terms of technics, China was much more advanced than Europe in the Middle Ages. China invented printing, paper, explosives and porcelain. Yet it was Europe where the Industrial Revolution began (David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, 45-59). 
Max Weber established a causal connection between capitalism and Puritanism, both in the methodical behaviour of the Protestant but also in the way that the religious ethic promoted honest behaviour between strangers that develop trust relations. In this instance, individualism could be associated trustworthiness on account of an internalised religious ethic. The Protestant Ethic and Capitalism combined markets and morality in a particular time and place and sustained this mix long enough for successful economic development. But economic growth is not the same thing as civilisation build. True, it develops institutions and passes laws, but in the service of the process of accumulation. The capital system is a totalising system that subordinates all aspects of life to its single, overriding purpose. Capital proceeds inexorably to unbalance the mix and hence destroy the cultural and moral conditions of its own success. Weber saw this more clearly than most.

In The Order of Things, Michel Foucault argues that 'man is an invention of recent date, and one that may well be coming to an end' (Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, 386-7). That is what is at stake. But can we reverse social trends? Can what I propose be done? 

‘The market’, in fine, is an institution, a social and historical creation which depends for its functioning and survival on a wider moral, cultural, social and institutional habitus. No economy is autonomy of its social and cultural setting. The economy, the free market, whichever euphemism one chooses in place of capitalism, depends on virtues which are generated outside of the market, just as the state depends on virtues which are generated outside the realm of the state. Neither the state nor the capital system generate the virtues upon which a viable social order, including their own functioning, depend. For the origin of these virtues one must again turn to biology and the notion of reciprocal altruism, Aristotle’s politikon bion and Hegel’s reciprocal relations between individuals, and the culture, morality, habit and custom that are associated with them.


Which begs the obvious question: if the market economy depends upon moral and cultural resources it does not create, does its very success undermine its own basis? The continued expansion of the market economy serves to further the process of disintegration by commodifying areas of social life and bringing them within the terrain of the economy. The cultural and social spheres that create the virtues are increasingly marketised. In expanding its economic reach, the market economy is narrowing and thinning its moral basis. 

HABERMAS – SYSTEM WORLD AND LIFEWORLD
The basis of a viable, functioning social order is the lifeworld. 'Lifeworld' (Lebenswelt) is the key methodological term defining the substratum in which social and economic structures interpenetrate with human action and consciousness. The lifeworld is the 'background consensus of everyday life', the store of knowledge that is passed from one generation to the next. The lifeworld is the context-forming horizon for the interaction between social action through culture, ethics and consciousness on the one hand and social structures on the other (Pusey 1993:59). For Jurgen Habermas, the lifeworld 'stands behind the back of each participant in communication' and is 'so unproblematic that we are simply incapable of making ourselves conscious of this or that part of it at will' (Habermas 1981:4/31).
Habermas draws a distinction between 'socially integrated action contexts' and ‘system integrated contexts’. 'Socially integrated action contexts' refer to self-organising public spheres in the lifeworld in which actions are coordinated through an intersubjective consensus about norms, values and ends. In 'system integrated contexts' actions are coordinated through the functional interlacing of the steering 'media' of money and power (TCA 2 1989:189/92 202 338/40; Giddens 1987:232/3).
Habermas seeks to maintain this distinction and identifies the problems of the modern world with the tendency of the system world to encroach on the lifeworld. Habermas’ concern is to confine instrumental rationality to its proper sphere in the system world. Rather than build an integral public world through absorbing steering media of money and administrative power into the lifeworld, Habermas seeks to balance discursive and non-discursive modes of coordination. Habermas argues for the necessity of a system world in which the steering media of money and administrative power coordinate human action on non-discursive grounds. For Habermas, a substantively rational society is achieved by strengthening the lifeworld so that the communicative interaction of free and equal individuals may generate a rational consensus (TCA 1 1991:69f 339; 2 1989:126/7 187 352/3). These structures are grounded in the lifeworld, 'as part of a cooperative process of interpretation aiming at situation definitions that are intersubjectively recognised' (TCA 1 1991:69/70).
 The problem is that as steering media assume increasing responsibility for coordination and encroach upon the lifeworld, the space for the lifeworld is diminished, generating socially pathological consequences (TCA 1 1991:299-303; TCA 2 1989:311/12 355/7 367/73 375 391/6). Given the tendency of 'monetarisation and bureaucratisation’ 'to overstep the boundaries of normality' by instrumentalizing the lifeworld (TCA 2 1991:323), destroying communicative contexts and non-renewable cultural resources, there are doubts whether Habermas can sustain his vision of the consensual and normative coordination of human action contexts (Giddens 1987:239). That vision needs to focus upon the lifeworld as a public sphere of emancipatory interaction to be invested with the power alienated to the steering media of money/capital and power/state. Habermas’ concern is to affirm the necessary co-existence of system world and lifeworld, therefore resisting the encroachment of either one upon the other. His theory does, however, express a demand for society to be governed normatively as against the domination of instrumental rationality. Habermas's communicative ethic opens up the possibility of the discursive coordination of human action centred up the lifeworld as the necessary world of real individuals.

MODERNITY AND MORALITY
Precious cultural and moral resources which have taken generations of cooperation and trust are destroyed and are replaced by the mercenary ties of money. And that is insufficient to sustain a civilisation. These are the most ephemeral of ties. In dissipating resources without replacing them, the market economy is destroying its own base? 
The idea that capitalism contains the seeds of its own downfall would hardly be considered novel. It is difficult to think of a major political economist who didn’t argue this proposition. Take Malthus and the population imperative, Ricardo. The stationary state of John Stuart Mill. And the elephant in the room, Karl Marx.
 The Austrian political economist Joseph Schumpeter rewrote Marx’s class war and capitalist crisis in a more general, sociological sense, innocent of notions of surplus value and exploitation and laws of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and all the other Marxist algebra which deters the uninitiated and non-obscurantist. In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942) Schumpeter argued that capitalism produces economic growth but in such a way as to induce social breakdown. Capitalism engulfs society in a 'perennial gale of creative destruction' which eventually erodes its own foundations:

Capitalism creates a critical frame of mind which, after having destroyed the moral authority of so many other institutions, in the end turns against its own; the bourgeois finds to his amazement that the rationalist attitude does not stop at the credentials of kings and popes but goes on to attack private property and the whole scheme of bourgeois values.

Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 143.

It hasn’t happened yet. That’s the nature of predictions. They can never be precise for the very reason that human foresight is such as to identify and anticipate problems, learn to think and act differently and change direction. But the same logic that struck a Weber and a Marx, and myriad others like Veblen, as an inexorable necessity is still in place.
Just as Marx noted many countervailing tendencies which could stave off the final crisis and collapse, so Schumpeter identified consumerism, with its emphasis on choice and its devaluation of loyalty, as a solvent of marriage and the family, neighbourhood and community. Consumerism is the real politics and ideology of contemporary society, commanding loyalties and motivating efforts far in excess of anything any political movement or party can generate. There is a book about the Spanish Civil War called The Last Great Cause. It has been a long time since great battles between competing visions and ways of life were fought in politics. The cynical little song says it all: ‘Why worry, put your cross in the bin. No matter who you vote for, the government always gets in’. Every government the same, every one concerned most of all to facilitate the process of private accumulation. First and foremost, individuals are taxpayers and only secondarily are they voters. As voters, they resent the way that their money is being spent by the government. The same people who, in Marxist terms, hand over a proportion of the wealth they have created in the form of surplus value, a tax that property owners levy on the propertyless, and are oblivious to this exploitation, object to ‘big government’ and the ‘nanny state’. Government with social purpose, mind. Spending on crime, law and order, prisons and police, arms and wars is immune from attack. Spending on war and repression seem beyond political controversy as concerning national security. Spending for health and welfare, social and environmental justice, genuine security, are subject to constant assault. This paradox is beyond the political level and concerns the psyche and culture, the ingrained mentalities of a people used to a certain way of life. That is an ecology of fear and despair that has to be turned around.
Least of all are these individuals citizens. They have little opportunity to be citizens. Where are the extensive public spaces in which to act as citizens?
The origins and effects of consumerism have been studied for decades now. The words of Veblen, Galbraith, Vance Packard and William Whyte can still be read with profit. One of the best of more recent critiques comes from Benjamin Barber.
This paper has sought to connect insights from mathematics and games theory with a certain ‘rational’ tradition in ethics and political philosophy. It has done so to contest the facile connection of individual liberty with the common good. Games theory demonstrates what rationalist thinkers in politics and ethics have always argued, that individual rationality generates a collective irrationality and that individual freedom generates a collective unfreedom, thus diminishing the real freedom of the individual in the process. Genuine freedom is negotiated between each and all within reciprocal relations. This is the long range strategic thinking and learning capacity that humanity requires in order to regulate its interchange with nature in the future. The problem is that all the power of ethics, philosophy and mathematics, Plato, Pythagoras, Jesus and German philosophy together cannot compete against the seductions of the slogan ‘free to choose’ when the winnowing away of traditional institutional and moral restraints have left individuals alone on the market to confront the psychological warfare and mass manipulation of advertisement. Just as games theory with mathematics and evolutionary biology give scientific proof to old political and moral truths, commercial society has gone careering off in precisely the opposite direction of identifying licence with liberty. Michael Walzer paints an appropriately lurid picture of a society of rampant individualism that has thrown aside ethics and institutions that drew people together in their common humanity:

We are perhaps the most individualist society that ever existed in human history. Compared certainly to earlier and Old World societies, we are radically liberated, all of us. Free to plot our own course. To plan our own lives. To choose a career. To choose a partner or a succession of partners. To choose a religion or no religion. To choose a politics or an anti-politics. To choose a lifestyle - any style..Free to do our own thing, and this freedom, energizing and exciting as it is, is also profoundly disintegrative, making it very difficult for individuals to find any stable communal support, very difficult for any community to count on the responsible participation of its individual members. It opens solitary men and women to the impact of a lowest common denominator, commercial culture. It works against commitment to the larger democratic union and also against the solidarity of all cultural groups that constitute our multi-culturalism.

Michael Walzer, Citizenship and Civil Society, part 1, 11-12.

Freedom to Choose was the book by Milton Friedman. It purported to be a vision of human freedom. Walzer’s words reveal the utter inhumanity of this psychologically crude, institutionally naïve and culturally bankrupt nonsense. These ‘arguments’ survive and circulate for no other reason than that they ring true at the lowest rung of the levels of cognition, striking individuals in their egoism at the level of wants, impulses and desires. And what works in economics works also in politics. Thomas Jefferson warned of ‘manacling people by their own consent’. The politics of slogans, soundbites and images give voters what they want to hear, that they are the ‘aspiring classes’ and that they won’t have to pay too much for their politics. Flattire. 
 This really is the end of public life and public spiritedness and the retreat of individuals into the world of private idiocy, the rule of the idiotes. These developments point to a decline in social capital. Political scientist Robert Putnam wrote about this decline in 1995 and coined the phrase ‘Bowling Alone’. What he meant was that whilst more people were going ten-pin bowling than ever before, fewer were joining leagues (Robert Putnam, 'Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital', Journal
of Democracy, January 1995, 65-78).
 The liberal democracies of mature capitalism all showed the same tendency to the withering away of the associational space of civil society. The forces of family and intermediary associations which Hegel made the building blocks of his Sittlichkeit and which Burke identified as the ‘little platoons’ were all breaking down, families, neighbourhoods and communities. More and more individuals are withdrawing from the whole range of civic and social engagements. Church attendance is down and less people are joining voluntary groups. All of the spaces in which individuals meet and interact with each other in solidary exchange are being vacated. Increasing numbers of people do not even know their own neighbours. What Alexis de Tocqueville had praised as the 'habits of association' crucial to a viable civic and social order are being lost. Individuals are pursuing and seeking satisfaction of their ends in the private sphere. Not only are they abandoning politics, they are at least sceptical towards and often positively hostile to politics as a collective project aiming at some greater good. As idiotes, individuals don’t believe in such a politics and won’t pay for it.
The result is that society, in the mistaken belief that individual choice equates with human freedom, is closing down its public space, narrowing its horizons and undermining the conditions of freedom. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma holds that the repeated interaction of individuals within stable, long term relationships is crucial to the creation and maintenance of trust. When this contact and interaction is lost and these relations do not develop, individuals withdraw into a private space and become more suspicious of general goods and purposes. 

ARISTOTLE ASSOCIATION OF FRIENDS
For Aristotle restricts citizenship to the virtuous minority of the population, even though the egalitarianism that Aristotle defines in terms of civic friendship is something that carries over into Marx's notion of a classless society (Miller 1989:203 204). For Aristotle, citizenship, as active participation in the state, should be restricted to those who are superior in goodness and wealth (P IV.xii 1981:270/2).

First and foremost, the Greeks gave the world philosophy. The classical Greeks were a people who, although not very numerous, not very powerful, not very well organised, ‘had a totally new conception of what human life was for, and showed for the first time what the human mind was for’ (Kitto 1951:1). The Greek philosophers asked an apparently but deceptively simple question that has proved of enduring significance and which the world stops asking at its peril: ‘What is the proper way for human beings to live?’ How that question is answered – indeed whether the question is even asked at all – determines the kind of society in which one lives.

Both Plato and Aristotle identify politics with a concern with the good life for human beings. Before going into the specific philosophical conceptions, this section examines the polis as an historical institution with a view to defining a public life that is constituted by a plurality of communities and identities and is empowered from below. 

Politics and philosophy were born in the agora, the citizen assembly and market place in Athens (Heller 1984; Doyle 1963:ch 2). ‘Most modern political ideals – such … as justice, liberty, constitutional government and respect for the law – or at least the definitions of them, began with the reflection of Greek thinkers about the institutions of the city state’ (Sabine 1937:3). Finley presents the Athenian polis offers an historical example of an expansive public life that may serve as a model for emancipatory urban governance in the modern world. The polis was founded upon a ‘sovereign assembly .. open to every citizen’ and convened at least 40 times a year. The polis made a virtue of its amateurish principle. The fact that it was managed by a rotating council of 500, with the chair selected by lot and sitting for just one day, checked the bureaucratic principle. The extensive use of selection of lot throughout the institutions of governance indicated the high value placed upon self hood as something obtained through participation. Free individuals possess politike techne, the skill and techniques of the statesman, the ‘art of political judgement’ (Finley 1973:18). 

These political arrangements reflect a philosophical anthropology. The classical conception defines humanity as a social and cooperative species, possessed of philia (friendship) and dike (justice). This points to public life as a solidaristic conception in which each and all unite for purposes of individuation. Human beings are by nature inclined to live in a polis. These characteristics of citizenships imply a controlled self-hood, a ‘self-control’ that makes community life possible (Finley 1973:29/30).

Importantly, the polis made justice integral to its mode of life. ‘It was the common assumption of the Greeks that the polis took its origin in the desire for justice. Individuals are lawless, but the polis will see to it that wrongs are redressed. But not only by an elaborate machinery of state-justice, for such a machine could not be operated except by individuals, who may be as unjust as the original wrongdoer. The injured party will be sure of obtaining justice only if he can declare his wrongs to the whole polis. The word therefore now means ‘people’ in actual distinction from the ‘state’ (Kitto 1957:72). 

The pursuit of justice becomes a question of making available a social identity that connects public and private interest. This social identity was available in the city-state. The city-state is a quite distinct institution from the modern state and is crucial in envisaging a smaller scale public sphere located in everyday social activities. The all-important political unit in classical Greece, the polis was more on the scale of a modern medium sized town than the modern nation state or metropolis (Jones 1964; Davies 1978; Mayo 1960: ch 2). The size of the city-state was kept in check in numbers and in area deliberately so that citizens could meet within its centre and engage in meaningful political activity (Doyle 1963:25).

In Aristotle’s conception, the original polis was a self-sufficient and self-governing group of villages, in a narrow and closed region lying around an urban centre. The poleis were mostly very small. When Aristotle wrote there was probably no town in the classical world with a population of more than about 150,000. In all likelihood, there were not more than half a dozen with a population of more than – 50,000 (Hall 1998:35).

If the polis was less than a state in the modern sense of the term, it was also something more than a city. The polis had an urban centre but also embraced the surrounding agricultural land. It consisted of farmers, craftsmen and sailors, and many individuals would combine a couple or more of these roles (Bowra 1957:9; Chamoux 1965:291). When Marx speculated that in the future communist society the individual could assume a number of roles rather be restricted to one specialised task imposed by the division of labour, he was adopting the position of the Greek polis.

The obvious question is that, if Athens really was so successful and really did achieve so much in all areas, why did it not presume to conquer and lead the city-states in a unified Greek state. The question would have struck the Athenian – and other Greeks – as illogical. The polis is what was integral to the identity of each individual and nothing beyond the polis, no amount of riches or power, could have the remotest significance with respect to that sense of self-identity. As Kitto put it, ‘if the Greek was not within a day’s walk of his political centre, then his life was something less than the life of a real man’ (Kitto 1951:121).

Every Greek knew the polis: ‘there it was, complete, before his eyes. He could see the fields which gave it sustenance .. he could see how agriculture, trade and industry dovetailed into one another.. The entire life of the polis, and the relation between the parts, were much easier to grasp, because of the small scale of things’ (Kitto 1951:73).

Kitto defines the polis as a ‘community’ since ‘its affairs are the affairs of all’ (Kitto 1957:71). In the polis, every Greek understood the functions of other Greeks: ‘he could see how agriculture, trade and industry dovetailed into one another; he knew the frontiers, where they were strong and where weak .. The entire life of the polis, and the relation between its parts, were much easier to grasp, because of the small scale of things’ (Kitto 1957:73).

The polis conception of scale is rational in that it is premised upon self-consciousness as the distinctive attribute of the human species. Human beings engage in rational action, are teleological and reflexive beings, projecting ends and reflecting upon their actualisation. Reflexivity is built into human action. Praxis is rational. The human habitat is to be evaluated according to whether it promotes the good life, realising human potentialities, expanding rather than inhibiting the growth of human capacities.

A human habitus is premised upon human scale and is, on that account, a public life in the classical conception. A habitat that is beyond human comprehension and control is unjust according to these premises. For reason of size and quantity, its centralisation and concentration modern society is overscale and hence inhuman. The exclusivity of its political and economic functions denies citizens the opportunity to participate in the determination of the forces and decisions affecting collective life. Denied the opportunity to participate in public life, individuals lose not only their citizenship but also their sense of self-identity.
The physical form of the polis emphasised public space with temples, stadia, the agora (combined market place and public forum) and theatres. This everyday public life made possible an everyday public life in which all could participate. The accent was upon association and interaction. Appropriate scale facilitates public comprehension. The question is not, however, settled by establishing human proportions. Beyond scale, there remains the ethical question of the just and the good. A mode of life qualifies as ‘good’ to the extent that it achieves material sufficiency and reflexivity in an ethical community founded on justice, participation and mutual justice. This emphasises the importance of the polis.

The polis embraces much more than the institutional make up and is both the community of citizens and their collective sense of community. There is no equivalent word for polis in the modern world. For Kitto, the usual translation ‘city-state’ may be the nearest we can get but is still a bad translation since the polis was not much like a city and was much more than a state (Kitto 1957:64). The Athenian would not have understood the difficulty of translating polis and how inadequate the term city-state is. To the Athenian, city and state are inextricably linked as one and the same. And to complicate the issue even further, the Athenians did not conceive the city-state in institutional or geographical terms, as a set of institutions or as a definite territory. The polis was the people, it is as simple and as complex as that. There is an important distinction to be drawn between the polis and the state. This distinction makes it possible to separate public life from the institutional machinery of the state and locate it in an autonomous self-governing urban realm. Kitto uses the term polis rather than city-state so as to describe the reality of a self-governing community. 

The polis establishes the social context within which individuals fully realise their spiritual, moral and intellectual capacities (Kitto 1957:78). They realise these essential capacities only in relation to each other. The polis is therefore a holistic and moral framework. The polis ‘is so much more than a form of political organisation. The polis was a living community, based on kinship, real or assumed – a kind extended family, turning as much as possible of life into family life..’ (Kitto 1957:78). The Athenians conceived the polis as a mode of life fostering a sense of community, as a communal modus vivendi. The polis is an integral part of the realisation of the good life, is a dimension of it. ‘The Greeks thought of the polis as an active, formative thing, training the minds and characters of the citizens; we think of it as a piece of machinery for the production of safety and convenience. The training in virtue, which the medieval state left to the Church, and the polis made its own concern, the modern state leaves to God knows what’ (Kitto 1957:75).

At the heart of the polis was a moral purpose based upon a philosophical anthropology. The polis was a physical place, true, but more than geography and space it was a collectivity composed of citizens (Chamoux 1965:309; Hansen 1991:62).. ‘it is the men that are the Polis’ (Ehrenberg 1965:88 quoting Thucydides). The Athenian city-state was not the republic of Athens in its institutional form but the Athenians as a people: the Athenians as citizens were the city-state; the city-state had no independent significance but was embodied in the person and idea of demos, the people.

Aristotle restricts citizenship to the virtuous minority, the ‘middle people’ who are superior in goodness and in wealth (P 1981:181 180/3 267 270/2).. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s conception of citizenship entails a notion of civic friendship that implies an egalitarianism which can carry over into the radical idea of a classless society of equals (Miller 1989:203 204). Aristotle’s argument offers a principle that, radicalised as a universal principle, demands an inclusive, participatory public based on the continuous and active involvement of all as citizens.





The question is how to ensure that all get a share of happiness. ‘Property too must belong to these people; it is essential that the citizens should have ample subsistence; and these are citizens. The mechanical element has no part in the state nor has any other class that is not productive of virtue’ (Aristotle P 1981:416).
Aristotle argues that whilst ‘property should up to a point be held in common, the general principle should be that of private ownership. Responsibility for looking after property, if distributed over many individuals, will not lead to mutual recriminations; on the contrary, with every man busy with his own, there will be increased effort all round. 'All things in common among friends' the saying goes, and it is the personal virtue of individuals that ensure their common use’. 
 Aristotle is arguing for a system of private ownership and common use. It is a view which presupposes a society of virtuous citizens whose close ties and relations enable them to see and work for the common good. ‘Each man has his own possessions, part of which he makes available for his friends' use, part he uses in common with others…. Clearly then it is better for property to remain in private hands; but we should make the use of it communal. It is a particular duty of a lawgiver to see that citizens are disposed to do this’ (Politics II v). 
Aristotle asks what is the ‘best constitution’ and what is the 'best life’ for individuals: ‘a way of living in which as many as possible can join and, second, a constitution within the compass of the greatest number of states’. Arguing that ‘virtue is a mean, and that the happy life is a life without hindrance in its accordance with virtue, then the best life must be the middle life, consisting in a mean which is open to men of every kind to attain. And the same principles must be applicable to the virtue or badness of constitutions and states. For the constitution of a state is in a sense the way it lives’. Aristotle advocates ‘moderation and a middle position’ as the best. Concerned to avoid extremes of riches and poverty, Aristotle argues that the middling condition ‘is most easily obedient to reason, and following reason is just what is difficult both for the exceedingly rich, handsome, strong and well-born, and for their opposites, the extremely poor, the weak, and those grossly deprived  of honour. The former incline more to arrogance and crime on a large scale, the latter are more than averagely prone to wicked ways and petty crime’.
 It follows that no viable state can be built upon extremes of riches and poverty. Those who have a ‘superabundance of good fortune, strength, riches, friends, and so forth, neither wish to submit to rule nor understand how to do so’. Those who are greatly deficient in these qualities are ‘too subservient’. Aristotle is concerned with his definition of a citizen as one who is capable of ruling and of being ruled in turn. Those with excessive riches do not how to be ruled in any way and will not accept being ruled; at the other extreme the poor not only ‘do not know how to rule, but only how to be ruled as a slave’. ‘The result is a state not of free men but of slaves and masters, the former full of envy, the latter of contempt. Nothing could be farther removed from friendship or from partnership in a state’. ‘The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal, a condition found chiefly among the middle people… It is the middle citizens in a state who are the most secure: they neither covet, like the poor, the possessions of others, nor do others covet theirs as the poor covet those of the rich’. (Politics IV).

ARISTOTLE LICENCE AND LIBERTY
Liberty they say when they mean licence, castigated Aristotle.
Where individuals ‘live intemperately, enjoying every licence and indulging in every luxury’ the inevitable result ‘is that esteem is given to wealth’ .. ‘a common state of affairs in military and warlike races’ (Bk 2)

“The final association, formed of several villages, is the state. For all practical purposes the process is now complete; self-sufficiency has been reached, and while the state came about as a means of securing life itself, it continues in being to secure the good life. Therefore every state exists by nature, as the earlier associations too were natural. This association is the end of those others, and nature is itself an end; for whatever is the end-product of the coming into existence of any object, that is what we call its nature - of a man, for instance, or a horse or a household. Moreover the aim and the end is perfection; and self-sufficiency is both end and perfection."

“It follows that the state belongs to the class of objects which exist by nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. Any one who by his nature and not simply by ill-luck has no state is either too bad or too good, either subhuman or superhuman — he is like the war-mad man condemned in Homer's words as 'having no family, no law, no home'; for he who is such by nature is mad on war: he is a non-cooperator like an isolated piece in a game of draughts”.

Autarkeia means 'political and/or economic independence'. Aristotle uses the word in a more expansive sense, embracing opportunities to live the 'good' life according to the human virtues.

Aristotle is concerned to properly define liberty so that it is distinguished from licence. In reconciling the freedom of each and all so as to enhance overall freedom, Aristotle rejects the two definitions of democracy - the 'sovereignty of the majority’ and 'liberty' as 'doing what one wants' - as 'bad'. 'Just' is equated with what is equal, and the decision of the majority as to what is equal is regarded as sovereign; and liberty is seen in terms of doing what one wants. So in such a democracy each lives as he likes and for his 'fancy of the moment', as Euripides says’. Aristotle defends ‘living according to the constitution’ as ‘self-preservation’ or ‘salvation’ rather than, as it is for those who mistake liberty for licence, 'slavery' (P V.ix 1981:332; Politics trans Barker 1958:1310a). Aristotle follows Plato in identifying excessive personal liberty with license, claiming that such liberty ensures a large body of support for demagogues (1981:373/5).

Personal freedom as the freedom of the individual against the state - the 'negative' liberal conception - is not the peculiar product of the modern world. Aristotle explicitly acknowledges the existence of such a conception - 'to live as you like' - and argues against it: 'from it has come the ideal of 'not being ruled', not by anyone at all if possible, or at least only in alternation. This [to be ruled by alternation]  is a contribution towards that liberty which is based on equality' (VI.ii 1981:362/3).

The same people who mistake licence for liberty will no doubt see this democratisation of decadence as an extension of freedom. It isn’t. It is its narrowing, a constraining of human possibilities to the lowest rungs of wants and desires. And it progressively eats away at its own basis. Such an economic system rests on fragile foundations.


This is a ‘failure properly to define liberty’. Aristotle's concept of the polis as 'expressing the needs of the individual on a high plane' (Edel 1982:319) leads him to a view of the polis as rationally constraining self-seeking individuals so as to secure the common good. Aristotle thus rejects democratic freedom as leading to the licence of individualism 'divorced from law and justice' (I.ii 1981:59/60). Aristotle’s 'positive’ conception of politics implies an associative framework which expand rather than inhibits individual freedom. Aristotle argues that ‘there is a natural impulse towards this kind of association; and the first man to construct a state deserves credit for conferring very great benefits. For as man is the best of all animals when he has reached his full development, so he is worst of all when divorced from law and justice’ (1.ii). Arguing that ‘injustice armed is hardest to deal’, Aristotle concludes that ‘man without virtue is the most savage, the most unrighteous, and the worst in regard to sexual licence and gluttony’. Hence Alasdair MacIntyre’s pessimism in After Virtue, a book title which defines the modern predicament. For Aristotle, ethics and politics are one and the same question implied by the social nature of human beings. ‘The virtue of justice is a feature of a state; for justice is the arrangement of the political association, and a sense of justice decides what is just’ (1.ii).





Within the private space, individuals feel themselves to be surrounded by strangers, not friends. Suspicious of others and cynical about politicians, there is a decline in trust relations and a loss of confidence and hope with respect to goals and goods which individuals hold in common. The authorities and institutions which once gave an atomistic society an overarching order and ethos no longer command the legitimacy that they once had. The self-interested ethos of capitalism, its message that individuals are free to choose, free to do anything they want, has eroded the social, moral and institutional basis of the capitalist system itself. Consumer capitalism is a self-consuming artefact. Capitalism requires and is sustained by the very thing it destroys but cannot itself create, long term trust relations and civic virtues.

The irony is that Adam Smith is far from himself being the apostle of the self-consuming ethos of self-interest. As great a book as The Wealth of Nations (1776) is, Smith wrote a greater and much more morally and psychologically richer book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments |1759). In this book, Smith set self-interest within a wider moral and social framework, arguing that 'to feel much for others, and little for us ... constitutes the perfection of human nature'. The moral sentiments, then, are social. German thinkers, for whom freedom is a common project setting the individual in a social matrix, referred to this apparent contradiction as das Adam Smith Problem. The Anglo-American world has resolved this problem on the libertarian side of self-interest, unravelling all kinds of social and institutional ties that bind individuals together. This is no resolution at all. A genuine resolution sets ‘the economic’ and self-motivated behaviour within a general framework as one part of a greater whole. No one part should encroach on another. 
Habermas distinguishes between the system world governed by the steering media of money and (administrative) power and the lifeworld of human reciprocity and interaction. In the terms of this paper, the market economy, ‘free’ or otherwise, belongs to the system world. Morality belongs to the lifeworld and is engendered by the concentric circles of family, friends, community and society. 

The paper has cited Hegel on the family, Aristotle on friendship. Here is Marx on the need for society.  ‘When communist workmen gather together, their immediate aim is instruction, propaganda, etc. But at the same time they acquire a new need - the need for society - and what appears as a means has become an end… Smoking, eating and drinking, etc., are no longer means of creating links between people. Company, association, conversation, which in its turn has society as its goal, is enough for them. The brotherhood of man is not a hollow phrase, it is a reality, and the nobility of man shines forth upon us from their work-worn figures’ (Marx EW EPM 1975). 
What Marx is emphasising here is the social interaction and engagement that fosters long term ties and trust relations that extends sociality and in the process social intelligence. It produces justice as a social virtue.
When the lifeworld encompasses the economic system, it generates the virtues of industry, honesty, reliability and trust upon which economic success. The problem is that the central dynamic of the capital system, private accumulation, tends to overreach its domain and encroach upon lifeworld domains, commodifying social and moral domains and subordinating them to the imperatives of exchange value. The capital system thus necessarily tends to subvert the moral order. As a moral philosopher, Adam Smith was well aware of the consequences that follow: 'luxury, wanton and even disorderly mirth, the pursuit of pleasure to some degree of intemperance, [and] the breach of chastity'. Some may take it as a sign of economic success that Smith's target here was the wealthy elite. Now, the affluent society that JK Galbraith wrote about in the fifties and sixties, has extended licence and hedonism amongst broad sections of society. 

TRANSACTIONAL ENCOUNTERS
In The Crisis of Global Capitalism, George Soros writes of the 'Open Society Endangered'. Whereas successful business depends on the patient building of relationships, it has now become 'transactional', a series of one-off encounters. The results should be predictable if one understands the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. One-off encounters lead to the least optimal outcome. In the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma it is repeated encounters that build trust and foster the cooperation that leads to the most optimal outcome. One-off transactional encounters predictably bring about the destabilisation of the social order. 

In a perfectly changeable, transactional society the individual is paramount. From the point of view of the individual it is not necessary to be morally upright to be successful; indeed it can be a hindrance ... In a society where stable relationships prevail, this is much less of a problem because it is difficult to be successful if you violate the prevailing social norms. But when you can move around freely, social norms become less binding, and when expediency becomes established as the social norm, society becomes unstable.

George Soros, The Crisis of Global Capitalism, 80.

HEGEL
This section examines Hegel’s conception of Sittlichkeit as an organised intermediation which affirms a communal, reciprocal and associative form of public life. With Sittlichkeit, Hegel discovered a form in which reason could be actualised in the empirical realm of politics in both its normal and cognitive aspects. Hegel thus furnished the institutional basis of the 'rational’ alternative to liberal individualist conceptions of freedom. 
The notion of the green polity as a civil public based on a federation of groups and a welter of intermediary associations is informed by Hegel’s political philosophy. Hegel formulates the state as the universal interest of all, the embodiment of right and the institutional expression of the connection between reason and freedom. The state is  'the power of reason actualising itself as will' (PR 1942:279). In the state, 'the rational  freedom of the will explicates itself’ (FA 1975:1:137). 
Hegel avoids the abstract individualism which afflicts rights-based liberal institutions by locating the individual within the 'objective ethical order' (PR para 144), the 'ethical substance' which relates particular individuals to each other (PR para 145). Ethical life incorporates the principle of subjectivity contained in liberal notions of individual freedom but is more concrete in situating the self within a living social order of related selves.
Hegel’s state serves to canalise the legitimate particular interests of individuals to the attainment of the universal good of all, overcoming self-interest in its immediacy for a greater good in the longer range. For Hegel, 'the essence of the modern state is that the universal be bound up with the complete freedom of its particular members and with private well-being' (PR 1942:280): 'its strength lies in the unity of its own universal end and aim with the particular interest of individuals' (PR 1942:161). Hegel therefore establishes the relation between the particular and the universal by connecting the individual and the state through a whole range of intermediary bodies. The unity between each and all is a mediated relationship which takes the individual beyond immediate self-interest to a greater, richer set of goods in common with other individuals. The ‘particular groups’ of the family and civil society are crucial institutions since membership of and participation in such groups allows the individual to enter into the universal realm of the state in an 'objective way' (PR paras 308R 158 166 182 207 209/229 242). Hegel exposes the isolated individual of liberalism as an empty abstraction apart from ethical life. The individual only acquires 'a content and a living actuality’ when 'filled with particularity', and only attains universality in becoming 'a member of a corporation, a society etc' (PR para 308). The Anglo-American liberal tradition continually misreads Hegel by reading any authority above the individual as an infringement on individual liberty. In this, the liberal tradition is constrained by its own state-civil society separation, with the state merely as a neutral instrument which leaves individuals to pursue freedom as they see fit. This principle of subjectivity is a limited freedom for Hegel. By connecting the state and civil society via intermediary associations, Hegel finds a way of connecting the particular and the general interest without denying the legitimate claims of either. Citizens 'know the state as their substance' in maintaining the 'title, authority and welfare' of 'their particular spheres of interest' (PR para 289R). The participation of the individual in affairs of common concern in civil society, as a member of corporations, associations etc., offers an ethical integration and practical education (Bildung) which goes beyond the 'selfish' interests of isolated individuals (PR para 253R). In such a way, the particular interests of individuals pass naturally into the universal life of the state (PR paras 197 201 256). Far from Hegel’s state possessing interests of its own which are asserted over against real individuals, the state is constituted by the particular interests of individuals acting in concert as a common body politic.

These social institutions are 'the pillars of public freedom since in them particular freedom is realised and rational'; they furnish the foundations of 'the citizens trust in .. and sentiment towards’ the state (PR 1942:281 163). The state therefore embodies and expresses the universal interest through an organised interaction between individual freedom and valid authority through collective bodies.
Hegel's state establishes an organic unity of the individual and collective so that no part and no member is an end or a means superior or subordinate to another part or member (WH 1975:112/95). As against normative constructions of the ideal society which haunt political philosophy and radical politics – in writing Utopia Thomas More wrote the last word first – Hegel's ethical  state is an actual institution. The view of this paper is that Hegel’s Sittlichkeit is the most cogent and intellectually structured theory of the political architectonics of individual freedom and a powerful resource for anyone who is serious about building political institutions that work in the real world. Hegel’s unity of the universal and the subjective will in the 'actually existing realised moral life' (PH 1956:38) and is the  highest  actualisation  of individual  freedom  (PR  para  257). 
Much of the attention in discussions of Hegel fall on the state, as though Hegel's state can be detached from the system of the ethical life, Sittlichkeit. Of critical importance are the intermediary associations which give individuals a form of public life and which invest the state with social content. 
In Hegel, patterns of social interaction between individuals obtain moral significance through a structured system of social roles and civil associations (Avineri 1972:84). In an atomistic society of market relations, individuals have only an egoistic identity and are confined within the sphere of self-interest. One can propose a moral good and make an appeal to altruism, but there is no good reason for these individuals to choose altruism over egoism. The social identity connecting the good of the individual with the good of all is simply not available. Hegel makes that social identity available in the way that individuals are socially integrated in an organised dynamic, expanding individual freedom by making the ethical life available to all (Hegel PS 1979:256/212; Wood 1990:25/30 200 201/2 219; Houlgate 1991:100/5 116/22). A genuine individuality offers a greater and richer range of human fulfilment beyond self-interest. This is achieved when the individual possesses a genuine social identity (PR paras 207 253) and fulfils a determinate social function (PR para 252R). And this individuality is possible only when it is socially structured within a functioning social order (PR para 253R).
Hegel’s Sittlichkeit raises individuals out of their private life of egoistic need by connecting them to politics via their functional purpose in the operation of the rational social order. The individual becomes an active part of society through his/her own industry, skill, a notion which suggests the possibility for an associative democratic public.
Hegel's recognition of the need for mediating institutions against atomistic conceptions of individual liberty offers an alternative to the undifferentiated and unmediated democracy of the modern representative state (Avineri in Miller ed 1991:199/200), Hegel proposes an organised intermediation as a genuine mode of participation as against the abstract and passive systems of representation offered by the liberal state (Kainz 1996:148). Hegel abolishes the split between the state and civil society, a split which is reproduced and reinforced by elections and proposes instead the mediation of corporate blocs.

The circles of association in civil society are already communities. To picture these communities as once more breaking up into a mere conglomeration of individuals as soon as they enter the field of politics, i.e. the field of the highest concrete universality, is eo ipso to hold civil and political life apart from one another and as it were to hang the latter in the air, because its basis could then only be the abstract individuality of caprice and opinion, and hence it would be grounded on chance, and not what is .. stable and justified.

PR paras 258 303

Hegel's state as 'an organism’ transcends the particularistic, self-seeking interests of individuals confined within the sphere of the private economy, what Hegel calls the system of needs (PR 1942:282). Through membership of and participation in the various intermediary bodies of civil society, the individual develops interests beyond the immediate level to finally proceed to the universal level. This entails a conception of representation that is actively and directly democratic. In contrast to the passive and indirect system of representation within the abstract (individualist liberal) state, Hegel proposes an organised pattern of interaction between individuals in society operating through a system of functional representation. Deputies are chosen not by an agglomeration 'dispersed into atomic units' as is the case with the passive suffrage of the liberal state but through an 'articulated system' comprising civil associations. The right to choose deputies is not 'a single, recurrent action for the electors' but is entrusted to 'local communities .. and other duly constituted associations'. Hegel thus replaces the passive electorate of the modern representative state with the active and organised citizen body. The close connection between the estates and the constitution of the whole means that a 'free attitude' on the part of both electors and deputies is only possible if the rights of individuals and particular local communities and interests are 'safeguarded by the free establishment of civic authorities and self-administering bodies' (NL para 153-PR para 308).

Hegel's critique of representative democracy is, therefore, a critique of the undifferentiated suffrage as feeding the divorce between private and public life, separating individuals from government, universal interest and the common good of all (Avineri 1972:162; Dallmayr 1993:152). To such isolated individuals, government as such is the problem. But rather than collapse into the world of immediacy and spontaneity, a world of pure egoism, true freedom as the freedom of each and all requires the reconstruction of public life so as to overcome the dualism of government and governed. The 'atomistic spirit' of the modern representative state’s undifferentiated suffrage divides politics between an active elite of professional politicians on the one hand and a passive mass concerned only with private interests in civil society on the other (NL para 121). In seeking reciprocity between rulers and ruled, Hegel firmly repudiated the idea that the representative body should represent individuals as individuals (PR 308R; Smith 1991:129). Hegel argued in favour of the estates and their legislative role. He condemns the 'prevalent idea' that members of society participate in this function 'as individuals, either by electing representatives or delegates or else by directly casting their vote' (Hegel in Dallmayr 1993:152) as an 'atomistic and abstract point of view' which disappears at the level of the family and civil society in which individuals are members of general groups. Since the state is also a general group, 'no one of its elements should appear as an unorganised multitude', as a 'formless mass' (PR 1942:198; Dallmayr 1993:152).

The rejection of the conception of the demos as an undifferentiated, amorphous and atomised mass of individuals makes it possible to envisage democracy as an active, organised mode of life exercised through a welter of intermediary powers (Dallmayr 1993:253; Meister 1990:120  177;  Kedourie  1995:142/3). What most concerned Hegel about representative democracy was the idea of an amorphous or atomized mass of individuals lacking connection to each other and lacking integration within a well-balanced constitutional structure. Hegel’s ethical relations or bonds of Sittlichkeit organised on various levels of society are sustained by a richly layered fabric of intermediary institutions, associations and offices with a variety of powers and competences relating particular and universal, centre and periphery, individuals and representatives. Crisscrossed by multiple identities, Hegel’s system of functional representation is a public regimen, an associative mode of life and experience for individuals that is irreducible, quite above the ‘anarchistic’ power struggles of particularist interests and impulses. Hegel therefore offers a way of revaluing public bonds and reversing the encroachment of private economic interests upon public life. 

What has been called the ‘corporatisation of public business’ (McDermott 1992), the private appropriation of collective concerns of health, education, utilities etc by big business, has been underway for more than a couple of decades. Against this, Hegel offers a genuine ‘corporatisation’, with corporations organised in the service of the public good within the state.

Benjamin Barber has coined the term "thin democracy" to describe the way that the contemporary state is subservient to individual rights and privileges and is held together only by a minimal set of abstractly formal rules. Against this, Barber proposes ‘strong democracy’, a way of strengthening democratic engagement through a broad range of local and regional institutions - neighborhood assemblies, social organisations, town meetings, civic unions, community trusts, cooperatives, and such like – whilst still guaranteeing the protection of individual rights. ‘My argument is that strong democracy is the only fully legitimate form of politics; as such, it constitutes the condition for the survival of all that is most dear to us in the Western liberal tradition." (Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), xvi. Regarding the decline and colonization of the public sphere cf. also Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958); Richard Sennett, The Fall of Public Man (New York: Random House, 1978); Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), and Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), 332-373.)

Barber’s ‘strong democracy’ savours more than a little of Hegel’s political philosophy in seeking to locate the individual within a shared public life. Hegel’s point is that individual freedom is a public responsibility that requires more than egoistic interests and impulses and wants, that implies organised intermediation between civil society and the state.

One of the most important features of Hegel's mediated suffrage is the recognition of problems of scale and quantity in the modern world. Old notions of polis democracy, face-to-face meetings, are nowhere near adequate given the size of modern states and communities and organisations (Avineri  1972:105  107/8  161  162/3  164/8;  Dallmayr 1993:133). But, articulated through  the internal communities constituting the state, Hegel can still break down complexity into comprehensible and controllable units to envisage an active democratic mobilisation from below. In rejecting an organisation 'directed  from  above’ Hegel argues that: 'it is extremely important that the masses should be organised, because only then do they constitute a power or a force; otherwise they are merely an aggregate, a collection of scattered atoms. Legitimate power is to be found only when the particular spheres are organised' (PR para 290A).
The achievement of Hegel's differentiated suffrage is to have extended the rights of civil liberty in civil society which individuals exercise and assert against each other as competitors for scarce resources to citizen rights of public participation which individuals exercise in concert. In this manner, Hegel achieves a balance between direct and representative democracy. 
Hegel’s conception of the 'democratic corporation' comprises churches, municipal and regional governments, and other civil institutions which mediate between the citizen and the state (MacGregor 1998:132). Hegel's state does not impose an abstract universality from the outside but is internally related to civil society. Universality or communitas thus grows organically from within civil society itself (Avineri  1988:171). 
Hegel's  concern  to  integrate  the intermediate  institutions of civil  society  within a comprehensive  legal  framework embodying the universal offers the basis of an expansive public sphere which challenges the monopoly of public life within the abstract liberal state.
More than most modern political philosophers, Hegel appreciated the democratic nature of the medieval institutions that ushered in modern civilisation. 'Representation is so deeply interwoven with the essence of the feudal constitution . . . that we may call it the silliest of notions to suppose it an invention of the most recent times.' Hegel's corporation bears comparison with the feudal guild, an organization which expressed the democratic ethos of 'mutuality and solidarity'. and which embodied ‘common will and consent' - i.e. the notions of exchange and contract.  

Hegel's conception of the democratic corporation develops an associative conception of politics.

Politics is the art of associating . . . persons with a view to establish​ing, nourishing and preserving social life together. Hence they are called sumbiotike (cohabiters). The first proposition of politics, therefore, is consociatio; in this the cohabiters ... by an explicit or tacit pact, undertake mutual obligation to one another to communicate to each other those things that are useful and necessary for the maintenance and sharing of social life . . . These [cohabiters] are, therefore, mutual helpers who, joined and associated together by a contractual bond, shared those of their resources which are helpful for the commodious conduct of the life of the spirit and body; they are sharers, participants in a communion.

Hegel considers the guild structure of the late feudal era to be 'the high tide of civil life; enjoyment lay in what was communal and people did not amuse themselves for themselves but in the community'. In contemporary market society, the process of atomization has rendered the communal spirit of the feudal age redundant. 'Now this [communal] spirit is undermined, so that people are ashamed of their class, are unwilling to be seen as members of it, and take pride in themselves alone.' That said, given that human beings are, as Aristotle argued, social animals, the associative impulse and communal spirit will live on beyond the particular forms of time and place. Atomisation and individualism operate against the grain of human life. Every contemporary society can show a welter of co-operatives, trade unions, business groupings, learned societies, professional associations and not-for-profit organizations. 
Hegel's vision of the structured relationship between the state and the corporation implies an institutional arrangement in which corporate organizations mediate between the individual and the administrative bodies of government.

In Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought, Antony Black argues that Hegel's organic concept of the corporation sought 'to give guild values and aspirations a central place in political theory'. Hegel is rare among modern political philosophers to have 'acknowledged that solidarity and exchange - the poles around which the values of guild and civil society, respectively, rotate - are not antithetical but complement each other. Hegel’s achievement is to have proposed an institutional framework which could weave solidarity and exchange together in a thickly textured and complex structure. 
Black criticises the way that the work-group ethic has been replaced by 'the values of market exchange' in contemporary market society. 'The problem is that today all those groups which in real life bind people together in so many ways are regarded as optional, based on taste or convenience.' In the manner of Hegel, Black affirms the virtues of a community of labour. 

Working together or sharing a craft creates a specific type of relationship. It forges bonds of a unique kind, less intense and pervasive than those of personal love or friendship, but truly human bonds none the less. It is an end in itself. Its merits may be sung but not listed. This does not mean that the work group is an absolute, any more than the nation-state: it can go wrong. But as a category of social life, it has its own unique and irreplaceable place in human affairs. (Black, Guilds and Civil Society, pp.202, 237, 241.)

In the neo-liberal assault upon government intervention and regulation in the name of liberated the ‘free market’ from the ‘dead hand’ of the state, vast swathes of mutual solidarity, communal networks, solidaristic ties have been swept away. The intention is plain. To leave the individual as nothing more than an atom on the competitive market. Neo-liberals 'are committed to the view that political life, like economic life, is (or ought to be) a matter of individual freedom and initiative . . . Accordingly, a laissez-faire or free-market society is the key objective along with a "minimal state".' (David Held, Models of Democracy, 2nd edn. (Stanford, CA, Stanford University
Press, 1996), pp.253-4.) The talk of the ‘free market’ is, of course, nonsense. The main beneficiaries of this destruction of public life are the transnational corporations as they proceed to 'privatize' as much of public business as they can - health, transportation, communications, and education. Genuine public space is diminishing and the whole notion of public interest is being reconfigured into a private spatial dimension where individuals are conceived simply as mobile, circulating consumers. (Joe Hermer, 'Keeping Oshawa beautiful: policing the loiterer in public nuisance by-law 72-94', in Canadian Journal of Law and Society, vol. 12, no. 1 (Spring 1997), p.192.) The situation is not dissimilar to the destruction of feudal society with the rise of industrialism, protested by conservatives like Carlyle and socialists like Marx. All of which makes Hegel's diagnoses and prognoses concerning the individualistic economic model curiously timely (MacGregor 1998 ch 6). 

The atomistic principle - that each individual fends merely for himself and does not bother about a communal [end], the principle of leaving it to each and every one whether one wishes to join a certain class, not examining a person's suitability from a political point of view since after all (as we are told by those who favor this principle) someone whose work fails to find any favor will shift to another line of business - such a principle abandons the individual to contingency. (Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science, §121, p.218.)

For Hegel, community and the common good, as constituted by social classes, estates and corporations, offers a richer freedom, more expansive of human capacities, than that yielded by individual self-interest. In joining a particular group and participating as a member, the individual recognises a communal purpose and spirit greater than the self. (MacGregor 1998 ch 6). 

Houlgate echoes Hegel in arguing 'that an economy based entirely on self-interested pursuit of profit will end up preventing large numbers of people from enjoying such freedom and welfare'.
The social nature of human beings, the need for the society of others as a moral and psychological imperative, will ultimately cause a human revolution against the isolating principle of individualism. The ugly inhumanism of the neo-liberal assault on all that connects human beings together is certain to generate a reaction. But to be more than a ‘rabble’, the people need structure and organisation. That is precisely what Hegel’s democratic corporation rooted in the associational space of civil society offers. 

Allen W. Wood writes that, ‘Hegel's conception of the corporation in civil society can be seen as quite radical. Perhaps it is even Utopian, unworkable in the context of a market economy. No doubt in actual market economies some of the functions Hegel assigns to corporations do sometimes get fulfilled for some people - by professional associations, corporate firms, or labor unions. But no institution fulfills them in the combined and systematic way a Hegelian corporation is supposed to’ (Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought, p.242.

The advantage of Hegel’s corporation is that it forms the basis of a working, functional polity. In an age when radical politics lacks constructive models of the alternative society, Hegel is as good a place to start as anywhere.
 Hegel envisages a work environment in which an esprit de corps develops. Sharing 'the same vocation, [the same] concerns and interests', members develop a communal point of view. Hegel describes the corporation as a 'second family' which provides stable resources and employment for its members. Workers are protected against poverty and the instability of work relations. Membership of the corporation brings social recognition and respect, diminishing the need for individuals to make a public display of wealth: 'wealth in fulfilling the duty it owes to association, loses the ability to provoke arrogance in its possessor and envy in others; rectitude also receives the true recognition and honour which are due it'. (Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §252, p.271.)
Presenting Hegel as 'the representative theorist of civil society' (Arato  1991:301), Arato  argues  that  Hegel offers a conception of the public sphere which transcends its classical republican origins. Hegel’s public sphere is not confined to a single level but is multilayered: 'a series of levels have key roles to play, including the public rights of private persons, the publicity of legal processes, the public life of the corporation, and finally the interaction between public opinion  and  the  public deliberation  of  the  legislature'  (Arato  1991:318). The way that Hegel locates public life in the associational space of civil society is broad conception capable of embracing social movements in an 'open ended public  space'  forged  by  a  'democratic  social  bond' (Dallmayr 1991).

CULTURAL AND SOCIAL CAPITAL
And it is a view which clearly resonates with the positive vision of a viable ecological society comprising community land trusts, local money, LETS, housing trusts, cooperatives etc.

At this point it is worth examining notions of cultural and social capital and community capacity building. And this revisits the notion of partnership, examining not its successes or failures as a form of urban economic development – which is how it was understood – but as the organisational form of community regeneration and empowerment. From this perspective, partnership mobilises the talents and marshals the resources of communities within an urban regeneration project and as such offers a form of ecological praxis, organised practical activity that draws numbers into social movement as members, actors, citizens. 

In ranging between bottom-up and top-down approaches, certain aspects of partnership contain the potential to transcend the parameters of official, institution-led, private business dominated partnership by mobilising participants in the direction of a self-organising, self-governing community. This is particularly the case with respect to capacity building and reciprocal understanding across participating members. The measure of a successful regeneration partnership, then, is the extent to which a regenerated community is able to transcend the institutional parameters of the original partnership by replacing the representatives of ‘official’ society, public and private with more organic forms rooted in the community. A successful partnership is therefore self-transcending or self-dissolving within the active self-regulating community. The successful emergence of community organisation across a variety of fields implies the increasing capacity of a community to be truly self-ordering and self-governing.
This eco-community perspective distances itself from the practice of the partnership model in recent experience, not only with respect to urban regeneration but most of all with respect to political implications. The UK partnership model compares very unfavourably with the American inspired ‘broad based organising’ (BBO) (Farnell et al 1994) in which local ‘actions’ promote initiatives that are fully accountable to local communities. Most importantly, rejecting the top-down approach, emphasis is placed upon ‘political pressure’ proceeding from the bottom-up through organisation building. BBO gives a voice within the community to the ‘hitherto voiceless’ through a broad based form of community involvement sustained by a ‘day to day activism’ (Farnell et al 1994).
There is a need, then, to examine the conditions that enable community groups and agencies to develop their organisational, political, cultural and intellectual capacities so as to be able to participate effectively in community and urban regeneration schemes. This is to envisage partnership as resting upon genuinely bottom-up structures, powered dynamically from below as a result of the development of social capital on the part of local communities. This shows an aspect of capacity building within the community that possesses the organisational and moral potential to transcend the official institutional approach within ‘top-down’ partnerships. In becoming active in community organisations and in gaining access to the policy process through partnership, individuals – the hitherto marginalized and excluded – develop their capacities to engage in local regeneration and, ultimately, govern their common affairs.
Back in the 1980’s, Kaase referred to the 'participatory revolution’ of contemporary society (Kaase 1984). And the contours of such a revolution are becoming visible in any number of social movements, some reactionary – concerned with tax and government – many much more progressive and expansive. There is a great and growing demand for participation in government and government policy and this could feed very easily into involvement in community affairs. As Colin Ward argues, if people no longer trust local or central government to analyse their problems and prescribe their solutions, they also reject the narrow presentation of alternatives on which they could comment before final decision. There is now a demand for much more proactive community involvement. ‘Community groups, voluntary organisations of many kinds, and individuals, now demand a say in the definition of problems and a role in determining and then implementing solutions. Even in the professional field that we normally think of as part of the establishment there are various movements concerned with reinterpreting or changing the professional role. Self-help groups of many kinds have sprung up, sometimes around a professional, or at least, advised or guided by a professional. It is quite clear that a number of people believe that the traditional professionals are not able adequately to communicate with people in a way that will help them solve their problems or make their wishes known to those who take the decisions’ (Ward 1989:38).
Ward identifies the central flaw of the concept of public-private partnership as a relationship between government and the private market - its exclusion of a third sector, ‘the residents of the community affected’.





It’s that ‘third sector’ that an ecological praxis building the green society should focus upon drawing into a participatory social movement. The potential in generating social and cultural resources and channelling them into a constitutive eco-praxis is substantial. If ‘the money motive’ is the only serious force in an urban regeneration project, then that project will almost certainly fail. There needs to be an input from members of the local community. This is the heart and soul of a genuine regeneration. ‘There is less chance of getting things seriously wrong if sensible and effective ways are found of consulting the existing inhabitants of our cities’ (Ward 1989:56). That ‘third sector’, the popular praxis of community activists and citizens, is the green constituency, generating the ecological sensibility through practical projects with tangible results. Local community organisations are highly effective getting things done and in winning the loyalties of the public in a way that government agencies and business interests are not. In contrast to the millions spent on official projects, which in so many cases seem to have little if any permanent effect, the community-inspired self-help activities lay the groundwork for first stabilising an area and then becoming a springboard for recovery (Ward 1989:62).

The idea of an ecological praxis building the eco-society points to the need to develop capacity building within communities. The purpose of capacity building is to empower communities and make it possible for individuals to do things for themselves in concert. Capacity building creates the organisations, structures and networks which facilitate the process of self-activity and self-initiative. The skills of local people are developed to enable them to take charge of their urban future (Geddes 1995).

Capacity building on the part of the community is a process that enhances:

1.	the empowerment of communities, because people increasingly do things for themselves;
2.	the ability to create structures and networks to assist this process;
3.	skills to enable local people to take charge of their futures (Jacobs and Dutton in Roberts and Sykes 2000:118).

Community organising through the development of grass roots partnerships is a creative response to a lack of material power and resources through the creation of social capital. The point goes beyond economics to envisage a ‘participatory’ conception of governance, with individuals emerging as active citizens, as against the more passive identity within the institutions of representative democracy. 

The idea of partnership possess the potential to transcend urban regeneration by embracing a broader range of activities. A wider scope increases the possibility of envisaging partnership as broadening participatory structures within the community, extending the participatory conception of democracy into the decision making sphere in community and public life. Examples here include residents’ associations, area fora, the users’ committees of a variety of facilities such as leisure centres and youth and age groups. Democracy is therefore transformed to mean working with rather than merely for local people (Hill 2000:182/3).

This raises a question as to whether this myriad of civic and community activity between the market and the state is a new form of social government in the process of evolution. Putnam (1993) employs the concept ‘social capital’ with respect to the ways in which norms such as trust, reciprocity, and social networks facilitate collective action in societies and communities (see also Foley and Edwards 1999:142). Putnam explains differences between the effectiveness of governmental units in different regions of Italy by differentials in social capital:





In one view (eg Fukuyama) social capital contrasts with physical capital (for example machines) and human capital (for example education). Social capital pertains to the social relationships, expectations, obligations and norms that facilitate productive human activity. But is there is something inherently limiting to connect the notion to productive human activity reduced to economics? Productive in what sense? Commercial life? Or community life? Productivity is capable of a much richer definition in terms of human creativity of the social world as a whole, not just institutions, manufactures, technology but ideas, culture, beliefs. 
Putnam makes a distinction between two types of social capital. The first type is bonding social capital, relationships within a group; the second type is bridging social capital, relationships that link a group with others. Together, these comprise the social capital of any given social group: ‘Bonding social capital is good for undergirding specific reciprocity and mobilising solidarity. Dense networks in ethnic enclaves, for example, provide crucial social and psychological support for less fortunate members of the community .. Bridging networks, by contrast, are better for linkage to external assets and for information diffusion.. Moreover bridging social capital can generate broader identities and reciprocity, whereas bonding social capital bolsters our narrower selves’ (Putnam 2000:22-3). 

In Coal, Capital and Culture, an examination of the sociology of changing conditions in former mining areas, Warwick and Littlejohn define a concept of ‘local cultural capital’ in terms of the strength that the community drew from social networks ‘based in kinship, friendship and neighbourliness in household and community settings’. These networks held community together in a ‘period of change’ during which the local economy was destroyed. The networks were the strength of the towns and villages (Turner 2000:2). 

Margaret Thatcher’s dream of an ‘enterprise culture’ could never be easily embedded in a community which rested upon these solidaristic notions. Academics analyse local efforts at economic regeneration to determine how many and what kind of new jobs had been created; Training and Enterprise Councils produce figures about the number of training placements they provided; local authorities circulate glossy brochures concerning the number of multi-agency partnerships they had established; and regeneration agencies boast about the call centres they have established on shiny new industrial estates; local councils in medium sized towns in decline run ‘city growth strategies’.. But what is always missing is ‘spirit’, that elusive quality which Warwick and Littlejohn identify as ‘local cultural capital’. It may be true that urban degeneration is manifested most obviously in the deterioration of the physical environment. However, this physical degeneration is the outer manifestation of a moral, spiritual and cultural degeneration proceeding within the heart of the community. Strategies that focus exclusively upon the regeneration of the physical environment have merely one part of the problem in view. It may be possible, over time, with sufficient resources, to rebuild urban areas through training places and employment opportunities and self-employment starter packs. The fact remains that the communities that are most in need of regeneration were formerly held together by a ‘spirit’ that can neither be quantified nor objectified. This spirit was a cultural resource that members of the community had developed over generations, a culture based on collectivism, kinship and upon advancement by cooperation rather than individualism, solidarity rather than self-interest. The social institutions at the heart of community symbolised this collective spirit that true regeneration needs to recover: the Co-op; the miners’ welfare; the club trip; the union. Rebuilding the spirit of community takes longer and requires the active participation of community members themselves (Turner 2000:280).

The spirit of community is a collective spirit, a culture of collective purpose and identity which is not created by a property- or market-led regeneration which has the private sector as the lead agency. A regeneration which is orientated towards fostering an enterprise culture, where the engine is private effort and where the motivation is private gain, fails to address the real issue – the true spirit of a community and the consequences of its loss, the rupturing of society, the dissolution of a collective community through a rationalistic desolidarisation. Regeneration that does not address the loss of this collective culture will fail. Regeneration efforts need to enable members of the community to unite themselves so as to transcend a series of individualistic survival strategies and hence generate a local cultural capital.

In what sense does this regeneration as the creation of local cultural resources, community spirit and social capital count as an ecological praxis? The green collar economy, the provision of green infrastructures and the greening of the city address all the issues of urban regeneration and more – social housing, local employment, transport, landscape, urban ecology, facilities and so on. But it does this with a view to boosting the quality of life and control of the residents of the community not increasing their dependence on outside interests with non-local priorities. 

In seeking to establish the character and content of the urban public realm as eco-community, it is worth drawing a distinction between use value and exchange value in relation to place. This is to distinguish between the use that individuals make of the built environment as a site for work, life and recreation and the market exchange value of that environment to commercial interests (Fainstein 1994:1).

 Molotch and Logan argue that ‘there are two distinct sets of urban interests (and local political agendas that follow from them) in any .. urban area. Some people seek wealth through the development, sale or rent of land and buildings; others’ primary interest in place is as a setting for daily life and production. These two corresponding sets of purposes, often in direct conflict with one another, correspond to the Marxian description of commodities as providing for both exchange and use value’ (Molotch and Logan 1985:144).

This distinction sets up a contrast between the capitalist reduction of urban space to exchange value on the one hand and the attempt on the part of the citizen community to reappropriate urban space as a use value on the other.
Urban regeneration in the US in the 1980’s focused firmly upon exchange value. Dominant in the redevelopment and gentrification of US cities were ‘a set of actors who push for local growth maximisation to increase returns from real estate manipulation and other business activities specifically dependent on local growth – collectively making up the “growth machine”’ (Molotch and Logan 1985:144). The focus upon the activities of ‘local growth coalitions’ in the US reveals the extent to which restless and aggressive commercial interests dominate at the expense of the community. The policies pursued by such coalitions are often ‘environmentally destructive, fiscally damaging and socially regressive for urban populations’ (Molotch and Logan 1985:144; 1987).

The argument of Molotch and Logan shows how the interests comprising the urban environment can be polarised. The purposes and priorities of urban growth coalitions dominated by commercial interests not only do not necessarily coincide with other urban interests but may well conflict with the interests of others in the urban locality, particularly in the sense that citizen interests are primarily ‘oriented towards use values of urban space’ (Molotch and Logan 1985:144). Commercial interests concerned with the exploitation of exchange values can override local citizens more concerned with use values. Urban space is characterised by a latent tendency towards conflict and divergence between the users of urban space and the exploiters of urban space, between those who conceive urban space as a living environment for citizens and those who conceive urban space as a site of commercially exploitable economic activities. This implies antagonism between citizen interests and commercial interests, between community groups concerned with living space and growth coalitions concerned with accumulation and profit.
The city as a growth machine is a capitalist machine organised around accumulation and in which banking, finance, property, building, developers as well as representatives from within the formal political sector have the initiative. The purpose is to produce the social and physical infrastructures as prerequisites of accumulation, facilitating the conversion of surplus capital into new commodity production through combining surplus means of production with surplus labour power. 





A regeneration conceived in terms of community building, spirit and cultural and social capital seeks to reclaim the city as use value as against attempts to reduce the urban realm to a sphere for producing exchange value. This emphasis upon the local community realm does not imply parochialism. Local economies in the advanced world could establish trading arrangements, having greater control at this level than is the case with anonymous transfers of exchange value via business interests with private priorities independent of place. The point with respect to city regions goes further than the nation. Establishing links with other parts of the world could effect an enduring international understanding that involves the transfer of goods, people and ideas. It is possible to act locally and think globally. But it is also possible to think locally and act globally. Greater self-sufficiency makes sustainable employment possible. Given uneven development, some cities will be better placed than others to begin with. But self-sufficiency would make local economies less dependent upon a range of goods and services from outside the area. This would have the effect in the long run of reducing costly transportation. The end in view is to abolish the tyranny of exchange value as a systemic imposition upon place and people and to affirm the primacy of use value as determined by the citizen body. ‘Ultimately, capital would be for the use of people rather than people for capital (Short 1989:21).
Examining the forms that this principle of use value could take brings the discussion into the area of community empowerment, organisation and development. The distinction between use and exchange value identifies the polarities that exist in regeneration strategies by exposing competing perceptions of the urban environment on the part of different agents. The idea of the urban environment as the site of commercial activity producing preconditions of accumulation is a very different notion to the idea of the urban environment as a lifeworld site of everyday human activity. The tension that this creates ‘lies at the heart of a number of urban problems and also helps to define the limits within which solutions can be constructed and applied’ (Roberts 2000:10/1).

Partnership approaches to urban regeneration have been accompanied by numerous attempts to coopt ‘the community’ as just one partner among many. It isn’t. The community is the content of the place, its moral, cultural, solidaristic essence. Part of this process has involved reducing ‘social capital’ to being merely a ‘factor of production’ like labour and machines and raw materials. For Francis Fukuyama ‘if people who have to work together in an enterprise trust one another because they are operating to a set of ethical norms, doing business costs less’ (Fukuyama 1995 Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity). This is an impoverished notion compared to the way that ‘social capital’ is being defined and used in this argument. Proceeding from Warwick and Littlejohn’s conception of ‘local cultural capital’ as the behavioural norms specific to a local community, social capital is to be defined as a solidaristic notion that pertains to the collective resources that a community generates through its self-organisation and self-activity in order to counteract its lack of material power. 

The concept of ‘social capital’ defines the capacity of those lacking material power and resources to create capital through their organisation and activity. Community organising creating ‘social capital’ transcends ‘the economic’ and its emphasis upon quantifiable measures of how much land and how many buildings have been brought into industrial use, how many training places have been provided, etc. It is more than producing preconditions for private accumulation and instead focuses upon the urban environment as a lived space and experience, a use value controlled by the people who live there. This is a conception that concerns the strengthening of social bonds and relationships between members of a community. Unlike physical capital, measured in terms of products, or human capital, developed through education and training, social capital possesses a cultural dimension pertaining to ethical and behavioural norms within a community. ‘Social capital’ generates cooperation, trust, self-discipline and recognises that psychology or culture, the ‘spirit’ of a community is as strong a factor in urban well-being as the level of capital investment, employment opportunities, training places. 

 To emphasise the importance of social capital is to widen the scope of community building beyond the emphasis on exchange value in which everything is quantified, commodified and measured. It is to organise around use value in building upon the local community and the mobilisation of the new social movements. This initiates a trend away from official agencies and institutions towards people reclaiming their productive activity and living space as a use value, thus absorbing politics into the grassroots. In engaging in politics at both local and regional levels, individuals empowering themselves within the communities in which they live. Community organisations can be actively involved in the provision of social services and economic activities in the local environment, enhancing mutual aid mechanisms and strengthening social solidarity. Such movements thrive on the social and cultural capital they create, thus overcoming the relative lack of material resources. Such movements can pressure the conventional political sphere into providing a supporting framework for the empowerment of local populations, a framework which fosters cooperative organisation in the provision of services, of housing and in production. Such an approach nurtures the formation of skills through being able to tap the resources in the local community.
Such local community development is crucial to the creation of an ecological sensibility and to the building of an ecological urban public. Nothing succeeds like success and nothing motivates more than positive outcomes and tangible results. The creation of local cultural resources and social capital is an empowerment that affirms people’s capacity to generate use values. The strengthening of local networks and the development of community life improves urban life markedly through increased public activity. Organisation can begin with community protest and campaigning. Castells points out the extent to which urban protest actually creates a community; a community as such does not exist until its members raise their voices and take action on urban issues. ‘The struggle for community created a communal foundation on which to base a broader fight’ (Castells 1983:260/1). Urban social movements are, then, important in building the public life of a community by sharing mobilisation through a network of activities and organisations. 

Community building and mobilisation from below extends structures and practices of participation and encourages demands for participatory democracy at higher levels of organisation.

In the contemporary world, civic order is being overtaken by civic attrition, leading to the extension of coercive forms of social control. The heterogeneity of neighbourhoods is being replaced by the homogeneity of bureaucratic imposition, the constitution of a civic order through a socially active citizenry is being replaced by an economic development which is fiscally supported by government agencies. The principal concerns of those who run cities in the contemporary world are economic growth rather than civic culture, public integrity and community activism. City dwellers are treated as clients rather than as citizens, and are the passive recipients of services, not active participants in the provision of services. With success measured in economic rather than civic terms and with freedom coming to be relocated from the public to the private realm, urban governance becomes a matter of bureaucratic management and manipulation of the masses so as to deliver the objectives set by a pre-determined developmental business agenda.

The diminution of public spaces for citizen discourse, interaction and association amounts to the death of the city. The classical conception of city-state as a public sphere, an arena of communication and administration presumes the existence of public spaces for the formation of public consciousness. Without such a public arena in which individuals assert themselves as active citizens, there is no polis, no community and no citizenship. There is no public consciousness and no learning through the exchange of ideas and information. Instead, public life takes the form of political and business agendas formulated by professional elites in abstraction from the demos and promoted via top-down ‘public’ institutions. This is the very antithesis of public life. The bureaucratic management of social space in the interests of accumulation has the effect of turning the urban environment over to the imperatives of endless economic development. Such things as the gentrification and the mallification of the city symbolise the extent to which individuals are treated as consumers rather than citizens, reinforcing the extent to which the pursuit of freedom is no longer a collective project undertaken in conscious deliberation with others in the public realm. In this depoliticised urban landscape, individuals not as citizens but taxpayers. Politics is given a price. Freedom is identified with keeping that price as low as possible. Proposals for radical change and social and environmental justice falter before a mass electorate of passive voters who see themselves as taxpayers locked into the pursuit of freedom and happiness in the private economy rather than citizens joined together in a public realm.

Movements for community control look to realise the goal of civic self-management, overcoming social domination in favour of a free, self-governing citizenry independent of the formal state sphere. This active citizenship is realised in institutional forms organised within a civic public sphere. 
The urban social movements represent the self-constitution of public life through citizen identity and activity. The urban social movements can be valued to the extent that they are based upon extensive participatory structures which are autonomous of the formal political sphere and its dependence upon financial and business interests. They are vehicles for the repoliticisation of the civil sphere against the abstracted public of the state. This is a self-socialisation which contains the potential for filling civil society with political content, organising society around collective issues properly considered ‘public’. 

Associations of civic groups are part of a process in which the demos cease to be a mere aggregate and instead become a citizen body. The urban social movements extend and embed social structures and encourage and facilitate citizen participation in contrast to the way that formal political structures narrow the scope for participation. This is to foster empowerment and a sense of political involvement and so check the pervasive sense of powerlessness that disfigures contemporary city life. Urban social movements are evidence of a burgeoning civic awareness, activism and responsibility and contain the potential for social transformation driven by notions of long term public good. Social movements represent the assertion of social structure over political structure through the participatory aspirations of their members. They represent a claim to urban governance on the part of members defining their individuality in terms of citizenship, forging the associative relations and communal bonds of public life through deliberation, interaction and cooperation.

The complex networking of community groups and associations promotes a conception of decentralised urban governance practising forms of self-management through neighbourhood government and grassroots democracy. Social movement networking generates a sense of social awareness and develops a degree of civic liberty in everyday life activity. The mobilisation of city dwellers through urban social movements thus reclaims the city as an urban public space constituted by an active citizenry. Rationality here denotes a civic self-awareness and public consciousness. This presumes an urban environment in which individuals as citizens can conceptually comprehend the forces that shape social life and thereby assume control of them. Comprehension and control are crucial conditions of autonomy and rationality. And these require the practical reappropriation of power alienated to the state and capital and the reorganisation of this power as a social power. Power is diffused throughout civil society, investing it with political significance and governmental capacity. The mental, material and institutional appropriation and exercise of social power cultivates the growth of human being, generating social forms and organs of popular control which expand rather than inhibit the human ontology.

Such a conception of the urban future is ‘rational’ in being scaled to human dimensions, being accessible to human comprehension and control. For Aristotle, the core of the city is an active, rational citizenry. In talking about the city, Lewis Mumford argued that the most important thing about the container is its contents. In truth, the two go together. Without the container, the contents are spread and dissipated, without character or identity. The true city is constituted by and can be reshaped by citizen activity; but it is also the form which gives shape, order and significance to citizen activity, gives citizens an identity. The city is a form which contains the active citizen body as its content. Without this citizenry, there is no city and vice versa. 

Aristotle’s argument is a political ecology in the broad sense of a humanly scaled public life, as politikon bion, being a condition of human self-realisation. In conditions of overscale power this argument implies decentralisation. Power is to be kept within human proportions so as to ensure everyday human contact and exchange. Human scale is not merely institutional but intellectual and spiritual and anthropological. It is a political ecology which defines an existential civic arena based upon an active rational citizenry. And it is a human ecology. Marx’s demand for the restitution of social power to the social body and for conscious common control of relations affirms the classical principle of scale as the condition of the politikon bion which is crucial to self- and social fulfilment. The ideal city asserts the ‘rule of man’ over the ‘rule of property’ (Marx 1975:208).

ICT AND COMMUNITY
There is another sense in which the creation of cultural and social capital can be conceived as a ‘rational’ ecology. Defining social capital as a dependent variable of a community network, Riedel et al focus upon the three essential components of social capital (interpersonal trust, social norms and association membership) and evaluate the impact that computers and network use can have on these elements. From this perspective, proposals for electronic democracy are valued as a means to achieving equality of political participation. Such a notion implies equality in terms of access to information technologies and to the skills necessary for using the technologies. The authors argue that such equality can be achieved by accentuating social or group-based forms of participation. In this respect, social capital is a valuable concept since it ‘deals directly with equality by predicting the conditions under which those lacking resources can co-operate to accomplish collective ends’ (Riedel et al 1998:375). 

The emergence of the new information and communications technologies (ICTs) has added a potentially radical dimension to the notion of community control and promises to realise the ‘rational’ ideal of an intersubjective community of active, interacting citizens in its most direct and literal form. There may well be a direct connection emerging between citizenship as an active designation, community culture, communication and political self-management.

The implications of the new ICT’s for community capacity building and social capital are profound. ‘A new, “wired” political community is emerging, a net-polis. The contours and nature of this political community are only in formation, nebulous. The task of research is to study what is happening, why, and what possible patterns might emerge. A major concern – for politicians, scholars and citizens – is maintaining democratic values in cyberspace: equal access, responsibility, representativity, public control and accountability’ (Walch 1999:23). These democratic values point to the need to revalue the potential of individuals to shape the new communication media in forms that are liberatory, creative, educational and socially supportive. This suggests the need to explore the potential connections that exist between electronic communication and local community. Whilst ICT implies new electronic networks which are independent of geography, there are grounds for believing that new technologies may be integral to the recovery and strengthening of place based social meaning. The activities of community groups, social support networks, voluntary organisations and government agencies have highlighted the liberatory and transformative potentials of the information and communications technologies (ICTs) in myriad ways. 
 Community informatics (CI) are engendering new possibilities for fostering social cohesion and inclusion over against social exclusion and polarisation, strengthening neighbourhood ties, overcoming cultural isolation and giving community members, urban activists, and policy-makers an awareness of feasible alternative futures (Rheingold 1994; Schuler 1996). In this perspective, the new media contains the potential for reviving community life for individuals. ICT is something that individuals can access and use in sharp contrast to the vast abstract processes beyond human comprehension and control which govern the wider world. To the likes of Rheingold, computer mediated social relations function as the conduit through which spontaneous electronic interaction engender new forms of community structures and culture.
The new ICTs enhance remote or distributed self-management on the part of local communities. Local information has the same capacity under networked local control and management as when it is under central management and control. Connecting decentralised computing capacity with a communications capacity enables work to be undertaken from any remote location that is networked. There is the potential here for the local ownership and management of information; the potential to engage in information-intensive activities at a distance, to exploit local nuance, accent or timbre in the processing of information and of products; and the ability to exploit economies of disaggregation, the synergies of distributed production networks and the flexibility of small-scale distributed management and control. The implications for small communities are significant, easing access to markets and suppliers, to information providers and to others for mutual support. This enhances the possibility of competing effectively from a distance with globalised producers (Gurstein 1998).
The rapid expansion of Internet-enabled activism and organising is most clearly manifested in the anti-WTO protests, but it contains the potential for future lines of development involving distributed opportunities for information-management and information control. It offers not only a way of connecting the local with the global but of connecting a plurality of locals across the global to effectively assert local priorities against global imperatives. The activities of others in distant places but with common concerns and common goals serves to inspire the emergence of local groups concerned to assert these issues and interests on the local terrain. Information is exchanged seamlessly between different locales and serves to counteract the systemic pressures of a supra-communal and supra-national business and finance. Community networks or community networking provide a means of developing and sustaining locally based information systems to buttress local development, facilitating local empowerment through the management and use of local systems. The broader struggles are supplemented and complemented by local concerns and local resources, strengthening both through pooling numbers, resources, experiences, knowledge and information.
The development of community information infrastructure of systems and networks creates the means by which local interests, objectives and responsibilities may be served. ICTs are set within a framework which permits their use to manage local processes and to participate in global processes. Increasingly, these local processes are in opposition to and even in direct conflict with the global processes and the way that technology and economic activities are remotely managed and controlled.
In this sense, community networking forms a potential counter-current to globalisation (Castells). There is a need, in this sense, to develop the pragmatics with respect to the means for adapting ICTs within community processes – community development, e-health, e-culture, e-government and e-politics and not least e-exchange and e-commerce.
Community networking offers the organisational means for grounding a local framework of ICT within community. The management and control of a locally based computing buttresses collaborative community-based activities. The true potential of local computing is realised as local empowerment achieved by enhancing computing access with the effect of integrating individuals into local structures of computing and community. 
As access to computing facilities increases, there are numerous and parallel applications, including the opportunity for the community to assume ownership and control of its own identity, especially the ‘products’ of its culture and language. This is important at a time when the corporate forces of globalisation are looking to capture and commodify vast swathes of culture and knowledge as intellectual property, protected by rules of copyright and patent. Communities have the ability to resist privatisation by affirming their own sense of public space and public resources, utlilising ICTs to preserve, capture and exert ownership over the products of local cultural development, production, history and knowledge (Turk and Trees 2000).
Networking, a basic ecological principle, is the key to the new urban future. Whether one refers to traditional development organisations or the newly established community-technology centres, networks are integral to the most successful strategies for ICT-based development. This doesn’t simply apply to a network of computers but applies more generally to the process of linking individuals together using computers – thus combining the ICT resources with local capacities in flexible, creative structures.

The emergence of new types of networked small enterprises, both public and private, demonstrates the potential for exploiting the synergies of scale and of intra-organisational linkages (ease of communications, common administrative systems, creation of common organisational cultures) that had formally been considered to be available only to the large corporations. Here one sees the basis of the ‘third sector’ economy that can expand within the bloated shell of public state and private market (see Paul Hirst, Associative Democracy).

Projecting visions of the ‘information society’ has largely been the preserve of those who have profited from new developments: ‘wired condos in the sky, high-tech communications between the suburban semi-castle and the Caribbean island time-share, wired cities speeding the commerce of the rich and bringing infotainment to the rest. These are actually the dullest aspects of the potential of ICT, commercial, consumerist and conformist. The real potential of ICT lies in its capacity to reinvigorate the ‘local’ community and economy and, most importantly of all, in the extent to which it stimulates the activity, involvement and enthusiasm of individuals who have long since abandoned conventional politics. The public form that the ‘wired world’ may take if ICTs were adapted into the social practices of counter-publics creating their own social capital is an area which of massive, untapped political potential.  The true radical potential of the ICTs lies in the decentralisation of power, control and resources. The mainframe era characterised by the concentration of computing power and the supporting technical resources is disappearing. Personal computers permit powerful yet decentralised computing for local users and not just, as in the past, for those who can afford specialised technical support. The potential for the empowerment of individuals and local communities arising from the personal computer is in the process of being realised.
This has a bearing on precisely how the local and the global relate and intersect. The nexus of power and the rejuvenation of citizenship are likely to reside in the interaction between the virtual and the real. Physical place will be empowered by the global reach of the virtual; the virtual will be empowered by the material force of the real. It is in this zone of engagement that the true resistance to the global and the globalising will be contested.

The ongoing attempts to subordinate communities, whether virtual or real, to commercial objectives will flounder for the simple reason that the most valuable activities within communities share the ethic of the ‘gift’ and ‘hacker’ culture as opposed to the commodity cultures of the e-commerce juggernauts. This points to use value as a prior and permanent resource over against exploitative exchange value, hence the continuous attempts of business to commodify all non-market resources and bring them within the domain of the market. Communities are primarily concerned with assuming responsibility for the immediate environment – whether physical resources, the cultural environment of the education and arts and language and music, the reproduction of ethical systems, the virtual environments of communications and vital usable information. These are the use values which are the true sense of a public life and community. The economic exchange and commerce which takes place in a community are undertaken as elements of re-production, emerging as the unintended consequences of more vital urban activities, not as the overriding imperative. The potential for community control will be realised when virtual and physical force merge so that the ‘hi touch’ of the physical is reinforced by the ‘hi tech’ of the virtual.

COMMUNITY AND COMMERCE
The argument draws upon the emergence of grass roots organisations and community organisations across the world and seeks to value the contributions that social movements can make not only to social provision but to urban governance. 

At some point the human need for something higher and richer than immediate and egoistic want and desire will rebel against the empty promises of endless gratification. And as the intensity and promise of consumer capitalism wanes, so individuals will see through its symbolism as a repackaging of essential human needs – freedom, happiness, family, community, sociality – to be sold back at a profit as dreams and fantasies. And as the system of endless gratification wanes, so also will the human desire to maintain it. Needs can be identified and satisfied, argued Keynes in Economic Prospects, but wants are infinite and hence can go on forever. This may apply to individual human beings, but a culture cannot be founded on an infinity of wants. Such an economy is parasitic upon the moral and social capital of previous civilisation and, as time goes by, progressively dissipates it without having the ability to replace it. Denied an ethos, a culture, constitutive ties and overarching institutions invested with public purpose, individuals lack a framework that allows endless gratification to continue. To this extent, infinity does have a limit. Any economic life, production and consumption, is closely embedded in the social structures within which human beings have lived, which make civilised social life possible. Economic behaviour is no different to social behaviour and is the product not of instincts but of tangible institutions, moral codes and norms, social relationships. Capitalism has succeeded in achieving economic development that gives a standard of living that is far higher than ever achieved before and for greater numbers of people. In its own terms, it is a success. But economics is only one part of civilised life, not the whole part. Capitalism has succeeded so well for so long on the basis of morals, institutions and structures built by previous civilisations. By steadily encroaching on other aspects of civilisation, the totalitarian tendencies of capitalist economics undermines its own foundations. 

Capitalism therefore weakens the institutional and normative framework of civilised life, thus inviting its own demise. Capitalism even undermines its own economic foundations. As Schumpeter explains: "The capitalist process, by substituting a mere parcel of shares for the walls of and the machines in a factory, takes the life out of the idea of property. . . . Dematerialized, defunctionalized and absentee ownership does not impress and call forth moral allegiance as the vital form of property did. Eventually there will be nobody left who really cares to stand for it—nobody within and without the precincts of the big concerns."
No civilisation can survive on the basis of social atomism, moral anomie, nihilism and widespread impersonalities. Civilisations only fall on such foundations, never rise. The ‘free’ market only thrives within the context of a flourishing associational life. Economic individualism can only prosper within the non-individualistic contexts of association and community, contexts which embody and exhibit moral purpose. Where these social and moral resources weaken, so capitalism itself weakens, no longer commanding support as a system of allegiances and incentives.

It is significant that the first targets of totalitarian regimes are trade unions and cooperatives. They are social forms which are capable of combining association and economic freedom. Such associations connect the goals of production, distribution, and consumption to a personal sense of belonging to a social order. These and other such forms of association in civil society are the foundations of freedom, giving the individual a sense of relatedness to the wider community, in time becoming an active member.
 
The irony is that in pursuit of an aggressively pro-business agenda, the neo-liberals have systematically targeted, destroyed or at least undermined the associational forms which are the foundation of a free economy. The philosophical, sociological and anthropological crudities and simplicities of neo-liberalism have damaged capitalism far more than socialism could ever have done. Identifying all forms of association as manifestations of collectivism, and hence of ‘socialism’, which somehow means ‘the State’, neo-liberalism has made a cult of individualism, with predictable results. 

The social structures of family, community, professional association or body, union, cooperative, or industrial corporation form a culture and generate communal spirit and ties. In weakening or destroying these social structures, neo-liberalism has set about turning a culture into an atomized mass. For reasons that conservatives like Burke would understand, let alone socialists, this atomized mass will lack the associational ties and connections to be able to resist the feared servile state. The intention was to create an atomized mass of individuals who will lack the will, the incentive, ability, the support, the connections to be able to withstand the necessity of the ‘free’ market. For the same reasons, though, they are unable to resist the collectivism of the central state. In defending a supposedly ‘free’ capitalism, the neo-liberals have eased the transition to collectivism by depriving people of the sense of social and moral belonging to and participation in their own associational life. As Marx well knew, denied community in the real social world, human beings will project their need for sociality upwards to the ‘illusory community’ of the state.
“And out of this very contradiction between the interest of the individual and that of the community, the latter takes an independent form as the State, divorced from the real interests of individual and community, and at the same time as an illusory communal life, always based, however, on the real ties existing in every family and tribal conglomeration—such as flesh and blood, language, division of labour on a larger scale, and other interests—and especially … on the classes, already determined by the division of labour, which in every such mass of men separate out, and of which one dominates all the others.
“Just because individuals seek only their particular interest, which for them does not coincide with their communal interest (in fact the general is the illusory form of communal life), the latter will be imposed on them as an interest "alien" to them, and "independent" of them as in its turn a particular, peculiar "general" interest; or they themselves must remain within this discord, as in democracy. On the other hand, too, the practical struggle of these particular interests, which constantly really run counter to the communal and illusory communal interests, makes practical intervention and control necessary through the illusory “general" interest in the form of the State.

And Marx had the solution:
“The transformation, through the division of labour, of personal powers (relationships) into material powers … can only be abolished by the individuals again subjecting these material powers to themselves and abolishing the division of labour. This is not possible without the community. Only in community [with others has each] individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; only in the community, therefore, is personal freedom possible. In the previous substitutes for the community, in the State, etc. personal freedom has existed only for the individuals who developed within the relationships of the ruling class, and only insofar as they were individuals of this class. The illusory community, in which individuals have up till now combined, always took on an independent existence in relation to them, and was at the same time, since it was the combination of one class over against another, not only a completely illusory community, but a new fetter as well. In a real community the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association. (Marx GI 1999). 
Add a passage on the need for intermediary associations connecting individuals to the state, organising particular interests for the general good, and this is about as concise and cogent a statement of the principles of conservatism as one can find. The point is that insofar as the individual is separated from a sense of belonging and participation in associational forms, he or she tends to move in the direction of collectivism as an ‘illusory community’. 
A civilisation is founded on social relations, constitutive ties and moral allegiances, firmly rooted in institutions and a variety of associations. Without this structure, there is nothing but an atomized mass. Writing about the city, Lewis Mumford argued that the contents are more important than the container. Civilisation is a process in which both go together. Without the container, the contents are merely a sand heap of disparate particles of humanity. And denied community and connection in civil life, human beings will seek to have their need for sociality satisfied at the artificial level of the centralized, omnicompetent state. The irony is that Hegel has been accused of making freedom mean worship of the state and Marx has been accused of ‘state socialism’ whereas both, the one a conservative the other a socialist have sought precisely to avoid the all-powerful state as an inevitable consequence of the atomistic, instrumental relations of the ‘free’ market capitalism. 

The important thing about community is the moral and social values that inhere in it. Community is an anthropological datum that satisfies the human need for the society of others. The community offers status, belonging, membership, social identity, public recognition and a coherent moral perspective. It recognises that the individual needs others in order to become and be himself or herself. Community serves social, moral and human needs which can neither be bought nor sold on the market. They are not economic goods. Economic goods alone are morally empty and spiritually insupportable and to the extent that non-economic goods are destroyed or commodified, the society that results is likewise morally empty and spiritually insupportable.

The greatest appeal of community lies in its ability to provide individuals with a sense of moral coherence and communal membership. Fostering this sense is the sine qua non of community capacity building. In weakening this capacity, the ‘free’ market has generated a series of social and psychological dislocations that will, ultimately, undermine the economic order. 

The dislocations and tensions of contemporary society are, of course, endemic to capitalism and the way that it has transformed loyalty to institutions, social ties, the location of social functions, the norms of culture, and, above all, in the origin and location of power. For all of the claims to freedom, capitalism is a force for centralisation. The mythology and cult of individualism conceals capitalism’s inherent tendency to totalitarianism and collectivism. The modern centralising state and capital rose as part of the same historical process and exist in symbiotic relation. The contemporary crisis of intermediate association in politics, industry, society and community originates in capitalism’s tendency to fracture and atomize society in order to concentrate power and control in the state and capital.


In the nineteenth century, English conservative Sir Henry Maine argued that modern history demonstrates a continuous movement away from the centrality of the social group, characterised by status and membership, to the primacy of the legally autonomous individual and impersonal relations of contract. "Throughout all its course [the movement of progressive societies] has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of family dependency and the growth of individual obligation in its place. The Individual is steadily substituted for the Family as the unit of which civil laws take account."
With no hint of regret or nostalgia, Karl Marx borrowed from the conservative Carlyle (Past and Present) to comment on the monetisation of social ties under capitalism. "The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his 'natural superiors,' and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous 'cash payment.' It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy waters of egotistical calculation. ... It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the man of science, into its paid wage-laborers. The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and has reduced the family relation to a mere money relation."
A number of German sociologists pursued the insights of Marx to analyse the processes which have brought about the an atomization and mechanization of the primary social relationships. Tonnies noted the progressive erosion of the ties of Gemeinschaft — the communal ties of family, guild, and village — and the rise of the impersonal, atomistic, and mechanical relationships of Gesellschaft. Simmel focused upon the depersonalizing effects of the spread of money as means of exchange upon traditional moral and social patterns. Simmel referred to the levelling and fragmenting effect of capitalism upon the contexts of status and membership as a result of the easy convertibility of all qualitative values and status relationships into fluid relationships of contract based upon money. Max Weber drew attention to the way that processes of rationalization and bureaucratization transformed systems of authority, patterns of culture, and the location of social function with the result that the impersonal office and mechanical systems of administration have supremacy over the primary unities of social life.
In France, Le Play and Durkheim also emphasised the socially atomizing effects of the modern forces of technology, individualism, and the division of labor. As Durkheim wrote, "What is in fact characteristic of our development is that it has successively destroyed all the established social contexts; one after another they have been banished either by the slow usury of time or by violent revolution, and in such fashion that nothing has been developed to replace them."
What these social theorists draw attention to is the transition from medieval to modern society in terms of a contrast between a past society characterized by the primacy of custom and community and a modern society, organized increasingly in impersonal terms and resting on the legally autonomous individual. 
The advantage that Hegel has over Marx lies in this sense of the natural pluralism of society, the respect for localism, for autonomous association in civil society and for the family. This pluralism is the surest safeguard against an overly centralized society. For Aristotle, the state is the community of communities, the legitimate claims of each respected in their own sphere. The smaller associations within civil society are intermediate forms in which the general will finds individual expression. Hegel made the estates, corporations, communities, guilds, and families integral to his state as ethical system, but for Marx this amounted to an attempt to resolve the problems of modern capitalist society by obsolete feudal forms. This displays a remarkable neglect of the associative aspects of human life for a socialist, a socialist who is explicitly committed to dissolving the state and capital as alienated social power to be absorbed back into society. Back into what kind of associational social forms? 
Marx's historicism led him to criticise ‘past’ forms as pertaining to past social relations. As to what future forms may look like, Marx was sketchy. Marx celebrated the "gigantic broom of the French Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century, which swept away all these relics of medievalism" yet proposed nothing more than the sketch of commune democracy (Civil War in France). This evasiveness creates a vacuum quickly filled by political collectivism and centralization. 

The problem is that beyond the social and historical nature of specific there are certain constants to any social order - family, community, association, and religion are traditional affiliations in that there has never been a society or a civilisation without these in one form or another. Building the social forms of a future civilisation starts from these constants and embeds social and cultural plurality within a variety of social centres. This recognises the pluralism of society and the nature of solidaristic social ties, loyalties and allegiances. 

Totalitarianism is not just a centralisation and pervasiveness of power but the suppression of those constitutive social ties and associations within which individuality develops. The autonomous forms of social association function to ground political community in civil life, checking the tendency of the state to become an omnipotent institution separated from its social roots. The isolated individual separated from associative ties, loyalties and solidarities is powerless. With the atomization of society, the smaller communities of society diminish and the individual loses the sense of place and belonging. With social atomization, autonomous association is weakened and individual identity is diminished. 

An associative politics seeks to enhance the power of the smaller communities of society, to extend the range of cultural and social opportunities offered by productive activity, religion, and kinship, strengthen the social roots of the individual. Personality flourishes and develops autonomy against external power through the intermediate layers of value and association within the social ties and allegiances of community. The social contexts of family, church, production, association preserve the communal spirit against atomization. The political and economic enslavement of individuals to the centralised state and the ‘free’ market requires the emancipation of individuals from all associative ties and memberships that serve, in one way or another, to protect the individual from alien power. The inversion of the meaning of slavery and freedom reveals the paradox of modernity. Marx argues that the ties of dependence upon persons in the feudal age has been replaced by the impersonal dependency of all upon objects in the modern world (Grundrisse). The emancipation of the individual from traditional ties of class, religion, and kinship is a personal freedom; however, this personal freedom has left the individual isolated from other individuals whilst being confronted by vast impersonal forces and objective powers – capital and commodities, the state and bureaucracy, technology. Individual freedom is thus accompanied by social anxiety, insecurity, even disintegration. What we see is expanding masses of insecure individuals seeking communal refuge of one form or another, pop music, sport etc becoming targets for common loyalties and allegiances. The egoistic image of homo economicus is theoretically inadequate, morally impoverished, psychologically mean, anthropologically intolerable and socially impossible. The self-maximising individual of economic theory is not self-sufficing in social isolation. Human nature cannot be deduced simply from those elements which fit crude economic models. Individualism is a false mythology that ignores the fact that between the individual and social groups such as the family, local community, and interest association there is an indispensable connection which makes individuality possible and creates the context in which it flourishes. There is no conception of individuality which does not refer to the constitutive ties which normatively and solidaristically bind the individual to others from birth to death, generation to generation. Human beings are social, familial and historical beings.

Moral conscience and the sense of civilized decency is fostered by the associative ties. It is this connection of each individual with other individuals that generates, reinforces and gives expression to the moral imperatives of conscience. Individualist liberalism conceives human nature according to the model of market capitalism and thus seeks to separate individuals from the primary contexts of normative association so as to create a mass of atoms competing on the market. This separates individuals from primary contexts, social ties, culture and hence from the very sources which nurture individuality itself. 


A viable political philosophy proceeds not from the individual abstracted from society but with the personalities of human beings as they are actually formed and function association. What the actual world shows is not the abstract State presiding over a mass of unrelated individuals, a phenomenon of modern social relationships, but a vast complex of associations - families, clubs, functional groups, professional bodies, trade unions, colleges – comprising individuals.

The idea that the free individual is one who is emancipated from the binding ties of kinship, corporation, and community, characterises the individualist liberalism of the English speaking world. There was always an alternative in the corporate liberalism of Hegel. The autonomous individual is possible only in a social context of autonomous associations and groups, autonomous in their own sphere but joined together in a mutually enhancing and enriching social matrix of cultural norms, communal spirit, moral imperatives and functional institutions. 

A philosophy of a sustainable political society requires knowledge and institutional skill to create an associative public which the basic unit of the social group creates the context in which individuality flourishes. At the moment, ‘globalisation’ is systematically destroying the customs and habits of place and people, ripping up associations, villages, communes and all manner of securities, loyalties and solidarities. In other words, the very units and centres which foster wider connections and enable the individual to take account of the interests of others over an extended time span are being deliberately destroyed to reduce individuals to an atomized mass of individuals on the market. These associational forms are the very things which are the building blocks of a viable social order, ensuring that economic forces and technics are productively channelled to the long term common good, away from short term self-interest and hence from the social, moral, economic and ecological disaster. This disaster is being deliberately brought about, with the globalisation of economic relations through the TNC’s being used to force privatisation and economic liberalisation. Economic theory covers this political agenda by reference to the fiction of the autonomous individual abstracted from social and cultural unities. There is no such individual apart from society and social relationships with others, social association with others. To achieve the end of the autonomous individual would amount to the destruction of society, leaving nothing but the collectivist state. The liberal values of autonomy and personal freedom can be achieved and maintained only by being firmly grounded in social conditions which nurture them – and this requires diversity of culture, plurality of association, and institutional authority which rests upon a legitimate division and diffusion of power, competence and control. 

REVOLUTION AS PROCESS
Notions of social transformation need to be reworked to take account of genuine change as a process rather than as event. It is a process because the new society only functions and flourishes if the individuals constituting it have developed their moral, political, intellectual and organisational capacities. In this sense, capacity building develops the capacity to constitute the new social order.

This emphasis upon process has the advantage of avoiding an identification of politics with the traditional forms and structures of the political party and state (representative institutions, parliaments, constitutions, elections). It can apply to these but also embraces all those things which are integral to the democratic governance of collective affairs, as practised through everyday interaction, communication and reciprocity as an associative process of shared experience. Extending democratic control throughout society in this way recovers the classical notion of politics as the politikon bion which is essential to the truly human life. Politics ceases to be defined as the conquest and monopolisation of institutionalised power, the persuasion of the masses in elections and the management of the masses in government; instead, politics is restored to its original meaning as something integral to human self-realisation. Distinct from state-centred perspectives, it has nothing in common with attempts to engineer the public through the ideal agency of 'the party’. Genuinely novel social, organisational and normative structures emerge through an associative process of everyday interaction.

The political implications are radical, affirming social transformation as a process of self-emancipation on the part of actual individuals organising themselves in their communities, as against action engineered from above and without via an abstracted form of political organisation. The citizens composing the body politic engender the ideal public community in their self-activity and self-organisation, thus constituting the new, associative public.


